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ABSTRACT
The 1896 elections in Louisiana produced a Regular Democrat as governor, but 
a reform government within New Orleans. The turbulence o f the Populist era led to the 
unification of political factions behind disfranchisement of blacks and a narrowing of 
the electorate. In spite of attempts to make their triumph permanent, New Orleans 
reformers gave way to a resurgent Regular Democratic organization, the Choctaw Club, 
which dominated city politics for the first half of the twentieth century. Mayors Paul 
Capdevielle and Martin Behrman successfully led the city in an era of commercial 
expansion, public works, and municipal reform. That leadership persisted through 
factional political conflict because the underlying consensus favored the major policies 
typical of southern progressivism.
Three public works projects, and their accompanying governmental structures, 
demonstrated the progressive consensus in New Orleans. The Sewerage and Water 
Board oversaw the development of the water, sewerage, and drainage systems o f the 
city. The Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans constructed and 
administered the docks, wharves, and landings of the city and the surrounding area 
along the Mississippi River. The New Orleans Public Belt Railroad Commission built 
and operated a public railroad that facilitated the exchange of commerce, particularly 
along the riverfront. The construction and operation of these public works occurred
vi
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during the administration of Regular Democrats, but all political factions supported the 
role of both state and municipal governments in these projects. The consensus in favor 
of public activity drew strength from the southern progressive assumption that economic 
development, commercial expansion, and municipal progress represented ideal methods 
of addressing social concerns.
By the end of the second term of Martin Behrman, the reform faction in New 
Orleans sought to regain power through the introduction of a new form o f city 
government-the commission. Mayor Behrman and the Regular organization accepted 
commission government and the city adopted a new charter. But the elections results 
under the new system did not fulfill the expectations of the reform faction. The 
Regulars stayed in power, continuing the pattern begun in 1899 of ineffectual reform 
challenges to the Regular organization.
vii
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INTRODUCTION
New Orleans was the largest city in the South from the time of the Louisiana 
Purchase well into the twentieth century. It remains the largest city in Louisiana and 
enjoys a reputation for a colorful history, not least because o f an impressive array o f 
cultural influences that included colonial French and Spanish, African-American, 
German, Irish, Italian, and, more recently, Vietnamese, and Central American. This 
cultural melange thrived in unlikely geographical circumstances—swamps, sinking land, 
difficult transportation, and frequent floods. One observer, noting the Crescent City’s 
triumph over its precarious site, called New Orleans “the impossible but inevitable 
city.” By the end o f the nineteenth century, New Orleans had long since passed its 
golden age, the antebellum boom times of cotton, sugar, and the steamboat trade. The 
first decade o f the twentieth century brought a different excitement to the city: the 
challenges of modernization. This investigation o f the history of New Orleans focuses 
on the years 1896 to 1912 and provides a case study of urban political and economic 
development in the era of southern progressivism.1
The narrative begins with 1896 for two reasons. In that year, the Regular 
Democrats of Louisiana defeated a strong challenge by a Fusion candidate, who
1 Peirce F. Lewis, New Orleans: The Making o f  an Urban Landscape 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1976), 17.
1
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2
represented an unlikely coalition of wealthy sugar planters, hill-country Populists, urban 
reformers, and independent black voters. Thereafter, Populist political activity went 
into a long period of inactivity, to be awakened in the 1920s by Huey P. Long. Also in 
1896, the Regular Democrats of New Orleans lost control o f the city government to the 
Citizens’ League, one of a series of reform groups periodically organized to challenge 
the power of the Regulars. The League cooperated with the Louisiana legislature to 
bring to the city the beginnings of progressive municipal reform. In the same 
legislature, white politicians of all factions united to eliminate black voters by adopting 
a new state constitution.
The elimination of black voters and the decline of Populism drastically reduced 
multi-party political contests. Subsequently, factional candidates for state office 
contended within the Democratic party, rarely straying from Regular orthodoxy. In New 
Orleans, the Regular organization, called the Choctaw Club, was the political 
beneficiary of the increased Democratic loyalty. The Regulars reorganized after their 
1896 defeat, attracted defectors from the reform ranks, and recaptured the city 
government. Many businessmen, formerly associated with the Citizens’ League, 
became active, influential, and loyal members of the Choctaw Club. Building on the 
foundation o f legislation passed from 1896 to 1899, the Regular administrations of New 
Orleans embraced most of the progressive initiatives of their predecessors, especially 
the organization of new administrative units of the city and the state, which transformed 
New Orleans by building and operating major public works. By 1912, when the study
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3
ends, the Regulars enjoyed political control and the gratitude of the voters, who could 
see the products o f public works projects and the changes brought to the city.
The examination of New Orleans events from 1896 to 1912 reveals lively 
political conflict, embodied in the factional split between reformers and the Regular 
Democrats. But it also establishes the existence of a strong, underlying consensus in 
favor of progressive policies. That consensus grew out of political decisions to 
disfranchise blacks and in response to the need for substantial public development and 
investment. For the leaders of New Orleans, “progressive” was synonymous with, 
progress. The progress that they strived for was inextricably bound up with the 
commercial advancement of the city. This consensus crossed community income 
groups, occupations, and political inclinations, and favored what this study will call 
progressive civic development.
Many of the changes in New Orleans constituted progressive reforms, both in 
the substance of the changes and in the governmental structures utilized to implement 
the reforms. Regardless of whether those changes began as the result of the reformers 
or the Regulars, both political factions and, subsequently, scholars considered the 
policies deserved the label progressive. Also, the changes in New Orleans were broadly 
civic in nature. In reaction to fears of private monopoly power and aware of nationwide 
trends toward municipal ownership, a clear majority of New Orleanians agreed with 
activist city administrations. Citizens accepted the efficacy of public financing, 
ownership, and operation. Finally, the consensus most strongly supported the 
promotion of economic and commercial development as a defining municipal interest.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Factional disputes paled in comparison to the unanimity on the need for business 
success and the creation o f wealth.2
The most pressing arguments in favor o f the existence o f such a consensus for 
progressive civic development are found in the shared attitudes toward major public 
works. This study examines three new governmental entities, products of the 
progressive era, and the public works completed by each: the Sewerage and Water 
Board, which built a modem sewerage, water, and drainage system, the Board of 
Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans, which reconstructed the city docks, and the 
New Orleans Public Belt Railroad Commission, which constructed the railroad car 
transfer system crucial to the movement o f freight along the docks. These entities, 
though isolated from the impacts of direct democracy, built public facilities, maintained 
public ownership, and carried out operations by means of public administration.
The results o f this study demonstrates the existence of a consensus for 
progressive civic development, but consensus did not imply unanimity. In at least three 
ways, the limitations of the consensus were apparent. First, the vast majority of blacks 
who had participated in politics prior to the Constitution of 1898 no longer had the 
opportunity to join or reject the consensus. Second, at least two crucial elements of the
2 The author wishes to acknowledge the insights o f Matthew Schott in “The New 
Orleans Machine and Progressivism,” Louisiana History 24 (Spring 1983): 141-153. 
Schott wrote of the New Orleans “conservative leaders who identified civic progress 
with economic growth and development which the consensus believed would occur 
with municipal and state government working in harmony with business interests.” The 
present study attempts to build on that insight by more closely examining the interplay 
among progressive ideas, the commercial leadership, the reform faction, and the Regular 
Democrats who controlled city government.
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national progressive agenda—reform of patronage and the control o f morality—were not 
part o f the New Orleans consensus. The reform and Regular factions continued to differ 
on the value of civil sendee reform as well as attempts to control gambling, promote 
prohibition, and suppress prostitution. Third, in spite of the successes of public utilities 
in New Orleans, a segment of the political and business leadership remained skeptical 
about the advisability of public ownership. Electric power, street lighting, and streetcars 
remained in private hands. Nonetheless, evidence for the existence of the consensus for 
progressive civic development is strong, particularly in the behavior of the city’s two 
political factions, the reformers and the Regulars.
Although there were vigorous electoral contests in New Orleans, 1896 to 1912, 
those contests did not disturb the fundamental consensus for progressive civic 
development. Both factions in New Orleans politics agreed with the essential southern 
view of progressivism. Between 1896 and 1912, there were five municipal elections. 
The two factions staged vigorous contests in all but one of the mayoral races, and, in 
each contest, the rhetoric of each faction corresponded to the expected constituencies 
and interests. Reform candidates emphasized efficiency in government, low taxes, and 
restoration of honest government. The Regulars praised Democratic unity, their 
connections to the people, and the practical progress accomplished in city government. 
But behind the rhetorical flourishes, and the sometimes bitter campaigning, neither 
faction sought to challenge the prevailing consensus or alter the governmental structures 
put in place to carry out the progressive reforms.
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There were many examples of the reluctance of either political faction to 
challenge the initiation or implementation of progressive policies. The reliance on 
independent boards and commissions received support from both factions at the state 
and local levels. The appointments to those boards and commissions, while not 
explicitly non-partisan, drew from a pool of businessmen and interested citizens that did 
not vary significantly whether the reform or Regular faction made the appointments. 
Numerous tax and bond referenda enjoyed support from both factions; from 1896 to 
1912, no such referendum was seriously contested nor defeated at the polls. And in the 
most important structural change in city government—the adoption of a commission 
form of government—both factions agreed with the essential elements of the new plan.
The two political factions in New Orleans corresponded to Richard Hofstadter’s 
dichotomy of reformer versus machine politicians. The reform faction in the city 
included a slightly higher percentage of Protestants, and its members had somewhat 
more wealth than the members of the machine. But the social and ethnic patterns of 
New Orleans did not correspond to those in the northeastern urban centers, and the 
Hofstadter status-anxiety model only occasionally fits the Crescent City’s political 
environment. The machine faction, known as the Regular Democrats, not only included 
a large number of Protestants, but also attracted numerous businessmen that 
Hofstadter’s model would normally place in the ranks of the reformers. The policies of 
the city administrations did not fit a preconceived model of reformers versus the 
machine. Martin Behrman, Mayor of New Orleans from 1904 until 1920, led the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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machine faction, but also supported a remarkable list o f progressive reforms and 
municipal improvements.3
The evidence also undermines the traditional semantic treatment o f the two 
political factions. The assignment of the word “reform” to one faction and “machine” to 
the other leaves little to the imagination. George Orwell’s famous essay “Politics and 
the English Language” warns that English becomes “ugly and inaccurate because our 
thoughts are foolish, but the slovenliness of our language makes it easier for us to have 
foolish thoughts.”4 The use o f “reform” and “machine” is not foolish per se, but 
indiscriminate and unexamined acceptance of the terms is inimical to historical 
precision. The capture o f  the “reform” label by those opposed to the Regular faction in 
New Orleans ought not lead to the automatic assumption of a Manichaean political 
contest, wherein the opposite o f “reform” must necessarily stand for the tainted status 
quo, governed by political “bosses.” In particular, there is a danger that the “reform” 
faction and progressive policies become identified as one, and it is imperative to 
disconnect progressive policies from factional rhetoric and labels. With these cautions 
in mind, the term “reform” is used to identify the insurgent faction within the 
Democratic party, and its opposition is identified as the Regulars or Regular Democrats.
3 Richard Hofstadter, The Age o f  Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1960). See also John Buenker, “Sovereign Individuals and Organic 
Networks: Political Cultures in Conflict During the Progressive Era,” American 
Quarterly 40 (June, 1988): 187-204.
4 George Orwell, “Politics and the English Language,” in Sonia Orwell and Ian 
Angus, editors, In Front o f  Your Nose, Volume IV of The Collected Essays, Journalism 
and Letters o f  George Orwell (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1968), 127.
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The term “boss” is also retained. Though the reformers used “boss” as a term of
reproach, many Regular leaders accepted the label, sometimes with pride.5
The rejection of the reform versus machine dichotomy is not based on the New
Orleans experience alone. Howard Chudacoff, in the Evolution o f  American Urban
Society, praised the contribution of the bosses and their political machines, and pointed
out that “Prestige, service, loyalty, accomplishment. . .  were what the machine offered
inner-city residents, and these were what enabled the boss system to withstand heated
attacks for so many years.” Chudacoff summarized the reality o f boss rule by asserting:
Men like [the political bosses] would not have lasted as long as they did if  they 
had not served real needs o f large segments of the urban population. Machines 
were less immoral than amoral, less illegal than extralegal. They were not 
reactionary but pragmatic, not one-dimensional but flexible. Moreover, bosses 
did express higher goals, if not in their words then in their deeds. Bosses were 
both villains and heroes—and something more.
Previous work on the same period o f New Orleans tended to accept the traditional
reform-boss dichotomy. Robert Williams provided a largely sympathetic portrait o f
Martin Behrman, but asserted that “Behrman was no reformer . .  but identified himself
with many elements of contemporary civic reform.” Matthew Schott’s valuable
biography of John M. Parker stressed the social bases of Parker’s antagonism toward the
Regulars, rather than significant policy disagreements. Even though Schott credited
Behrman with a “responsible, constructive, and businesslike administration,” he
nonetheless concluded that “Behrman undoubtedly lacked the idealistic devotion to
5 Less charitable labels assigned to the Regulars included not only the 
“machine,” but also the “ring.”
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honest and efficient government which characterized Parker.” In his study of New 
Orleans politics 1896 to 1900, Oscar Nussbaum discussed the election of 1900 during 
which the Regular organization accommodated insurgent factions within several wards. 
“These insurgents,” said Nussbaum, “could not be described as reformers because they 
were merely seeking the leadership for themselves.” Later, in a discussion of 
comparative campaign rhetoric, Nussbaum refers to the Regulars’ “shameless 
manipulation of public opinion.” The analysis of the reform versus machine split 
extended to state and regional studies as well. Dewey Grantham, while giving credit to 
the accomplishment of the bosses, including a specific mention of Martin Behrman of 
New Orleans, claimed that “in some cases urban reform came in the guise of city boss 
and organization leadership.” And C. Vann Woodward, in reference to state political 
conflict, referred to traditional Democratic “interests” that “were defended by southern 
apologists . .  .strongly entrenched within the old party and frequently controll[ing] it
through bosses and state machines The struggle for progressive democracy was
directed against [the bosses] and was carried on within the old party between 
conservative and reform factions.” Contrary to these views, the evidence from New 
Orleans demonstrated that the consensus for progressive civic development in New 
Orleans owed far more to the leadership of the Regulars and their political machine- 
including support from the state party—than to the good intentions of the New Orleans 
reformers and their haphazard political organizations.6
6 Chudacoff, The Evolution o f American Urban Society, 2nd edition (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1981), 160; Michael McCarthy, “On Bosses, Reformers and
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No single city or state can provide a picture sufficiently broad to answer all of 
the questions about southern, urban progressivism. But New Orleans in the first 
decades of the twentieth century offers a  view into three worlds: the South, progressive 
reform, and urban life. The city was within the South, but, perhaps, not completely o f  
the South. It was, by the start of the new century, an old city, by United States 
standards, whereas most southern cities were just developing. As a seaport, it shared 
characteristics with northeastern coastal cities, particularly as a destination for 
immigration. Finally, its politics shared at least the rhetoric o f the progressive era, as 
self-proclaimed "reformers" entered battle against the New Orleans "ring." One 
particularly interesting aspect of New Orleans government during the post-Civil War 
period was its dependence upon governmental forms that provided a precursor to 
progressive reforms. The sheltering o f certain functions of government from democratic 
impulses began with the establishment o f the Board of Liquidation of City Debt. The 
dependence on such boards continued throughout the 1890s and beyond with the
Urban Growth: Some Suggestions for a Political Typology of American Cities,” Journal 
o f  Urban History 4 (November, 1977): 29-38; Robert Webb Williams, “Martin 
Behrman: Mayor and Political Boss o f New Orleans, 1904-1926" (M. A. thesis, Tulane 
University, 1952), 12; Matthew James Schott, “John M. Parker and the Varieties of 
American Progressivism” (Ph.D. diss., Vanderbilt University, 1969), 100-103; Oscar 
Nussbaum, “Progressive Politics in New Orleans, 1896-1900” (Ph.D. diss., Tulane 
University, 1974), 193,208; Dewey W. Grantham, Southern Progressivism: The 
Reconciliation o f  Progress and Tradition (Knoxville: University o f Tennessee Press, 
1983), 287-288; C. Vann Woodward, The Origins o f the New South, 1877-1913 (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1971), 371-372. In a later publication, 
Matthew Schott gave Behrman credit for the accomplishments o f the his administration, 
but suggested that “whether Behrman’s leadership deserves any credit for these 
achievement may be debated.” See Schott, “The New Orleans Machine and 
Progressivism,” 144.
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establishment of state-sanctioned levee boards, the Public Belt Railroad, Dock Board, 
and, by the turn of the century, the Sewerage and Water Board in New Orleans.
Specific analysis of New Orleans during this era is limited. In 1930, Harold 
Zink included a chapter on Behrman in his study o f city bosses, and George M.
Reynolds published a study of New Orleans politics in 1936 drawing on interviews with 
members of the prominent New Orleans political organization. The period 1896 to 
1900 is covered in Raymond Oscar Nussbaum's "Progressive Politics in New Orleans, 
1896-1900," a doctoral dissertation for Tulane University in 1974. More recently, 
Terrence Fitzmorris authored "Pro Bono Publico: New Orleans Politics and Municipal 
Reform in the Progressive Era, 1912-1926," a dissertation covering the later years o f 
Mayor Behrman’s administration through the mid-1920s. Works utilizing the state as a 
focus include Schott’s biography o f John M. Parker and studies o f minority voting, the 
Populist movements, and Republican politics. More recently, Edward Haas has written 
o f New Orleans politics in the beginning of the twentieth century and compiled a useful 
statistical comparison of reform and machine leadership. His characterizations of the 
reformers and the Regular Democrats provided valuable information and insights into 
the composition o f the political factions.7
7 Oscar Nussbaum, “Progressive Politics in New Orleans, 1896-1900”; Terrence 
Fitzmorris, “Pro Bono Publico: New Orleans Politics and Municipal Reform in the 
Progressive Era, 1912-1926” (Ph.D. diss., Louisiana State University, 1989); Schott, 
“John M. Parker of Louisiana and the Varieties of American Progressivism”; William 
Ivy Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest: Louisiana Politics, 1877-1900 (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969); Henry Clay Dethloff, “Populism and 
Reform in Louisiana” (Ph.D. diss., University of Missouri, 1964); Phillip Uzee, 
“Republican Politics in Louisiana, 1877-1900” (Ph.D. diss., Louisiana State University,
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The historiography of progressivism, once a staple o f consensus, has been in 
turmoil for nearly two decades. The work of Richard Hofstadter set the standard and the 
intellectual assumptions for the study of progressivism and progressives, but Peter 
Filene’s “obituary” for the movement marked a turning point by noting the impossibility 
of identifying progressivism as a distinct movement and the elusive nature of clear 
definitions. From the early 1970s to the present, a spirited argument has raged over the 
usefulness of the concept progressivism. Certainly there is less agreement now than 
several decades ago on whether or not there existed a central organizing set of tenets of 
progressivism. In another development, a new approach to progressivism captured the 
attention of historians. The organizational synthesis promised an explanatory 
framework for progressivism, to be found in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century transition from “villages” to a bureaucratic, urbanized society. Such an 
approach echoed Hofstadter’s emphasis on the professional middle-class, but offered an 
explanation for the ambivalent, even paradoxical nature of the movement. If 
progressivism were a “search for order” emphasizing new organizational forms, its 
tendency toward conservative, anti-democratic elitism became understandable.8
1950); Harold Zink, City Bosses in the United States: A Study o f  Twenty Municipal 
Bosses (Durham: Duke University Press, 1930); John R. Kemp, editor, Martin Behrman 
o f  New Orleans: Memoirs o f  a City Boss (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1977); George M. Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 1897-1926 (New 
York: 1936); Edward Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern City: New Orleans in the 
Progressive Era, 1896-1902 (Ruston, Louisiana: McGinty Publications, 1988).
8 See for example, Peter Filene, "An Obituary for 'The Progressive Movement,'" 
American Quarterly, 22 (1970): 20-34; Richard L. McCormick, The Party Period and 
Public Policy: American Politics from the Age o f Jackson to the Progressive Era (New
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Cautious historians now write o f progressivism as a set of attitudes, rather than 
as a consistent view of the world, and a series of shifting coalitions, rather than a 
coherent movement. Richard McCormick identified three reasons for the decline in the 
use o f the term progressivism: the discomfort with using a “value-laden” term, general 
discouragement over the “liberal reform tradition,” and a growing recognition of the 
“complexity and diversity of early twentieth century reform.” In a search for the 
identity of progressives, scholars find multiple groups in favor of progressive reforms. 
“Many groups had a hand in it,” wrote McCormick, including “urban residents 
[crusading] for better city services, more efficient municipal government, and, 
sometimes, the control of social groups whose habits they feared.” McCormick added 
that “businessmen, too, lobbied incessantly for goals which they defined as reform.”9 
These observations fit the history of New Orleans, where a range of citizens clamored 
for progressive reform. But progressivism in New Orleans not only echoed national 
experiences; it also took place in the South, and bore the characteristics o f  that region’s 
uniqueness.
York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Daniel T. Rogers, “In Search o f Progressivism,” 
Reviews in American History 10 (December 1982): 113-132; JohnD. Buenker, “The 
Progressive Era: A  Search for a Synthesis,” Mid-America 51 (July, 1969): 175-193; 
Louis Galambos, “The Emerging Organizational Synthesis in Modem American 
History,” Business History Review 44 (Autumn, 1970): 279-290; Robert Weibe, The 
Search for Order (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967); Dewey W. Grantham, “The 
Contours of Southern Progressivism,” American Historical Review 86 (December, 
1981): 1035-1059.
9 Richard L. McCormick, The Party Period and Public Policy (1986), 263.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
14
The study o f southern history pays somewhat less attention to the progressive era 
than to the antebellum or Reconstruction years. In part, that relative neglect can be 
traced to the tremendous interest in slavery and race relations, but it can also be 
explained by the overwhelmingly rural nature o f the South, even during the progressive 
era. But a paucity of urban influence did not prevent the emergence of a southern 
progressivism. In Origins o f  the New South, C. Vann Woodward stated that the South 
“developed its own variety o f progressivism in the era that followed hard upon 
McKinley.. . .  [a] phenomenon [that] has been pretty universally ignored—or 
misconstrued.” Woodward argued that “the Southern counterpart o f a Northern 
progressivism developed nearly all traits familiar to the genus, but it was in no sense 
derivative. It was a pretty strictly indigenous growth.”10
The most obvious characteristics of the South that made its variety of 
progressivism different were the composition o f its electorate and the high proportion of 
African-Americans among the working classes. According to Woodward, “Southern 
progressivism generally was progressivism for white men only, and after the poll tax 
took its toll not all the white men were included.” Woodward also pointed the way to 
the cities as the logical starting point to examine southern progressivism. “Southern 
progressivism was essentially urban and middle class in nature, and the typical leader 
was a city professional man or business man, rather than a farmer.” Dewey Grantham’s 
study of southern progressivism made a similar point. “Since most black southerners
10 C. Vann Woodward, The Origins o f  the New South, 1877-1913, 371.
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had been disfranchised, along with many poor and illiterate whites, the southern urban 
electorate was relatively homogeneous and increasingly middle- and upper-class in 
makeup.” Grantham also noted that urban life emerged as a key element in the 
discussion of southern progressivism and confirmed the usefulness of a municipal study 
to demonstrate southern progressive policies. “Municipal reform,” Grantham wrote, 
“made up an essential part of southern progressivism. While it reflected all o f the 
progressive tendencies o f the age, the most significant aspect o f municipal reform in the 
South was the movement to modernize the organization and administration o f the city.” 
He emphasized that "the expanding role o f cities in Southern life brought notable social 
changes," and that "proliferating organizations . . .  provided an indispensable matrix for 
the growth of progressivism in the South."11
In addition to urban influences, southern progressivism was formed by strong 
local traditions in rural areas. In The Paradox o f  Southern Progressivism, William Link 
cited patterns of “traditional governance” and “republican libertarianism” as 
countervailing tendencies to the modernizing and centralizing force of progressivism.
His thesis reinforces the argument in favor o f the uniqueness of southern progressivism. 
Another element of that uniqueness was the nature of the Southern working class and its
nDewey W. Grantham, Southern Progressivism, 260. A number of state studies 
provide insight into local conditions in the South, and two studies of particular cities— 
Memphis and Birmingham—add valuable local examples to the general questions about 
the interaction of southern and progressive tendencies. See, for example, Sheldon 
Hackney, From Populism to Progressivism in Alabama-, William D. Miller, Memphis 
During the Progressive Era, 1900-1917 (Memphis, 1957); Carl V. Harris, Political 
Power in Birmingham, 1871-1921 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1977).
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relationship to suffrage, which created a social configuration that necessarily affected 
political alignments and the agenda of progressive politicians. J. Morgan Kousser, in 
his Shaping o f  Southern Politics, added an important dimension to the study o f the 
progressive years in the South through an examination of the disfranchisement 
movement. Kousser argued that the movement to reduce the black electorate reflected 
not only the politics of race, but also the desire of the Democratic party in the South, 
and its middle- and upper-class leadership, to establish and maintain a monopoly on 
political power. Suffrage laws and constitutional changes in Louisiana altered the 
electorate of New Orleans in the early twentieth century and, consequently, altered the 
shape and course of progressivism. Jack Temple Kirby examined the interplay between 
race and progressive reform in Darkness a t the Dawning. Kirby argued that the “desire 
for reform ran deeper and broader in the South than in other regions.” But the 
“seminal” reform for Southerners was the segregation and disfranchisement of blacks.12
These views of progressivism and its southern variant provide a composite 
backdrop against which the civic development of New Orleans can be examined, 
southern progressivism promoted municipal reform, public health, regulation of 
industry, education, and economic development, goals it shared with its northern
12 Link’s thesis also suggests a basis for studying the role of the South’s urban 
areas in weakening rural adherence to tradition and republicanism. William A. Link, 
The Paradox o f  Southern Progressivism, 1880-1930 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1992), xi; J. Morgan Kousser, The Shaping o f  Southern Politics: 
Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment o f  the One-Party South, 1880-1910 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1974); Jack Kirby, Darkness at the Dawning: Race and 
Reform in the Progressive South (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1972), 1-5.
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counterpart. But southern progressivism operated within a  social and political context 
that disfranchised large numbers o f its workers, suffered from oppressive poverty, was 
dominated by rural values, and, yet, struggled to promote economic development and to 
join the mainstream United States economy. This study o f New Orleans seeks an 
understanding o f southern progressivism as practiced in a urban setting. The evidence 
supports the existence o f a consensus in favor of progressive civic development 
developed and sustained during the period 1896 to 1912. But in a departure from much 
o f the literature, the evidence also supports the finding that the Regular Democrats, the 
so-called machine, helped to develop the consensus and were largely responsible for the 
successful implementation of progressive reforms and improvements in civic 
development.
This study begins with a chapter describing the politics of Louisiana and New 
Orleans in the 1890s, the end of the Populist revolt, and the beginning of the progressive 
era. Chapter Two discusses the new Louisiana electorate and the organization of New 
Orleans political factions; Chapter Three looks at the election of 1899 and the return of 
the Regulars to political power. Chapters Four and Five provide brief histories of the 
mayoral terms of Paul Capdevielle (1899-1904) and Martin Behrman (1904-1908). 
Chapters Six through Eight break the political narrative to discuss the three great public 
works of the early twentieth century in New Orleans: the sewerage, water, and drainage 
systems, the New Orleans port, and the public belt railroad. Chapters Nine and Ten 
describe Martin Behrman’s second term as Mayor, the adoption of commission
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government in New Orleans, and Behrman’s election to a third term under the new 
commission plan.
The study ends with the adoption of commission government in New Orleans, 
although Martin Behrman serves through 1920 and is once more elected Mayor in 1925. 
By 1912, the Regulars had demonstrated conclusively that progressive policies did not 
depend upon the rule o f a reform administration. At the end o f Behrman’s second term, 
the Regulars accepted progressive structural reform and demonstrated that their political 
skills would outlast those of the reformers. The Regular Democrats, complete with a 
ward boss system, an effective political organization, and a dependence upon patronage, 
presided over a consensus in favor of progressive civic development that transformed 
New Orleans into a twentieth century city.
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CHAPTER I
THE LIMITATIONS OF FUSION POLITICS:
PROTEST AND REFORM IN LOUISIANA AND NEW ORLEANS
The story of New Orleans during the progressive era begins in the state and local 
conditions of the 1890s. Louisiana politics in that era were uncommonly turbulent. The 
decade started with a significant agrarian revolt, continued with major disputes over the 
state lottery and tariff protection for the sugar interests, reached a tense battle in the 
disputed gubernatorial election of 1896, and ended with major constitutional change and 
the disfranchisement of most black voters. Conditions in New Orleans, the largest city 
in the state, were no less tumultuous. The lottery dispute intruded upon city politics, the 
city council suffered a major scandal, a reform ticket ousted the Democratic machine in 
1896, and disfranchisement not only eliminated the city's black voters, but threatened 
large numbers of white voters as well. These developments transformed New Orleans 
and its politics and provided essential background to the progressive era in city 
government.
Agrarian protest was particularly strong in Louisiana as the result of falling 
cotton prices, natural disasters, and the anti-authoritarian impulses o f the hill country 
farmers of the northern part of the state. Upset with the refusal of their Regular 
Democrat congressmen to endorse the subtreasury plan, independent-minded voters in
19
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the Fourth and Fifth Congressional Districts challenged the incumbents in the 1890 
elections by urging their followers to stay away from the polls, and the resulting drop in 
participation signaled a high level of unrest. Not content merely to boycott the 
elections, the organized opposition in Catahoula Parish put forth a congressional 
candidate who polled a majority in that parish, but lost the district-wide vote to the 
incumbent. Although both Regular Democratic congressmen triumphed, the political 
establishment took note of the danger. The challenge engendered enthusiasm among the 
insurgents and helped to develop leadership that would carry the Populist banner 
through the middle of the decade. Within a year, Louisiana representatives of the 
Peoples’ Party had attended organizing conventions in Ocala and Cincinnati. By 
October, 1891, Alexandria was host to the first Populist Party convention in the state, 
consisting of seventy-eight delegates from seventeen different parishes, including thirty- 
five from the city of New Orleans.1 The New Orleans Daily Picayune at first assessed 
the convention's attendees generously as “men of the better classes,” but later 
editorialized against what it viewed as the revolutionary nature o f the third party efforts. 
“The organization o f a ‘Third Party’ movement in Louisiana,” the paper complained, is 
“the inauguration of a revolution designed to change the entire character of the 
government; it is the movement not of a party but of a proletariat.. . .  It is a gathering of
1 In Louisiana, counties are called parishes. The City of New Orleans is an 
incorporated entity and consists of the entirety of Orleans Parish. For details o f the 
formation and growth of the Peoples' Party in Louisiana see William Ivy Hair, 
Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest: Louisiana Politics, 1877-1900, 198-233.
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all the discontented, dissatisfied and unprosperous elements . . .  a war o f classes against 
classes [and] a movement toward a radical revolution.”2
Opposition to the power o f the Regular Democrats seen in the Alexandria 
convention reflected economic, racial and political resentments. Farmers faced weak 
economic conditions; cotton production in 1890, for example, lagged behind that of 
thirty years before, and bad weather reduced Louisiana output during the years 1891 to 
1893. Yet increasing production from other states and countries resulted in an 
oversupply, and prices for cotton declined severely. Per pound prices dropped below 
eight cents by 1890, reached a low of less than five cents within three years, and did not 
exceed eight cents again until the turn of the century. One investigation o f  the prices 
concluded that proceeds from the sale of cotton in Louisiana in the early 1890s did not 
match the cost of production. Populist complaints about monopoly power and the ills of 
small producers found a ready audience among farmers suffering under the effects of 
such an economy. Complaints about race found receptive listeners as well.3
Racial resentments by the Populists derived from the peculiar distribution of 
population in the state. The agricultural alluvial parishes along the Mississippi River 
and the Red River held disproportionate political power based upon a pronounced 
imbalance between black and white residents. These parishes produced approximately
2 New Orleans Daily Picayune, October 2, 1891, 2; October 3, 1891, 1; October 
4, 1891, 7; October 5, 1891, 4 (hereinafter cited as Daily Picayune).
3 Lucia Elizabeth Daniel, “The Louisiana People's Party,” Louisiana Historical 
Quarterly 26 (October 1943): 19; Dethloff, “Populism and Reform in Louisiana,” 51- 
56; Gavin Wright, Old South New South (New York: Basic Books, 1986), 81-123.
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two-thirds of the state's cotton with the labor provided by predominantly black tenant 
fanners; in some parishes the black population outnumbered whites by ten to one or 
even more. In most of these areas, white planters controlled the votes of their black 
laborers and enjoyed an inherent advantage at election time, although the extent of 
control over the black vote varied greatly from one electoral district to the next. New 
Orleans black voters enjoyed a high level of independence as did their colleagues in 
some of the southern sugar-producing regions.
Populist anger at the manipulation of black votes shaped their attitudes and 
tactics toward potential black allies throughout the decade. Although members o f the 
Colored Alliance were allowed to speak at the Alexandria Convention in 1891, relations 
between the two races were always difficult. A second convention in Alexandria went 
so far as to place two black Populists in nomination for statewide offices, but the 
convention ultimately chose an all white ticket. The convention's platform reflected the 
ambivalence of the delegates. Although it included a statement on behalf of equality 
under the law, the platform also asserted that “the interests of the white and colored 
races in the South. . .  would suffer unless the undisputed control o f our government 
were assured to the intelligent and educated portion of the population.” By organizing 
those who rebelled against the Regular Democratic organization, the Populist Party 
began to gain electoral support; its candidate for governor carried four parishes in the 
election of 1892.4
4 Normal Pollack, editor, The Populist Mind, a volume in The American 
Heritage Series edited by Leonard W. Levy and Alfred Young (New York: Bobbs- 
Merrill, 1967), 385-386; Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest, 222-225. Populists
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The third-party movement was not the only threat to Regular Democratic 
hegemony. Though it did not often face an effective Republican opposition, the 
Democratic Party displayed a tendency toward bi-factionalism, as coalitions formed and 
dissolved around issues of religion, geography, and attitudes toward gambling.
Factions within the party arose to challenge current orthodoxy and to seek political 
advantage. The controversial Louisiana lottery, for example, served as a lightening rod 
for political opinion. First chartered in 1868, the lottery faced numerous attempts to 
abolish it, but the courts ruled that its contract with the state could not be abrogated by 
legislative action. When a convention rewrote the state's constitution in 1879, delegates 
chose to retain the lottery, but set a time limit on its existence. In the absence o f further 
action, the lottery would expire on January 1,1895. If lottery proponents were to extend 
its life, the governor and legislators elected in 1892 would have to act.
As the deadline approached, pro- and anti-lottery forces supported candidates for 
state office who would determine if the deadline were to be extended, an issue of 
“increasing warmth.” In 1890, those opposed to the extension organized the Anti- 
Lottery League as a vehicle for electoral politics, particularly looking toward the 
gubernatorial race in 1892. In that contest, the Anti-Lottery League settled upon 
Murphy J. Foster as its candidate, but reached beyond the Democratic base by joining 
with the Farmers' Alliance. Even before the formation of the League, the farmers had
eventually joined a statewide push for disfranchisement as a solution to the alluvial 
parishes’ manipulation of black votes.
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opposed the lottery and were willing participants in the campaign against its renewal.5 
But the Democrat-Alliance partnership diluted the effectiveness of the Farmers' Alliance 
on other matters.6
Attitudes toward the lottery were more complex than the simple question o f  
whether or not one opposed gambling. The lottery provided financial support to a 
number of Louisiana projects, not the least of which was the levee system. During the 
flood season of 1890, the company contributed $100,000 to state levee districts. The 
reform mayor of New Orleans accepted $50,000 toward flood protection and had to 
defend himself against charges from religious leaders that the funds were tainted.7
During the campaign, lottery proponents made extravagant promises to assist 
public works, including a direct subsidy for drainage in the City of New Orleans.
5 John S. Kendall, History o f  New Orleans (Chicago: Lewis Publishing 
Company, 1922), 2: 483, 492. At the Farmers' Union convention in Lafayette, the 
keynote address emphasized opposition to the lottery. Within two days, the Daily 
Picayune reported that “ the Anti-Lottery League and the Farmers' Alliance have come 
to terms [on the upcoming election].” See Daily Picayune, August 5, 1891, 1,4; August 
6, 1891,1; August 7 ,1891,1 ,4 . For brief accounts of Murphy J. Foster, see Joy 
Jackson, “Murphy J. Foster,” in Joseph G. Dawson, III, editor, The Louisiana 
Governors: From Iberville to Edwards (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1990), 189-193 and Glenn R. Conrad, editor, A Dictionary o f  Louisiana Biography 
(New Orleans: Louisiana Historical Association, 1988), 315.
6 On the lottery issue, see Joy Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969), 121-135; John R. Kemp, editor, Martin 
Behrman o f  New Orleans, Memoirs o f  a City Boss, 13-20; George M. Reynolds, 
Machine Politics in New Orleans, 1897-1926, 23-26; Dethloff, “Populism and Reform 
in Louisiana,” 82-120; Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest, 168-169, 201-204.
Hair considered the absorption of the Farmers' Union by the Anti-Lottery League “one 
o f the most Machiavellian maneuvers in the long, squalid history of Louisiana politics.”
7 Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 125.
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Samuel D. McEnery had served as Louisiana governor from 1881 to 1888, acquiring the 
nickname “the levee governor” in the process, though his enemies tagged him with 
“McLottery” as well. He supported the extension o f the lottery's charter and sought 
reelection in the 1892 campaign. He and Foster fought almost to a draw in the 
Democratic primary, but Foster prevailed by a narrow margin. McEnery then declared 
as an independent and stood in the general election, losing to Foster once again, but by a 
more decisive margin.8 The new governor had run with the support of the reformers, 
but Foster proved no hero to the state's reform elements. Although partners with the 
Alliance during the election, he quickly formed political connections with the Louisiana 
Regulars who had supported McEnery and with the New Orleans Regulars lead by John 
Fit2patrick. Populists who had resisted the fusion movement suggested by the Farmers' 
Union, and who had insisted on their own candidate for governor, felt vindicated when 
Foster abandoned the Alliance soon after the election.9
In addition to the rise of the People's Party and the lottery issue, a third factor 
disturbed the power of the Democratic party in the 1890s—the defection of the state's 
sugar producers from the ranks of the Regulars. Although the agricultural depression of
8 Not only the Democratic Party was split on the lottery issue. The Republican 
Party also divided into pro- and anti-lottery factions, adding two more candidates to the 
general election. The People's Party candidate rounded out the field of five, although 
only the two Democrats polled significant numbers.
9 Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 135; Schott, “John M. Parker and the 
Varieties of American Progressivism,” 50. John Fitzpatrick, leader o f the New Orleans 
Regulars, had represented the McEnery faction on the committee which assessed the 
results of the Democratic primary in March, 1892, but his association with Foster's 
opponent did not prevent post-election cooperation.
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the mid-1890s lowered the prices of sugar as well as cotton, economic troubles o f  a 
different sort befell the sugar producers of south Louisiana when national tariff policies 
and politics exacerbated the effects of the price drop. During the Republican 
presidency, sugar producers enjoyed a per-pound bounty of two cents, which offset low 
prices and helped to protect the industry. After Cleveland's second term began, national 
Democrats revised tariff policy and removed the bounty in favor o f an ad valorem tariff. 
Outraged Louisiana planters bolted the party and joined the Republicans. In September, 
1894, John N. Pharr, a sugar planter from St. Mary's Parish, led the effort. Regular 
Democrats expressed concern that the split “would encourage the return of Negro rule” 
and Governor Foster, although a sugar planter himself, condemned the move. It would, 
he said, “bring the Negro back into political prominence and would breed strife and 
turmoil.”10
Not content with their new political home, the planters organized the National 
Republicans, dedicated to white supremacy (in contrast to the other Republican faction 
in the state, National Republicans called themselves the Lily Whites) and sugar 
protection.11 The new faction offered candidates for Congress in 1894 but could not 
defeat the Regular Democrats. Nevertheless, this was a danger to the Democratic Party 
different in kind from the Populists. National Republicans were part of the state's elite, 
enjoyed great wealth, and controlled significant black votes o f their own that might
10 Dethloff, “Populism and Reform in Louisiana,” 227; Glenn R. Conrad and 
Ray F. Lucas, White Gold: A BriefHistory o f  the Louisiana Sugar Industry, 1795-1995, 
Louisiana Life Series, Number 8 (Lafayette: Center for Louisiana Studies, 1995), 58-59
11 Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest, 246-248.
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counter the effects o f the cotton region. Regular Democrats had held power by avoiding 
such issue-based divisions within the party. Faced with insurgency from the left and the 
right, the state’s regulars sought stability in the state’s largest city. At least there—or so 
they hoped—the city’s Regular organization would provide a steady majority in state 
elections. But even the New Orleans Regulars found the 1890s a  challenge to political 
stability.12
Post-Reconstruction politics in New Orleans was a  battle ground between 
Regular Democrats and periodic challengers, usually organized under the banner of 
reform. The election results had alternately favored Regular and reform elements o f the 
city's leadership. The Regulars triumphed in 1884 and 1892; the reformers won munici­
pal elections in 1880,1888, and 1896. The reform group represented many o f  the city's 
commercial elite and often placed issues and interests ahead o f formal party affiliation. 
In spite o f their participation in the Redeemer movement, the reformers often had more 
in common with the national Republican Party and held to a Whiggish view o f 
governmental functions and finance. For many years after Reconstruction, the 
candidates of the Regular Democrats questioned the party loyalty of the reformers, often 
with good cause. For their part, the New Orleans reformers tried to have it both ways 
politically, adhering to the emotional tradition of the anti-Republican Redeemer 
movement, while at the same time proclaiming non-partisanship as an ideal and
12 Dethloff, “Populism and Reform in Louisiana,” 226-228.
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reserving the right to run against the Democratic Party, generally known as the Regulars, 
in city elections.13
Within New Orleans, the Young Men's Democratic Association (YMDA) carried 
the reform banner in 1888. The YMDA drew its support from the city's commercial 
exchanges, particularly the Cotton Exchange. The Association took up the cause of 
reform from several predecessors, including the Committee of One Hundred and the 
Law and Order League. Those organizations undertook investigations of the city 
administration of Mayor J. Valsin Guillotte, lobbied for state legislative intervention 
into city affairs, and provided evidence to local grand juries, but without noticeable 
effect. The YMDA sought success at the ballot box instead.14
Mayor Guillotte declined to run for reelection and Judge Robert Davey became 
the Regular candidate for mayor in 1888. Davey was not only a prominent Regular, he 
was one of the so-called “Big Four” ward bosses which governed the Regular 
organization and the city’s seventeen wards. Burdened by the public perception of an 
inept, if not corrupt, city government, and by the defection of normally loyal Ring
13 The city Democrats are referred to herein as Regular Democrats or Regulars. 
Opposition newspapers and political opponents often referred to the Regulars as the 
Ring or the Machine.
14 Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 92-95. The YMDA “was not made 
up strictly of young men, or of Democrats.” William W. Howe, “Municipal History of 
New Orleans” in Herbert B. Adams, ed., John Hopkins University Studies in Historical 
and Political Science (Baltimore, 1889), 187 quoted in Jackson, New Orleans in the 
Gilded Age, 95. The New Orleans commercial exchanges played an important role in 
the political and economic life of the city. In addition to the Cotton Exchange, 
businessmen organized the Sugar and Rice Exchange, the Stock Exchange, the Board of 
Trade, and the Mechanics, Dealers and Lumber Exchange.
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members, Davey lost by over 7,000 votes. YMDA candidate Joseph. A. Shakspeare 
entered the mayor's office for a second time (he had served an earlier term from 1880- 
1882) along with a city council pledged to YMDA principles.15 But governing 
successfully proved more difficult than winning the election. Having gained power, the 
YMDA adherents sought to constrain the authority o f  city government. Some 
restrictions echoed standard good government reforms, such as purchasing 
requirements, advertising o f bids prior to award of leases, and ordinances to control 
hiring practices. More controversial changes included the establishment o f a Police 
Board, the Orleans Levee Board, and a municipal fire department to replace the old 
system of volunteer companies. In addition, the Mayor helped to refinance bonds at a 
favorable interest rate, and put the city on a firm financial basis, balancing the budget in 
1890.16
Shakspeare's term in office exhibited the frustrations faced by the reform 
elements. The urge to remove politics from city administration served to weaken his 
authority and control. As boards and commissions took over city functions while still 
other municipal services remained in private hands, the mayor's ability to affect policy 
was minimal. During the Shakspeare administration, Maurice Hart, a New Orleans 
financier, held influence over the ostensibly reform council, opening the Mayor to
15 Daily Picayune, April 20-31, 1888; Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 
96. For the political status of Davey, see Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern City, 
16, 35 and Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 20. Robert Davey subsequently 
served the city as a member of the U.S. House of Representatives and remained a loyal 
member of the Regular Democratic organization.
16 Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 95-109.
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charges o f hypocrisy. Finally, Shakspeare’s voter base included the city's black 
population. Any attention paid to black voters attracted the scorn of the city's press and 
political opposition.17
In 1892, after four years of Joseph Shakspeare, the city's Regular Democrats 
nominated John Fitzpatrick for the office of mayor, one of the “Big Four” o f the Regular 
organization. Observers later complained that the nominating contest had been held at 
the same time that the city was celebrating the reunion of the United Confederate 
Veterans and that the “best element” o f the electorate was otherwise occupied. City 
Democrats had little to fear from the new Populist Party or from the Farmer's Alliance, 
but the anti-lottery campaign took center stage in the city elections as it did at the state 
level. In spite of a political history that included attempts to suppress the lottery, the 
Fitzpatrick group followed the pro-lottery stance of McEnery. Shakspeare, although 
personally in favor of the regulation, not outright suppression, of gambling, followed the 
Foster faction in its crusade against the lottery company.18 Martin Behrman later 
recalled the bitter fight between Foster and McEnery:
I was a delegate to the convention of the McEnery, the pro-lottery faction in
Pike's Hall, Baton Rouge, in the fall of 1891. The Foster faction met in the State
17 Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 109.
18 By the time o f the 1892 election, two of the “Big Four” were no longer ;n 
politics. Behrman's recollections assert that “political power tended to spread itself 
more evenly among the wards [as a result].” Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 
20; Kendall, History o f  New Orleans, 2: 503. Kemp’s work consists of edited 
newspaper columns published as “Behrman Tells.” The memoirs were printed in the 
New Orleans Item after Behrman’s 1920 defeat for a fifth consecutive term as mayor. 
The columns—and Kemp’s edited version—provide a valuable source of information 
about the Regular organization, state and local politics, and the thoughts o f Behrman.
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House. I have some recollections o f the appointment o f a committee on 
harmony to get the two factions together, but it is not distinct, and I am told that 
there was no such committee. As I remember the excitement over that issue, I 
guess a committee on harmony would have had little chance to do anything.19
Although Foster won at the state level, the city organization carried the day for
Fitzpatrick by over 3,000 votes. Foster's rapid rapprochement with the Regulars
lessened the possibility of adverse state legislation, and Fitzpatrick settled in for an
eventful four-year term. Regular Democrats controlled the New Orleans city council as
well as parish-level offices essential to the organization's patronage system.20
The new mayor had learned that system well. During his service with the
Louisiana National Guard he acquired the nickname “Captain John.” He served for six
years as the city's Commissioner of Public Works, a position that controlled a large
payroll, spread liberally among the city's Irish-American population in particular. One
account o f his activities lists memberships “in the Elks, the Knights of Columbus, the
Ancient Order of Hibernians, the United Irish League of New Orleans, the Continental
Guards, and the Firemen's Charitable and Benevolent Association.”21
19 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 13-14. The Regular Democrats 
often utilized a committee on harmony in instances where two or more strong 
candidates threatened to split the loyalty o f the group.
20 Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, Chapter VII; Kendall, History o f  
New Orleans, 2: 499, 505. The City of New Orleans and the Parish of Orleans have 
identical boundaries; however, two sets of elected officials serve. One set represents the 
municipal government, established by charter; the other set fills parish (county) 
positions such as criminal sheriff and district attorney. Both sets of offices came under 
the influence o f the Regular organization.
21 Mayor’ Office, Administrations o f  the Mayors o f  New Orleans compiled and 
edited by the Works Progress Administration, New Orleans Public Library, Louisiana 
Division (New Orleans, 1939), 198-203; Conrad, A Dictionary o f  Louisiana Biography, 
303; Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern City, 15-18.
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The first half of Mayor Fitzpatrick's term held great promise for the city and for 
the political career o f Captain John. He committed the city to the completion of public 
works projects, some of which had been started by the previous administration. The 
notoriously bad streets of New Orleans, laid on land subject to flooding, received 
Fitzpatrick’s attention, and by 1894 the mayor boasted to the council that major streets 
“are [now] graveled roads, while most all the cross streets are likewise paved, much to 
the credit of the city's enterprise and progressiveness. Square block granite pavements 
have also been laid on Rampart, Burgundy and St. Philip streets” in the French Quarter. 
Behrman later commented that “the gravel did not turn out so well as was expected, but 
the people were satisfied with it at the time. There was not sufficient money to use the 
large granite blocks” on all the streets.22
The Shakspeare administration had reorganized the volunteer fire department, 
but the completion of the task was left to Fitzpatrick. The city purchased the assets of 
the volunteer associations and assumed the responsibility for fire protection in 
December, 1891, but the city's obligations for payments fell into the subsequent three 
years. (Behrman recalled the figure owed at $700,000, but other accounts put the 
obligation much lower.) Fitzpatrick honored the commitment and paid the funds. He
22 Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 135, quoting from John Fitzpatrick, 
Mayor's Message to the City Council o f  New Orleans (New Orleans, 1894), 8.; Kemp, 
Mayor Behrman o f  New Orleans, 22. Street paving became a priority for Behrman after 
his election to the mayor’s office in 1904, but remained a perpetual problem. No mayor 
has permanently conquered the difficulties of maintaining streets on reclaimed swamp 
land. In the 1989 mayoral campaign, Mayor Sidney Barthelemy was challenged about 
the conditions o f city streets by a voter. The mayor replied in frustration, “Did you ever 
try to pave a sponge?”
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also completed several large construction projects begun by his predecessor, including a
courthouse, police, and jail complex. Behrman would later recollect that the Fitzpatrick
administration replaced the city's gas lamps with electric versions with the result that
“small boys were deprived of the fun o f annoying the gas man as he came around at
sunset to light the gas lamps.”23
These projects and others put a  heavy demand upon city finances, but the
administration effectively met the challenge. More efficient collection o f revenue,
reduction of debt, and a slow but steady increase in assessments provided sufficient
revenue for the ambitious program. In the judgement of one historian:
If Fitzpatrick had left office in early 1894, his administration would have 
appeared to be one of the most successful since the Civil War. With a balanced 
budget, a surplus in the treasury, and public improvements for all to see, the 
Third Ward's favorite son was at the peak of his career. He could even look 
forward to the possible capture o f  the governorship at some future date.24
But the last two years o f Fitzpatrick's tenure would eliminate any talk of the
governorship and would burden the Regular organization for years. The mayor's alleged
connections to emerging scandals would doom Fitzpatrick's future political ambitions
even within the city.
The proximate cause for the mayor's trouble came from a new reform
organization, the Citizens' Protective Association, a direct descendant of the YMDA, the
23 Kemp, Mayor Behrman o f  New Orleans, 21-23; Jackson, New Orleans in the 
Gilded Age, 136; Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern City, 18
24 Oscar Nussbaum, “Progressive Politics in New Orleans, 1896-1900,” 16; 
Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 137-138. Fitzpatrick later tried to secure the 
Democratic nomination for governor, but the attempt failed.
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anti-lottery group, and the commercial exchanges. The association reacted to the 
council's award of a franchise for the construction of a public belt railroad to an agent of 
the Illinois Central Railroad. At about the same time, the council awarded a favorable 
contract for garbage disposal at a increased cost to the city over the previous 
arrangements. Although both developments addressed important municipal problems, 
the method of awarding franchises and contracts attracted the attention not only o f the 
Citizens' Protective Association, but also of the city's law enforcement establishment.
During the latter half o f 1894, Fitzpatrick's administration and members o f  the 
council faced investigation by the press, the Citizens' Protective Association, and the 
grand jury. Eventually, indictments fell on twelve city officials, including ten members 
o f the council. The most serious charges involved public bribery and three of those 
indicted served time in prison. The council acquired the nickname “Boodle Council,” 
and the press expanded its charges to include the mayor himself. Fitzpatrick fought 
back by suing for libel, an action he eventually won against the Daily States. Not able to 
find specific criminal activities with which to charge the Mayor, but still pressed by the 
Citizens’ Protective Association for some action, the district attorney agreed to an 
impeachment hearing in civil court.
In March, 1895, the Mayor defeated the attempt when the judge found in his 
favor. The repercussions o f the council scandals, the libel trial, and the impeachment 
process provided the background to the next city election, which would be held on the 
same day as the state contest for governor. Once again, the outcome of the city and state 
elections would be intertwined, but instead o f the 1892 crusade over the lottery, the
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1896 election included a significant challenge to the dominance of the state's Regular 
Democrats and a replay of the 1888 and 1892 contests between the reformers and the 
Regular within the city of New Orleans. The Regulars at the state level survived the 
challenge, but the New Orleans Democratic organization did not.25
At the state level, Foster's fusion with the Farmers' Alliance in 1892 had split the 
agrarian movement. Populists nominated their own candidate in 1892 and the Alliance 
faded from the scene. As the election of 1896 approached, Regular Democracy in 
Louisiana faced numerous threats. Populists represented a potential adversary, one that 
had proved independent of attempts at absorption. An influential segment o f the 
Redeemer elite-wealthy sugar planters, mostly from the southern part of the state-had 
defected from the Democratic Party entirely. And the prospects for the Regular ticket in 
New Orleans had dimmed, which made Foster's reelection outlook even more 
precarious. In Foster's favor, however, was the disparate nature of the opposition and 
the prior success Democrats had in coopting rebellious factions. “Democrats found that 
one o f the most effective ways o f combating political insurgency and the reform 
movement lay in absorbing part o f the reform program. This occurred sometimes 
reluctantly, sometimes purposefully, and sometimes under coercion, but it happened.”26
25 For accounts of the investigations, trials and civil actions, see the Daily 
Picayune, June, 1894, through April, 1895; Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 
139-144; Kemp, Mayor Behrman ofNew Orleans, 20-21; Dethloff, “Populism and 
Reform in Louisiana,” 258-260; Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern City, 19; 
Kendall, History ofNew Orleans, 2: 511-514.
26 Dethloff cites numerous examples of successful Democratic attempts to coopt 
the opposition, including Foster's activities with the anti-lottery forces, endorsement of 
free silver by some Democrats in 1894, and various bills regarding election reform.
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The perennial Republican challenge to the Democrats would be strengthened by 
the addition of the National Republicans, still angry over Democratic policy on the sugar 
tariff, but the possible combination o f that group with both the agrarian Populists and 
city reformers seemed implausible. Foster had faced the threat o f  fusion in 1892, but in 
that year the Republican Party divided its votes between two candidates, and the left 
wing of the Alliance formed the People's Party and offered a candidate o f its own. To 
the chagrin of the Regulars, however, the unlikely fusion took place and seriously 
threatened Bourbon Democracy. The election of 1896 tested the strength of the Fusion 
movement, the ability of the Democrat Party in the state and New Orleans to respond to 
this challenge, and even the civil stability of the state.
The combination against the Regulars in 1896 resulted, in part, from the 
congressional elections two years earlier. Both the Populists and the Republicans 
attempted to win congressional seats in that year, but without success. In the northern 
part of the state, Populists candidates ran strong campaigns in the Fourth and Fifth 
Congressional Districts. In the former, Congressman Henry W. Ogden adopted the free 
silver stance of his Populist opponent and won by a margin o f over 6,000 votes. The 
Populists contended that election fraud had cost them the seat. Study of the election 
returns indicated that manipulation of the black vote helped to provide Ogden with his 
apparent margin. In the Fifth Congressional District, the Regular Democrat, Charles J. 
Boatner, held fast to the gold standard in defeating Alexis Benoit by over 10,000 votes. 
More charges o f fraud came from the Populist camp, and Benoit took his case to
Dethloff, “Populism and Reform in Louisiana,” 137-138.
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Congress. Although the investigation resulted in a new election, Boatner's margin of 
6,000 in the rematch was sufficient to convince Congress to award him the seat.27
Republicans fared no better in the First through Third Congressional Districts in 
the 1894 elections; three candidates put forward by the Republicans suffered defeat by 
Regular Democrats. In these elections, as well as those in the northern part o f  the state, 
charges of fraud tainted the Democratic victories, but the dominance of the Democrats 
was clear. I f  opposition parties were to mount serious efforts to capture the 
governorship and other state and federal offices, a combination between the Republicans 
and Populists was essential. A third partner in the anti-Regular effort would bring 
success even closer: the urban reform movement in New Orleans. The success of 
Foster in 1892 had demonstrated the necessity of gathering substantial support from the 
state's largest city even in the absence of support from the urban Regulars.28
On November 8, 1895, New Orleans reformers organized yet another election- 
year association, the Citizens' League. The League had common membership with the 
Citizens' Protective Association and earlier organizations enlisted to fight the Regulars. 
Cotton broker John M. Parker assisted in the formation of the League, as did prominent 
lawyer Walter Denegre and insurance executive Charles Janvier. Opposition to Mayor 
Fitzpatrick had grown as the scandals multiplied, and the League pronouncements made 
clear that recapturing the mayor's office was the group's first priority, but, as a  side
27 Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Reform, 239-243.
28 Uzee, “Republican Politics in Louisiana, 1877-1900,” 145-150; Hair, 
Bourbonism and Agrarian Reform, 247; Dethloff, “Populism and Reform in Louisiana,” 
235-236.
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effect o f the city reform effort, statewide challengers to the Democratic Regulars gained 
potential allies.29
The economic aspirations of the hill country small farmers paralleled the 
political goals of the city reformers. Both fought against the constraints o f Regular 
Democratic organizations and the use of vote fraud and manipulation. Brought together 
from opposite ends o f the economic spectrum by shared concerns, urban and rural forces 
formed an unlikely alliance as the election o f 1896 approached. What emerged in 
Louisiana in 1896 was an opposition to Regular Democracy held together primarily by 
its common target, not by a joint program or a shared ideology. Wealthy sugar planters 
formed an alliance with upcountry small fanners, and sophisticated urban reformers 
joined (albeit tentatively) with rural Populists opposed to machine rule, whether it 
dominated the city or the alluvial parishes. A common adversary united the disparate 
groups whose members found themselves at odds with the dominant party’s objectives. 
As one historian later explained, “The criteria for determining why a Louisiana 
Democrat became a Populist will also largely explain why an Allianceman became an 
anti-lottery Democrat, or a sugar planter a Republican, or an urban Democrat an anti- 
lotteryite or a Citizens' Leaguer. Democratic solidarity . . .  prevented each of these 
interests from obtaining [its] objectives within the regular processes of the Democratic 
party.”30
29 Daily Picayune, February 26,1896,1, 5; Schott, “John M. Parker,” 57; 
Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 312; Kendall, History ofNew Orleans, 2: 517.
30 Schott, "John M. Parker,” 39-90; Dethloff, “Populism and Reform in 
Louisiana,”!53, 173,256. Schott notes that in 1895 John M. Parker and Farmers'
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Partners in the Fusion movement of 1896 did not easily reach agreement on a 
candidate. Populists and the remnants of the Farmers' Alliance harbored suspicions 
toward their partners; memories of the betrayal that followed cooperation with Foster in 
1892 led to a high degree of caution. Negotiations between factions of the Republican 
Party and the Populists began in mid-1895 and continued later that year. The 
Republicans pledged to await the Populist nominating convention in early 1896 and, 
assuming the selection of a broad-based ticket, promised their backing for the nominees. 
In fact, the National Republicans preempted the Populists less than a week before the 
convention by nominating E. N. Pugh, a wealthy planter, for governor. The Populists 
proceeded with their own plans, but had difficulty in selecting a nominee. After a series 
of mishaps and negotiations, competing nominees stepped aside and all parties to the 
coalition—Populists, National Republicans, and Regular (Radical) Republicans—settled 
on John N. Pharr, a wealthy sugar planter from the southern part of Louisiana, as the 
Fusion nominee for governor. Pharr had led his planter colleagues out o f the 
Democratic Party in response to the Wilson-Gorman Tariff, possessed sufficient wealth 
to run a plausible campaign, and exhibited enough sympathy toward the Populist 
platform to convince the agrarians that he could be trusted to uphold their interests if  
elected.31
Alliance leader Thomas Scott Adams advocated common political reforms including the 
secret ballot. Dethloff gives Adams substantial credit for actions that resulted in the 
formation of the Citizens' League. The direct quote is found in Dethloff, “Populism and 
Reform in Louisiana,” 153.
31 Hair offers the most complete account of the nominating process and 
speculates that Pharr's wealth and subsequent support o f Populist newspapers eased the
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The New Orleans reform movement did not take part in the nominating process 
as a formal organization, but connections between the city's elite and the sugar planters 
had always been strong. The city's business interests supported tariff protection, and 
many reform supporters had economic or family ties to the sugar regions. The Fusion 
ticket could expect substantial votes from the city, if  not an official endorsement. By 
the time of the election, therefore, Regular Democracy was under siege both at the state 
level and in its largest city. The Regular Democrats fought back, employing legal and 
illegal means. Orators for Foster denounced the Fusion opposition for its left-wing 
tendencies, its disloyalty to the memory of the Civil War and Reconstruction battles, 
and, most energetically, for its implied threat to white supremacy. Pharr’s somewhat 
moderate record on race proved an easy target for such claims.32
At the same time as the state contest, the Citizens' League fought to take back 
the New Orleans mayor's office from the Regulars. The League nominated Walter C. 
Flower, attorney, successful businessman, and former president of the city's Cotton 
Exchange. He accumulated substantial wealth as a cotton broker, but contracted 
tuberculosis and moved from the city to recover his health. After recuperating, he left 
retirement to make the mayoral race. It was his first attempt at elective politics, a 
presumed deficiency in experience that reformers turned into an asset when contrasting 
the League ticket with the Fitzpatrick administration. Although Flower's party
way toward Fusion. Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest, 248-256; Dethloff, 
“Populism and Reform in Louisiana,” 126.
32 Schott, “John M. Parker”, 68-70.
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credentials as a Democrat were somewhat suspect, as a young man he had participated 
in the Battle of Liberty Place, the 1874 revolt against Reconstruction authority that 
achieved mythic status in subsequent years. Charles Janvier, leader of the Citizens' 
League, announced Flower's candidacy a month before the election, and the local 
newspapers mentioned the crucial role that Janvier had played in the selection process.33
The Regulars faced a difficult task in deciding upon their own mayoral candidate 
and accompanying ticket. Fitzpatrick's administration carried the weight of scandal, but 
the mayor still commanded popularity among many voters and, more importantly, the 
loyalty of his Regular colleagues. The selection would normally fall to the Regular 
caucus where Fitzpatrick enjoyed his greatest strength, but this was not a normal 
election. Mindful of the Fusion threat and needing a strong vote from New Orleans, 
Governor Foster intervened and pressured the Regulars to drop the notion of a 
Fitzpatrick candidacy. His influence and that of the press convinced the Regulars to 
select a “clean ticket,” repudiating the “Boodle” council and it current officeholders.
The Regulars prevailed upon Charles F. Buck, incumbent Congressman from the state's 
Second Congressional District in New Orleans, and former City Attorney in the early 
1880s. Buck, bom in Germany in 1841, appealed to the city's significant population of 
German ancestry and provided the Regular ticket with a scandal-free leader.
33 Janvier was a prominent member of the city's elite as a banker and insurance 
executive. In the same year that he worked on behalf of Flower, Janvier reigned as Rex, 
king of the city's annual Mardi Gras festivities. Administrations o f  the Mayors o f  New 
Orleans, 1803-1936, 204-207; Daily Picayune, March 22,1896,4,11; Conrad, A 
Dictionary o f  Louisiana Biography, 309,431; Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern 
City, 50-51; Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 312, 314; Oscar Nussbaum, 
“Progressive Politics in New Orleans,” 52-57; Kendall, History o f  New Orleans, 2: 519.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
42
Nevertheless, he was a member o f the Regulars and considered safe in matters of 
patronage should he be victorious. Fitzpatrick and Ernest B. Kruttschnitt, chairman of 
the state's Democratic Central Committee, personally worked to secure Buck's 
agreement to run.34
The city contest reflected the larger issues fought at the state level, but the 
Citizens' League did not embrace the statewide insurgency. Content to challenge for 
control of New Orleans, the League did not offer its endorsement to Pharr, fearing that 
alliance with the Populists would weaken prospects in the city. In contrast, Pharr and 
his supporters promised complete support to the League’s candidates. In one important 
respect, League strategy mirrored that o f the Fusion effort: both made strenuous efforts 
to secure votes of the city's black population.
In New Orleans, black voters constituted slightly less than one-fourth of the total 
registration, a smaller proportion than in the state as a whole. But the urban minority 
vote tended to be independent, prepared to negotiate in its own interest, and less subject 
to pressure than its rural counterpart. Regulars did not ignore the potential of black 
support, and Ring candidates actively campaigned among black voters. The Republican 
Protective League, an organization o f black voters under the leadership o f the Radical 
Republican faction, sought to bargain between the two competing tickets. Ultimately, 
the League succeeded in this competition. In April, 1896, blacks assembled at a mass
34 Daily Picayune, February 26, 1896, 1; April 3, 1896, 2, 8; April 8, 1896, 1, 4; 
April 11, 1896, 7; April 12,1896, 3; Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 314-315; 
Nussbaum, “Progressive Politics in New Orleans,” 62-63; John F. Nau, The German 
People o f  New Orleans, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1958), 129-130; Kendall, History o f  New 
Orleans, 2: 521-522.
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meeting agreed to support the city's reform ticket and, at the same time, pledged support
to Pharr. Behrman recalled later that:
I remember seeing John Fitzpatrick's office jammed with colored preachers one 
day as the fight was getting h o t.. .  everyone was dressed in black and most of 
them wore long tailed coats. Their leaders conferred with Fitzpatrick again and 
again but they were unable to make arrangements satisfactory to themselves and 
they all went to the Citizens1 League.
Although Behrman does not mention it, a labor dispute along the New Orleans docks
may have contributed to the loss of the black vote for the Regulars. It would be many
decades before the black vote in the city or the state once again had any substantial
affect on the outcome o f an election.35
Foster retained the governor's seat after a bitter fight. Throughout the state,
Regulars harnessed compliant or cowed black voters in an ironic effort to make the state
safe for white politics, while Fusionists fought to protect polling places from Regular
chicanery. By most accounts, Foster's victory resulted from a high degree o f vote
manipulation if not outright fraud. In six rural parishes, for example, the 1890 census
listed only 3,278 white males in the parishes, but over 16,000 votes were counted
overwhelmingly for the Democrats. Pharr, the Fusionist candidate, received only 139 of
these votes. In three other parishes, he received no votes and, in a fourth parish, only
one vote. George Reynolds's study of New Orleans politics asserted that “the election
35 Daily Picayune, March 19, 1896, 13; April 3, 18896, 2; April 19, 1896, 12; 
Dethloff, “Populism and Reform in Louisiana,” 190,261, 312; Kemp, Martin Behrman 
o f  New Orleans, 39-40. Eric Amesen asserted that black leaders supported Flower as a 
reaction to Fitzpatrick’s support of white dock workers in an ugly inter-racial labor 
conflict in 1895. See Eric Amesen, Waterfront Workers o f  New Orleans: Race, Class, 
and Politics, 1863-1923 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 146.
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was the most disorderly ever held in the state. There were charges of fraud, coercion, 
stuffing of ballot boxes, in fact every known election crime.” Reynolds reported that 
eyewitnesses to the election confirmed the extent of the vote manipulation.36
The Fusionists may have lost at the state level, but in New Orleans, Flower 
defeated Buck by over 6,000 votes out o f45,640 cast. The Citizens' League swept 
almost all of the city council positions, losing only two to the Regulars, and elected a 
total of at least nineteen members of the state legislature as well. The results seemed a 
complete defeat for the city machine, and local newspapers that supported the League 
proclaimed the death o f the Ring. Regulars blamed their losses on the Republicans and, 
especially, on the black vote. From the perspective of the 1920s, Martin Behrman 
would recall the election when “the negro vote elected the Citizens' League ticket in 
New Orleans and came very near to electing the Republicans in the state.”37
Foster's victory, though, seriously diluted the League triumph. If  he were 
allowed to take office, New Orleans patronage would continue to flow to the Regulars,
36 The evidence in strong that the Regulars stole the state election from the 
Fusion ticket made up o f Republicans and Populists. See Hair, Bourbonism and 
Agrarian Protest, 248-267; Lawrence Goodwyn, The Populist Moment (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1978), 195-196; Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 
27; Dethloff, “Populism and Reform in Louisiana”, 261-275.
37 Daily Picayune, April 22, 1896, 1; Reynolds, Machine Politics in New 
Orleans, 27-28; Kemp, ed., Mayor Behrman o f  New Orleans, 35; Kendall, History o f  
New Orleans, 2: 523. There is disagreement among the sources regarding the number of 
League legislators. Reynolds gave the figure of nineteen; Hair stated that twenty-seven 
of the new legislature were loyal to the League. Dethloff s figures agreed with Hair, i.e., 
“The league had eighteen in the House and nine in the Senate.” Dethloff, “Populism 
and Reform in Louisiana,” 282. Haas set the figures at seventeen in the House and five 
in the Senate. Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern City, 51.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
45
whose support was crucial to Democratic control of the legislature. The League 
members of that body served alongside thirteen Republicans, eighteen Populists, and 
four Independents. The Fusionists disputed the election o f Foster and hoped that the 
legislature would intervene. The Citizens' League members would be crucial in any 
vote, and Pharr's supporters expected the cooperation of the city reformers. But the 
fragile electoral coalition did not survive even the initial legislative session. Natural 
divisions between the Fusion partners began to emerge, and, by the end of the session, 
the Populists had litde to show for their efforts.38
The legislature convened less than a month after the state and city elections 
amidst rumors that the Fusionists would resort to violence. The League legislators 
agonized over whether to align with Foster or pursue a more independent course. 
Although a majority of the League initially voted to maintain its independence, 
members quickly opted to prove their party loyalty rather than respond to the pleas of 
their recent allies. The legislature's first task was to settle the disputed governor's 
election. Pharr had continued his campaign and urged an inquiry into the suspicious 
returns. The precarious Democratic majority in the legislature combined with the votes 
o f many League members, and the legislature certified Foster’s election by eighty-six to 
forty-eight. League members had a lengthy agenda for the remainder of the session, but 
this initial issue did not bode well for the Fusion effort.39
38 Joy Jackson, “Murphy J. Foster,” 192.
39 New Orleans Times-Democrat, May 15,1896, 2, 4, 5; Schott, “John M.
Parker,” 77-79; Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Reform, 266-267; Nussbaum, 
“Progressive Politics in New Orleans,” 79. Reynolds described Foster's victory margin
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The high point of the Citizen's League influence in the state occurred over the 
following two weeks. The legislature began to consider the election for a U.S. Senator, 
and numerous candidates emerged, including Pharr, McEnery, the 1892 candidate for 
governor, incumbent Newton Blanchard, and Walter D. Denegre, one of the most 
prominent members of the Citizens’ League. Behrman later characterized Denegre as 
“what we called a 'silk stocking,' a term used to designate a man o f wealth and education 
out of touch with the average citizen.” In spite of the League's ill treatment o f the 
Fusion members on the issue of Foster’s contested election, the Regulars’ opponents 
coalesced around Denegre on successive ballots. Faced with an inability to elect 
Blanchard, Foster swallowed his pride and negotiated an agreement to back his 1892 
rival, McEnery, for the position. Blanchard played his role by withdrawing from the 
race, and Denegre was narrowly defeated. Shortly thereafter, Foster appointed 
Blanchard to the Supreme Court of Louisiana. Having lost the prize of the Senate seat, 
the League settled for smaller victories in the legislative session and changed their 
expectations from reform of the state to the task of reforming the city. The Populist 
experiment in Louisiana ail but ended with the election o f 1896, but the new League 
administration in New Orleans and it allies in the state legislature began to introduce 
their version of progressive reform into city government.40
as “a small majority,” but he may be referring to a previous procedural vote. See 
Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 29.
40 Daily Picayune, May 29, 1896, 1; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 
30-31; Dethloff, “Populism and Reform in Louisiana,” 293-296.
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In the state’s largest city, the Regular Democrats had been routed. Newspaper 
headlines proclaimed that the “ring is smashed.” The cycle of reform and Regular 
administrations swung once more toward reform, and the new government began the 
task of preparing New Orleans for the new century. National trends encouraged reform, 
and the spirit of progressive change inspired the Flower administration. But for its 
political success to become permanent, the reformers had to learn the lessons of 
previous efforts to challenge Regular power. It would not be sufficient to bring 
progressive policies to the city. The reformers had to develop the political skills, and 
the level o f comfort with political power, that had made the Regulars so formidable in 
the past and would once again in the not too distant future.
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CHAPTER II
ORIGINS OF THE PROGRESSIVE CITY:
STRUCTURE, SUFFRAGE AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
The political skills of Governor Foster and the strength of regular Democracy 
thwarted the statewide of ambitions of the New Orleans Citizens League. The failure of 
the fusion movement to investigate the gubernatorial election and the defeat of Walter 
D. Denegre in the contest for the U.S. Senate foreclosed any decisive role in state or 
national politics. But the League held substantial power in the legislature and was 
determined to use the state forum to effect change in the city. League members set out a 
far-reaching agenda to revise the city charter, to reform election procedures, and to 
establish governmental structures that would transform not only the means of 
government but also the physical infrastructure of New Orleans. The legislative actions 
promoted by the League set the conditions for the emergence of progressive New 
Orleans and the shape of the city well into the twentieth century.
The actions of the Regulars produced similarly far-reaching effects. The 
disputed gubernatorial race, and the close call for the Regular candidate for the United 
States Senate, set the strategies of the Democratic leadership. In quick succession, the 
Regulars solidified control of the legislature, agreed to call a constitutional convention, 
limited the convention agenda to prevent most Populist reforms, and passed restrictive
48
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laws to control the electorate that would choose convention delegates. The explicit 
purpose of the planned new constitution was the disfranchisement of Louisiana's black 
voters. The Democratic leaders faced a dilemma. The disfranchisement of blacks 
would reduce the majority that could be counted on in the many rural parishes; yet the 
failure to disfranchise allowed the continued possibility o f a Populist-Black or 
Reformer-Black alliance. Democratic fears o f such a combination increased after the 
1896 Pharr candidacy, during which his platform condemned lynching, his campaign 
remarks supported black voting, and the Fusion ticket recorded significant numbers of 
black votes.1
New Orleans Democrats confronted a set of circumstances opposite from their 
rural counterparts. Although Regular Democrats in the rural areas of the state controlled 
the majority of the black vote, the New Orleans black electorate exercised considerable 
independence.2 Disfranchisement would rid the Regulars o f the threat posed by the 
city's independent black voters, but many o f the proposed schemes of disfranchisement 
risked a reduction of the votes of poor whites—particularly the rapidly-growing Italian
1 For accounts of the politics of disfranchisement, see Hair, Bourbonism and 
Agrarian Protest, 255-256, 274-279; Kousser, The Shaping o f  Southern Politics,
152-165; Matthew J. Schott, "Progressives Against Democracy: Electoral Reform in 
Louisiana, 1894-1921," Louisiana History 20 (Summer 1979): 247-260; Goodwyn, The 
Populist Moment: A Short History o f  the Agrarian Revolt in America, 195.
2 The independence of the state's black vote depended on a number of factors: 
the extent of intimidation, level of economic pressure, and the absence or presence o f an 
alternative to the regular organization. Hair provided results for the 1896 election 
which showed a fusionist win in East Baton Rouge parish. He explained the victory in 
part because o f an independent black vote made possible by conflict between factions of 
the regular Democrats. Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest, 263.
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immigrant population. The New Orleans Regulars backed Foster, the winning candidate 
in the 1896 gubernatorial race, but lost the city elections to the Citizens' League. The 
city results frightened the machine leadership at all levels in the state because the 
Citizens' League's victory, based on an alliance of reformers, Republicans, and blacks, 
was an object lesson of the risks to Regular rule of fusion movements. Even though the 
rural parishes’ heavily black population could be counted on to remain Democratic, the 
prospect of losing the urban base of New Orleans helped move the legislature toward 
disfranchisement.3
The Citizens' League had abandoned their Populist allies by supporting Foster's 
claim to the governorship. The League thereby lost any chance of establishing a solid, 
state-wide reform group in opposition to the Regulars. Such a combination was 
unlikely from the start, given the vast economic differences between the two groups; yet 
the ease with which the League broke ranks with their colleagues provided an indication 
o f reform weakness that would affect the next municipal elections. What bound the 
reformers together—antagonism toward the machine—broke down in the face of calls for 
party and racial solidarity. The 1896 fusion with Populists and blacks had been tenuous 
from the beginning (the League never formally endorsed the Fusion candidate for 
governor), and within a few weeks after the election, the Citizens’ League’s loyalty to
3 The city's Italian population increased by more than 100 percent from 1890 to 
1900. The 1890 total of foreign-born Italians was 7,767; by 1900 that figure had grown 
to 16,560. The Italian population in New Orleans tended to cluster into a limited 
number of distinct neighborhoods, which increased its political effectiveness at the ward 
level. Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 13.
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party proved stronger than Fusion politics. Moreover, the political performance of the 
League in the 1896 legislature suggested an amateurish inconsistency and insufficient 
appreciation of the uses of power.4
The black voters of New Orleans, who had provided substantial electoral support 
for reform efforts in the city, fared no better. When the state legislature moved toward 
disfranchisement, ostensibly in the name o f reform, the League quickly abandoned its 
meager efforts at biracial politics. Anxious to prove their credentials on the issue of 
race and to certify their loyalty to the Democratic Party, the reform bloc supported 
disfranchisement. Blacks were left with no legislative support. Neither the rural nor 
urban branch of the Regulars strayed from a commitment to disfranchisement. The 
Populists resented the manipulation of the rural black vote and did not sufficiently 
appreciate the potential o f an electoral coalition based on economic class. And the 
urban reformers cynically abandoned a group that helped bring them to power in New 
Orleans.5
4 The breakdown of the coalition continued on the issue of a constitutional 
convention. Populists sought an unrestricted convention, but the Regulars rejected the 
call and received League support for their more restrictive convention. New Orleans 
Times-Democrat, May 30, 1896, 2; Nussbaum, 83-86.
5 Schott, "John M. Parker," 76-80; Schott, "Progressives Against Democracy: 
Electoral Reform in Louisiana, 1894-1921," 253. In the latter work, Schott presents 
evidence that the reformers were not reflexively anti-black, and that disfranchisement 
was not part of the formal Citizens' League program. For an examination of the 
argument that disfranchisement constituted a progressive reform in the mind of southern 
reformers, see Jack Temple Kirby, Darkness at the Dawning: Race and Reform in the 
Progressive South.
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The city contingent of Regulars in the legislature wanted to reduce or eliminate 
black voting, but took care to preserve the votes of immigrants and other poor whites 
who provided strong support at election time. Ironically, this concern aided the interests 
o f one element of the Fusionists—the rural poor, stronghold of agrarian dissent. With 
almost unanimous support from the city reformers, the legislation that called the 
constitutional convention and restricted suffrage passed. Although white registration 
declined in New Orleans as the result o f this action, the city Regulars managed to 
preserve an important part of their base through protection for poor white voters. 
Statewide, the Regular Democrats faced somewhat less o f a threat from the Populist 
tendencies of poor whites, although the normally compliant rural black vote declined as 
well. The legislation that proposed revision o f  the constitution also stipulated a 
referendum on whether or not to hold the convention. The election of delegates to the 
proposed convention was scheduled at the same time, January, 1898. Assuming a 
favorable vote, the constitutional convention would follow one month later. Legislators 
placed certain limitations on the work of the convention, but examination of suffrage 
rights clearly held center stage.6
The call for the constitutional convention was the most important work of the 
1896 legislature, but other crucial pieces of legislation followed. The same legislature 
that called the constitutional convention also dealt with a backlog of municipal 
problems. The Citizens’ League vowed to reform the city charter, renew the registration
6 Schott, “Progressives Against Democracy: Electoral Reform in Louisiana, 
1894-1921,” 247-260; Schott, "JohnM. Parker," 82;
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laws, revise the election laws in favor of a secret ballot, fight the abominable sanitary 
conditions of the city, and address the needs of city merchants, especially those 
concerned with the conditions of the city wharves. This agenda involved the state 
legislature because the state exercised substantial power over the city’s finances and 
possessed the ability to propose amendments to the state constitution. Although home 
rule provisions guaranteed a measure of independence to New Orleans, the city’s 
infrastructure needs constituted a degree of change that required participation of the 
state. In addition, governmental forms had evolved during the 1880s and 1890s to 
include alternatives to direct control by city government. As progressive opinion 
developed in local government, the trend toward utilizing boards and commissions 
increased. The Citizens’ League controlled the New Orleans government and 
maintained significant strength in the Louisiana legislature. Many League members, 
drawn from the professional and commercial elite, harbored suspicion toward pure 
democracy and, perhaps, anticipated a time when the Regulars might regain control of 
the city. Insulating certain functions of govemment—and the associated revenue sources 
—from the city council appealed to the League. Progressives often sought to balance a 
professed belief in the efficacy of people with their attraction to expertise, if  not elitism.7
7 Samuel P. Hays, “The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the 
Progressive Era,”Pacific Northwest Quarterly 55 (October, 1964): 157-169. Daniel 
Rogers wrote “the progressives appeal to ‘the people’ is a more complicated example of 
the phenomenon [of language use]. . .  but one of the reasons for the triumph o f that 
particularly elastic phrase . .  .was that it allowed those who sincerely believed in a 
government serving the needs of ‘the people’ to camouflage from voters the acute 
distrust many o f those same persons harbored of political egalitarianism.” Rogers, “In 
Search o f Progressivism,” 122.
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The city and state had depended upon boards and commissions even before the 
1890s. In the post-Reconstruction era, debt problems plagued both the city and the 
state. A good credit rating proved impossible, and banks limited loans to government. 
The city and state established the New Orleans Board of Liquidation in response and 
gradually rebuilt confidence in city finances. But the city agreed to circumscribe its 
fiscal independence severely. The Board enjoyed first rights to city revenue and pledged 
the first proceeds to bond holders and other creditors. The city was unable to enter into 
additional long-term debt without the permission of the Board. The most significant 
Board power was in the area of membership. After the initial members were named, the 
Board enjoyed self-perpetuating power of appointment. Vacancies caused by 
resignation or death were filled by the remaining Board members. Although city 
government enjoyed representation on the Board of Liquidation, the elected members 
were in a perpetual minority to the other members.8
The New Orleans Board of Liquidation of City Debt proved an effective model 
for the legislature and a precursor to progressive restructuring o f governmental 
administrative units. Creating such agencies allowed the legislature to address 
important governmental functions, but keep direct control out of the hands o f the city 
council-even one dominated by the Citizens’ League. Throughout its tenure, the 
legislature elected in 1896 consistently approved changes to the constitution and passed 
statutes in favor of a devolution o f authority from the council to other bodies. Two such
8 Carl E. Hyde, Jr, “The Origins of the New Orleans Board of Liquidation of the 
City Debt, 1876-1882" (Unpublished seminar paper: University of New Orleans, 1993).
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innovations occurred in the first session o f the legislature: the formation of a city 
Drainage Commission and the establishment of the Board o f Commissioners of the Port 
of New Orleans. At the end of its term, the legislature, in a special session of 1899, 
created another independent agency by passing the enabling legislation that established 
the Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans.9
Agitation for a state takeover of the city docks began with complaints from 
shippers and merchants concerned about the conditions o f the river front. A city council 
committee investigated the purchase of the private contract under which a corporation 
administered the wharves, but concluded that the estimated price of $450,000 was too 
high. A committee of the city’s commercial exchanges considered legal action to 
abrogate the contract, but no action took place. A port commission bill passed both 
houses of the state legislature by the end o f June, 1896, with support from both the 
reform and Regular factions, and the governor signed the legislation shortly thereafter.
A Daily Picayune editorial called the legislation “among the measures of great 
importance to the people of New Orleans.” The newspaper further claimed that the 
legislation “promises to secure for this city a permanent lowering o f port charges as well 
as an economic and businesslike administration of the docking facilities.” During the 
same session, at the request of Citizens’ League members, the legislature passed laws 
revising the city charter and instituting a system of civil service. But the success of the 
League at the legislature did not produce the normal patronage rewards. Governor
9 See Chapters VI and VII.
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Foster continued to favor the Regulars, and the “League was left out in the cold as 
regards patronage.” 10
The League could take some comfort in its control of New Orleans. Its 
impressive city victory over the Regulars secure, the Citizens' League sought to make its 
power permanent. Members recognized that one of the failings of previous reform 
efforts was a lack of formal structure. Groups of politically active opponents of the 
Regulars formed organizations prior to elections, but rarely survived for more than a few 
months. Reform groups attracted members of the professions and businessmen, not all 
o f whom were ambitious to serve in elective office. Nor were they willing to make the 
financial sacrifices that election and service as public officials demanded. After 
hard-fought elections, members returned to other interests, and political control could 
not be sustained even in those instances when the reformers were victorious. To counter 
this tendency, the League copied the machine’s organizational structure based on wards 
and precincts, incorporated as a permanent association, and established a headquarters. 
“Periodical revolutions are no longer to be endured,” asserted one League spokesman. 
More important, the League moved to control patronage, its support for civil service 
reform notwithstanding. In December, 1896, over two hundred persons signed the 
charter and selected Charles Janvier as president.11
10 Daily Picayune, June 5, 1896,4, 12; July 2, 1896, 1; July 3, 1896, 3; July 7, 
1896, 4.
11 Even before the election, Charles Janvier had attacked the Regulars and called 
for permanent changes in the city charter and civil service. Daily Picayune, February 
26, 1896. For the post-election organization changes, see Charles Janvier, "Municipal 
Reform in New Orleans," Proceedings o f  the Louisville Conference fo r  Good City
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The organization o f the Citizens’ League attempted to duplicate the centralized 
characteristics o f its political rival. In addition to Janvier, the group elected five vice- 
presidents, a secretary, and a treasurer. The president exercised considerable power in 
appointing an executive committee, which included one member from each o f the city's 
wards as well as ten at-laxge members. The charter granted the executive committee the 
responsibility for “the entire control and management of the business of the League.” 
However, the League's ambivalence to political power led to inherent contradictions. In 
an organization ostensibly dedicated to the acquisition and exercise of political and 
governmental power, members tried to divorce governance of the League from office- 
holding. Article V of the charter specifically prohibited League officers and members 
of the Executive Committee from holding elective office. In the League, adherence to 
an idealized view o f reform separated office-holding from the leadership o f  the private 
political organization. In its charter, the League adhered to its principles by specifically 
legislating such a division, though there was no evidence that such exaggerated purity 
influenced the electorate at large. Even as successful League members governed the 
city and sought legislative change, the charter expressed the organization’s views on the 
necessity of disinterested officials. In the Regular organization, power flowed from the 
influence of the elected leadership and its day-to-day connection with the machinery of 
government. Most Regular leaders held government posts that kept them in touch with
Government and o f  the Third Annual Meeting o f  the National Municipal League 
(Philadelphia: National Municipal League, 1897), 216-217; Daily Picayune, May 2, 
1896,1; Edward Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern City, 39-59. Haas's work 
provides the best summary o f the characteristics of League members.
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voters and provided a dynamic critique of policy. The League attempted to copy the 
Regular organization, but in its zeal to demonstrate political purity, cut off its leadership 
from the practical side of public administration. In its organization, the League fell far 
short of what was necessary for political permanence.12
Stung by the defeat o f their city ticket in 1896. the Regulars moved to reorganize 
as soon as possible. The Crescent Democratic Club, formed in 1891, had provided the 
political vehicle for the Regulars, but its usefulness disappeared along with the 
Fitzpatrick scandals and Buck's defeat. In November, 1896, members of the club moved 
to dissolve, but, within a month, a committee of Regulars convened to organize a 
successor association. The initial meeting occurred only a few  days after the official 
formation of the Citizens’ League. The “new Democratic club” selected the name 
"Choctaw" in imitation of the successful Tammany organization and drafted a charter 
outlining three purposes: "to uphold and advance Democratic principles; to promote 
harmony, enjoyment, and literary improvements; and to provide the conveniences of a 
Club House." Martin Behrman later acknowledged the New York antecedents o f the 
use of an Indian name, and recalled in his memoirs that club historians listed 
Chicamauga, Houma, and Tensas~all Louisiana tribes—as other possibilities.13
Although contemporary accounts of the organizational meetings do not mention 
the role o f the governor, Behrman later credited his influence. "Foster. . .  combined the
12 For details of the League organization, see the New Orleans Daily States, 
December 13-19, 1896; Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern City, 39-41.
13 New Orleans Times-Democrat, December 30, 1896, 12; Kemp, Martin 
Behrman o f  New Orleans, 34-35; Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern City, 20-23.
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city organization and the parish politicians more completely into one faction than they
have ever been since then.”14 Specifically , Foster continued his patronage support o f the
Regulars, as he had after the 1892 elections. In appointing Regulars to state offices, he
ignored the League control o f the city administration. Behrman wrote:
Foster's appointment o f regulars to state offices in New Orleans after [their] 
defeat by the Citizens' League was, in my opinion the beginning of the “city 
organization” known as the regulars. These appointments gave him a following 
o f about half the leaders in New Orleans. When he came to New Orleans and 
mixed in local politics, he did it openly. He did not send friends or agents but 
came himself and the [New Orleans] Times-Democrat thought this was a very 
wicked proceeding.
Behrman was not a neutral observer. Within a month, Foster named him and four of his 
Regular colleagues as tax assessors for the city, powerful offices often associated with 
ward and city leadership. Any property owner displeased with an assessment could 
make a personal appeal to the assessor, who often granted relief based on the political 
inclinations o f the petitioner. Other Choctaw members received appointments to boards 
and commissions, such as the Dock Board, crucial to a continuation of patronage for 
loyal party members, the “very life blood for a machine struggling to be bom.”15
The governor's interests revealed the partisan nature o f  the New Orleans rivalry 
as well as the extent o f the influence the Choctaw Club might have in statewide
14 Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 33; Haas, Political Leadership in 
a Southern City, 23-21; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 34-36,57, and 
343-347. Kemp provided a copy of the charter of the Choctaw club in an appendix to 
the Behrman memoirs. Officers filed the charter in March, 1897, but the essentials of 
the new organization were in place by the end of the previous year.
15 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 34; Haas, Political Leadership in a 
Southern City, 27; Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 33.
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contests. “The welfare o f the country,” the charter proclaimed, “shall be determined and 
guided by the principles of the Democratic Party.” This identification between the 
Choctaws and the Democratic Party formed the basis o f Behrman's assertion that “In 
those days, the Choctaws did not represent a faction. They represented the Democratic 
Party.. . .  The Choctaws were good Democrats who organized against a Republican 
party in Louisiana and a combination o f Republicans and ‘reformer’ Democrats in New 
Orleans.”16
Unlike the Citizens’ League, the Choctaw Club charter had no prohibition 
against its leadership holding elective office. Club members embraced political life, not 
only for the obvious patronage benefits, but also for the functional necessity of politics 
as a means to various ends. Behrman commented in his memoirs that “the theory that a 
thing can be done because it is a good thing to do seems to run through a great deal of 
what I have read about city government. That is not true.” He and his colleagues knew 
that municipal action flowed from electoral power, not good intentions. Article 2 of the 
Choctaw Club charter asserted “that it is the duty of every good citizen to take not only a 
deep interest, but also an active part in the political affairs o f the country.” Writing in 
the 1930s, George Reynolds put it more bluntly: “Professional politicians organized the 
Choctaw Club and have always dominated it.” The professional nature of the Choctaw 
Club and the political practices of its members suggested that the progressive ideal of 
expertise extended to electoral politics. The bureaucratization of American life at the 
turn of the century included not only governmental agencies, but also professional and
16 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 35-36.
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voluntary associations. The many examples o f urban political machines—especially 
when viewed apart from the value questions o f patronage and corruption-constituted 
further examples of society’s “search for order” and pursuit o f expertise.17
Attempts to characterize the differences between the League and the Choctaw 
Club, and, more generally, between “reform” organizations and their “machine” rivals, 
often depends on an analysis of what the competing groups said about themselves and 
each other. Representatives o f the two groups adopted stock rhetorical devices to 
distinguish themselves from their political enemies, and this led historians to adopt 
simplistic portrayals of the competing organizations. The upper and upper-middle class 
reform rhetoric emphasized purity of motive, the disinterested nature of reformers’ 
actions, criticism of the political process (particularly voting procedures), the corrupt 
nature of the opposition, and economy in government. By the end o f the 1890s, reform 
rhetoric also emphasized the assumed virtues of “business” and the “businessman,” who 
would bring efficiency to a boss-ridden system. Citizens’ League President Charles 
Janvier emphasized the honesty of League candidates and mocked the Regulars’ efforts 
to construct a “clean ticket” in 1896. His colleague Charles Claiborne, candidate for 
city council, told a League rally that there were no “issues in the election,” not “the 
tariff nor protection,” but only “good government against bad.” League spokesman A.
G. Romain characterized the 1896 election as “the people against fraud, bribery, and 
plunder;” H. Dickson Bruns called it “honesty against dishonesty.” Walter Denegre
17 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 344; Reynolds, Machine Politics in 
New Orleans, 33.
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proclaimed a League victory necessary for the “honest and efficient management of the 
affairs of the city.” And Bernard McCloskey asked rhetorically, “Who shall be the 
directors of this great corporation known as the city of New Orleans?”18
In contrast, the oratory of the Regulars highlighted achievements in government, 
party loyalty, racial solidarity, references to southern history, especially Reconstruction, 
and the amateurism and hypocrisy of the self-styled reformers. The Regulars’ self- 
identification with the Democratic Party—the party of the Confederacy-provided the 
theme most utilized in support of “Regular Democracy” and against opponents o f all 
stripes. Regulars in the New Orleans elections of 1896 and 1900 also played on public 
fears of monopoly and corporate power. In elections such as 1892 or 1896 when 
specific issues such as the lottery or the recent municipal scandals dominated, speakers 
integrated the traditional themes with those more timely issues. In fighting the Citizens’ 
League in 1896, Ernest B. Kruttschnitt called for racial solidarity and characterized the 
members of the League as “traitors to the Democratic Party.” Regular Democrat S. A. 
Montgomery told a rally that “Citizens League members were Republicans,” and labor 
leader James Leonard declared them “anti-labor.” In a later election, Regular candidates 
continued to assert that “Democrats are the party of the people,” and the leader of a city 
ward claimed he was “proud to be a ward boss by the voice o f the people.” In 
comparing reform and Regular platforms, one candidate noted that the Regulars
18 The illustrative remarks come from the 1896 campaign o f the Citizens’ League 
in New Orleans, but are typical of reform campaigns throughout the period under study. 
Daily Picayune, April 2, 1896, 1, 9.
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declared in favor o f “home white labor,” but the reformers had placed only the words 
“home labor” in their platform. Captain Fitzpatrick connected the reform candidates to 
the city’s prominent banks, insurance companies, and the leadership of Tulane 
University. Charles J. Theard, a supporter of the Citizens’ League in 1896, “came back” 
to the Regulars in 1899 and charged that independent movements “not only threaten to 
dismpt the party, but threaten you with a return to Republicanism. . .  and tend to 
degrade politics by setting a premium upon political dishonesty and disloyalty.”19
In Political Leadership in a Southern City: New Orleans in the Progressive Era, 
1896-1902, Edward F. Haas provided a careful analysis o f the memberships o f the 
League and the Choctaw Club. His statistics revealed information on age, education, 
wealth, and other aspects of the participants. Haas’s analysis offered evidence about the 
nature of the groups beyond the assertions of campaign orators, but the data failed to 
support the existence o f dramatic differences between the rival political factions. Haas’s 
basic comparison relied primarily on memberships lists from the Citizens' League 
charter in 1896 and, for the Choctaw Club, the charter membership in 1897 and a 
subsequent list published in 1902. The different years from which the lists were drawn 
raised questions about the significance of the data, particularly given the movement of 
Citizens' League members into the Choctaw Club at the end of the century. But the 
distributions of membership characteristics remained essentially the same whether or 
not the analysis accounted for duplicated membership. The transfer of a segment of the
19 Daily Picayune, April 1,1896, 6; September 19, 1899, 8; September 27,1899, 
7; October 1, 1899, Section I, 8, 9.
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Citizens' League membership into that of the Choctaw Club did not alter the differences 
(or lack o f differences) between the two groups.20
What were those differences? Apart from patterns of electoral speech, what 
characteristics of participants provided insight into policy decisions and electoral 
choices? Place of birth, indicative of standing in the community or of association with 
tradition, did not separate the groups. A higher percentage of Regulars were bom in 
Louisiana; slightly more Citizen's League members were bom outside of Louisiana, but 
most were bom in the South. In education, the two groups shared similarities: 
approximately thirty-seven percent of members of both had college and/or professional 
education, and distribution among other education categories did not vary significantly 
between the Citizens’ League and the Choctaw Club. The data confirms the widespread 
assertions that reform groups drew most heavily from business interests, but the 
percentage of Regulars with backgrounds in business closely tracks that in the League.21
Closer examination of the data, however, reveals several interesting patterns.
One trend is the distribution of membership within the city. Canal Street bifurcated
20 Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern City, 105-120 (statistical tables) and 
123-155 (a listing o f membership). Twenty-seven League members became Choctaw 
Club members by 1902, approximately eleven percent of the original sample of 235 
League members identified by Haas. Specific membership listings allow isolation of 
this group. A sample of the original Haas figures were reworked to correct for the 
duplication factor, but no significant variations emerged.
21 Haas reported that the business and professional members of the League 
totaled 68.5 percent and 28.1 percent respectively. The corresponding figures for the 
Choctaw Club were 60.2 percent and 29.6 percent. Only in the category of skilled labor 
did the distribution vary significantly: 8.2 percent for the Regulars versus 3 percent for 
the League, although the low number of skilled workers among League members (seven 
out of 235) reduces the statistical level of confidence in comparing the two numbers.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
65
New Orleans on a course perpendicular to the Mississippi River. The areas o f the city 
downriver from Canal Street included the French Quarter, the oldest section o f the city, 
and the Fourth through the Ninth Wards. Algiers, part of the city but on the west bank 
of the Mississippi, made up the city's Fifteenth Ward. The remainder of the seventeen 
wards were located upriver from Canal Street and included the wealthy, ante-bellum 
neighborhood known as the Garden District. Over three-quarters o f League members 
lived upriver of Canal Street; nearly fifty-five percent inhabited the fashionable Tenth 
through Fourteenth Wards. Approximately sixty-five percent of the Regulars lived 
uptown, but only thirty-two percent had homes in the most desirable wards.
The choice of residence reflected wealth differences most apparent at the upper 
end of the economic spectrum: nearly forty-five percent of the League member had 
taxable wealth in excess of $10,000, while only twenty-four percent of the Regulars did. 
Louis Grunewald and Orris McClelland, the two wealthiest Choctaw members in 1902, 
were both members of the Citizen's League in 1896. An additional divergence between 
the two groups lay in the area o f club memberships. Choctaw members joined the 
volunteer fire companies at a rate of over five times that o f the League members and 
were more than twice as likely to join the Elks. On the other hand, League members 
joined the exclusive Boston Club at four times the rate of their Choctaw counterparts, 
and were fifty percent more likely to be members of the Pickwick Club.22
22 Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern City, Tables 7, 8, 12, 14 20, 21, 25 
and 27. The wealth differential may have been even greater than Haas measured, since 
most of his figures for the Citizens' League predated those of the Choctaw Club by five 
years or more.
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Coupled with the information on wealth and residence, the club information 
paints a picture o f the Citizens' League members distinguished from the Regulars by 
social class rather than by ideology. Reformers, concentrated in exclusive 
neighborhoods and sharing membership in even more exclusive clubs, complained 
about taxes, inefficiency in government, and dishonesty, thereby reinforcing their innate 
suspicions of the Regulars, most of whom did not come from the “better element.” The 
Regulars returned the antagonism and held the reformers in contempt for being out of 
touch with the majority of the population. Behrman, for example, nurtured a healthy 
skepticism toward the uptown Citizens’ League members, “the silk stocking element in 
politics.”
In those days the words “silk stocking” were used to point out a type of citizen 
who knew all about municipal government because he read magazines and books 
and the Life of Jefferson and did not know where to file his complaint if the 
garbage man did not come around early enough to suit him. The high class silk 
stocking always knew what led to the fall of the Roman empire, but he did not 
seem to know that the bulk of the voters were more interested in schools, police, 
firemen, the charity hospital, the parks and squares and labor troubles than the 
Roman empire.23
In addition to class distinctions, the data on occupational background revealed 
differences between the two groups in patterns o f employment. The Haas compilation 
emphasized the occupation of each member without regard to government employment; 
no category accounts for those who held full time government positions, including those 
elected or appointed. Thus, occupational listings for Citizens' League members during
23 In New Orleans, the geography and residential patterns led the terms 
“upriver,” “uptown,” and “above Canal” to carry social as well as geographical 
implications. For Behrman's comments, see Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 
106-108. See also, Schott, “The New Orleans Machine and Progressivism,” 145.
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1896-97 indicated that nearly twelve percent enjoyed government employment; the 
figure rises to seventeen percent if elected council members are included. (Council 
members were not considered full time government employees because they were able 
to maintain other employment.) For the Choctaw Club, over twenty-seven percent held 
government jobs in 1902, a figure that rises only slightly if  council members are 
included. Regardless of background, many Choctaw Club members viewed political 
participation as either a means to obtain or keep government employment, or a by­
product of that employment. The difference between the two groups also reflected the 
relationship with the governor enjoyed by the Regulars, which resulted in state positions 
for many members of the Choctaw club. Thus, in their contest for political supremacy, 
the two groups shared many characteristics, but differed in social standing, wealth, and 
attitude toward government employment. The similarities allowed a gradual 
convergence of the two organizations; the differences persisted for decades, and arose in 
bitterly fought campaigns.24
By the beginning of 1897, the two factions dominated the city’s political 
landscape and seemed to add a degree of stability, especially compared to previous 
years. The Citizens' League had delivered on its promise to organize a permanent 
opposition to the Regulars, and the Regular organization, reorganized under fresh 
leadership, prepared to distance itself from the Fitzpatrick scandals. But 1898 would 
upset the temporary tranquility, as the state's call for a constitutional convention came
24 Author's calculations, drawn from the detailed membership listings in Haas, 
Political Leadership in a Southern City.
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before the voters, and political loyalties broke down. The product of that convention 
upset the political balance and provided the conditions to return the Regulars to power 
for an unprecedented five terms. Throughout those terms, the basic political and 
electoral conflicts between the Choctaw club and various reform groups played out in a 
manner familiar to the New Orleans scene.
Revision of the state's basic law had occurred in 1864, 1868, and 1879 amidst 
Reconstruction and its aftermath. If  the voters agreed to a convention in 1898, the 
delegates would revise the constitution created by the 1879 convention. That meeting 
had considered the suffrage question, but declined to explicitly confront the Fifteenth 
Amendment. Among the 134 delegates in 1879 were thirty Republicans and seven 
blacks, enough of a voice to lend support to the state's black voters. In addition, the 
delegates were aware of the risk of a declining labor pool caused by black departures 
from the state, and, in the early days of their deliberations, passed a resolution to 
reassure the state's black residents by specifically rejecting any diminution of civil 
rights. The convention eventually extended suffrage to all adult male citizens, though it 
authorized a poll tax and tightened residency requirements. Attempts to extend the 
suffrage to women failed.25
25 Ronald M. Labbe, “The Reign of Robbery Will Never Return to Louisiana: 
The Constitution of 1879,” Warren G. Billings and Edward M. Haas, editors, In Search 
o f  Fundamental Law: Louisiana's Constitutions, 1812-1974 (Lafayette: Center for 
Louisiana Studies, 1993), 86-87. See also, Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 
20. Regarding the issue of women's suffrage, Labbe cites the New Orleans Times 
defending the decision to withhold the right to vote for women on the basis that 
Louisiana politics was too “dark and dismal” to include the work of women.
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In January, 1898, a state election affirmed the call for the constitutional 
convention, and voters chose the delegates to rewrite the basic law. The vote for the 
convention was 36,178 in favor and 7,578 opposed. In the delegate vote, Martin 
Behrman won election from Algiers, a New Orleans neighborhood on the west side of 
the Mississippi, somewhat isolated from the rest of the city. He attributed the light 
turnout to the inevitability' o f the convention since “when the results of the election are 
absolutely certain, the vote is not usually very heavy.” Later observers mentioned the 
drop in registration due to suffrage restrictions imposed by the legislature and by the 
confusion caused by a complicated ballot process. The strict requirements for voting 
imposed by statute in 1896 had reduced total registration by over half. Black 
registration fell by ninety percent.26
All accounts of the 1898 convention mention its domination by the Regular 
Democrats, whose party controlled all but two of the 134 delegates, one Republican and 
one Populist. Ernest Kruttschnitt o f New Orleans, chair o f the Democratic Party State 
Central Committee, served as convention president. When the convention met on 
February 8, 1898, he set the tone early in the proceedings by characterizing the 
convention as “little more than a family meeting of the Democratic Party of the State of 
Louisiana.” Two prominent New Orleanians—T. J. Semmes o f the Judiciary Committee 
and former Mayor John Fitzpatrick of the Committee on New Orleans— became chairs
26 Report o f  the Secretary o f  State, 1898, 145, quoted in Reynolds, Machine 
Politics in New Orleans, 35; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 40; Hair, 
Bourbonism and Agrarian Reform, 275; Michael Lanza, “Little More than a Family 
Matter: The Constitution of 1898,” in Billings and Haas, Louisiana Constitutions, 98.
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o f important committees, but the primary work of the convention lay in the hands of the
Committee on Suffrage and Elections, chaired by T. F. Bell o f  Caddo Parish, home to
the state's second largest city, Shreveport.27
In addition to his characterization of the convention as a “family meeting,”
Kruttschnitt's opening address to his colleagues delineated the purpose o f the gathering:
We are all aware that this convention has been called by the people of the state 
of Louisiana principally to deal with one question, and we know that but for the 
existence of that one question this assemblage would not be sitting here today... 
to eliminate from the electorate the mass o f corrupt and illiterate voters who 
have degraded our politics during the last quarter of a  century.
Behrman's recollections were less subtle: “The main purpose of that convention was to
put the negroes out of politics.” The delegates highlighted the importance of the
suffrage issue by making its settlement the first order of business; the convention took
no other actions until it appointed the Committee on Suffrage and Elections and then
settled on the method of disfranchisement.28
Delegates could choose from a range o f options in the disfranchisement process.
The 1896 changes in state registration laws proved efficacious, reducing black and poor
white suffrage. Various other tactics included refinement of the poll tax, education or
property qualifications, and the understanding clause. But these changes posed a danger
27 Lanza, “The Constitution of 1898,” 98-99 in Billings and Haas, Louisiana 
Constitutions', Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 34-35.
28 Kruttschnitt’s remarks can be found in the Official Journal, Louisiana 
Constitutional Convention, 1898, 9. See also Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 
39-41 and Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 35. Behrman had hoped to 
serve the convention as a member of the committee on suffrage and elections, but was 
appointed to the committee on New Orleans affairs.
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to various constituencies, particularly to the New Orleans Democrats. Broad brush 
education and property qualifications threatened the votes o f poor whites. To counter 
those effects, Frank. A. Monroe, judge and Regular stalwart from the city, proposed a 
grandfather clause, providing the vote to descendants of voters eligible in 1868. The 
clause covered mostly whites otherwise unable to qualify for suffrage under the new 
rules. Special provisions were added to ease restrictions on recent immigrants. 
Additionally, the city Regulars opposed the poll tax, but reached a compromise with tax 
supporters that allowed its imposition after the elections of 1900.29
The city Democrats emerged with the best of both worlds: the elimination of the 
black vote, which in New Orleans was not subject to Regular control, and the 
preservation of a large part o f their natural constituency. Members of the 1894 Ballot 
Reform League and the Citizens' League that brought the reformers to power in 1896 
could not afford to oppose the convention or the new constitution. Their political 
history contained more than a few dalliances with Republicans, Populists, and blacks.
In the new electorate, the Democratic Party had achieved an enviable position in the 
white popular imagination. Racial solidarity demanded a loyalty to the party, now seen 
as the architect of the new constitution and preserver of white supremacy. As in 
previous elections, the Regulars would remind voters of the role of the party in the 
history of the South, but now an additional part of that history became available.
29 Daily Picayune, March 1, 1898,4,13; March 2, 1898, 1; March 3, 1898, 4; 
March 4, 1898, 1,4; March 5, 1898,4, 9; Lanza, “The Constitution of 1898", 100-105; 
Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern City, 80.
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Regulars presented themselves not only as Redeemers, but also as the authors of the 
state constitution that effectively eliminated the black vote. When New Orleans 
elections occurred in 1899, the city Democratic organization would benefit from the 
convention's work. And in the event that any lingering protest vote remained, the 
Democrats in control of the state added one more provision to their handiwork: the new 
constitution would go into effect without facing a referendum.30
The adoption of the 1898 constitution represented a watershed in the politics o f 
the state. The results of disfranchisement marginalized the opponents to the Democratic 
Party by assuring that dissident groups could not mobilize the black vote. For city 
reformers, long suspected of weak party loyalty to the Democrats, the constitution 
drastically reduced opportunities for political maneuvering. The Citizens’ League 
victories for mayor and the city council did not survive the political revolution. The 
League had come to power in part because of black voters in New Orleans. Those votes 
were no longer available. The changes o f the 1898 constitution~and the political skill 
o f the Regulars—led to the familiar pattern of reform administrations: electoral victory 
followed by vain attempts at permanence. But during the four years o f its tenure, with 
the cooperation of its colleagues in the state legislature, the League helped to initiate 
municipal changes that would far outlast its electoral success.
30 Schott offers a brief discussion of J. Morgan Kousser's thesis on the politics o f 
disfranchisement—namely, that the partisan dimension was paramount in the plans o f 
the constitution—in "Progressives Against Democracy," 254-255. See also Schott's 
comments regarding the disfranchising convention in the same article, 254.
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As the municipal elections of 1899 approached, neither the League’s permanent 
organization nor its record of achievement could overcome the changing political 
environment. But the League’s contributions to the city would survive. Not only its 
leadership but also its ideas would be absorbed by the Choctaw Club. The legislation 
establishing independent boards and commissions would not be reversed, and the work 
of those new entities would go on. The progressive reforms initiated by the League 
combined with Regular Democratic implementation formed the basis for a long-term 
consensus in favor of progressive policies, civic involvement, and municipal 
development.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER IH
THE REGULARS RETURN AS THE MORNING GLORIES FADE
"Capdevielle for Mayor," proclaimed the headline o f the Daily Picayune. The 
convention o f New Orleans Regular Democrats met on September 11, 1899 to select the 
ticket for the municipal elections scheduled for early November. Within another day the 
convention selected the entire slate, and the campaign for control of the South's largest 
city began. Within two months, the Regular Democrats would triumph, regaining city 
offices they had lost in 1896. The election of 1899 proved crucial for the emerging 
politics of the twentieth century. Over the years since Reconstruction, the voters o f 
New Orleans had alternately favored Regular and reform elements of the city's leader­
ship. The 1899 election completed this pattern of the previous two decades, alternating 
city administrations led by Regular Democrats and then by a self-styled reform opposi­
tion. It also marked the start of twenty years control by the Regular Democrats. Not 
until 1920 would an anti-machine candidate again become mayor. A close examination 
o f the 1899 nomination process and the subsequent election reveals important features 
o f the city’s post-disfranchisement political environment.1
1 Daily Picayune, September 11, 1899, 1; Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded 
Age, 28-54, especially Table 4, 38.
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As the 1899 election approached, the Citizens' League suffered defections. 
Ambitious members looked to increase their chances for election, and it seemed 
unlikely that the reform elements would triumph again. Disfranchisement eliminated 
the possibility of mobilizing the black vote, and, although the Regulars lost potential 
voters among the poor as well, the new constitutional limitations on suffrage damaged 
the reformers' efforts to establish a  permanent hold on city government. Ironically, 
some of the restrictions on voting hampered the reformers in unexpected ways. The 
Regulars took care that their supporters paid the poll tax on time, an example o f the 
advantages o f a professional political organization. Behrman later commented that the 
reformers calculated at the time of the convention that imposition of the tax would be to 
their advantage and fought against a provision to delay the tax until after 1900. Instead, 
weak rates of poll tax payment hampered many reforms efforts. In addition, the 
identification of the Regular Democrats with white solidarity increased after the 1898 
convention. Deviation from the Democratic line had been dangerous before 
disfranchisement; after the convention, politicians risked almost certain defeat outside 
the Democratic Party structure. Finally, the inducements o f patronage and the favor of 
the governor convinced many reformers from the League to reconsider their allegiance. 
Charles Janvier, Citizens' League President, anticipated the problem in an 1897 essay in 
which he wrote that many reformers would be tempted to alliances with the machine.2
2 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 50-51.; Charles Janvier, "Municipal 
Reform in New Orleans," 214-215.
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Writing in 1904, Civil Service Commissioner J. Pemberton Baldwin looked back 
at 1899 and assessed the political situation. The legislature had given the League a 
victory in the form of a new city charter which included provisions for civil service 
under an independent board, "the first attempt in this State to separate patronage from 
politics." Pemberton noticed "a development among certain members of the better 
element (to use an awkward term) who went into politics, and took a prominent part in 
the reform movement of 1896." The League had succeeded in defeating the Regulars in 
the municipal contest o f that year, but its members discovered "before the term of that 
administration had expired that it was necessary in order to carry the next election to 
make some coalition with the ward leaders." Pemberton next posed the question 
"whether it were wiser to risk defeat or to give the ward leader recognition, in return for 
which he would join the better element in naming a high class of candidates for submis­
sion to the people on the regular party ticket." The commissioner's analysis concluded 
that compromise was the best policy, thereby constructing a virtue out of necessity. Had 
the reform movement persisted in sufficient strength, no coalition with the ward leaders 
would have been necessary. The labeling of what occurred as a coalition put the best 
face on the situation from the League point of view, but the direction of the political 
movement was largely one way.3
3 J. Pemberton Baldwin, “New Orleans Under a partisan Administration.” 
Proceedings o f  the Chicago Conference fo r  Good City Government and the Tenth 
Annual Meeting o f  the National Municipal League (Philadelphia: National Municipal 
League, 1904), 143-153.
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The rush of political realignments accelerated as the campaign of 1899 drew 
near.4 Citizen League members abandoned their colleagues and sought out the Regulars 
in the hope o f joining the Regular ticket or obtaining an appointment. By the time both 
tickets took shape, Bernard McCIoskey, Samuel Gilmore, and others had shifted 
allegiances from the League to the Regulars. For their part, the Regulars attempted at 
least a symbolic break with the discredited past, and they accepted, if  not embraced, the 
change in loyalties offered by their former antagonists. Eager to avoid overt connection 
with former Mayor Fitzpatrick's associates, the Regulars pledged a clean ticket and 
promised to nominate a mayoral candidate above reproach.5 The incumbent Mayor 
Flower tentatively tested the waters, but a rapprochement between the Regulars and the 
candidate that had succeeded Fitzpatrick was apparently too much for both sides.
Earlier in the year Fitzpatrick had requested tickets for carnival seating at City Hall, but 
was turned down by Mayor Flower, who expressed regret that "seating is limited . . .  
and seems to be in demand this year." Fitzpatrick had requested the seats to
4 The constitutional convention of 1898 had separated the municipal and state 
elections. Thus elections for city offices took place in late 1899; state elections would 
follow in April, 1900. Some reformers hoped that the election timing would reduce the 
influence of the Regulars that contemporaneous elections would allow. Behrman later 
noted laconically that this proved not to be the case. Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New 
Orleans, 55-56.
5 Unfortunately for Fitzpatrick, his escape from legal problems during his 
mayoralty did not exempt him from guilt by association. He sought vindication by 
putting himself forward as candidate for mayor in 1899, but was unsuccessful. Haas, 
Political Leadership in a Southern City, 35; Daily Picayune, September 5, 1899, 4, 7.
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accommodate the Cook County Democratic Club, and the Mayor's snub indicated a 
distinct lack of political judgement.6
Subsequent consideration o f Charles Janvier for Mayor by the Regulars was 
even more startling than the possible Flower defection. Janvier had been president of 
the Citizens' League and had served as Rex, ruler of the city's Mardi Gras, during 
carnival season, 1896. He was bom in New Orleans in 1857 and had participated as a 
White League member in the Liberty Place battle~an experience that certified his 
Democratic credentials—but had been no friend of the Regular organization. Janvier's 
departure in mid-summer, 1899, signaled the end of the League; no clearer indication 
could be found that it had fallen on hard times.7 There are conflicting accounts of 
Janvier's switch to the Regulars. Schott asserts that Janvier "with the encouragement of 
Governor Foster. . .  joined with several individuals [to] organize the Choctaw Club of 
New Orleans," which would place his defection in late 1896. Haas describes Janvier's 
"retirement" from politics in fall, 1899, and his reappearance as a member o f the
6 Office o f the Mayor, Outgoing Correspondence, Walter Flower to John 
Fitzpatrick, February [date illegible], 1899, New Orleans Public Library, Louisiana 
Division (hereinafter cited as Mayor’s Correspondence). Kendall, History o f  New 
Orleans, 2: 533 provided an account o f the Regulars approach to Flower which failed, 
among other reasons, because of Flower’s reluctance to be seen as “seeking” the 
nomination.
7 The New Orleans carnival, or Mardi Gras, included a number of marching 
clubs and social organizations. Among the most prominent, the Rex organization 
represented the city's elite citizens and families. As King o f Carnival, Janvier repre­
sented the uptown social elite. For a capsule biography o f Janvier, see The Writers 
Press Association, Advance Press Service, New York, June 7,1912, available in the 
Janvier Family Papers, Historic New Orleans Collection.
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Choctaw Club in December. The dates are significant since the announced retirement 
comes shortly after the Regulars rejected his bid to become their mayoral candidate.
The December emergence as a Choctaw member coincides with Janvier's selection as a 
member of the Democratic Party State Central Committee.8
Citizen League members uncertain of their organization's efficacy, yet unwilling 
to join the Regulars, had two other options available: remain with the Citizens' League 
and face almost certain defeat or form yet another organization. From the ranks of 
disaffected Citizens' League membership and occasional Regular defectors arose a new 
organization to carry the reform banner—the Jackson Democratic Association. 
Jacksonians refused to take part in the primary; victory in that process was unlikely and 
would make subsequent challenge to the Party difficult. Yet establishing a presence 
among voters proved even more difficult, since the Jacksonians organized only a few 
months before the election.
Founders of the Jackson Democratic Association took care in the choice of a 
name. Associating its name with the Democratic Party, the new organization sought to 
reassure voters who valued the traditional label and white solidarity. The memories of 
1896 angered the Regulars, who quickly reminded voters that Flower’s victory could be 
attributed to the black vote. The Jacksonian Democrats quickly adopted standard anti-
8 Schott, "John M. Parker," 87; Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern City,
34; Nussbaum, “Progressive Politics in New Orleans, 1896-1900,” 198; Daily City Item, 
January 25, 1900, 10; Daily Picayune, December 31, 1899, 11.
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Ring rhetoric. Chairman W. B. Porter asserted the intention of the group to “further the
election o f such a city government and such offices for New Orleans as will secure to
the people” an honest government, safe from boss influence and illegal ballot practices.
The Jackson Democratic Association warned against ballot fraud, claiming that “all
reasons and excuses for fraud or even irregular methods in elections have . . .
disappeared” since the removal o f the black vote.9
Walter Denegre, the reform candidate for the United States Senate in 1896, came
back to the city in midsummer to help the Jackson Democratic Association effort,
though he regretted the return to the New Orleans summer heat and missed his
Massachusetts vacation spot. Denegre sought to reassure Democratic voters and to
shore up the party credentials o f the new organization:
[Denegre] thought that there would be no ticket of Republicans or Populists in 
the state [election], but that they would see that the best thing to do was to 
support the Jackson Democracy.. . .  The Association was strongly Democratic 
and was working inside of the party and that there was really only one party in 
the state since the negroes were elim inated. Mr. Denegre indicates that there 
would be some hustling in the association now but was sorry to miss the 
remainder of his vacation.
The Jackson Democratic Association support soon included the usual line up of
reformers, including members of the 1888 Young Men’s Democratic Association, many
of whose political backgrounds the Regulars suspected o f disloyalty, and members o f
the Citizens’ League still attracted to reform ideas. While organizing the Association,
9 Daily Picayune, July 14,1899, 4, 9; July 25,1899,10; August 6, 1899,4.
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the leadership thought it best to await the Regulars’ choice for Mayor before nam ing  its 
own ticket.10
The Regular Democrats chose a mayoral candidate through a primary election 
system that selected delegates to a party convention. Control of the party machinery, 
influence in state elections, and designation of lesser candidates for municipal and 
parochial offices depended upon the outcome o f the primary. In effect, the Regulars’ 
primary consisted of seventeen separate ward elections wherein potential challengers to 
the Regular establishment contested local power. Victory by one or more insurgents, 
however, did not overthrow Regular rule. The challengers sought to be part of the 
machine, not to subvert it. Although in some instances the Regulars avoided electoral 
fights through negotiations, compromise, or timely retirements, primary conflicts were 
not uncommon. The 1899 primary measured the effectiveness of the Choctaw Club as 
the newest incarnation of the Regular machine and the extent to which it could absorb 
new actors at the ward and precinct level. Victors at the ward level entered the caucus 
(also known as the Council of Seventeen) which governed the Regular organization. In 
addition, the caucus members routinely held office on the Democratic State Central 
Committee, thus providing a link between city and state politics.11
10 Daily Picayune, July 27, 1899, 3; Daily Picayune, July 29, 1899, 12. In a 
speech to a Ninth Ward gathering of YMDA and JDA supporters, Denegre claimed that 
the Citizens’ League should be given credit for “getting rid of negro suffrage.”
11 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 61; Reynolds, Machine Politics in 
New Orleans, 122-126.
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The September 8, 1899, primary produced mixed results. Although the Regulars 
returned most of its chosen leadership to the caucus, vigorous contests took place in 
several wards and new leaders emerged in several others. In the First Ward, the 
leadership of Mike Fanning and C. Taylor Gauche faced a challenge from the Trauth- 
Drown-Kohnke faction, associated with the reform elements in the ward. Businessman 
E. F. Kohnke and his brother, Dr. Quitman Kohnke, were originally Citizens’ League 
members; Quitman served on the 1896 city council. George Trauth was a saloon 
keeper. In spite o f the challenge to the leadership, Trauth remained loyal to the 
Choctaws. The Fanning-Gauche faction won easily and carried every precinct. Ward 
Two was the stronghold of Congressman Robert Davey; no opposition emerged. The 
Third Ward was even stronger for the Regulars. It was home to former Mayor John 
Fitzpatrick and Remy Klock, two of the most entrenched of the Democratic stalwarts.
In Ward Four, home of the powerful boss Victor Mauberret, an intra-party challenge by 
Samuel Gately ended in victory for Mauberret by a majority of slightly less than two to 
one, although Gately carried two precincts out of nine. Gately remained within the 
Regulars; the 1902 Choctaw Club roster included his name. Fifth Ward leader 
Alexander Pujol won reelection over the De Ranee faction by margin of 1,170 to 830. 
Although De Ranee carried only one precinct, Pujol's margin of victory in four other 
precincts was in single digits. The Daily Picayune noted that a number of ballots were 
disallowed, raising suspicions of voting irregularities. But more than two-thirds of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
83
rejected ballots named Pujol's faction. Wards One through Five included the oldest 
parts of the city on either side o f Canal Street.12
The Sixth Ward was the site of a bitter contest between incumbent leader John 
Brewster and James Demoruelle. Feelings ran high enough to include gunplay between 
rivals at an earlier date. Although Brewster prevailed, the margin of 820 to 639 was not 
great. Demoruelle carried two precincts and lost three others by less than twenty-five 
votes in each. The returns showed a clear geographic pattern with Brewster strongest in 
the lower end of the ward (those precincts near the river) and Demoruelle strongest in 
the upper precincts, toward the north along fashionable Esplanade Avenue. Since the 
river area precincts had the highest percentage of immigrant voters, mainly Italians, the 
Demoruelle faction accused Brewster of appealing to "that class of people commonly 
known as Dagoes." The Regulars likewise triumphed in the Seventh through Ninth 
Wards, where they faced only token opposition. The Sixth through the Ninth Wards 
include the downriver, eastern part of New Orleans, consisting mostly of working class 
families.13
The most serious challenge to the Regulars came from uptown wards where the 
Citizens' League had its greatest strength. In the Tenth Ward, Robert Ewing, a 
politically ambitious newspaper manager, challenged the Regulars. Eager to join the
12 Daily Picayune, September 9, 1899, 1; Nussbaum, “Progressive Politics in 
New Orleans, 1896-1900,” 199-200.
13 Daily Picayune, July 27, 1899,6, 12; September 9, 1899, 1, 7.
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Council of Seventeen, Ewing and his supporters worked within the primary structure 
while denouncing the Regular leadership. At a rally the day before the voting, one 
speaker in support of the Ewing candidacy said that Fitzpatrick was “like the other 
bosses—a barnacle and should be turned down by the people.” Ambrose A. Maginnis 
argued for Ewing on the basis that the city needed “new men.” Maginnis admitted to 
being a Republican, but excused the apostasy on the grounds that he voted that way “for 
protection” in manufacturing. Another speaker characterized Ewing as a champion o f 
small capital, opposed to the trusts, one of which had just closed a plant in the city. 
Ewing was simultaneously against the “Jackson group and bossism.” He reasoned that 
with the threat of “Negro rule” gone, the bosses could safely be discarded, and he read a 
letter from former Citizens' League leader Charles Janvier supporting the Ewing 
candidacy. Janvier had recently moved out of the Tenth Ward but continued to have 
influence in his former neighborhood. Perhaps the hardest fought contest of the 
electoral season saw Ewing triumph over Peter Farrell by a margin o f403. Out of 
eleven precincts, Ewing carried seven to his opponent’s four. Farrell was popular 
among the Choctaw Club leadership, and his defeat weighed heavily upon the 
supporters of former mayor John Fitzpatrick. Ewing would play an important role in 
city politics for two decades as a Regular, but with an erratic record for loyalty to the 
organization.14
14 Daily Picayune, September 7,1899, 6; September 9,1899, 1, 7.
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In another uptown neighborhood, Ward Twelve, the former Citizen League 
councilman W. J. Turner had challenged Assessor Henry McMurray for the leadership 
prior to the primary. McMurray prevailed, but would face additional challenges in the 
coming years. The Thirteenth Ward remained firm for the Regulars, but in the 
prosperous Fourteenth Ward, lawyer Samuel Gilmore, formerly of the Citizens' League, 
replicated Ewing's tactics, placing himself between the League and the bosses, but 
willing to work within the Regular machinery. Gilmore had served as Assistant City 
Attorney in the 1888 administration o f Mayor Shakspeare and had moved into the City 
Attorney position under Mayor Walter Flower. Eager to explain his participation in the 
Citizens' League movement, Gilmore said that joining the League in 1896 was the only 
way to keep the new sewerage and water revenues out of the hands o f Fitzpatrick's 
“Boodle” council, and that the Regular leaders, “perhaps inadvertently,” had lost their 
way in 1896. Gilmore claimed that he “didn't want to be a ward boss” but ran for office 
to insure the city could “go forward in improvement forever.” Gilmore defeated his 
opponent in every precinct for a majority o f 350. He joined the Council o f Seventeen, 
took an important position on the Regular's municipal ticket, and served as city attorney 
for another nine years.15 There was no contest in the Fifteenth Ward (the Algiers 
neighborhood on the West Bank of the Mississippi), home to the emerging Regular 
leader Martin Behrman, then thirty-five years of age. The Regulars faced light
15 Conrad, A Dictionary o f Louisiana Biography, 346; Daily Picayune, 
September 7, 1899, 6; September 9, 1899, 1,7; January 2, 1909,2.
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opposition in the remaining uptown two wards, the Sixteenth and Seventeenth, where 
ineffective challenges to the leadership fell short.
The results confirmed the strength of the new Regular organization. After only 
three years, the Choctaw Club proved it could mobilize votes and maintain discipline. 
But the primary also illustrated an important feature of the post-constitutional 
convention political world. The Regulars had to find ways to absorb the defections 
from the League and, at the same time, provide for upward mobility among the 
ambitious members of its own organization. Particularly in the uptown wards, where 
Gilmore and Ewing defeated Regular bosses, the Choctaw Club’s victory came at a 
significant price, as newly elected leaders took their place on the Council of Seventeen. 
The Regulars did not make concessions only to those who successfully challenged them 
at the polls. Citizens’ League member Bernard McCloskey defected to the Regulars, 
but did not run for office. His legal skills, however, recommended him to the 
Democratic organization, and he served as attorney to the new Dock Board. These 
adjustments by the Regulars proved crucial to the emergence of a citywide consensus in 
favor of progressive civic development. There were no significant disagreements over 
municipal policy between the two factions, and the Regular Democratic environment 
proved comfortable to the numerous reform defectors.
The press considered the results of the primary a victory for reform, to the extent 
that it believed that reform could take place within the Choctaw Club. The citywide
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results certainly constituted a challenge to the Regular hegemony. Prior to the election, 
the fear o f establishment newspapers, the Daily Picayune and the Times-Democrat, 
involved the possible return of Captain John Fitzpatrick. The former mayor held a 
prominent position within the Regulars, and he hoped for a return to City Hall as well as 
vindication for the scandals o f his administration. But even before the primary, 
Fitzpatrick’s chances dimmed. The Daily Picayune commented that “the [Jackson 
Democratic Association leaders] have recognized that their greatest hope o f success lies 
in the probable mistake the ward leaders will make [in not naming a  clean ticket].” But 
the newspapers observed that “latterly, the Jacksonians began to appreciate that some 
few of the ward leaders have been and are sincere in their determination to insist on the 
nomination o f a clean ticket. . .  and this determination has occasioned no inconsiderable 
amount of alarm among” the Jacksonians.16
Before the selection of the two tickets, local comment expressed amusement at 
the high-toned Jackson Democratic Association rhetoric. An editorial titled “They Are 
All on the Make” skewered the reformers’ claims of purity and reminded readers that 
practical politics necessarily involved self-interest and the exercise o f power:
One of the funny features of the [current] political campaign. . .  is the rising into
prominence o f . . .  leaders who loudly proclaim that they do not want any office
16 Daily Picayune, September 3,1899,4, 10. On following days, the Daily 
Picayune continued this theme in editorials explicitly opposed to Fitzpatrick, reminding 
its readers of the 192 “Boodle” council. A more general condemnation of “bossism” 
invoked the evils o f Tammany Hall. Daily Picayune, September 5, 1899,4 and 
September 6, 1899,4.
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or any other reward, but are only working for the public good. The old ward 
bosses are never caught making protestations of their patriotism and 
disinterestedness . . . .  They know by experience that no ward boss . . .  can exert 
any influence and gather and hold any following unless he proves his ability to 
get office for himself and places for his . . .  helpers. It will not do for politicians, 
no matter on which side they might be, to boast too much of their patriotism. 
They deserve to be distrusted. They want something.17
As the Regulars counted votes on September 8, the local newspaper interpreted 
the ward by ward results as either pro- or anti-Fitzpatrick. The Orleans Parish 
Democratic Committee apportioned to each ward in the city a number o f convention 
votes based on the size of the ward. Ninety-six votes were available, and by the 
calculations of the Daily Picayune, the new Regular leadership would oppose 
Fitzpatrick's return by a margin of fifty-six to forty. The Regulars had absorbed the 
most ambitious remnants of the Citizens' League, but lost their most prominent leader. 
Fitzpatrick paid the price for the unification o f  the Democratic Party under the all-white 
banner. The balance of power shifted toward a caucus that would be more independent, 
less susceptible to Captain John’s control. Any ambitions that Fitzpatrick had of 
returning to the Mayor’s office died with the primary results, although he attempted to 
secure the gubernatorial nomination in 1900. Several of the Council o f Seventeen had 
opposed his candidacy even prior to the primary; the addition of Ewing and Gilmore to 
the caucus settled the issue. When the caucus convened to choose the municipal ticket, 
the “old leaders” threatened a walkout on behalf of Fitzpatrick, but, as accomplished
17 Daily Picayune, August 4, 1899, 4.
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politicians, they knew that the former mayor could not carry the caucus and would 
damage their chances in the election. The supporters of Fitzpatrick controlled fewer 
votes at the convention, but represented the most powerful, and tightly controlled, 
wards. Ever the realists, the Fitzpatrick loyalists accepted their champion’s defeat and 
settled for a favorable division of municipal patronage.18
The elected ward representatives of the New Orleans Regular Democrats met in 
convention on September 11, 1899. Selection of the Mayor was the first order of 
business, and the choice for mayor served as a perfect symbol for the fusion of a 
significant portion of the Citizens' League and new Regulars, represented by the 
Choctaw Club. John Brewster, the leader of the Sixth Ward, suggested a plan to divide 
patronage but found himself in competition with the Fifth Ward, led by the formidable 
Alex Pujol, for the comptroller position. To break the deadlock, the Sixth Ward leader 
would forego lesser offices, but suggested Paul Capdevielle, resident of the Sixth Ward, 
for mayor. Charles J. Theard, a prominent banker, placed his friend’s name in 
nomination on behalf of the Sixth Ward’s organization. Brewster’s promotion of the 
Capdevielle candidacy did not come as a surprise. In July, an enthusiastic Sixth Ward 
gathering had endorsed Brewster for ward leader and Capdevielle for mayor. Reporters 
at a meeting o f the Orleans Parish Levee Board, on which Capdevielle served, asked the
18 Daily Picayune, September 9,1899, 1, 7; September 11, 1899,1,2,4; Haas, 
Political Leadership in a Southern City, 35; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans,
65.
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potential candidate whether he would be a candidate, and he indicated a willingness to 
run. A letter to the Daily Picayune confirmed his interest; he “would not decline the 
honor.” Capdevielle was a Citizens’ League vice-president in 1896, but had followed 
many of his colleagues into the Regular ranks.19
Capdevielle was an amiable man with a history of involvement in civic and 
charitable causes. He was a product o f a Jesuit secondary education and a law graduate 
of Tulane University who had given up the law for business, though his efforts did not 
put him the first rank o f the city's commercial elite. His record as a businessman was 
not impressive. He acted as CEO for several companies that faced bankruptcy and 
others that showed poor return on investment. During the campaign the opposition used 
his lackluster business history as proof that the Regular mayoral candidate was ill suited 
to the office. Capdevielle lived on Esplanade Avenue, the downtown equivalent (in 
social terms) to uptown's grand boulevard, St. Charles Avenue. His brother, Armand 
Capdevielle, edited a French language newspaper in the city. Paul Capdevielle was a 
member of the Progressive Union, forerunner to the Chamber of Commerce, but his 
name was not found among the leaders of the city's commercial exchanges or business 
associations. His civic resume was more impressive: president pro tempore of the
19 Kendall, History o f  New Orleans, 2: 532-533; Daily Picayune. September 12, 
1899, 1,4; July 22, 1899, 3; Times-Democrat, September 11, 1899, 3, 4; September 12, 
1899,1; Kendall, History o f  New Orleans, 2: 532. Kendall provides an elaborate 
account of the maneuvering over city positions, but gives the wrong date for the 
convention.
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Orleans Levee Board, former member of the School Board, member and chairman o f the
Finance Committee of the Drainage Commission, president of the Esplanade Avenue
Commission, and active in the Prison Reform Association. As President o f the City
Park Improvement Association, Capdevielle demonstrated political dexterity and the
ability to bring “divergent factions” together, playing a role between “old-line New
Orleans families” and professional politicians. This would be precisely the skills needed
in the Mayor’s office. He retained his interest in City Park and remained on the board
until his death. Thirty-four years after the Civil War, a  Confederate war record still
added luster to a candidacy. Behrman's memoirs recounted Capdevielle's bravery and
noted that although he had been captured by the Northern forces and paroled, he risked
additional punishment by rejoining the Southern army.20
The caucus had “agreed upon a citizen o f the highest character. . .  in the
business and social world.” A Daily Picayune editorial continued its praise of
Capdevielle and, significantly, related the nomination to the advancement of public
works in New Orleans:
The city, under the benign influences of an honest city government, has reached 
the point in its programs when it is about to enter on the construction of public 
works o f the greatest importance in the way o f municipal improvement and 
sanitation, and, in order that these works may go on to their complete and perfect 
level, a continuation of honest and faithful city government is necessary.
20 Mayor’s Office, Administrations o f  the Mayors o f  New Orleans, 208-212; 
Sally K. Evans Reeves and William D. Reeves, Historic City Park New Orleans (New 
Orleans: Friends of City Park, 1982), 20; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 63- 
64.
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The Regulars recorded the selection as unanimous, although the press reported that one 
member o f the caucus had walked out rather than accept the nominee. Rumors began to 
spread that the nominee was no friend of the working man, and Capdevielle quickly 
defended himself from the persistent charge that he had once proclaimed a dollar a day 
to be a sufficient wage for the city's laboring classes.21
Within another day the convention selected the rest o f the ticket, and the 
campaign for control o f New Orleans city began. With large numbers o f the working 
class vote disfranchised, the Regulars moved toward the center o f the political spectrum, 
attracting reform defectors along the way. Concessions to the former Citizens’ League 
members could be seen in the nomination o f Samuel Gilmore for City Attorney and 
George B. Penrose for Treasurer, in addition to Capdevielle at the top of the ticket.22
The Jackson Democratic Association put forth its own ticket on September 25 
after balancing the demands o f the several wards and the ambitions of political hopefuls. 
After some hesitation, the leadership nominated Walter Flower for Mayor, hoping that 
the voters would reward him with a second term. Flower’s prior interest in the Regular 
nomination created some misgivings among the Jacksonians, but his residual support 
among the reform community remained strong. Reformers, including veterans of the
21 Daily Picayune, September 12,1899,1, 4, 9. Behrman also recalled the 
controversy over the candidate’s alleged antagonism toward the working class. See 
Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 63-64.
22 Daily Picayune, September 13,1899,1.
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YMDA victory in 1888, and the more recent Citizens’ League triumph of 1896, filled 
other positions on the ticket. Abraham Brittin, cotton broker and president of the City 
Council under Flower, stood for Comptroller and A.G. Ricks, merchant, ran for 
Treasurer; both were charter members of the Citizens’ League. During the campaign, 
Ricks stated that the Regulars had offered him a spot on the ticket, but he felt he should 
stay with Flower out of loyalty to the Mayor. The leadership also nominated 
Councilman Sidney Story for the position of Commissioner of Police and Public 
Buildings. (During the Flower administration, Story had sponsored the ordinance 
establishing the city’s red light district, thereafter nicknamed Storyville.) A few days 
later, the few remaining members of the Citizens’ League also nominated Flower, 
although the League divided places for lesser offices among both Jacksonian and 
Regular hopefuls. The Regulars responded promptly by disavowing the nominations 
and refusing to be listed on the League ballot. Nominee Gilmore wrote his former 
colleagues suggesting that “independent political movements within the Democratic 
party” were dangerous.23
Press reaction to the tickets followed predictable patterns. The Times-Democrat, 
a virulently anti-Regular publication, assailed the boss-dominated Regular ticket and
23Daily Picayune, September 13, 1899, 1; September 24, 1899, 3, 4; September 
26,1899, 1,4, 7, 8; October 1, 1899,4,10, 11, 12; Haas, Political Leadership in a 
Southern City, 49; Kendall, History o f  New Orleans, 2: 533.
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reminded readers of its “Boodle” antecedents. The somewhat less partisan Daily
Picayune opined that:
A careful comparison with the roster of the candidates on the Regular ticket 
develops no superiority in the ability and quality o f the men put forth by the 
Jacksonians. In fact, there is in many cases a positive inferiority in the 
[Jacksonian] committee’s ticket. Comparisons o f individuals show in many 
cases decided advantages on the side of the Regulars.
The Daily Picayune attitude toward the Jacksonians represented a perceived difference
between the two tickets that the Regulars would exploit and the Jacksonians strive to
overcome. In the late 1890s, public attitudes toward corporate power reflected a
growing concern with monopoly, political corruption, and other effects upon the public.
A Third Ward political club—the Fitz[patrick] Invincibles—simultaneously declared
“against civil service [and] opposed to trusts and oppressive combinations.” In spite of
the record o f the Flower council, which generally supported public ownership, the Daily
Picayune and the Regulars’ orators singled out Mayor Flower and Abraham Brittin as
“friends of corporations” not to be trusted with the emerging public utilities in the city.
The day after the Jacksonian announcements, the Daily Picayune condemned the actions
of the Mayor and Brittin in their dealings with railroads, the Water Works Company, a
“defunct and defaulting sewerage corporation,” and the Electric Light company. The
paper questioned Flower’s candidacy, claiming his was “favorable to the demands of
corporations, too yielding to the efforts of railroad corporations,” and willing to give
away levee lands “to the permanent injury of the mercantile interests.” Ironically, the
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JDA had delayed its nomination o f Flower for Mayor in part because o f his attendance 
at the convention of the League of American Municipalities. The Mayor delivered a 
paper to the delegates explaining the work of New Orleans in establishing the publicly- 
owned water, sewerage, and drainage systems.24
Both tickets addressed the press and public’s concern with public works. Earlier 
in the year the city had approved a constitutional amendment to fund the construction of 
the Sewerage and Water Board and the Drainage Commission. The promise of public 
improvements merged with a generalized anti-corporation movement and helped define 
the issues for the election. The Jacksonians endorsed municipal ownership as part of 
their platform, but Flower was on record opposing a city-owned lighting system, 
generating doubt in the sincerity of his support for public utilities. Some Jacksonian 
ward meetings drew only limited numbers of voters, leading one supporter to complain 
about the lack of favorable press and to assert that his organization “was just as much 
opposed to trusts as the regular Democrats.”25
Former Mayor John Fitzpatrick, a favorite Regular orator, constantly reminded 
audiences of the corporate connections of the prominent Jacksonians, and posed the 
primary question of the election as “are we to allow a small coterie of individuals
24 Times-Democrat, September 12, 1899, 4; September 13, 1899, 1, 4;
September 14, 1899,4; Daily Picayune, September 23,1899, 4; September 27, 1899,4. 
The Regulars’ use of antimonopoly rhetoric echoes the point about language in Rogers, 
“In Search o f Progressivism,” 123, in which he describes “three languages of 
discontent.”
25 Daily Picayune, September 2, 1899, 6.
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interested directly in a certain few corporations to take unto themselves . . .  the 
government of our city?” Fitzpatrick’s rhetoric condemned the Jackson Democratic 
Association connection to the city’s Board of Liquidation, whose members were closely 
allied with the New Orleans banking industry. At one rally, Fitzpatrick condemned the 
influence of Charles Janvier, perhaps unaware that the former Citizens’ League member 
and prominent banker would soon join ranks with the Regulars.26
Campaign rhetoric aside, neither ticket sought to undermine what had developed 
in the late 1890s as a clear consensus in favor of a progressive civic development. The 
freely-granted franchises of post-Reconstruction New Orleans had framed the city’s 
development, sanitation, health, and transportation. The resulting urban conditions 
appalled both Regular and reformer alike and led to the legislative underpinnings for 
drastic change adopted in the period 1896-1899. When the legislature considered the 
statutory prerequisites for that change, neither League nor Regular members of the 
legislature objected to either the substance or the structure of the new government 
agencies. Similarly, in the municipal election of 1899, neither ticket sought to change 
the direction of that change. City development and ownership of public improvements 
and major utility systems became a firm belief of most Newr Orleanians.
The strongest evidence for the existence of an underlying consensus flowed from 
the commonalities in the two tickets’ platforms. Both proudly announced for municipal
26 Daily Picayune, October 1, 1899, 10
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ownership and praised the recent vote in favor of establishment o f the Sewerage and 
Water Board. Press opinions notwithstanding, the Flower administration had provided 
ample support for the difficult early years of large-scale public improvements. By the 
1899 election, neither aspirant for mayor would move counter to overwhelming public 
opinion on the public improvements question. Although individual interests of various 
parties would cause occasional dissent, the consensus was firm.27
The campaign rhetoric escalated as election day drew near, but political 
conditions favored the Regulars. Voters associated the successful Constitutional 
Convention with Regular leadership, the reform organization neglected grass roots 
canvassing and considered itself above patronage, and wholesale defections of 
businessmen and other reformers softened the public view of the Choctaw Club. 
Capdevielle triumphed easily, polling 19,559 to Flower’s 12,998. The regular ticket 
swept the municipal and parochial offices as well. Walter Flower left politics and 
retired to his country home. Shortly thereafter, he suffered a recurrence of tuberculosis 
and died October 11, 1900. His family declined a City Hall funeral. Although the Daily 
Picayune had not supported him in the recent election, the paper praised his devotion to 
the cause of clean water and other public works projects for the city.28
27 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 56, quoting both the post-election 
admissions of the Daily Picayune, November 9, 1899, and Norman Walker, “An 
Attempt at Municipal Reform,” Harper’s Weekly, 40 (August 29, 1896): 854.
28 Daily Picayune, October 2, 1900, 1.
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Three elements shaped the politics o f  the new century: a new electorate, 
constructed by disfranchisement and immigration, the resurgence of the Regulars after 
the 1896 defeat, and a non-partisan consensus on the importance of progressive civic 
development, seen most clearly in the movement for municipal control of utilities. Paul 
Capdevielle was the first beneficiary of these trends, and his four years in office 
solidified the hold of the Regular Democrats on New Orleans government. His victory 
symbolized the transition of the city across the turn o f the century and into the modem 
world. His style of governance and support o f civic development prepared the city for 
an activist successor more firmly committed to the power of the Democratic 
organization, but equally committed to a new concept of municipal progress and the role 
o f the mayor in city government.
The victory of the Regulars vindicated their policy of flexibility, but also 
reflected the rewards of their persistence. George Washington Plunkitt, political sage of 
Tammany Hall, characterized the reformers as “morning glories [who] looked lovely in 
the momin’ and withered up in a short time, while the regular machines went on 
flourishin'.” In New Orleans, the “morning glories” had faded once again. If the 
progressive policies o f the reformers were to survive, it would now be the work of 
machine politicians.29
29 William L. Riodan, Plunkitt o f  Tammany Hall (New York: Bedford Books, 
1994), 57.
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CHAPTER IV
PAUL CAPDEVIELLE: THE MAYORALTY IN TRANSITION
Paul Capdevielle entered the New Orleans mayor’s office via a curious political 
route. As a leader in civic, not political affairs, he gravitated toward the Citizens’ 
League, and when the reform group organized as a permanent group in 1896, he became 
its vice-president. He declined to run in the 1896 election and thus became an ideal 
official for a political group whose leadership felt honor-bound not to seek office for 
itself. When the changing electorate, altered by disfranchisement, encouraged a 
convergence of political interests between the defectors from the Citizens’ League and 
the Regular Democrats, Capdevielle found himself in a serendipitous situation. His 
selection as the Regulars’ candidate for mayor provided the reformers with an excuse to 
come home to Regular Democracy, while providing the machine politicians with a 
ceremonial leader, if  not figurehead, to polish its credentials on honesty and business- 
oriented issues. Capdevielle also bore an pronounced resemblance to financier J. P. 
Morgan.
Capdevielle served as a transitional figure in several ways. He represented the 
change from the nineteenth to the twentieth century political style. He eased the way for 
a more loyal machine advocate to convince the business community that Regular 
Democracy and business interests coincided on most material issues. And the new
99
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mayor helped prepare the city government for a more activist mayor in matters of public 
administration and public interest. At the national level of politics, the country 
witnessed an abrupt transition from William McKinley to Theodore Roosevelt during 
the same years, hastened, of course, by the assassination of the Republican President. 
Though the city’s transition was without violence, it was no less dramatic. By the end 
of Capdevielle’s term in office, his staid performance helped lead to a new mayor and a 
new energy. To describe Capdevielle as transitional and as a man o f the nineteenth 
century is not to disparage his service to the city. His record reflected the courtly honor 
of his attitude toward service and the responsibility o f  his position. Capdevielle 
accepted the duties of the mayoralty with gravity, if  not cheerfulness.1
The mayoralty of Paul Capdevielle also played a crucial part in the effectiveness 
of the consensus for progressive civic development. Capdevielle was the candidate of 
the Choctaw Club, but, as a former officer in the Citizens’ League, reassured the 
business community and commercial elite. Capdevielle favored municipal ownership, 
but appreciated the complexities inherent in government takeover of utilities. Had the 
Regulars chosen a more traditional machine candidate, political tensions between the 
reform and Regular factions might have prevented progress toward civic development.
Capdevielle took office in May, 1900, succeeding Walter C. Flower. Within 
two months he endured the most serious crisis of his term, the mayhem occasioned by 
the actions of Robert Charles and the subsequent race riots. Charles was a rural-born
1 Kendall, History o f  New Orleans, 2: 532; Administrations o f  the Mayor o f New 
Orleans, 1803-1936,208-212.
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black from Mississippi who had come to New Orleans, perhaps to escape trouble arising 
from an incident in Jackson. In late July, 1900, he wounded a policeman in a minor 
confrontation, but then shot and killed two other policemen who tried to arrest him for 
the original incident. He then eluded capture for several days, creating a crisis 
atmosphere in the city. Fear and racial hatred combined into generalized riots against 
blacks throughout the city.2
At the time of the initial murders and riots, Mayor Capdevielle was absent from 
the city. The Mayor enjoyed a second home in Bay St. Louis, Mississippi, about sixty 
miles from New Orleans. He used the residence as a frequent retreat, but also as a place 
to convalesce after several illnesses which he suffered during his term in office. 
Newspaper reports offered the latter explanation for the Mayor’s absence, although he 
was well enough to return to the city immediately after hearing the news o f the racial 
troubles. In his absence, Acting Mayor William Mehle, in an attempt to reduce 
violence, issued a proclamation asking “persons not to assemble and discuss events,” 
but deaths and injuries from white mobs continued. Within a day of the police deaths, 
three blacks had been killed and over fifty beaten, some seriously. Regarding one 
victim of mob violence, the Daily Picayune reported that “nobody tried to identify the 
poor fellow and his name is unknown.” The paper recommended better training for
2 William Ivy Hair, Carnival o f  Fury; Robert Charles and the New Orleans Race 
Riot o f 1900 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1976) provides the most 
complete account of Charles’s background and the riots. Extensive coverage appeared 
in all local papers, July 26 to August 1, 1900. See also Parkash Kaur Bains, “The New 
Orleans Race Riot of 1900" (M.A. thesis: Louisiana State University in New Orleans, 
1970).
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police so they might shoot better and not leave the community dependent upon “the 
Negro [being] hunted by boys.” At the funeral for a murdered policemen, the 
officiating Catholic priest, Father Coughlin of St. Michael’s, used the occasion to 
denounce opponents to capital punishment. In an attempt to promote peacefulness, 
Former Mayor Fitzpatrick addressed a mob, called for calm, and asked the assembled 
group to return home/
Capdevielle’s return on July 26 brought decisive action. Arriving at 9:00 A.M., 
the Mayor announced that “I am here to stay until I have the situation met and 
conquered.” He issued declarations to close all saloons in the city, arrest rioters, and 
hold lawbreakers without parole. Capdevielle’s order to the superintendent of police 
was unequivocal: “You are hereby commanded to immediately cause to be arrested the 
persons who participated in the unlawful disturbances which occurred in the city last 
night.” He issued a call for a force of five hundred special officers and requested that 
the governor assemble the state militia. To equip the special force, he directed a local 
hardware supplier “to please deliver. . .  500 revolvers along with ammunition,” and 
added the instructions to “please charge to the account of the City o f New Orleans.” 
When a call for transportation did not produce the required vehicles on a voluntary 
basis, he “impressed” what he needed from livery companies. The city’s street railways 
offered their services as well. The response to his call for volunteers exceeded the
3 Hair, Carnival o f  Fury, 146; Dale A. Somers, “Black and White in New 
Orleans: A Study in Urban Race Relations, 1865-1900.” Journal o f  Southern History, 
XL (February, 1974): 42; Kendall, History o f  New Orleans, 2: 539; Daily Picayune, 
July 26, 1900,1.
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Mayor’s initial request; the special force grew to over fifteen hundred, and order slowly 
returned to the city. On the next day, the Mayor added another proclamation asking 
citizens to obey the law and remain in their homes. Concerned that liquor had added to 
the unlawful behavior, he directed that if any barkeepers refused to obey the order to 
close bar rooms, the police were to put them under arrest.4
An informant revealed the hiding place of Robert Charles, and police, joined by 
an unsafe number of supporters and onlookers, quickly surrounded the residence. A fire 
drove him out of hiding to his death at the hands of the volunteers, but not before 
Charles shot and killed several other policemen and civilians. Blacks in the 
neighborhood came under suspicion of harboring the fugitive, and at least one was 
killed. Police arrested the occupants of the house where Charles had taken refuge on 
suspicion of complicity, but after some threats to their safety, the authorities gained 
control of the situation. Capdevielle issued another proclamation, removing restrictions 
on the population and thanking the militia for its assistance. Under the Mayor’s picture 
in the Daily Picayune read the caption “to whose prompt and courageous action the 
speedy restoration of order was due.” Praise for the Mayor continued in the city council, 
which passed a resolution thanking him for his management of the crisis. A discussion 
o f the food bills for feeding the special officers led one council member—a hotel owner—
4 Letter to D. S. Gaster, Superintendent of Police, July 26, 1900, Mayor’s 
Correspondence; Two Proclamations from Mayor Capdevielle, July 26, 1900, Mayor’s 
Correspondence; Letter to A. Baldwin & Co., July 26, 1900 Mayor’s Correspondence; 
Letter to Colonel Wood, Commander of Special Force, July 26, 1900, Mayor’s 
Correspondence; Letter to American Express Company, July 26, 1900, Mayor’s 
Correspondence; Proclamation from Mayor Capdevielle, July 27, 1900, Mayor’s 
Correspondence; Daily Picayune, July 27, 1900, 1; Hair, Carnival o f  Fury, 154-155.
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to donate the food he had provided and offer an additional $25.00 toward the effort. 
Several days later, Capdevielle appeared at a benefit concert and received a standing 
ovation. The city collected a fund for the widows and orphans of the slain policemen. 
The Mayor personally thanked prominent contributors and convened a committee to 
distribute the proceeds.5
Less edifying results also followed the resolution of the violence. Two police 
commissioners resigned over the performance of the force. One of the police officers 
present at the original attempt to arrest Charles was tried for cowardice, convicted, and 
removed from the force. Several other policemen were punished for various 
deficiencies in conduct during the course o f the riots and the search. The city 
prosecuted eight bar owners who, in defiance of the Mayor’s proclamation ordering 
them to close, remained in business during the riots. To provide a legal basis for the 
Mayor’s actions should a similar situation develop, the city council passed an ordinance 
providing the Mayor the authority to close the city’s saloons in case of riot or other civil 
disturbance. Claims for damages resulting from the riots included one store owner’s 
lawsuit for $4,404.25. The district assessor derided the claim and reported that the 
assessment o f the store’s goods only six months before “was sworn [by the store owner] 
to be $500.” And the owner of the hardware store which loaned weapons to the special
s Letter to Charles Janvier, August 3, 1900, Mayor’s Correspondence; Letter to 
Charles F. Claiborne, August 3, 1900, Mayor’s Correspondence; Letter to Robert M. 
Walmsley, September 18, 1900, Mayor’s Correspondence; Letter to JohnM . Parker, 
September 18, 1900, Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily Picayune, July 30-31, 1900; 
August 1, 1900, 1; August 12, 1900, 1; Hair, Carnival o f  Fury, 156-200; Bains, “The 
New Orleans Race Riot of 1900,” 33-45. The black man who informed police o f the 
hideout location was subsequently murdered.
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police complained that a number o f weapons had not been returned by the volunteers. 
The city paid for the firearms and for the ammunition provided as well. Eager to 
distance themselves from Charles, a group of Tenth Ward blacks offered “support to 
suppress lawlessness among our people.” The city’s press, already sensitive to regional 
differences on the matter of race, highlighted race troubles in the North and made 
explicit comparisons with the Charles riots. The Daily Picayune focused on New 
York’s race disturbances in its August 17,1900 issue. The following day, the headlines 
read “The North Has a Black Problem As Well As the South.”6
In August o f 1900, with the memories of the Charles riots receding, the city 
council turned to other matters. A new Civil Service Commission took office, replacing 
the one created by the Citizens’ League under the 1896 revision of the city charter. The 
Choctaws did not attempt to dismantle Civil Service in its entirety. The new 
commission resulted from legislation introduced by the Regulars in 1900, designed both 
to weaken the 1896 reform legislation and to correct its defects. Act 89 of the 
legislative session o f 1900 was the result. Like other developments under Capdevielle, 
the new commission combined reform and machine characteristics. City officials—the 
mayor, the comptroller, and the treasurer—served on the commission, preserving direct 
representation and, presumably, political influence. Two citizen members, nominated 
by the mayor and subject to council approval, completed the commission’s membership. 
Capdevielle chose two non-political businessmen: one was an elderly Civil War veteran
6 Bains, “The New Orleans Race Riot o f 1900,” 42,44-45; Daily Picayune, July 
31, 1900,3; August 1, 1900,3; August 2,1900; August 17,1900,4.
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and president of the Red Cross society; the other a real estate agent, manufacturer’s 
representative, and bicycling enthusiast. Capdevielle did not belong to the Choctaw 
Council of Seventeen, though he was a member of the Club. The ward leaders may 
have advised the Mayor on appointments, but evidence does not suggest that he blindly 
followed that direction. Capdevielle’s former Citizens’ League colleague Charles 
Fenner filed suit against the new commission, but the legal challenge failed.7
Capdevielle demonstrated a measure of independence from Democratic powers 
in his politics. He defended the choice of W. B. Sommerville for a judicial vacancy 
even in the face of objections from State Democratic Chairman E. B. Kruttschnitt that 
the candidate “was not a good enough Democrat.” Sommerville was a former Citizens’ 
League member, who had served Mayor Flower as assistant city attorney. He ran for 
District Attorney in 1899 on the Jackson Democratic Association ticket. Perhaps worse, 
at least in the opinion of Kruttschnitt, he admitted voting for President McKinley. A 
letter by a number of prominent former Citizens’ League members, including Charles 
Janvier and Samuel Gilmore, supported Sommerville, and the Council of Seventeen 
eventually endorsed the nomination with only one dissent. The episode indicated that 
Capdevielle would not be content as a figurehead, and that the combination of former 
League members and the Regulars was not yet stable. The Daily Picayune observer 
“Mr. McDonogh” commented:
7 Daily Picayune, August 14,1900, 6; August 21, 1900,4; Reynolds, Machine 
Politics in New Orleans, 58-60; Kendall, History o f  New Orleans, 2: 536. Mayoral 
appointee Harry Hodgson served only three months and resigned in November, 1900.
His replacement was not prominent in political activities. See Capdevielle to Harry 
Hodgson, November 10,1900, Mayor’s Correspondence.
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The power in the regular party was as good as sworn to the mayor and his policy 
. . .  for bringing the regular Democratic party to such a standard that the 
representative men of business and the professions would attach to i t . . .  .That is 
saying a happy thing for the mayor. It has been told [to] me that the regulars 
have found the man they have sought for so long. The mayor has the respect of 
the entire community.. . .  He is calm, deliberative, determined, fearless and will 
dare assert himself when right.8
The Mayor asserted himself on other occasions as well. The increased traffic 
along the city’s main thoroughfare, Canal Street, and its deplorable condition led to a 
plan for redesign and paving. Several street railroads enjoyed franchises along the street 
and could not agree on responsibility for the improvements. The redesign would also 
necessitate the removal of the Henry Clay statue at Canal and St. Charles, a traditional 
meeting place utilized by generations of New Orleanians and equivalent to Lee Circle 
and Liberty Place in their hearts. But the Mayor pushed forward at a meeting o f street 
railroad managers. “Gentlemen, as mayor of this city I represent 300,000 people,” the 
Mayor said, “ and I do not propose to allow this matter to drag any further. This 
ordinance will be introduced in the council at the next meeting. It will be passed and go 
into effect. That is my decision.” The meeting with the managers took place on Friday, 
August 24,1900. By that afternoon the Mayor had once more left the city for his Bay 
St. Louis home where he would remain for the weekend. The council fought over a new 
location for the Clay statue, eventually moving it to Lafayette Square in front o f City 
Hall. In order to pay the cost o f the relocation, the Mayor informally assessed each 
street railroad company. The Mayor’s secretary informed Robert Walmsley, prominent
8 Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern City, Appendices I and H; Daily 
Picayune, August 19,1900,4. Choctaw club records list Sommerville as a member by
1902.
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banker and president of the New Orleans City Railroad company, that “$300 has been 
fixed as your company’s proportion of the amount needed” to beautify the statue in its 
new location.
The Mayor was wrong in his estimate of the New Orleans population; that same 
weekend the 1900 census count put the figure at 287,104, a gain o f approximately 
45,000 over the 1890 population. The city remained the largest in the South; only New 
Orleans, Louisville (204,731), and Memphis (102,320) exceeded 100,000 among 
southern cities. In spite of the comparative advantage, the new figures distressed some 
observers; though the city had grown over eighteen percent, the rate o f increase trailed 
other fast-growing cities of the nation and of the South. The Daily Picayune bemoaned 
the lack of manufacturing base and called for a Lake Borgne canal to connect interior 
waterways with the Gulf of Mexico, shipyards, maintenance of a forty-foot river depth, 
and “possibly a river crossing” to accelerate the city’s growth.9
City development, prosperity, and New Orleans’s reputation in the nation were 
constant concerns of the Mayor and the city’s commercial and civic establishments. The 
epidemics of the 1890s had damaged that reputation, but the new public works promised 
to improve the situation. Real estate businessmen predicted an increase in property 
values, and in its annual commercial review, the Daily Picayune proudly proclaimed 
“New Orleans is the Healthiest City.” The paper reported municipal mortality rates and
9 Daily Picayune, August 25, 1900, 3; August 26, 1900, 1. August 30, 1900, 3; 
September 2, 1900,4. Capdevielle to Robert Walmsley, November 20, 1900, Mayor’s 
Correspondence; Twelfth Census o f  the United States, P arti (Washington, D.C., 1901), 
lxix-lxx, quoted in Grantham, Southern Progressivism, Table 11,277.
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found “the true white mortality. . .  is unquestionably low and compares favorably with 
most cities of the world.” The rate among the city’s blacks was much higher, but the 
Board of Health released figures for each race to highlight the differential. The issue o f 
health arose again the following month. The Shreveport Times defended New Orleans 
from “the attitudes of other cities.” The Daily Picayune saw the issue in terms of 
economic competition. “The Times is quite correct in stating that false reports have 
been circulated about the health of New Orleans by commercial rivals . . .  and such 
reports have been put forth for commercial purposes without any foundation.” The 
Louisiana Board of Health mortality rates for whites per 1000 were 18.4 in July, 14.05 
in August, and 16.57 in September, “on a plane with the most favored cities in the 
union.”10
An important role for the Mayor involved the promotion of the city’s economy 
and, particularly, the convention business. The New Orleans Progressive Union 
organized local businessmen to promote the city and to attract conventions that would 
generate visitors and their expenditures. In this effort, the Progressive Union received 
the assistance of the city’s commercial exchanges and the city administration. 
Immediately after taking office, the Mayor had agreed to serve on a committee that 
welcomed Professor Emory Johnson, Chairman of the Committee on Industrial and 
Commercial Value of an Inter-Oceanic Canal. This was only one of numerous efforts 
involving the personal intervention of the Mayor. The Progressive Union succeeded in 
attracting the Southern Industrial Convention to the city in 1900 and began raising funds
10 Daily Picayune, September 1, 1900; October 17,1900,4.
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to entertain the attendees. Voluntary groups such as the Progressive Union depended 
upon contributions from their members. Hospitality funds and the costs of temporary 
construction projects for convention visitors required fund raising drives led by the 
exchanges or local newspapers. The Progressive Union, for example, suffered from 
financial problems due to an unsuccessful trade fair in 1899 that led to operating 
deficits. The organization resorted to the raffle of a horse to raise funds. Even the 
Mayor was solicited to sell tickets. At the end of the year, the Progressive Union, with 
only $100 on hand, dissolved its Board of Directors and reorganized as a more broadly- 
based association. The city’s eagerness to promote the convention business did not 
extend to direct municipal subsidies to voluntary associations.11
The Mayor also faced questions regarding municipal ownership of utilities early 
in his term. Although the legislature had acted to establish the Dock Board and the 
Sewerage and Water Board, the city faced decisions over how quickly to pursue 
implementation o f the public system. In an effort to replace the private water company 
with the new public body, for example, the city filed suit claiming the franchise was null 
and void because o f gross violations of the private company’s franchise agreement. 
Though the city would eventually prevail, the initial decision went against the public 
argument, leaving New Orleans “at the mercy of the monopoly.” The Daily Picayune, a
11 Letter to Udolpho Wolfe, President, Board of Trade, May 15, 1900, Mayor’s 
Correspondence; Letter from Progressive Union to Mayor Paul Capdevielle, Mayor’s 
Correspondence; Daily Picayune, September 7, 1900, 3; November 9, 1900, 3. As o f 
early September, 1900, the winner had not yet claimed his prize in the horse raffle. An 
attorney advised the group to sell the horse and hold the proceeds in escrow for six 
months.
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staunch advocate of public ownership, published a bitter editorial after the setback in the 
water case. “About the only satisfaction that the city and its people have gained from a 
judicial examination of their relations with private companies is that they incur extreme 
risks o f suffering irremediable evils when they delegate their municipal powers, 
franchises and privileges to private corporations.” Electric utilities were on the city’s 
agenda as well. Early franchisees found it difficult to make money and petitioned the 
city to transfer rights to other companies. The Merchants Electric Light and Power 
Company sought to combine with another electric power company for advantages of 
scale. The city council debated the merits o f competition versus the protection of the 
investors. Although fear o f corporate combinations was widespread, the council agreed 
to allow the merger. In the midst of the discussion, the issue of municipal ownership of 
the electric franchise arose and would come before Capdevielle and the council again.12
In November of 1900, the national election received the attention of the New 
Orleans political establishment, although there were no local races in serious contention. 
Conservative Democrats preferred other candidates, but went along with the party’s 
choice of William Jennings Bryan. As the election approached, the national debate 
turned briefly to consideration of disfranchisement, and Republicans suggested a 
reduction in the number o f representatives allocated to the South. Local press reaction 
was swift. “Those young men who think [Republicans are different now] are simply 
shutting their eyes to the present conditions. It is the same old party stripped o f the
12 Daily Picayune, October 20, 1900, Section 1,4 and Section H, 1. See Chapter 
VI for an investigation of the early years of the Sewerage and Water Board.
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arbitrary power it once exercised, the Daily Picayune warned. “The Republican Party 
was the one which put black heels on white necks in the southern states.” When 
McKinley won easily, the Daily Picayune petulantly declared that “the people of the 
United States have unmistakably declared for McKinley and Roosevelt. This means that 
they are in favor of trusts; they want a large standing army; they believe in the conquest 
and annexation of foreign countries.” Not all New Orleanians shared the newspaper’s 
view. At Thanksgiving, 1900, J. C. Murphy, president of the Louisiana Sugar and Rice 
Exchange, gave thanks to the “American people for sending Mr. Bryan to the ‘scrap 
pile’” as well as “for a splendid grinding season.” He added a compliment to the Mayor 
“for his admirable handling o f the ‘Charles’ incident.”13
The Mayor’s City Hall colleagues honored him in early November, the first 
anniversary of his election victory. City Attorney Samuel Gilmore gave a florid speech 
praising Capdevielle’s leadership, and the press echoed his judgements. The memory o f 
the Charles riots continued to affect journalistic assessments of the Mayor. “Many who 
knew him but slightly mistook his personal courtesy for weakness and his modesty for 
timidity,” wrote the Daily Picayune, “but in less than a year his great courage and 
calmness [and] his self possession and resourcefulness in a great emergency . . .  have 
stamped Mayor Capdevielle [as] one of the greatest mayors New Orleans every had.”14
13 Daily Picayune, November 2, 1900, 4; November 7, 1900, 4; November 29, 
1900, 3.
14 Daily Picayune, November 8,1900,4. The Daily Picayune remained a 
supporter of the Mayor, but in the next three years did not offer any assessment of the 
Mayor which put him in the first rank o f New Orleans mayors.
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The enthusiasm of the new century and the constant emphasis on commercial 
improvement set the stage for the Southern Industrial Conference in the city. Delegates 
heard Capdevielle’s welcome to New Orleans as well as promotions for a Nicaraguan 
Canal. In early 1901, James S. Zacherie, “the progressive and public-spirited 
councilman,” put forth a vision of the city reaching northward to the lake, with grand 
boulevards and municipal ownership of electricity and water. At the Progressive 
Union’s annual meeting, President Andrew Blakely, proprietor of the St. Charles Hotel, 
predicted that “New Orleans would be the country’s second city before another decade 
will have passed.” Businessman and recent Choctaw convert Charles Janvier echoed the 
remarks two weeks later, though he allowed more time for the city’s expansion. “By 
2001,” Janvier wrote, “New Orleans will have 2,000,000 people, second only to New 
York.”15
The New Year also brought renewed discussion regarding the public’s role in the 
provision of utilities. Mayor Capdevielle had run on a platform of municipal ownership, 
though the city’s resources would not support absorption of all utilities. Encouraged by 
the Board of Trade, the lessees of markets in the city reached a compromise with the city 
government, and public markets became another function of the municipal government. 
The status of electrical service, however, posed a more difficult problem. The city’s 
debt load was already large. Out of twenty-two mills property tax, ten mills supported 
debt service, and that proportion of operating to capital funds would increase as
15 Daily Picayune, December 5,1900,2; January 2, 1901, 3; January 14,1901, 3; 
January 26,1901, Section II, 1.
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construction started on the new sewerage, water, and drainage systems. Purchase of 
existing franchises and capital assets would require yet more borrowing. Capdevielle 
also seemed reluctant for the city to absorb electric service because electric franchises 
were intertwined with electric street railroad service, the business base of more than a 
few prominent citizens, including Board of Liquidation President Robert Walmsley and 
Dock Board President Hugh McCloskey.16
A middle path, however, was possible. The city’s plans for a modem drainage 
system anticipated the construction of an electric generating station to provide power to 
the various drainage pumping stations. Since the capacity of the generating plant would 
exceed the requirements of the pumping stations, which would be in use intermittently 
depending on rainfall rate and amount, members of the council proposed to build the 
generating station with sufficient capacity to provide not only for drainage, but also for 
street lights and other municipal purposes. But this plan placed the city’s Drainage 
Commission in the middle o f the issue. Frequent problems with city drainage had hurt 
the credibility o f the commission, and the prospect of it absorbing another major 
function discouraged implementation of the plan. Although the Daily Picayune 
continually pressed for municipal ownership, the city’s other morning newspaper, the 
Times-Democrat, opposed it, clearly doubting the ability o f the Regular-led 
administration to manage electric power successfully. The paper also feared expansion
16 Daily Picayune, January 13,1901, Section 1,4; January 16, 1901, 3; Kendall, 
History o f  New Orleans, 2: 537.
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o f the Regular patronage base and constantly demanded investigation of the payrolls in 
city departments.17
At the end of March, 1901, the Daily Picayune reported on a lecture by Mayor 
Capdevielle at Tulane University in which he took the position that “modem progress 
and the advancement of public interests in cities demand municipal ownership and 
operation o f public utilities.” The newspaper noted the Mayor’s speech and answered 
anticipated objections concerning graft in public ownership by turning the argument on 
its head. “Graft [was] easier to hide when in private hands.” The Daily Picayune saw 
the danger in the awarding o f franchises, a process wherein “bosses derive power from 
arrangements with private owners.” Quoting from a contemporary article in the Atlantic 
magazine, the newspaper noted that given the protection of a civil service system, public 
ownership would be administered by non-political managers to the benefit o f the public 
interest. The newspaper also attempted to delineate services subject to public 
ownership—police, fire, sewer, drainage, parks, and street lighting—from other services 
that would remain private—street railroads, gas, telephones, and electric power. There 
was no such distinction in Europe, where “public ownership had prospered . [But] 
whether or not [complete ownership] will be the answer in the cities of the American 
republic remains to be seen.” Crucial to the management of public utilities were “non-
17 Daily Picayune, March 13, 1901,4; April 12, 1901,3. See Chapter VI for a 
discussion o f the city’s difficulties with drainage. Although characterization of the 
editorial positions o f the two newspapers can be hazardous, it is clear that the Daily 
Picayune more closely followed national developments and attitudes towards municipal 
ownership. The Times-Democrat was reflexively, if  not bitterly, anti-Regular in its 
politics and a more likely defender o f private enterprise in almost all circumstances.
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political boards for the non-political public business,” an important feature of the 
progressive era theory of governance. The Daily Picayune reflected the ambivalent 
feelings of the city’s leadership. The emerging consensus for progressive civic 
development easily covered the basic utilities—sewer service, water, and drainage. 
However, New Orleans was not a wealthy city, and its needs were great. The 
anticipated financial burden of a takeover of the electric services, street lighting, and 
streetcar transportation caused even enthusiastic supporters of public ownership to 
reconsider.18
Not all municipal developments carried so much weight. During the spring 
months, Mayor Capdevielle and the city council fought over the efficacy of an anti­
spitting ordinance, vetoed by the Mayor but passed over his objections, in part at the 
urging of various women’s organizations. On a more pleasant note, the city prepared for 
the visit of President McKinley, the first sitting chief executive to visit New Orleans.
The President’s agenda included a parade, an elaborate reception, and a tour of the port 
to impress the visitor and his party with the importance of the city in national and 
international trade. School children enjoyed a holiday and enthusiastic crowds greeted 
the Republican chief executive.19
During late spring, 1901, the press of business kept the Mayor busy. He declined 
an invitation to attend the National Municipal League annual convention and held
18 Daily Picayune, March 28, 1901,4; March 29, 1901, 4; May 14, 1901,4.
19 Daily Picayune, April 10, 1901. 3; April 17, 1901, 4; April 13, 1901, 8; April 
29 - May 4,1901; Capdevielle to McKinley Reception Committee, April 24,1901, 
Mayor’s Correspondence; Kendall, History o f  New Orleans, 2: 538.
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extensive talks with the managers of the street railroads to complete plans for a 
redesigned Canal Street. City council members requested a meeting to discuss the 
Public Belt Railroad, a project neglected during the previous year. And the anticipated 
arrival in the city of a large Navy dry dock facility brought forth another round o f 
committees, fund raising, and planning. In early June, Capdevielle “was on the sick list 
. . .  exhausted from meetings.” In the middle of the month, he wrote former councilman 
Sidney Story and declined an opportunity to head the city’s delegation to the Trans 
Mississippi Commission Congress. The following month, the Mayor’s secretary 
requested the rescheduling o f a Drainage Commission meeting so the Mayor “can leave 
for his home over the lake the same evening.” For much of the summer, the Mayor 
spent time in Bay St. Louis, and in early August, he left for Montreal “for reasons of 
health.” In his absence, council president William Mehle served as Acting Mayor.20
During the Mayor’s absence, Commissioner Moulin o f Public Works admitted to 
a scheme with Louis Knop, a Regular ward leader. In exchange for the organization’s 
support, Moulin had agreed to a detailed procedure (for some reason committed to 
writing) for sharing his salary or obtaining a position for Knop equal to one-half o f the 
Commissioner’s salary. When informed of the scandal, Mayor Capdevielle directed 
Mehle to suspend Moulin and the grand jury began an investigation. After hearings, the
20 Capdevielle to National Municipal League, April 30, 1901, Mayor’s 
Correspondence; Capdevielle to Robert Walmsley, May 4, 1901, Mayor’s 
Correspondence; Capdevielle to Hugh McCloskey, Dock Board President, June 7, 1901, 
Mayor’s Correspondence; Members, New Orleans City Council to Mayor Capdevielle, 
June 7,1901, Mayor’s Correspondence; Capdevielle to Sidney Story, June 16,1901, 
Mayor’s Correspondence; Capdevielle to Robert Walmsley, President Drainage Board, 
July 10, 1901, Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily Picayune, June 6, 1901, 3.
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council recommended Moulin be fired, but a technical deficiency in the state law under 
which he was charged saved his position. In another scandal, city councilman P. J. 
McMahon informed the Mayor of a bribery scheme involving council members. The 
Mayor assumed the scheme involved the current city council. Pressed for an 
explanation, McMahon admitted the matter involved a prior administration, but would 
reveal no more. The council required him to apologize and, when he refused, expelled 
him. A subsequent court decision reinstated McMahon to the council in May, 1902.21
Returning to the issue of public utilities, the council assigned the issue of 
municipal lighting to its Lighting Committee and requested that the group study a city 
engineer’s report recommending municipal ownership. The committee did not act 
promptly, generating a stem Daily Picayune editorial reminding the council that the 
current franchise for city lighting would expire December 31, 1902. If  the city were to 
take over the franchise, immediate action would be required. Dogged by the newspaper, 
the committee asked the Sewerage and Water Board engineer for assistance. By early 
October, the pace of action picked up and the committee held hearings on the possible 
assumption of lighting responsibilities by the city. The threat of city action affected the 
current franchisee. Representatives o f  the private company appeared at the hearing and 
promised to offer new rates that were “very much lower.” A letter from the company 
claimed “it has yet to be demonstrated that municipal ownership [of] electric lighting
21 Daily Picayune, August 16, 1901, 3; August 30, 1901, 7; September 13, 1901, 
3; October 9, 1901; October 11, 1901, 6; October 12, 1901, 3; October 15,1901,4-5; 
October 25, 1901, 3; October 27,1901, 10; November 6, 1901,3; November 9, 1901; 
April 15, 1902,10; April 26,1902, 3; Capdevielle to City Council, October 15, 1901, 
Mayor’s Correspondence.
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has been much of a success.” The letter continued, “Every large city . . .  has 
investigated [such ownership, and] only two or three have constructed their own plants.” 
In spite of the company’s opposition, the Mayor asked the council to continue its 
investigations. Although City Attorney Gilmore reminded council members that 
“municipal ownership was the platform on which the present administration was 
elected,” members remained reluctant to take the expensive steps required toward 
complete public ownership. Uncertain about a firm course of action, the council 
approved specifications for a municipal plant, but also advertised for bids from 
companies to provide lighting. The threat o f municipal power forced the franchisee to 
offer the city increasingly better rates, and the council settled for that victory. Lighting 
remained in private hands.22
A measure of the city’s progress was provided by former resident o f New 
Orleans, who returned for a visit in February, 1902, and gave an interview to the Daily 
Picayune. St. B. McConnico praised the city for the “ new spirit” and “advances” he 
noticed, including new Illinois Central tracks, the Sewerage and Water Board, advances 
in drainage, and the reorganization of the Progressive Union, the city’s predecessor to 
the Chamber of Commerce. His mention of the Progressive Union coincided with a 
new effort to revitalize that voluntary organization. To assist the effort, the Daily 
Picayune announced it would annually donate a loving cup for the Progressive Union to 
award to a New Orleans resident. The first award went to Frank T. Howard, who
22 Daily Picayune, September 11, 1901, Section II, 1; September 26, 1901, 4; 
October 4,1901, 3; October 10,1901, 7; October 11, 1901, 3; November 11, 1901, 3.
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merited the cup for his donation of an elementary school to the children at the northern 
edge of the Third Ward. Subsequent awards provided a important indication of the 
charitable and civic work valued by the community.23
Capdevielle continued to face numerous issues of public ownership and 
operation. To acquire the assets o f the private sewerage company, now out o f business, 
the Sewerage and Water Board offered $295,000. The proposed amount included 
forgiveness of back taxes and required the approval o f the city council. The council did 
not move rapidly on the proposal and became reluctant to agree after testimony that 
questioned the quality o f the company’s pipes. Controversy grew after an editorial in 
the Daily States severely criticized the council. Outraged members forced Capdevielle 
to convene a special session at which a resolution condemning Robert Ewing, manager 
o f the Daily-States, passed easily. Council anger was undoubtedly increased by the fact 
that the Daily-States held the official printing contract for the city. Ewing was a ward 
leader and member o f the Choctaw club, but exhibited a high degree of independence 
and feistiness. Not content with a council resolution, members prevailed upon the grand 
jury, which issued indictments for libel against Ewing. Nothing came o f the libel 
charges, and additional litigation opposing the sewer settlement delayed further action 
for months.24
23 Daily Picayune, February 14, 1902,3; March 13, 1902.
24 Daily Picayune, February 15, 1902, 3 ,4 ; March 12, 1902,15; March 15, 1902, 
9; March 18, 1902, 4,10; March 21, 1902, 3; March 25, 1902, 3; April 4, 1902, 7; City 
Council to Capdevielle, March 20,1902, Mayor’s Correspondence.
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The Louisiana legislature met in regular session during 1902, and the city had an 
interest in several crucial pieces o f legislation. At the request of the Drainage 
Commission, the legislature passed a bill to merge the commission with the Sewerage 
and Water Board. Of greater interest in the political realm, the legislature changed the 
city’s election from November, 1903, to the following year. Capdevielle and his 
administration would serve an extra six months. In addition, the legislation altered the 
charter of the city by increasing the membership o f the council and by making elective 
previously appointed positions in the administration, such as city engineer. The 
governor would not have proposed such changes in the absence o f agreement from the 
city’s ward leaders. At a conference on May 19,1902, the Regular leadership agreed to 
the changes and, at the same time, assured the governor the New Orleans delegation 
would not oppose a movement to repeal the poll tax.25
In May, 1902, the Mayor became ill once more. A severe abscess required 
hospitalization and surgery. Although public information assured citizens that the 
Mayor would recover, the Daily Picayune openly commented on the issue of succession 
should Capdevielle not survive the ordeal. The legislature was still in session, and 
members quickly introduced a vacancy and succession bill. The Mayor’s recovery made 
the issue moot, but Capdevielle did not regain full strength for several months. He 
retreated to his Bay St. Louis residence, and William Mehle served a Acting Mayor once 
again, though Capdevielle kept up correspondence through his secretary. From
25 Daily Picayune, May 17, 1902, 9; May 20, 1902, 9; Kendall, History o f  New 
Orleans, 2: 542-543. See Chapter VI for details on the merger bill. The legislature did 
not repeal the poll tax.
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Mississippi, the Mayor accepted the presidency o f a new city group dedicated to 
building an auditorium that would serve the growing convention business. Capdevielle 
appointed a committee to assist him in the auditorium effort and later announced a 
replacement for the membership of a committee appointed to find a site for a new 
federal post office in the city. In late July, the city council journeyed to the Mayor’s 
home to receive his policy recommendations. The next day, the Mayor felt well enough 
to journey halfway to New Orleans from his Mississippi home, where he was met by a 
messenger from the city with important papers for his signature.26
The Mayor returned to New Orleans in mid-August to sign bonds, but remained 
on a limited schedule. He left town intermittently in early September, but returned full 
time by September 18 because Acting Mayor Mehle departed on an extended vacation. 
Events tested his health once again when a strike o f street car workers shut down the 
city’s transportation system for several weeks. The contending parties rejected offers of 
mediation from the Progressive Union. Capdevielle ordered the street railroads to 
operate, but violent demonstrations prevented even token service. Only intervention by 
the governor brought the two sides together. Within one week o f announcing the 
settlement, Capdevielle left New Orleans “to rest and recuperate” in part from the stress 
associated with the “Carmen strike.” On November 4, 1902, the Daily Picayune 
reported that William Mehle returned from his vacation, resumed Acting Mayor status,
26 Daily Picayune, May 29, 1902, 10; May 30, 1902, 4; May 31, 1902, 13; July 
6, 1902, 3; July 28, 1902, 7; July 29, 1902, 6; Acting Mayor William Mehle to the City 
Council, July 1,1902, Mayor’s Correspondence; Capdevielle’s secretary to Bernard 
McCloskey, July 14,1902, Mayor’s Correspondence; Capdevielle to James Porch, July 
30,1902, Mayor’s Correspondence.
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and received a letter from Capdevielle recuperating in New York. The public did not 
comment on the Mayor’s health and frequent absences from his office. Municipal 
management did not depend upon his daily presence, and Capdevielle’s view of his 
duties and obligations did not include a high level of initiative.27
Toward the end of 1902, the city enjoyed several conventions that highlighted its 
role as a center of corporate, voluntary, and professional association meetings. In 
November, New Orleans played host to the American Federation o f Labor, an 
association of bankers, and the United Daughters of the Confederacy. (Nearly forty 
years after the Civil War, the Daily Picayune still printed a weekly column on the 
history of the Confederacy.) In 1903 the city would host an even more important 
meeting—the reunion of the United Confederate Veterans. But financing for visitor 
facilities lagged. The movement to build an auditorium stalled for lack o f funds. The 
estimated cost of the structure exceeded $250,000, but only $27,000 in stock 
subscriptions had been received by December. Additionally, estimates of the hospitality 
funds needed for the U.C.V. reunion approached $100,000. The city abandoned plans 
for the auditorium, and funds for the reunion fell short of expectations.28
27 Capdevielle to M. J. Sanders, President, New Orleans Progressive Union, 
October 3,1902, Mayor’s Correspondence; Capdevielle to City Council, October 7, 
1902, Mayor’s Correspondence; Capdevielle to City Council, October 14, 1902, 
Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily Picayune, October 21, 1902, 4; Kendall, History o f  
New Orleans, 2: 540-42. Kendall’s account provides significant detail, but errs by 
placing the date of the strike in 1901, not 1902.
28 Daily Picayune, November 14, 1902,4; November 30, 1902, Section IV, 2; 
December 7, 1902,4.
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Capdevielle's inactivity on at least one major issue became an issue late in 1902. 
Stung by lack of movement on the public belt system, the Mayor agreed to call the 
commission together in January, 1903. Nothing came o f the effort in spite of numerous 
requests from New Orleans commercial interests. Capdevielle lacked the leadership or 
the energy to assess such an opportunity and to appreciate its political and economic 
dimensions. But railroad issues dominated the Mayor’s agenda in the new year and 
highlighted his passive, if  not ambivalent, attitude toward issues that demanded a clear 
vision of the public interest.29
The New Orleans Progressive Union held its annual meeting on January 12,
1903. Assessor Martin Behrman joined the board of Directors. The organization 
reviewed the previous year’s successes and looked forward to 1903. One theme of the 
Progressive Union’s work was the improvement of railroad service to New Orleans. 
Within two weeks, another railroad would petition to serve the city, initiating a 
controversy that lasted for several years. In an age of suspicion toward corporate power, 
railroads held a special place in the public mind. Cities needed transportation 
development, yet feared domination by companies controlled by Harriman and Morgan. 
In January, 1903, the Daily Picayune reported that a city council committee had been 
“railroaded” by the Frisco, popular shorthand for the St. Louis and San Francisco 
Railroad. The committee granted to the company a large corridor running roughly
29 Daily Picayune, December 16, 1902, 12; Capdevielle to Members, Public Belt 
Railroad Commission, January 5, 1903, Mayor’s Correspondence; Capdevielle to 
Members, Public Belt Railroad Commission, January 17, 1903, Mayor’s 
Correspondence.
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north-south, east of and parallel to Canal Street. In addition, the Frisco received 
permission to bring tracks to the riverfront, upriver from Canal Street, to provide access 
to the lucrative Mississippi River trade. The Frisco lawyer was E. H. Farrar, partner of 
E. B. Kruttschnitt, and nationally prominent attorney.30
At the end of January, the council's Streets and Landings committee took up the 
Frisco ordinance as well as a second request for track privileges. The additional request 
came from the Shreveport and Red River Valley Railroad, anxious to obtain access to 
the city’s water front. The next day, a conference of the city’s commercial exchanges 
met to sort out the varying requests and suggested a compromise. The exchanges feared 
monopoly railroad power and wanted the city to complete its plans for a public belt 
railroad along the river. Exclusive rights to the Frisco threatened those aims. The 
council did not take the advice of the exchanges and voted the Frisco most of what it 
requested. Capdevielle vetoed the ordinance, but was overridden. Only five 
councilmen voted with the Mayor.31
Suspicions about the ordinance arose immediately. The Board of Trade objected 
to the actions of the council, and the Daily Picayune raised the issue of conflict of 
interest. Answering the letter of a Frisco proponent, the newspaper pointed out that 
Councilman Cucullu, “one of the honestest men alive,” was nonetheless president o f a
30 Daily Picayune, January 13, 1903, 5; January, 24, 1903,1, 6. Farrar also 
represented the defunct water company in its various suits against the city, even though 
Farrar has assisted in drafting the original Sewerage and Water Board legislation.
31 Daily Picayune, January 31, 1903, 3; February 1, 1903,4; February 3, 1903, 5; 
February 4,1903, 1,5; February 11, 1903. For a full discussion of the public belt 
railroad, see Chapter VIII.
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bank that the Frisco had favored with $1,000,000 of deposits being held for the purchase 
of property. On February 20, the Mayor took the matter to the local civil district court 
and asked the judge to enjoin execution of the ordinance. City Attorney Samuel 
Gilmore argued the case. On February 26, local press accounts mentioned that the 
Frisco had joined the J. P. Morgan railroad interests, but that news was quickly 
overshadowed by a Daily Picayune expose.32
Curious about the corporate background o f the Frisco, the Daily Picayune 
investigated the railroad’s incorporation and discovered that a widespread assumption 
about the its ownership was incorrect. The franchise had been granted to a local 
corporation—the New Orleans and San Francisco Railroad-not to the national railroad 
line assumed to be in charge. Moreover, the local corporation was a “paper” entity with 
no operations. The owners of the local Frisco included E. H. Farrar and E. B. 
Kruttschnitt, whose political connections surpassed even the most prominent New 
Orleanians among Regulars and reformers alike. Kruttschnitt was President of the 
School Board as well as chairman of the State Democratic Central Committee. His 
brother was a prominent official with the Harriman railroad interests. The paper called 
for more investigation and urged the courts to overturn the council’s actions.33
To the disappointment of the Frisco opponents, the ordinance survived its first 
court challenge as Civil Court District Judge King ruled the council had not exceeded its
32 Daily Picayune, February 11, 1903, 5; February 12, 1903, 6; February 21,
1903, 4; February 26, 1903,1.
33 Daily Picayune, February 28, 1903, 6.
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authority, although he placed some limitations on the right of the railroad to close 
streets. An appeals court upheld the district court in May, and one month later the state 
Supreme Court affirmed the council’s powers to grant the franchise. Safeguards to the 
public interest were at “the discretion o f the council,” which, the Daily Picayune 
claimed, “has already given everything away.” But the Frisco did not win everything.
Its franchise to the river front brought a challenge from the Dock Board, established by 
the state to organize the river front. The Board prevailed, setting the important 
precedent for public control of the areas adjacent to the docks.34
During the Frisco fight, the attention of most New Orleanians was on the reunion 
of the United Confederate Veterans. The hospitality fund did not reach its goal of 
$100,000, but citizens contributed nearly $60,000, including a donation o f $12.00 from 
a civil jury hearing the probate case of a departed veteran. Although the city’s drive for 
a permanent auditorium had failed, organizers built a temporary auditorium and 
hospitality areas at a local race track in order to host the reunion crowds. City officials 
and reunion committees pressed the railroads to offer preferential rates to visitors, and 
thousands of veterans and their families came to the city. The event proved such a 
success that the Progressive Union began a drive to have the city declared the permanent 
reunion site. (Although the U.C.V. declined the offer, the group returned to the city in 
1906.) The U.C.V. reunion was not the only prominent meeting in the city in 1903. 
Earlier in the year, the Mayor helped to plan the convention for the National Association
34 Daily Picayune, March 31,1903, 4; May 28,1903; June 2,1903, 6, 8. For a 
discussion of the Dock Board and its power, see Chapter VII.
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of Manufacturers, o f which prominent New Orleanian James Porch was Vice- 
President.35
In early August, Capdevielle once again left the city for Bay St. Louis, planning 
to return “when healthy and when [council President William] Mehle leaves for a six 
week vacation.” At an early August council meeting, members agreed to adjourn “for 
two or three weeks during the oppressive days of August.” When the Mayor and 
council members returned to work, the political season began. Although the municipal 
elections had been moved to the fall o f 1904, the state election contests would take place 
in spring. By the end of September, the candidates for the Democratic primary began 
lining up support. A solid, Regular Democratic ticket emerged—Newton Blanchard for 
Governor, Jared Sanders for Lieutenant Governor, and former Governor Murphy Foster 
for the U.S. Senate. But the potential state ticket lacked sufficient presence from New 
Orleans. Martin Behrman, President o f  the Board of Assessors and Regular ward leader 
from the Fifteenth Ward, filled the gap. “Algiers Endorses Martin Behrman” announced 
the Daily Picayune headline. “The people of Algiers last night [presented] Martin 
Behrman . . .  who is now before the people o f the state for the nomination as Auditor.” 
The election also saw the electoral debut of Charles Janvier, who ran for the Senate 
from uptown New Orleans.36
35 Daily Picayune, April 17, 1903, 15; May 17-21, 1903; May 29, 1903,4; 
Capdevielle to James Porch, April 6, 1903, Mayor’s Correspondence.
36 Daily Picayune, August 1, 1903, 4; August 5, 1903, 5; September 30, 1903,4; 
Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 71-78.
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The state election monopolized the attention of the city leaders through the end 
o f 1903 and the first month o f 1904. On January 20, Blanchard won election and carried 
most of the Regular ticket to victory. Behrman barely missed a majority and faced a 
runoff, but rather than face a second primary, Behrman’s opponent withdrew, making 
the New Orleanian the State Auditor. With the state elections completed, city issues 
returned to the top of the agenda. But city elections would take place in early 
November, and Capdevielle’s administration showed no great energy or initiative to 
affect substantial change in the interim.37
In early February, the city prepared for the annual Mardi Gras celebration.
Mayor Capdevielle asked Council President William Mehle to take responsibility for the 
entertainment of official City Hall guests. The Choctaw Club offered its own hospitality 
to a delegation of 150 Democrats “with a band of fifty pieces” from Cook County, 
visiting the city “as has been their custom for the past several years.” A group of 
Choctaw Club members, led by former Mayor Fitzpatrick, went to Chicago to escort the 
quests to New Orleans, and the Choctaw club house was headquarters for the visitors. 
Serious matters intruded upon the festivities, and the council once again dealt with a 
proposal for municipal lighting. Uncertain over the direction the city should take, the 
council called for bids for the construction of a city plant. But the city simultaneously 
received proposals from local companies for the provision of lighting. In April, the 
council abandoned plans for a municipally-owned system and awarded the lighting
37 Daily Picayune, January 10,1904,6; January 20,1904,1; February 9,1904,
11.
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franchise to the local street railroad company. Although the Mayor had recommended a 
municipal lighting system for more than four years, the council did not follow his 
advice. Capdevielle’s position, however, was more in the nature o f a sincerely offered 
opinion, rather than a serious advocacy. The Mayor fought for elements o f progressive 
civic development, but did not offer a comprehensive program for council adoption.38
The months prior to a municipal election were often marked by a flurry of press 
interest in possible areas of conflict. In late April, evidence of widespread gambling and 
the complicity of the Police Department in the vice became front page news.
Capdevielle asked for the resignation o f the Police Board, but the members refused. A 
group of citizens quickly organized a Civic League and approached the commercial 
exchanges for support. Only the Sugar Exchange seemed interested; the others 
“suddenly decided they must keep out o f politics.” Exchange members expressed 
reluctance for good reasons. The municipal elections were approaching, and alignment 
behind the Civic League could constrain their ability to maneuver. In early June the 
Civic League met in the offices o f Regular (and former mayoral candidate) Charles 
Buck to condemn gambling and the spread of saloons. Although the daily papers did 
not lend strong backing to the League, the Daily Picayune reminded readers o f the 
responsibilities of voters. The paper cited the commission government of Galveston as 
a model. “The success of the experiment [i.e., Galveston’s government] depended on
38 Daily Picayune, February 3, 1904, 4; February 6, 1904, 5; February 10, 1904, 
10; April 19, 1904, 4.
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two important facts. There was honest and intelligent administration and it was free 
from politics. Here is the entire key to proper municipal government.”39
The Capdevielle administration had not proved that lack o f politics promoted 
proper municipal government. In the years following his election, Capdevielle 
steadfastly adhered to his concept of mayoral duty. He acceded to Progressive Union 
requests to attract conventions to the city. He responded forcefully to threats to the 
public order. He gave of his time to charitable and civic causes, even to the point of 
maintaining the presidency of his high school alumni association and presidency o f the 
City Park Improvement Association. Capdevielle’s campaign com m itm ent to public 
ownership of utilities shaped his attitudes toward the Sewerage and Water Board and to 
the possibility o f municipal lighting owned by the city. Mayor Capdevielle, however, 
did not transcend the gilded age era in which he had become a man of prominence. He 
acted as the chairman of the board of the municipal corporation, not as a chief executive 
officer. He showed no particular enthusiasm for active government and certainly 
exhibited no great personal energy on behalf of progressive causes. The Mayor spent a 
great deal of time outside o f the city, and frequent illnesses contributed to his absences.
At the end of Capdevielle’s term, his name was not prominently mentioned as a 
mayoral candidate. Speculation in July, 1904, centered around Captain (and member of 
Congress) Robert Davey, Charles Janvier, former Council President Abraham Brittin, 
and businessman W. G. Tebault. The Daily Picayune praised the Mayor’s record in the
39 Daily Picayune, May 23,1904,4; June 2, 1904, 5. The Daily Picayune was 
more skeptical about commission government in 1911 and 1912 when it was under 
consideration by the city’s reform elements. See Chapter X for details.
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Charles riots and the streetcar strike, and speculated about the absence of a move to 
renominate him. The paper suggested that Capdevielle had offended “powers” in his 
handling of the Frisco grant, and that his efforts to enforce anti-gambling laws 
frightened those with a more casual attitude toward the practice. But there is no 
apparent evidence that Capdevielle wanted another term. The political environm ent and 
the Mayor’s record pointed to the thanks of the city and a pleasant retirement to his 
Mississippi home.40
But events did not run according to script. Capdevielle’s service earned him 
consideration on the part of the Regular organization, and developments in the city 
elections created an opportunity for his continued service. He assumed state office and 
served the public for nearly sixteen years. It would be his successor who brought 
together a firm consensus on behalf of progressive civic development in New Orleans. 
By 1904, however, many of the requirements for that success were in place. New 
boards and commissions had taken over functions of government previously held by the 
city. The business community, although never monolithic, united behind public works 
initiatives. Most important, through the Mayor’s service, the Regulars had consolidated 
their municipal political power. In 1899, the Choctaws had chosen Capdevielle to 
reassure the public. In the next city election, the Regulars would return to a nominee of 
their own ranks. Southern progressivism in New Orleans would be led by a Regular, 
who, to the surprise of many, found a way to stay loyal to this political colleagues and to 
promote the progressive civic development o f New Orleans at the same time.
40 Daily Picayune, July 23,1904, 5; August 25, 1904, 6.
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CHAPTER V
MARTIN BEHRMAN, 1904-1908:
POLITICAL BOSS AS COMMUNITY BUILDER
In July. 1904, New Orleans political and journalistic circles began to speculate 
about a successor to Mayor Capdevielle. Regular Democrats had every reason to 
assume an easy election for the Choctaw-anointed candidate. The Citizens’ League no 
longer existed, many o f its most prominent members having defected to the Regular 
opposition. Capdevielle’s tenure had raised no fundamental issues of governance. The 
recent gambling scandal generated little response, and the Civic League’s call to action 
failed to produce significant opposition to the entrenched Regulars. Within two months, 
however, the political landscape changed. Governor Newton Blanchard, easily elected 
in January, 1904, with significant Regular assistance, provided the opposition with an 
issue that threatened to return New Orleans to the pattern of alternating reform and 
Regular administrations. But the Regulars survived the challenge, elected their 
candidate, and initiated the most stable period in New Orleans mayoral history.
Underlying the political controversy, and eventually overshadowing its impact, 
was the continued progress of the city toward acquisition of a modem infrastructure. By 
the 1904 election, the legislature, the city council, and Mayor Capdevielle, with the 
cooperation of the both the city reformers and the Regular organization, had established
133
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three significant programs of public works. The Dock Board was a  state agency, 
appointed by the Governor. The Public Belt Railroad Commission consisted mostly of 
businessmen chosen by the commercial exchanges. And the Sewerage and Water 
Board, although subject to mayoral appointment, consisted of long-term members not 
subject to immediate removal. The voting public could enter the municipal elections 
secure in the knowledge that, regardless of the outcome, the transforming efforts in 
public works would continue without interruption. The consensus in New Orleans on 
behalf of progressive civic development benefitted from political stability and from the 
remarkable career of Martin Behrman.
Events moved quickly in the summer of 1904 as the Regulars searched for a 
candidate. At the end of July, State Auditor and leader o f the Fifteenth Ward, Martin 
Behrman, returned from an Elks Convention and the Louisiana Purchase exhibit at St. 
Louis and answered reporters questions about New Orleans politics. Professing to be 
“rusty on the city situation,” Behrman would not discuss possible candidates. He did 
say that he opposed a primary to choose a Democratic candidate and recommended 
instead the traditional process of party election and subsequent convention, wherein, 
Behrman claimed, “every businessman and every man [could] participate.” The 
Orleans Parish Democratic Party Executive Committee met soon thereafter to decide 
whether to retain the convention nominating procedure. The Daily Picayune reported 
that when the roll was called “thirty-three out of thirty-four members [i.e., two from 
each of the city’s seventeen wards] were present. The absent one was dead.” The 
committee reaffirmed the convention process a week later, apportioned delegates to the
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various wards, and arranged for elections in those wards where opposition to the 
Regular leadership had arisen. The Regulars anticipated no difficulties in electing a full 
ticket.1
In the first of a series of political missteps, Governor Blanchard angered Walter 
Denegre, former Citizen’s League member, 1896 candidate for the U.S. Senate, and 
prominent reform faction attorney. In a Shreveport speech, Blanchard recalled the 1896 
fight and referred to Denegre’s candidacy, and the reformer’s party status at the time, 
using the words “not a Democrat.” Denegre took issue, and an exchange of letters 
raised the temperature of the dispute. The charge of disloyalty to the party was a 
common theme of Regular electoral tactics, but Denegre took the occasion not only to 
dispute the charge, but also to defend the reform movement in New Orleans. He “had 
always voted Democratic,” Denegre argued, suggesting that Blanchard “had imperfect 
knowledge of local political conditions in New Orleans.” Denegre defended the record 
of the Citizens’ League and claimed reform credit for the “Dock Board, the Drainage 
and Sewerage Act , . . .  [and] the Constitutional convention.” His spirited defense o f the 
reformers revealed latent support for opposition to the Regulars and may have provoked 
the reformers to action.2
1 Daily Picayune, July 23, 1904, 5; July 31, 1904, 9; August 18, 1904, 5; August 
23, 1904, 4; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 65-66; Reynolds, Machine 
Politics in New Orleans, 82-83.
2 Daily Picayune, August 19, 1904, 1. Walter Denegre did not stand as a 
candidate after his narrow 1896 defeat for the U.S. Senate. He and his brother George 
Denegre, however, remained active in the various reform movements. Their law firm 
represented many important clients including the L&N Railroad, the defunct water 
company, and Tulane University. Behrman identified Walter Denegre as one of the
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The memory o f the political scandals of the mid-1890s had faded, but in its 
search for a mayoral candidate, the organization turned first to a prominent businessman 
and politician whose credentials attracted reformer and Regular alike—Charles Janvier, 
ex-Citizens’ League President, newly elected State Senator from uptown New Orleans, 
and confidante to Governor Blanchard. Blanchard personally requested that Janvier 
accept the call. Janvier did not disdain politics. In 1903, correspondence between 
Janvier and John Parker revealed different views on office holding. Parker believed that 
businessmen “should only ‘preach’ reform.” Janvier though that the businessmen’s lack 
of direct involvement resulted in laws “inimical to public interest.” Janvier’s political 
ambitions, however, collided with his economic aspirations. He had recently been given 
a position as an officer in the Canal Bank and Trust Company and, after a period o f 
deliberation, turned down the opportunity to run for mayor. After Janvier declined, a 
gathering of party stalwarts then turned to a surprise choice-newly-elected State 
Auditor Martin Behrman.3
Behrman was thirty-nine when the organization chose him to run for mayor.
Bom in New York, he moved to New Orleans before his first birthday. The family 
background was German and Jewish, but Martin became a Catholic. Having been 
orphaned at the age of twelve, his education was minimal. He later recalled that while
prime backers of the 1899 “Jacksonian Democracy” movement which opposed 
Capdevielle. Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 33.
3 Charles Janvier to John Parker, October 20,1903, Parker Papers, University of 
North Carolina, quoted in Schott, “John M. Parker,” 98-99. Parker eventually overcame 
his qualms about reformers running for office. He successfully ran for governor of 
Louisiana in 1920.
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at school he was called upon to help teach the newcomers, “Italians, Slavs, Greeks and 
Bohemians and a few Austrians.” After his mother’s death, he supported himself as a 
cashier and continued his education at a night school. He then moved to Algiers to work 
in a grocery store and his formal education ended. He later wrote, “I have always had 
the feeling that I would have been fortunate to have been able to spend more o f my 
boyhood at school. If  my mother had lived, I would have been kept at school, and I feel 
quite sure she would have wanted me to have a college education.” Though the lack of 
higher education did not constrain Behrman’s career, he retained some insecurity about 
his education. For many years, Behrman considered himself a poor speaker, and it was 
not until the passage of a number of years in public service that he developed a flair for 
public speaking.4
Behrman married in 1887 and held a series of jobs in the retail and wholesale 
grocery business. “I had always taken an interest in politics and . . .  I usually had work 
that brought me in contact with many persons,” he later observed. “I suppose it was my 
rather wide acquaintance for a young man that suggested to the active politicians that 
they choose me as secretary of the fifteenth ward campaign committee . . .  in 1888.”
4 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 3-5; Kendall, History o f  New 
Orleans, 2: 803; Conrad, A Dictionary o f  Louisiana Biography, 58. There is no 
biography o f Behrman. Kemp’s valuable editing of Behrman’s 1922-1923 newspaper 
columns provide the only memoirs by the ex-mayor. Harold Zink, City Bosses in the 
United States: A Study o f  Twenty Municipal Bosses (New York: AMS Press, 1968, 
reprinted from the 1930 edition), contains a chapter on Behrman, but most o f the 
biographical details are taken from the Behrman newspapers columns or from obituaries 
at the time of his death. Zink refers to interviews with Behrman’s son Stanley and 
“twenty-nine large scrapbooks” kept by the Mayor, but efforts to discover whether the 
materials still exist were unsuccessful. See Zink, City Bosses, 317-319.
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Soon afterward, the assessor of the New Orleans Fifth District offered Behrman the job
o f Deputy Assessor. He accepted and, by 1892, led the Algiers delegation to the parish
nominating convention that chose John Fitzpatrick as mayoral candidate. In his
memoirs Behrman recalled:
I had taken the position of deputy assessor because it appeared to be a generally 
better job than that of traveling salesman and Mrs. Behrman preferred to have 
me more at hom e.. . .  I did not feel like I was a politician at the at time. Even 
when I quickly organized a new faction in Algiers and beat the two older 
factions, I was not yet fully conscious of the fact that I had become a politician. 
But when I sat in the caucus with the mayor-elect, John Fitzpatrick, and 
discussed the apportionment of the patronage . . .  well, I realized that Martin 
Behrman had become a politician.
When the new Mayor divided the City Hall patronage, the clerkship of the city council
budget committee--a perfect training ground in the workings of municipal government--
went to Behrman. “I have read many books on municipal government and hundreds of
magazine articles,” Behrman wrote. The authors “would have done better if  they had
actually engaged in such work as I had as a clerk.” Behrman later added service on the
school board to his resume.s
In 1896, Behrman ran for the state legislature but lost in the midst of the
Citizens’ League municipal victory. He was active in the founding of the Choctaw Club
and never wavered in his loyalty to the Regulars. In the election for delegates to the
Constitutional Convention of 1898, Behrman won the right to represent Algiers. He
5 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 8-9, 20-26. In addition to being 
divided into seventeen wards, New Orleans also consisted of seven municipal districts, 
each with its own assessor and tax collector. Although the tax collector positions were 
eventually merged into one office, New Orleans still retains the seven assessor districts. 
District Five consists o f Algiers, the portion of New Orleans on the west bank of the 
Mississippi River.
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moved up to assessor for the Fifth District through a gubernatorial appointment and 
eventually became President of the Board of Assessors. From that position, he was 
tapped to run for State Auditor and won election in January, 1904. Behrman had the 
benefit of powerful patrons, such as Ernest Kruttschnitt, but his long-term success can 
only be explained by his considerable skills. He spoke several languages, served in 
volunteer fire departments, joined the Knights o f Columbus, participated as a director of 
the New Orleans Progressive Union, and helped take the census counts in 1890 and 
1900. He was gregarious, conscientious, generous, attentive to detail, and incredibly 
energetic. In short, he followed the sensible social and governmental routes to become 
well-known, well-liked, and respected in political circles.6
Faced with its inability to convince Charles Janvier to run for mayor, a high- 
powered Regular delegation summoned Martin Behrman to a meeting at the offices of 
the Daily Picayune. Members included: Robert Ewing, newspaperman and Tenth Ward 
leader, Samuel Gilmore, city attorney, former member of the Citizens’ League, and 
Twelfth Ward leader, former governor and Senate hopeful Murphy Foster, and Charles 
Janvier. After some hesitation (Behrman was reluctant to give up his new position as 
State Auditor), Regular loyalty won out, and Behrman officially announced his 
candidacy on August 24, 1904. The day before, Behrman had received the approval of 
the governor to make the race, and press accounts indicated the Regulars had done their 
homework. A majority of the convention participants immediately declared for
6 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 8, 38-41; Daily Picayune, August 25, 
1904, 3.
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Behrman, and his support grew to unanimity with a few days. The Daily Picayune 
noted only one negative reaction. A local, unidentified law firm “told Mr. Behrman that 
he would not do; that a businessman was wanted.”7
The anonymous judgement did not reflect the thinking o f most in the business 
community. Behrman’s political apprenticeship had not neglected business interests.
As president of the Board of Assessors, he often assisted the assessor of the business 
district in the evaluation of property and, in the process, made the acquaintance of many 
businessmen. In addition, his service as a Director in the Progressive Union gave him 
several years experience in both promoting the city and absorbing the opinions o f the 
business community. Though there was some natural opposition to the nomination of “a 
boss,” many business leaders announced approval of the Behrman candidacy. “Around 
the Board o f Trade in particular, many o f the best and most substantial businessmen of 
the city who know Behrman [agreed with] Albert Baldwin, Jr., that Behrman was good 
enough for them and they would vote for him.” A member of the Progressive Union 
added that Behrman “was one of the most active men; he was a worker” and “always 
willing either with work or with means.” He added that “we do not all agree as to the 
manner of his selection. . .  but we are for him for mayor.” Behrman encouraged this 
benevolent view in the announcement o f his candidacy by pledging “a clean business
7 Daily Picayune, August 24, 1904; 3; August 25, 1904, 3; Kemp, Martin 
Behrman o f  New Orleans, 78-81.
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administration” and a “new method [and] business-like approach” to government, 
including an emphasis on clean streets.8
All seemed in place for an uneventful Behrman nomination and victory, but 
Governor Blanchard intervened once again. In opposition to the plans of the New 
Orleans Regulars, he insisted that Porter Parker be place on the ticket as candidate for 
District Attorney. It was not uncommon for the state’ chief executive to influence a city 
ticket, but Blanchard’s replacement of a popular and universally-accepted candidate, 
Chandler C. Luzenberg, put the Regulars in an awkward position. Bowing to the 
Governor’s political and patronage power, the Regulars surrendered, creating a firestorm 
of reform and press opposition to Blanchard’s methods and to the craven agreement of 
the bosses. “Blanchard: Boss o f All Bosses” and “City Delivered to Blanchard” were 
the Daily Picayune headlines, and the reformers awoke to the convenient issue at hand. 
Behrman’s election was no longer a certainty.9
Within a matter of days, opposition to Blanchard’s actions and the Behrman 
candidacy coalesced into the Home Rule Movement, led by long-time reformer William 
S. Parkerson. The reform leadership would normally have supported Porter Parker, 
brother to John M. Parker, prominent cotton broker. And their new-found affection for 
Luzenberg hid their previous resentment as his appointment as District Attorney at the 
behest of the Regulars. As Behrman astutely noted at a later date, the controversy over
8 Daily Picayune, August 25,1904, 3; August 26,1904, 4; August 27, 1904,4; 
August 21, 1904, 8; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 9, 12, 81.
9 Daily Picayune, September II, 1904, 12; September 20, 1904, 1; September 
22, 1904, 1; September 23, 1904, 1; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 83-87.
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the governor’s actions was a convenient cover to “the main idea of the opposition. That 
idea was that a ward leader, which is what we call what they call a ‘ward boss,’ was not 
fit to be mayor. The impression they conveyed was that a professional politician was 
unfit for an office of honor because he was a professional politician.” The observation 
neatly summarized the ambivalence of the reformers, who wanted a professional 
administration but distrusted professional politicians. The Home Rule ticket that 
eventually opposed Behrman did not include Luzenberg, giving weight to Behrman’s 
argument that the alleged central issue of the Home Rule campaign hid the 
organization’s true motives.10
By October 3,1904, the Home Rule organization announced its own municipal 
ticket, led by former mayoral candidate and Choctaw member Charles F. Buck. In an 
echo of the Citizens’ League efforts, Buck called for a “permanent reform organization 
to protect the great city’s vital interests.” Both the Daily Picayune and the Times- 
Democrat supported Buck, although the election coverage in the Daily Picayune was 
fairly balanced. Detectives hired by the Home Rule organization brought to light some 
irregularities in the city’s voter registration records in the days before the election, but 
the numbers involved could not alter the outcome of the election. Parkerson charged 
Behrman with financial irregularities in the operation of his assessor’s office, and the 
Regulars responded with an attack upon Buck’s record in the Civil War, but most 
campaign rhetoric centered on the Home Rule issue, the power of the governor, and the
10 Daily Picayune, September 25, 1904,12; October 1, 1904, 8; October 2, 1904, 
2; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 88-93..
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efficacy o f boss rule. No candidate raised the question o f municipal ownership nor the
state of public works, a clear sign o f  the city’s basic consensus on progressive civic
development. The Regulars pointed to a good record from the previous term, but issues
of substance found no audience. A  typical editorial from the Daily Picayune read:
A vote [for the regular ticket] is a vote to vindicate the governor in his tyrannical 
invasion of the rights of the people o f the city . . .  to declare approval and 
endorsement of his hateful despotism and to support the slavish bosses in their 
inexcusable combination and conspiracy with the Governor to perpetuate a 
wanton outrage upon the people of New Orleans.11
By the end of October, the Home Rule leadership was certain o f victory
“express [ing] the opinion that the fight is already practically won.” The Times-
Democrat published an analysis o f  the projected vote demonstrating a Buck victory was
inevitable. But the Regulars maintained their poise and reminded voters of the history
of Regular Democracy. The “names of opposition parties had gone into oblivion,”
proclaimed Regular orators, and “the [Independents] change their name after every
election because they are afraid to stand before the people with the same name.” The
day before the election, the Daily Picayune editorial apocalyptically claimed that “today
New Orleans is on trial before the world.” Mayor Capdevielle called out special police
to suppress possible election day violence. In spite of confident Home Rule predictions
to the contrary, Behrman won not only the election, but also “a lot o f money. There was
11 Daily Picayune, October 3, 1904, 1; October 11, 1904, 1; October 20, 1904, 1; 
October 21, 1904, 6; October 27,1904, 6; November 3, 1904,4; November 4, 1904,
1,3; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 93-95. Robert W. Williams, Jr., “Martin 
Behrman: Mayor and Political Boss of New Orleans, 1904-1926," 11. Williams makes 
the claim for irregularities “to a marked degree” but does not provide evidence for the 
claim beyond the assertions of the partisan press.
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a great deal o f betting done on that election. I had a smali share in a big pool and we 
w on .. . .  The [Home Rulers] accepted the bets, knowing that their failure to do so would 
show a lack o f confidence in the Home Rule movement.” The mayoral count showed 
Behrman with 13,962 to Buck’s 10,047. Behrman’s willingness to wager on his own 
election was due in part to his analysis of registration figures. In spite o f the reformers’ 
expressed interest in voting restrictions, many o f their natural followers had failed to pay 
the poll tax. The various changes in voting law had reduced the electorate steadily since 
the 1896 municipal election. In that contest over 45, 000 New Orleanians cast ballots. 
The turnout fell to approximately 32,000 in 1899 and to 24,000 in 1904. Behrman 
enjoyed the irony that the reform elements—long in favor of a poll tax—now suffered as 
the result of its passage. In Behrman’s words, the reformers “had more followers than 
voters.” In the dejected words of the Daily Picayune, “Blanchard’s Bosses Seem 
Safe.”12
In spite o f Behrman’s margin of victory citywide, three Home Rule council 
candidates won office. Home Rulers seemed encouraged by their showing and “insisted 
that a permanent organization will be maintained and a constant campaign carried on to 
keep civic vigilance active in the interest of good government.” Post-election analysis 
by the Regulars drew several lessons from the vote. More than ever, the organization
12 Daily Picayune, October 22, 1904, 1; November 8, 1904, 8; November 9,
1904, 1; Capdevielle to Fitzpatrick, November 5, 1904, Mayor’s Correspondence; 
Capdevielle to Brigadier General S. P. Walmsley, November 8, 1904, Mayor’s 
Correspondence; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 101-102; Mayor’ Office, 
Administrations o f  the Mayors o f  New Orleans, 213-223; Reynolds, Machine Politics in 
New Orleans, 200-202.
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felt that without the black vote, reformers could not win. The Regulars admitted that 
“fresh blood was needed in some wards,” and that “the day was past when the Party can 
put up a yellow dog and elect him.” Behrman resigned as State Auditor two days after 
the election, and, in a surprise to most observers, the governor named Paul Capdevielle 
as his successor. The Mayor resigned several weeks before the official end o f  his term 
in order to begin work in Baton Rouge and turned over his post to Acting Mayor 
William Mehle.13
The election had been difficult, but Behrman did not bear grudges. Within a 
short time, he later recalled, he was friends with the Home Rule leaders--with the 
exception of Parkerson, who has raised the ethical charges against Behrman during the 
campaign. The Daily Picayune reported that Buck’s “large and imposing” picture still 
hung in the Choctaw Club in recognition of his 1896 candidacy. The Club displayed a 
“long row of honored Democratic leaders” in its club house. “Although defeated, his 
photograph will continue to occupy its honored placed on the wall of Choctaw Fame.” 
Politics was not personal to the Regulars. It was business.14
Behrman’s election was a surprise to the commercial leadership of New Orleans 
loyal to the Home Rule cause. The new Mayor was worlds apart from the educated, 
socially prominent Capdevielle and was a business neophyte compared to both 
Capdevielle and former Mayor Flower. Behrman later remembered that his enemies
13 Daily Picayune, November 10,1904,1,4, 5; November 16, 1904, 5; 
Capdevielle to City Council, November 15,1904, Mayor’s Correspondence.
14 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 90; Daily Picayune, November 13, 
1904,4.
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considered him “uncouth,” but over the years he would grow in stature and social skills. 
Eventually, he earned the respect, if not the friendship, o f many reformers. The harsh 
anti-boss rhetoric of campaigns and editorials often masked the recognition that 
Behrman “gave New Orleans a responsible, constructive, and businesslike 
administration.”15
Behrman took office on December 5, 1904. His first message to the city council 
set a tone for his administration—pragmatic, business-like, and down to earth. The 
business and governmental positions he had held prior to becoming Mayor required a 
keen sense of finance and organization, and he put those qualities into his call to action. 
He reminded council members that their primary duty lay in “organizing the various 
departments of the city government for practical operation o f the municipal purposes.” 
He pointed out the low level of public revenue and urged “efficient organization. 
Whether or not there have been sinecures in the city government of the past, there 
should be none in the government which has just been installed.” The council examined 
staffing in the Mayor’s and the city’s attorney’s office, but “both [were] deemed to have 
no sinecures.” Behrman called for “cutbacks in the list o f city employees,. . .  clean 
streets, and a healthful city.” The Progressive Union enthusiastically offered its help in 
working for clean streets and the removal of filth from the gutters.16
15 Schott, “John M. Parker, 102-103; Williams, “Martin Behrman,”, 4-5; Kemp, 
Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 89; Zink, City Bosses, 330.
16 Behrman to City Council, December 6,1904, Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily 
Picayune, December 6, 1904,3; December 9,1904, 5; January 11,1904,4.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
147
The new Mayor moved quickly to put his mark on city government. He presided 
over a Civil Service Commission meeting and asked the members to utilize “practical 
instead of theoretical questions in civil service exams for public works superintendents.” 
He urged the Finance Committee to move on acquisition of a city asphalt repair plant to 
reduce the dependence on private contractors. To fulfill a campaign promise for cleaner 
streets, he recommended the purchase of a street cleaning machine. He began a plan for 
personally inspecting street conditions and often wrote the heads of city departments 
with directions for correcting particular situations. He forwarded to the council a letter 
from the Progressive Union urging enforcement o f sanitation ordinances. By the end of 
February, the council considered a new ordinance regulating garbage collection. The 
Mayor wrote urging its passage. On occasion, he brought the Commissioner of Public 
Works with him on street inspections. When the Fire Board issued purchase orders for 
hoses without public bidding, Behrman went to court and enjoined the action. Viewed 
without reference to Behrman’s political affiliation, the actions corresponded to what 
any “reform” administration might have attempted. Behrman’s pragmatic orientation 
and auditor’s frugality combined with a clear confidence in the legitimacy of public 
activity. These characteristics would shape all o f Behrman’s service as mayor.17
Behrman first months in office also set a pattern for his attention to the role of 
mayor as dispenser of patronage and an important state Democrat with connections to
17 Daily Picayune, January 27, 1904, 7; January 31, 1905, 4; February 4, 1904, 4; 
February 28,1905, 7; March 15, 1905. 4; Behrman to City Council, January 31, 1905, 
Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to James Mayo, Secretary, Progressive Union, 
February (date illegible), 1905, Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to City Council, 
February 28,1905, Mayor’s Correspondence.
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the Congressional delegation. Less than two weeks after taking office, his secretary 
responded to a constituent’s request. “Mayor Behrman has directed me to inform you 
that it is impossible for him to comply with your request to give your husband 
employment.. . .  There are thousands of just such applications before him for 
consideration. Enclosed herewith you will find the sum of five dollars to aid you.” On 
another occasion, he intervened on behalf of a job seeker, writing to Louis Johnson, 
chairman of the Executive Committee of tire Sewerage and Water Board. “John 
Blessing, son of a late porter for the Sewerage and Water Board,” sought to take his 
father’s place. Behrman urged Johnson to arrange for his hire. The Mayor took such 
requests seriously, and he expected public agencies and private companies he 
approached to do the same. As leader of the Regulars in New Orleans, Behrman also 
took seriously his role as conduit to the city’s congressional representatives. In response 
to a request from Shreveport, Louisiana, leaders, he wrote to Congressman Robert 
Davey urging his assistance in obtaining an appropriation to dredge the Red River at the 
northern Louisiana city. The Mayor’s frugality coexisted with an assumption that public 
jobs should be at his disposal and that public funds should be dispensed to those in need. 
Years later, Behrman’s defended his use of patronage. He argued that “you do not 
appoint men . . .  because you can get control of their votes but because they are already 
with you.”18
18 Behrman’s Secretary W.P. Ball to Mrs. P. Schoen, December 16, 1904, 
Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to Louis Johnson, February 20, 1905, Mayor’s 
Correspondence; Behrman to Congressman Davey, January 11, 1905, Mayor’s 
Correspondence; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 300.
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The council received an indication of the level of detail under the Mayor’s 
scrutiny in March, 1905. The administration examined the bills received for municipal 
lighting and the terms of the contract to the lighting company. The city was to be 
credited a certain amount to compensate for lights burned out or inoperable during the 
billing period. The Mayor and Commissioner of Police and Public Buildings Alex Pujol 
began to monitor the outages. When the council passed a routine ordinance to pay the 
bill, the Mayor pointedly vetoed it and brought the discrepancies to the council’s 
attention. Another veto message overturned the council’s permission to operate a 
stockyard in a residential area. The Mayor wrote, “I have personally visited the site” 
and “the schools and public institutions nearby” and, somewhat grandly, reminded the 
council of the effect on “taxpayers, whose sacred rights must be regarded and 
respected.”19
In the same way that Capdevielle had been tested early in his administration by 
the Charles riots, Behrman faced a public health crisis in his first year in office. After a 
decade of sparing New Orleans, yellow fever broke out in the summer of 1905. The 
essential facts about yellow fever had been discovered by U.S. Army physicians 
working in Cuba. The yellow fever resulted from a particular type of mosquito, Aedes 
aegypti (Stegomyia), an “urban domestic mosquito . . .  breeding in small collections of 
water.” New Orleans provided a plethora of breeding places, including residential 
cisterns, undrained gutters, privy vaults, and even cemetery vases. The city health
19 Behrman to City Council, March 21, 1905, Mayor’s’s Correspondence; Daily 
Picayune, March 17, 1905, 8; Behrman to City Council, March 7, 1905, Mayor’s 
Correspondence.
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officials had previously attempted to regulate such potential hazards, but had been 
rebuffed by a skeptical council and the complaints of homeowners.20
The first cases o f the fever came to the attention of the city in late July. Notice 
of the disease rapidly circulated to other southern cities and nearby states. In an ironic 
and embarrassing development, Havana served notice on the Crescent City that it would 
be quarantined. (Cuba had been considered a source of yellow fever until U.S. Army- 
led sanitary procedures eliminated the disease in 1901.) No goods or persons from New 
Orleans would be allowed into the Cuban city. It would not be the only city to act 
against New Orleans; Mobile joined in the next day. The New Orleans Board o f Health, 
led by Dr. Quitman Kohnke, urged the Mayor to act, and on July 25 Behrman issued a 
detailed proclamation to the citizens. It called for emptying water containers, sleeping 
with mosquito nets, screening cisterns, and treating cesspools with oil. By July 26,
1905, the Board reported 154 cases and thirty-four deaths. The figure appeared in the 
Daily Picayune and other local papers “so that the exaggerated reports which have been 
in circulation can be discontinued.”21
20 For a history o f the yellow fever and the discovery o f its etiology, see Robert 
S. Desowitz, Who Gave Pinta to the Santa Maria: Torrid Diseases in a Temperate 
World (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), 120-143; Daily Picayune, July 26, 1905, 6.
21 Daily Picayune, July 23,1905, 1; July 24,1905, 6; July 25, 1905, 1; July 26, 
1905, 5; Kemp Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 133. Kohnke, originally a Citizens’ 
League member, had served the Board o f Health, formed after an outbreak o f yellow 
fever in 1897, in the Flower and Capdevielle administrations. His brother served as 
President of the Board o f Trade. Dr. Kohnke was also a mejnber of the Board o f Trade 
as well as the Knights o f Columbus and the St. Vincent de Paul Society. He died in 
June 1909. Daily Picayune, June 27, 1909, 7.
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The crisis required large-scale public action. The Mayor asked Charles Janvier 
to manage a business committee for the “sanitary war.” Janvier agreed and began 
collecting contributions to fund the effort. The city council reversed earlier policy and 
passed ordinances regulating the storage of water. Public education accelerated to 
convince citizens of the efficacy of the new measures. “The clinging to antiquated 
notions concerning the propagation and transmission of diseases is a great obstacle to 
the thorough and successful application of the mosquito doctrine of the causation of 
malarial and yellow fever.” As the number of cases accelerated, the city faced increased 
hostility from nearby areas, especially Gulf of Mexico cities in commercial competition. 
Assuming that the disease could spread by contact or through contaminated goods, 
additional cities began to quarantine New Orleans. Bay St. Loins and other Gulf Coast 
cities considered a quarantine of all of Louisiana. A dispute broke out in Baton Rouge 
between politicians urging a quarantine of New Orleans and doctors “unwilling to be 
influenced by a quarantine that we believe to be unscientific and impracticable, and 
based upon commercial and political interests.” Other cities expressed sympathy, and a 
hotel manager in Atlanta even “welcomed citizens and travelers from New Orleans.”
By the end of the month the number of cases increased to 283; deaths stood at fifty- 
seven.22
22 Daily Picayune, July 26, 1905, 5, 6, 15; July 27, 1905, 6; July 28, 1905, 4. 
Quarantines were not unique to the 1905 outbreak. One author estimates that New 
Orleans lost investment o f $ 10.5 million a year during the period 1846 to 1851. See 
Desowitz, Who Gave Pinto to the Santa Maria, 104-108. Behrman had no doubt that 
commercial motives entered into the quarantine orders. See Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  
New Orleans, 132-135.
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The distribution of cases varied across the city. African-American 
neighborhoods had lower rates of the disease. Some observers assumed a natural 
immunity, but mobilized the community nonetheless. To fight the disease “colored men 
organize[d] for sanitation’s sake.” On the other hand, the new Italian neighborhoods in 
the vicinity of the French Quarter suffered disproportionately. The city successfully 
enlisted “Italian colony leaders” to assist in the sanitation efforts. Arturo Dell’Orto of 
Comitato di Soccorso wrote Mayor Behrman in August noting that the city had received 
a donation of twenty-five cases of Mumm Champagne “for the purposes of supplying 
the sick. As we have a large number of such under our care, we would like to know 
whether we can get some cases to be used for the purpose for which they were donated.” 
In suburban St. Bernard Parish officials “met violent resistance when they attempted to 
investigate a sick woman.” The parish Sheriff and a local doctor were met by “ several 
Sicilians, mean-tempered and refractory by nature,” who “defied the representatives of 
the law.” Newspaper accounts of the incident, however, indicated that nothing more 
than a language barrier may have led to the confrontation.23
In the most antagonistic and strangest of the quarantine confrontations, 
Mississippi Governor James K. Vardaman called on armed ships to patrol the waters of 
the Mississippi Sound. Governor Blanchard protested the “violation o f Louisiana 
waters” and appealed to the federal courts. The president o f the New Orleans National
23 Desowitz refers to “partial resistance” to yellow fever among African- 
Americans, a condition that led to the assumption in some quarters that they were 
actually carriers of the disease. Desowitz, Who Gave Pinta to the Santa Maria, 108; 
Arturo DelFOrto to Behrman, August 1, 1907, Behrman Papers, New Orleans Public 
Library, Louisiana Division; Daily Picayune, July 28, 1905,4; July 29, 1905, 4.
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Bank, Albert Baldwin, had a vacation home at Pearl River, near the Louisiana- 
Mississippi border. Mississippi troops seized the home in their determination to 
quarantine the border from the disease. The courts sided with Louisiana, and the border 
panic subsided. But the conflict illustrated the city’s weakness in deaiing with multiple 
jurisdictions and public health demands with limited resources and authority. On 
August 4, 1905, the city appealed to the federal government for help, assuming that U.S. 
authority would at least lessen the commercial impact o f hostile quarantines. The 
“newly created Public Health Service . . .  responded to the emergency by declaring that 
it was broke and could do nothing.” Private bankers guaranteed the $250,000 
demanded by the federal government to fund the program, and local surgeon J. H. White 
o f the U.S. Marine Hospital in New Orleans took charge of the fight.24
Public efforts, led by Behrman, accelerated. The city put up $50,000 and asked 
the state government for another $100,000, a figure that a majority of the legislature 
agreed to within a matter of days. As cases o f the disease increased, the council 
increased the city share to $60,000. Ex-govemor Heard, vacationing in Asheville, North 
Carolina, prevailed upon the mayor of that city to offer hospitality to New Orleanians, a 
gesture gratefully received by Behrman especially when “the gates of other places were
24 Daily Picayune, August 3, 1905, 1; August 5, 1905, 1, 3; Kemp, Martin 
Behrman o f  New Orleans, 143. Trouble between Mississippi and Louisiana flowed 
from confusion over the exact boundary between the two states at the mouth of the Pearl 
River. The River split into three branches before it reached the Mississippi Sound. In 
early 1906, Louisiana received a favorable ruling from the Supreme Court and won 
most o f the disputed area. Its 1906 value lay in its prolific oyster beds. Later the value 
increased dues to discovery of offshore oil and gas deposits. Daily Picayune, March 6, 
1906, 4.
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closed.” Citizen committees organized self-help crews ward by ward to search out 
breeding places and to assist in screening cisterns and treating privies. Behrman wrote 
to his political adversary George Denegre assuring him that the Mayor would call out 
the police if cemetery crews refused “to admit sanitary forces to empty vases.”25 
Donations for the volunteer effort multiplied, including $250 from Lodge #30 of the 
Elks and an identical amount from Captain Fitzpatrick, safely on vacation in 
Massachusetts. By August 18, the council enacted a law calling for imprisonment for 
homeowners that neglected to screen cisterns. The Mayor personally sent a list of 
possible offenders to the Inspector of Police. The Gulf Refining company offered to 
donate “ten tank cars o f petroleum for disinfecting gutters.” But by the end o f August, 
total cases had grown to 1,878; deaths had reached 271.26
In the annual commercial review issue of the Daily Picayune on September 1, 
1905, the Mayor put the best face possible on the situation and claimed that “the 
visitation of the fever has only served to develop a spirit o f civic pride.” Health officials 
looked back to the epidemic of 1878, in which almost 4,000 persons died, and saw the
25 Behrman to W. Heard at Asheville, North Carolina, August 10, 1905, Mayor’s 
Correspondence. George Denegre was related to William Crawford Gorgas o f Mobile, 
who served as the Army’s sanitarian in Cuba. Desowitz, Who Gave Pinta to the Santa 
Maria, 139-140; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 133-134.
26 Daily Picayune, August 9, 1905, 2; August 10, 1905, 8; August 11, 1905, 4; 
August 16, 1905, 5; August 31, 1905, 2; Behrman to George Denegre, August 5, 1905, 
Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to Charles Janvier, August 11,1905, Mayor’s 
Correspondence; Behrman to Captain John Fitzpatrick in North Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, August 14, 1905, Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to Inspector of 
Police, August 14, 1905, Mayor’s Correspondence; H. James, Gulf Refining Company 
to Behrman, August 28, 1905, Behrman Papers.
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current crisis as “less of a threat.” Governor Blanchard wrote to Behrman, confiding 
that his son, “Dr. Blanchard, would be in New Orleans at the St. Charles hotel to study 
the yellow fever.” He asked Behrman to visit his son and offer help. Charles Janvier 
announced the formation of a permanent citizens’ group—the New Orleans Health 
Association—to propose legislation required to continue the efforts at improving 
sanitation. (The new association offered auxiliary status to the Women’s League, but 
was turned down on the basis that “nothing but equal standing will be accepted.”) The 
Elks organized a festival in mid-September to raise funds to fight the disease, but also to 
raise the spirits of New Orleanians. The group held a parade of “about seven hundred 
Elks,” including Mayor Behrman, “dressed in suits of cheese cloth and wearing hats 
made in good imitations of screened cisterns.” City officials expressed concern that the 
epidemic might prevent a visit by President Roosevelt scheduled for the end of October, 
but by mid-September the White House agreed that the President would come. The 
local papers praised Roosevelt’s courage. (Certainly cancellation of the trip would have 
been prudent.) Behrman later, in a letter of congratulations to Alice Roosevelt on the 
occasion of her marriage, mentioned the “kindness shown to the city by your father.” In 
his memoirs, Behrman acknowledged had Roosevelt “remained away from New 
Orleans, it would have done us a great deal of harm. The fact that he came did us a 
great deal of good.” Not until the end of October (and after the President’s visit) did 
new cases decline and the death rate stabilize. Years later, Behrman also recounted 
meeting a man on the local ferry who confided that he had placed a bet on the number of 
cases increasing. The local press printed statistics on the epidemic daily, providing the
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source of data for the macabre numbers game. The final count was 3,403 cases and 437 
deaths.27
Behrman’s stature increased as a result of the epidemic. The crisis tested the 
Mayor’s administrative abilities, the resources of the city, and the ability of New 
Orleans to project a public image consistent with economic progress. The epidemic also 
strengthened the position of those in the city advocating various public policies as 
solutions to public health problems. The city suffered commercially from not only the 
injurious publicity but also from the actions of other jurisdictions which, sincerely or 
not, feared spread of the disease. Behrman’s energy and enthusiasm never flagged, and 
he revealed an effective talent for working with a wide spectrum o f society. His 
temperament and work habits fit well with the interests o f  the city’s leadership, almost 
desperate to maintain the momentum of commercial expansion. Even before the end of 
the crisis, the New Orleans Board of Health published statistics to show the city’s white 
population had a death rate below the average of the rest o f the county, “in spite of the 
fact that yellow fever has existed here.” By Thanksgiving, the Mayor’s annual message 
acknowledged “deliverance from yellow fever,” a building boom, and “the spirit of the 
people.” Concern over public health led to increased support for the sewerage, water, 
and draining systems under construction by the Sewerage and Water Board. The
27 The estimated cases and “certified” deaths are reported in Biennial Reports o f  
the Board o f  Health o f  the City o f  New Orleans, 1904-1905, New Orleans Public 
Library, Louisiana Division. Desowitz, Who Gave Pinta to the Santa Maria, 141, put 
the death total at 452. Daily Picayune, September 1, 1905, Section IV, 1, 13, 16; 
September 17, 1905, 6; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 131-149; Behrman to 
Alice Roosevelt, February 17, 1906, Mayor’s Correspondence; Blanchard to Behrman, 
September 23, 1905, Behrman Papers.
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Board’s projects promised to eliminate the greatest sources of the disease-open cisterns, 
privies, and inadequately-drained gutters.28
Behrman’s energy carried over to other projects. As President of the Public Belt 
Railroad Commission, he regularly presided at commission meetings and promoted the 
railroad to the city council. The Mayor also took an active role in the Sewerage and 
Water Board, as well as the Board o f  Liquidation of City Debt, the School Board, the 
Fire Board, and the Police Board. In some instances the Mayor held an official post; in 
other cases, the Mayor’s appointment power provided direct input to the workings of 
various municipal functions. Within the city administration, Behrman took particular 
notice of the Department of Public Works and constantly forwarded letters of 
complaints or recommendations he had collected from citizens or his own 
investigations. In March, 1906, the Mayor received a threat from the Post Office that 
street and sidewalk conditions in some sections of the city were so poor that its mail 
carriers would refuse to attempt delivery. The Mayor brought the news to the city 
council to reinforce his arguments for improved draining and street paving. When an 
unexpected windfall of revenue accrued to the city in 1906, the Mayor urged that it be 
used for street cleaning “for visitors but also our own health.”29
28 Daily Picayune, October 24, 1905, 4; November 30, 1905, 10. See Chapter VI 
for a discussion of the Sewerage and Water Board.
29 Behrman to City Council, March 20, 1906, Mayor’s Correspondence;
Behrman to City Council, December 11, 1906, Mayor’s Correspondence. An 
investigation of the Mayor’s outgoing correspondence show that Commissioner of 
Public Works Smith received a communication from the Mayor at the rate o f more than 
one every working day. Although Behrman pressured the Commissioner for action, he 
also argued strenuously for additional resources and supplemental appropriations. See
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Adequate funding for the city was central to the Mayor’s concerns. As an 
assessor, Behrman had taken pride in seeing the additional revenue for the city inherent 
in increases in property value. As Mayor, he directed the city attorney to research 
payments owed by franchise holders that may have not been collected. Many street 
railroads were in default of franchise provisions that required the upkeep of streets 
where the railroads operated. Behrman insisted on enforcement of the franchises, which 
generated additional city revenue and better upkeep o f the streets. Behrman also 
took an interest in how the city handled deposits of idle funds and the policies for 
collecting interest on municipal bank balances. In a message to the city council, the 
Mayor demanded collection of interest due to the city. A canvass of the various boards 
and commissions receiving city funds revealed that most drew the funds in anticipation 
of expenses and deposited the proceeds in accounts that drew no interest. The city 
consolidated the funds and demanded interest payments. City Attorney Gilmore 
estimated the annual savings at $33,000 a year.30
Shortly afterward, the Mayor began a year-long campaign to force banks to pay 
interest on public funds on deposit with the Board o f  Liquidation. In the process, 
Behrman took on the most powerful of the city’s bankers and businessmen. Though his 
first efforts met with failure, he refused to drop the issue. The city had no direct control 
over the Board o f Liquidation, a post-Reconstruction era entity founded to guarantee
Behrman to City Council, April 3, 1907, Mayor’s Correspondence.
30 Behrman to City Council, November 28,1905, Mayor’s Correspondence; 
Behrman to City Council, January 30, 1906, Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily Picayune, 
January 26, 1906, 6; January 31,1906.
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bondholders that the city would pay its debts. Established by the state legislature in 
1880, the Board of Liquidation had direct control over twelve o f twenty-two mill?; 
collected by the city on the value of property. Ten mills paid off interests and principal 
on long term general obligation bonds. Two mills serviced the Sewerage and Water 
Board Debt. The Board split funds in excess o f  those requirements between the School 
Board and the Sewerage and Water Board. The composition of Board o f Liquidation 
was peculiar even in an era which prized expertise, elite administration, and non- 
partisanship. The core of the membership was six private citizens. The original 
appointees could fill vacancies without approval by city or state government, thus 
perpetuating a tight network of prominent bankers and businessmen isolated from 
normal state and municipal politics. Three members of the city administration also sat 
on this Board, but the private members could easily outvote their public colleagues. In 
January, 1906, the private members prevailed six to three in a vote to deposit funds in 
the Canal-Louisiana Bank and Trust Company at no interest. The Daily Picayune 
reported that five of the private members had connections to the bank, either as directors 
or stockholders.31
Behrman’s fight continued in the state legislature, which passed a law 
demanding members vote for interest bearing accounts. But the governor vetoed the law 
as unconstitutional. Board members took the position that requiring bids for deposits
31 Carl E. Hyde, Jr, “The Origins of the New Orleans Board o f Liquidation of the 
City Debt, 1876-1882," 1, 17-19\ Acts Passed by the General Assembly, 1880, Act No. 
133,180; Daily Picayune, January 26, 1906, 6; February 16, 1906, 12; Robert W. 
Williams, “Martin Behrman and New Orleans Civic Development, 1904-1920,” 
Louisiana History 2 (Fall 1961): 376-378.
4
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based on the level of interest offered would encourage an unhealthy level of competition 
and put the bondholders’ funds at risk. The Mayor took the Board to court, but lost at 
every level. However, Behrman’s persistence and the weight of public opinion 
eventually prevailed. Although they declined to solicit bids, the majority voted in 1907 
to place the Board’s funds in five banks, each o f which agreed to pay interest at three 
and one-half percent. As members voted, each declared that he had no financial interest 
in the banks chosen or recused himself when necessary. Behrman’s insistence on 
upholding the right of the public to earn money on its funds provided an interesting case 
of a “machine” mayor adhering to progressive principles, while the progressive, 
independent board acted to sustain private advantage.32
In 1906, Behrman faced another issue with public and private implications. The 
local “Frisco” railroad had obtained concessions from the New Orleans City Council in 
a contentious dispute during Mayor Capdevielle’s term. The railroad, now reconstituted 
as the New Orleans Terminal Company, requested land from the city along Basin Street 
be provided to the company “as a free gift.” The original franchise allowed the railroad 
access to Canal Street, the city’s central business thoroughfare, via Basin Street, but the 
width of the corridor was insufficient for the company’s new plans~the construction of
32 Daily Picayune, March 14 1906, 4; June 9, 1906, 4; June 12, 1906, 5; July 1 
1906, 5; December 21, 1906, 6; December 24, 1906, 6; Williams, “Martin Behrman and 
New Orleans Civic Development,” 377-378. Williams cites the Behrman memoirs 
which mention three banks receiving funds, but newspaper accounts list five recipients. 
Daily Picayune, March 13, 1907,4. See also Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 
169-172.
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a grand terminal on Canal Street- Once again, the city debated the business advantage of 
the railroad facility versus the value of the land requested-33
Louis Berg, the company president, must have wondered whether or not he 
would get a fair hearing from the Mayor. Earlier in the year he received an angry letter 
from Behrman:
I wish to take this opportunity to say to you. . .  that it seems to me that my 
sending notes to you with requests for employment for deserving people seems 
to be treated as a huge joke; perhaps not by yourself, but by those to whom you 
refer the applicants. O f course you know that I have sent a good many to you 
with letters, but there has been no results. This [letter] for your information.
Berg was fortunate that the city council, not the Mayor, had the first opportunity to
decide on the request. The company promised an investment of $1,000,000 in a
terminal and a consolidation o f passenger service in the new facility. The number of
tracks required and provision o f service for the Public Belt as well as street railroads
made the additional space necessary, Berg argued. The council’s Streets and Landings
Committee agreed to the request, but placed several restrictions on the grant. Only
passenger service would be allowed, expansion of the terminal to the east, along Basin
Street, would be limited, and the company would be required to pay the city $100,000
for the privileges. Berg resisted at first, perhaps for show, but agreed to the limiting
provisions. The full council approved the measure the following week. Further action
was the responsibility of the Mayor.34
33 Daily Picayune, March 23, 1906, 3. See Chapter IV for information on the 
original Frisco controversy.
34 Daily Picayune, March 23, 1906, 3; March 24,1906,4; March 28, 1906, 3, 6; 
March 29,1906, 5.
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Representatives o f the city’s financial and commercial leadership urged Behrman 
to sign the ordinance. Members o f the Board o f Liquidation, Charles Janvier, Abraham 
Brittin, and Board of Trade Vice-President Pearl Wight argued that the economic effects 
o f the terminal activity justified the grant. But the Mayor vetoed the council action. 
After paying respects to the attorney for the railroad (E. H. Farrar, who was also a part 
owner of the terminal company), Behrman told the council that no plans for the 
terminal had been submitted nor had the railroad consulted the city engineer on track 
placement. The Basin Canal property to the east of the terminal would revert to the state 
in 1907, and the city should protect the state’s interests. Finally, Behrman found the 
figure of $100,000 “ridiculous and not worthy of consideration” and suggested a 
minimum of $350,000 compensation. The city council upheld the veto by one vote. 
Three of the six votes to sustain came from uptown Home Rule councilmen. Most of 
the Regulars on the council sided with the railroad. Dire predictions that the company 
would abandon New Orleans disappeared when the Daily Picayune revealed that the 
Southern Railroad had taken a one-half interest in the terminal company and assured the 
city that it wished to stay in the city.35
Behrman’s defiance of the city’s financial and business establishment had its 
limits, and on most issues the Regular Mayor found no reason to dispute business 
policies. The Mayor shared membership with Charles, J. Theard, for example, on the 
Sewerage and Water Board. Theard, first appointed by Capdevielle, was prominent in 
banking circles. He and the Mayor worked together with no apparent hostility. But
35 Daily Picayune, April 1, 1906, 4; April 1906, 3, 3; April 8, 1906, 8.
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Theard supported the Home Rule movement in the 1904 election, and his appointment 
to the Sewerage and Water Board expired in 1906. Behrman nominated Joseph Voegtle 
to replace Theard, much to the displeasure o f the local newspapers, especially the 
reform-minded Times-Democrat. Behrman defended his choice as a “conservative, 
sensible, reliable, public-spirited gentleman.. .  not a lawyer, but a lawyer was not 
necessary.” The Times-Democrat had criticized Voegtle as a politician, but that label, 
Behrman argued, was “less applicable to Voegtle than to Theard.” Voegtle was, 
however, a loyal member of the Choctaw Club and, as the proprietor o f a French Quarter 
hotel, had provided Behrman with private offices during the campaign of 1904.36
Theard’s interest in serving on the Sewerage and Water Board remained strong, 
and his colleagues intervened. Charles Janvier resigned from the Board o f Liquidation 
and its members appointed Theard to the vacancy. The Board of Liquidation had 
reserved membership on the Sewerage and Water board, and one month later, the Board 
of Liquidation appointed Theard to fill one o f its slots. Behrman showed no antagonism 
to Theard’s somewhat contrived return and worked with him to pass crucial 
constitutional amendments in the November, 1906, election. In the years to come, 
Behrman and Theard cooperated in a strong defense of the Sewerage and Water Board 
practice o f using its own construction crews to drive down the cost of the systems.37
36 Daily Picayune, May 2, 1906, 5; May 5, 1906, 6, 8; Times-Democrat, May 3,
1906.
37 Daily Picayune, June 7, 1906,4; September 14,1906,4. See Chapter VT for a 
discussion of the construction practices of the Sewerage and Water Board.
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The importance of municipal action in the face o f urban problems remained a 
theme of Behrman’s administration. He urged the council to move quickly on the 
completion of the city’s asphalt plant, designed to avoid the expense o f private 
contractors. The plant opened in August, 1907, at a cost of over $77,000, with a speech 
by City Engineer Hardee, who declared “it must be kept out of politics.” Mindful that 
the hot summer months contained a threat of yellow fever, he urged a $10,000 
supplemental appropriation for the Board of Health “for mosquito work.” Council 
member and physician William O’Reilly became the new director o f the Board of 
Health, but delayed taking office until “after the summer fight [against the mosquitos].” 
Behrman worked with the legislature to clarify the ownership of the city’s West End 
recreational area and then pressed the city council to arrange a lease for its development. 
As increased government activity led to tight quarters in City Hall, the Mayor urged to 
council to accelerate the construction of an annex for City Hall. And to avoid delaying 
the construction of the water purification plant, he called the council into special session 
to approve the specifications.38
On January 1, 1907, a state law and constitutional amendment controlling child 
labor and providing for factory inspectors went into effect. The legislation held a 
special interest for Jean and Kate Gordon, uptown New Orleans sisters active in the Era
38 Daily Picayune, June 13, 1906, 5; August 22, 1906,4; July 4,1906, 3;
Behrman to City Council, March 6,1906, Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to City 
Council, April 17, 1906, Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to City Council, August 7, 
1906, Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to City Council, September 14, 1906,
Mayor’s Correspondence; Williams, “Martin Behrman and New Orleans Civic 
Development,” 380, 393.
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Club and a variety o f causes. (When the legislation considered the factory inspection 
bill in June, 1906, Behrman had responded to a request of Jean Gordon and sent a copy 
of the act to her.) The Gordons had no use for ring politicians, but they had cooperated 
with the Regulars in the campaign for clean water and in the efforts to clean up the city 
during the yellow fever epidemic. In November, 1906, Behrman announced that he 
would forward to the governor the name of Jean Gordon to be appointed Factory 
Inspector. When she returned from an overseas vacation, the Era Club honored her 
appointment, and Behrman spoke at the club’s gathering. The Mayor also continued his 
efforts to get jobs for friends or constituents in need. In a letter to Hugh McCloskey, 
President of the Dock Board, Behrman urged the hiring of “a Southern Pacific worker 
with a large family. He now needs work” because of a strike.39
Mayor Behrman, starting his third year in office, faced a host o f recurring 
problems, but his commitment to public authority and activist government persisted.
Not every problem was equally important. Many items of detail came to the Mayor’s 
attention from citizens moved to action by his accessibility. He reported to the city 
council, for example, on a complaint received “that a merchant at Poydras and Fulton 
was leasing out the sidewalk for a chicken coop.” On another occasion, the Mayor 
referred a claim for damages to the city attorney from a man who sought reimbursement 
of$125.00~the value of a mule killed by falling through a defective city bridge at
39 Behrman to Jean Gordon, June 29, 1906, Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman 
to Hugh McCloskey, November 7, 1906, Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily Picayune, 
November 23, 1906, 5; January 27, 1907, 5. The Behrman papers contain a copy o f 
Jean Gordon’s oath of office taken in the Mayor’s office and signed by the Mayor. Jean 
Gordon Oath, March 5, 1907, Behrman papers.
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Decatur and St. Louis streets. O f greater concern to the Mayor were problems 
associated with the completion of the Public Belt Railroad and the enormous public 
works o f the Sewerage and Water Board. Mardi Gras and the annual visit o f the “Cook 
County Democracy . . .  with a band of forty pieces” provided some respite from the 
municipal problems. Faced with a railroad request for the extension of a franchise, the 
Daily Picayune reported that “the matter would be discussed after carnival.”40
In March, the Mayor took on another long-standing municipal problem—garbage 
disposal. For many years, disposal had been simple, if less than hygienic. Garbage 
collected in carts from throughout the city was dumped onto garbage boats at a dock at 
Hospital Street, downriver from the business district. The boats transported the refuse 
to the middle of the river some distance from the city and dumped their cargo into the 
current. Unfortunately, the garbage boats did not always travel the requisite distance. 
And when the river front wharves expanded in the first decade of the century, 
complaints about the stench and inadequate disposal multiplied. As early as May, 1905, 
the Dock Board had asked the city to make other arrangements, but Behrman put off the 
request since the city did not have sufficient time to develop an alternative. By 1907, 
the Dock Board set a time limit of six months for the city to remove the garbage docks. 
The development of the Public Belt Railroad provided a means to haul the garbage and 
the city abandoned the river method. Specially built railroad cars hauled the garbage to
40 Daily Picayune, January 19,1907, 11; June 7,1907,4; February 8, 1907, 5. 
See Chapters VI and VIII for details of the Sewerage and Water Board and Public Belt 
Railroad issues.
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a swamp east of the French Quarter which served as the city landfill, and the refuse 
would be deodorized as the cars emptied their contents.41
In March, 1907, the New Orleans Term inal company revived its plan for a Canal 
Street terminal. The company had been unable to convince all passenger lines serving 
the city to consolidate in one depot, and the organizers reduced their $1,000,000 plan to 
$200,000. The smaller project did not required additional concessions by the city, and 
Behrman agreed to the new plan. The Frisco, Rock Island, and Southern lines 
eventually signed with the terminal company, raising the project cost to one-half 
million. Unfortunately, the north side of Basin Street, along which trains would enter 
the terminal, served as the southern border of Storyville. For years thereafter the city 
found itself in controversies over the alleged effects on passengers exposed to the seamy 
side of New Orleans life42
By mid-year, the city formulated ambitious plans to host a Panama Canal 
Exposition in 1915, the projected opening of the canal. Many businessmen remembered 
the 1884 World Cotton Exposition, held in uptown New Orleans, and wished to repeat 
the impact o f the fair on city development, even though the operations of the fair itself 
lost money. Behrman asked prominent citizens, such as Charles Janvier, to serve on a 
committee to plan the exposition. One replied that Behrman “was entitled to great
41 Behrman to Hugh McCloskey, President, Dock Board, May 18, 1905,
Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to City Council, November 11, 1907, Mayor’s 
Correspondence; Daily Picayune, March 13, 1907, 12; Williams, “Martin Behrman and 
New Orleans Civic Development,” 393-395.
42 Daily Picayune, March 16, 1907, 8; May 12,1907, 5.
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credit for starting this movement.” The wrote to President Roosevelt seeking his 
support for the city, agreeing to keep his answer “in sacred confidence.” Although the 
city had not received official sanction from the federal government, the vision of the 
exposition affected municipal policy. Heavy rains in April and May o f  1907 exceeded 
the average of the previous ten years by fifteen inches, for example, leading to serious 
damage. The city leadership worried that the drainage system would not be completed 
in time for the exposition and used the example of the rains as justification for increased 
efforts in public works. Planners chose site for the fair only after assurances from 
experts that the area could be drained.43
By fall of 1907, the state election cycle demanded the attention o f  city 
politicians. Capdevielle announced that he would seek reelection as state auditor, but 
the most important race to the New Orleans regulars was for the governor’s office.
Jared Sanders, Lieutenant Governor under Blanchard, announced his candidacy in April, 
1907, and Behrman committed to support him shortly thereafter. By October, in spite o f 
some dissent among the Regulars, the had successfully rallied the Choctaw Club to the 
Sanders candidacy. The city’s reform elements backed Colonel Theodore Wilkinson, 
who had been prominent in the Anti-Lottery League. Home Rule Councilman William 
Bisso organized the Fourteenth Ward for Wilkinson and declared “the Fourteenth Ward
43 Behrman to Charles Janvier, May 8,1907, Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman 
to City Council, May 7, 1907, Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to Theodore 
Roosevelt, May 21, 1907, Mayor’s Correspondence; Charles Janvier to Behrman, May 
8, 1907, Behrman Papers; George Dunbar to Behrman, May 9,1907, Behrman Papers;
A. Aschaffenburg to Behrman, May 6, 1907, Behrman Papers; Isidore Newman to 
Behrman, May 8, 1907, Behrman Papers; Daily Picayune, June 12,1907, 7; July 13, 
1907, 8. See Chapter X for additional details about the planned exposition.
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is always to first to get in line for good government.” The “Wilkinsonites promptly 
raise[d] the anti-boss slogan.” A third candidate, General Leon Jastremski, who had 
been defeated by Blanchard in the 1904 race, died during the campaign.44
The year had been a difficult one for the Regulars. Behrman and Governor 
Blanchard had sparred over state lands to be used for an immigration station and over 
levee protection. The boss of the Ninth Ward, Frederick Dudenhefer, died, and his son 
took over political leadership and the position o f  state tax collector for the district. 
Within months, he embezzled over $60,000 of state funds and spent the money on 
cotton speculation, automobiles, the race track, and a chorus girl. Faced with arrest, the 
young Dudenhefer fled to Honduras. Later in the year, Captain Fitzpatrick’s tax 
collection office discovered a larger theft. A clerk confessed to taking over $100,000 
over the course of several years. Most of the funds went to a “Negro mistress,” accused 
in the press o f “mesmerizing” the perpetrator, who was sentenced to seven years for the 
crime. Fitzpatrick repaid the state for losses not covered by the clerk’s bond.
Dudenhefer later returned to the city and was arrested at his family’s home in 1908. He 
went to prison, and while serving his sentence occasionally received small gifts of 
money from Behrman. Fitzpatrick sued Virginia Reed, the mistress of his larcenous 
clerk, in Civil Court to recover the money. The courts eventually found in favor of 
Reed, holding that Fitzpatrick could not prove that money had been given to her, and 
that property in her possession predated the embezzlement. Behrman had no personal
44 Behrman to J. Y. Sanders, May 1, 1907, Mayor’s Correspondence; Kemp, 
Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 193-205; Daily Picayune, July 14, 1907, Section I, 4; 
October 11, 1907, 5.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
170
connection to the thefts, and no one accused the Choctaw Club of complicity. But the 
thefts involved state funds and highlighted the system of patronage in New Orleans, 
which had seven municipal districts, each with an assessor and a tax collector.45
Changes in that system became the focus of a special session of the Louisiana 
legislature called for December 11, 1907. Governor Blanchard opposed the Sanders 
candidacy and used the session, Behrman later charged, to “take Sanders off the stump 
at the hottest period of the fight.” The call included plans for legislation to reduce the 
number of state-appointed officials, to increase protection “against defalcation by public 
officers,” revise the primary law, and investigate the port o f New Orleans. The 
Governor left Louisiana after issuing the call, and Lieutenant Governor Sanders, chief 
executive in the absence of Blanchard, added to the legislature’s agenda the 
consideration o f regulation of railroads and “other. . .  public service corporations.” 
Sanders hoped this would boost his campaign.46
Before the election, Behrman faced a series of controversies that illustrated the 
moralistic aspect o f progressive thought. The general consensus among the New 
Orleans leadership in favor o f a civic, pro-business progressivism broke down on issues 
of personal morality. In December, 1907, the Mayor received complaints that the 
Greenwald Theater exhibited immoral performances. Behrman wrote to the proprietor
45 Daily Picayune, April 19, 1907,4; September 12, 1907, 1; September 13,
1907; July 1, 1908; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 144-115; Kendall, History 
o f  New Orleans, 2: 516.
46 Daily Picayune, November 2, 1907; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 
205-206.
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that “many complaints have come to me about the character of the performances which 
are put on in your play-house.” The Mayor threatened to close the theater “unless there 
is some improvement.” “By ordinance,” the Daily Picayune reminded its readers, “the 
managers of all public exhibitions must reserve for every performance a free seat for the 
mayor and the chief of police (in the front row).” The paper concluded that it was “the 
Mayor’s duty to judge the presence of immoral and corrupting exhibition.” Within a 
week, Councilman Kelly introduced an ordinance to hold both “person and manager” 
responsible for “immoral and indecent exhibitions.” Proprietor Greenwald protested 
that he offered “clean shows” and had stopped one performance when its immoral 
content came to his attention. The Council declined to act, in part because the ordinance 
constrained public performance so severely that a ballet would have been outlawed due 
to the performers’ tights. There was a danger, warned the Daily Picayune, of 
“puritanizing the population.”47
The puritan spirit came to the city in human form the same month. On 
December 29, 1907, Carrie Nation, “of Saloon Smashing Fame,” paid a visit to the 
Crescent City, a somewhat unlikely location from which to argue prohibition. Mayor 
Behrman asked her “not to use her hatchet here,” but the famous crusader against drink 
had a ready response. “Would you be so audacious,” she asked, “as to refuse the Lord 
the right to smash?” She would give the Mayor no assurance because “she was 
absolutely in the hands of providence.” Saloons were not her only target. She spoke
47 Behrman to Henry Greenwald, Greenwald Theater, December 10,1907, 
Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily Picayune, December 13,1907, 4; December 18, 1907,
8; December 19, 1907, 6.
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against the use o f corsets, claiming that they weakened women’s organs and unborn 
infants. “Mothers, warn you daughters . . .  I always advise young men never to marry a 
girl who ruins her health by wearing tight corsets.” She later spoke to a male-only 
gathering, where she preached sexual purity and the avoidance o f disease.48
In what would prove far worse to New Orleans than bawdy exhibitions or drink, 
the ongoing campaign for governor raised the issue of gambling, specifically, betting on 
horse races. With two functioning race tracks and a thriving book-making business, 
New Orleans backed Sanders in part because he seemed the more tolerant of gambling 
of the two candidates. Wilkinson raised the question o f gambling early in the campaign, 
and sought votes in the Protestant areas of the state by reminding voters of the New 
Orleans vices. Behrman declined to suppress the city’s gambling, and~perhaps to his 
later regret-asserted that “it [was] a state matter.” The Mayor agreed to address the 
complaints of citizens on moral issues, but held strong beliefs on the intractability of 
human nature. His enforcement o f blue laws betrayed a reluctance to meddle in private 
behavior, although he did not ignore the law when called upon for more vigorous 
actions. The state elections of 1908 highlighted his (and the city’s) easygoing attitudes, 
and the issues of the campaign led to state action that Behrman could not control.49
The legislature had separated the state elections from those in the city in an 
attempt to cut down the influences that one had on the other. The city election would 
not take place until fall, 1908. But as early as December, 1907, in the middle of the
48 Daily Picayune, December 20, 1907,11; December 21, 1907, 12.
49 Daily Picayune, December 11, 1907,4.
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gubernatorial race, the Times-Democrat began an attack upon Behrman and “bossism.” 
The Mayor had contempt for the newspaper’s position. The Times-Democrat had been 
active in the fight to keep city and state elections separate. Now “it insisted that city 
affairs and city candidates and politics should be discussed in the state campaign . . .  in 
order that the people should be prepared for the city campaign and not give ‘the bosses’ 
the opportunity they had in the city campaign o f 1904.” Page Baker, editor o f the 
Times-Democrat vigorously attacked the city administration in a December 19,1907 
editorial titled “The Need for City Reform.” Behrman immediately responded, and in a 
series o f letters and editorials over the next several days, familiar lines of battle 
emerged.50
The Mayor acknowledged the basic position of the Times-Democrat and its 
editor. Baker “has always been and will ever remain in opposition to ‘ward-bossism.’” 
But the editorial called for “men who would lop off all superfluities, wipe out all 
deadheadism . . .  and suppress all graft.” Behrman demanded proof of the alleged 
wrongs and, in his response to Baker, seemed frustrated that after three years in office he 
had not been able to convince his opponents of the efficacy of his administration.
“Since I have assumed the office of chief executive,” the Mayor wrote, “I have given my 
whole time and attention to administration on a clean, honest, and business like basis.” 
He called upon Baker to provide “facts in substantiation of your charges.” Two days 
later, Behrman continued his counter-attack. “I challenge the comparison of the present
50 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 210-211; Times-Democrat, 
December 19, 1907; Daily Picayune, December 20, 1907, 6.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
174
with any reform administration you may see fit to single out.” When Baker published a
picture of city workers “loafing” at public expense, Behrman noted that one worker sat
next to his “dinner pail” and charged the picture had been taken during the meal break.SI
Behrman picked up an unlikely ally in this dispute. The Daily Picayune,
normally as anti-ring as the Times-Democrat, defended the Mayor at once. “It can be
confidently declared that the city has not had [a more honest] or more faithful and
public-spirited government since it was rescued from the hands of the carpetbaggers and
Republican self-seekers.” Shortly thereafter, the Daily Picayune added an editorial
analyzing the history of municipal of reform.
The Picayune had engaged in not a few of these movements for reform, but it has 
in every instance found that all of the glitter. . .  was too often disappointing in 
the extreme. For instance,. . .  [Mayor] Flower opened a harvest to the private 
corporations that preyed upon the public franchises and property of this city.
The so-called reform administration proved to be one of the most costly and 
disappointing to the people.
The Daily Picayune had revealed the key to Behrman’s success, and, perhaps, the
hypocrisy of the opposition. If “reform” administrations could be “costly and
disappointing,” it was but a small logical step to conclude that “boss” administrations
could be frugal, honest, and progressive.52
With a strong vote from New Orleans, Sanders prevailed in the Democratic 
primary on January 28, 1908. Of his statewide majority of approximately 13,500, nearly
51 Behrman to Page Baker, editor, Times-Democrat, December 19, 1907,
Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to Page Baker, December 21, 1907, Mayor’s 
Correspondence.
52 Daily Picayune, December 20,1907, 6; December 22,1907, 8.
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10,000 came from the city. There was a general election scheduled for the Spring, but 
Democrats felt sufficiently confident to begin planning the inauguration. Behrman felt 
triumphant- Choctaw Club candidates won election, including former Mayor Paul 
Capdevielle, who received a huge majority from New Orleans. Regular patronage was 
safe, and a close friend of the Mayor would be governor. Construction began on the 
long-awaited City Hall annex, a visible sign of the new functions and scope of the 
public sector. The often reactionary Cotton Exchange promised new cooperation. 
William Mason Smith, who had clashed with the Mayor or numerous occasions, was 
succeeded by William B. Thompson. The Mayor promptly answered Thompson’s 
request about the construction of approaches to the docks and wrote “I assure you . . .  
that it is my purpose to do everything in my power to facilitate the business of the Port.” 
Even the constant criticism of the Times-Democrat faded for a time as Behrman initiated 
his own investigations into city finances and administration. Behrman and the Regulars 
clearly held the upper hand.53
No one anticipated the surprise that Sanders revealed in his inauguration day 
speech, May 18, 1908. For reasons that escaped the Mayor, Sanders announced state 
initiatives to increase the regulation of bar rooms and to suppress gambling at race 
tracks. The Regulars firmly controlled the city delegation to the state legislature. The 
Speaker of the House, H. Garland Dupre, for example, was also assistant City Attorney.
S3 Behrman to City Council, January 21, 1908, Mayor’s Correspondence; 
Behrman to W. B. Thompson, President, Cotton Exchange, January 24, 1908, Mayor’s 
Correspondence; Daily Picayune, February 2, 1908,4; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New 
Orleans, 214.
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But the governor’s recommendations had sufficient support in the rest o f the state to 
overcome the efforts of Behrman’s colleagues. In one bizarre incident, the Daily 
Picayune printed a story accusing pro-gambling forces o f trying to poison an anti­
gambling senator. The senator recovered and explained that his illness resulted from an 
excess o f “ipecac, taken to relieve indigestion.” The bill passed by one vote and the 
governor signed the anti-gambling legislation on June 24,1908. The new laws--Gay- 
Shattuck to control the bar rooms and the Locke Law against race track gambling- 
caused the Mayor problems with enforcement and opened potential issues that might 
threaten his re-election. In spite of the governor’s position, he and Behrman remained 
close. The Mayor used his relationship with the governor to distribute patronage. Even 
during the gambling controversy, the Mayor wrote to ask that a local doctor be retained 
with the State Board of Health. “He is a good regular, a  Behrman man as well as a 
Sanders man. In addition to that, he is thoroughly competent.”54
The legislative session brought disappointment to the Regulars, but events in 
New Orleans held great promise. Behrman’s solid record in municipal ownership, 
construction of utilities, paving, and finance established a basis for a second consecutive 
term, something no mayor had accomplished since Reconstruction. His election as 
mayor had broken the cycle o f alternating reform and regular administrations. The 
Mayor’s interest and participation in the independent boards and commissions that 
governed the new development solidified the city’s commitment to progressive reforms,
54 Daily Picayune, May 19,1908, 1; June 23,1908, 1; June 24, 1908,1; June 25, 
1908, 1; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 220-228; Behrman to Governor Jared 
Sanders, June 1, 1908, Mayor’s Correspondence.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
177
although his overt use of patronage put him outside of the typical reformer. Behrman 
forged a strong relationship with the New Orleans business community by the end of his 
term, in spite of his credentials as a loyal Regular. Only those committed to 
comprehensive regulation o f moral behavior had reason to object to the Mayor’s record. 
The Mayor had agreed to police theater performances and cooperated with efforts to 
suppress child labor. But he showed no enthusiasm for suppression of gambling or 
liquor. Although the New Orleans reform element represented a latent political threat, 
Behrman entered the municipal political season in the summer of 1908 confident of his 
achievements and eager to serve again.
The years 1900 to 1908 also represented a success for the New Orleans effort to 
confront the new century. Behrman’s first term came to a close as three great public 
works project neared completion. The Sewerage and Water Board, first organized as the 
Regulars recaptured the Mayor’s office, promised a clean water supply, modem 
sewerage, and an improvement in the city’s drainage system. By 1908, those promises 
had largely been kept. Although work on drainage needed completion, the essential 
challenges had been met. Similarly, the city’s wharves, taken into public ownership and 
operation by 1896 legislation, entered an important era of expansion and development. 
Finally, the Public Belt Railroad, reorganized under Capdevielle in 1904, began full 
operations toward the end of the decade. These three initiatives illustrates the 
overwhelming public support each enjoyed from all points along the political spectrum. 
And the fact of their development during eight years of “boss” and “machine” rule
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makes clear that political and social pedigrees were not essential to the effective public 
development and administration o f progressive civic development.
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CHAPTER VI
THE NEW ORLEANS SEWERAGE AND WATER BOARD:
PUBLIC WORKS AND PUBLIC HEALTH
From its earliest days, New Orleans faced the reality of its improbable location. 
The first settlers located the city among numerous bodies o f water, wetlands, and 
swamps. To the north was Lake Pontchartrain, actually a large shallow bay connected 
to the Gulf o f Mexico by salt-water passes and other bays. The Mississippi River 
bisected the city into two unequal parts. The bulk of the city lay on the “East Bank;” the 
“West Bank” consisted of Algiers, which was part of the incorporated city, and the 
suburban parishes. The location brought commerce and status as a world port, but also 
problems o f access, weather and health.
Topography exacerbated the unfavorable location. The city existed in a natural, 
saucer-shaped depression that placed substantial parts of the municipality below sea 
level. The natural levees of the Mississippi river, interior ridges along placid bayous 
(once parts o f the river itself), and the surrounding swamps constrained the growth of 
New Orleans. Early settlers found relatively dry land only along the river, and the 
expansion of the city followed the natural levees in both directions. Residents dug 
crude drainage canals along the property lines, perpendicular to the river, in attempts to 
dry their land, but the resulting transfer of water to the rear of the city made conditions
179
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there even worse. The crescent of the river created a circumferential and radial system 
of streets instead of a grid system, and the radial streets converged in a section known 
simply as the “backswamp.”1
The pre-Civil War growth of New Orleans followed the dictates of topography. 
The influx of Anglos into a previously French and Spanish colonial landscape, created a 
tripartite city—an upriver American sector, the French Quarter at the city’s center, and a 
downriver melange of working class immigrants. Toward the backswamp lived free 
blacks and those without the means to live elsewhere. Residents in the backswamp built 
homes on makeshift pilings, dug drainage canals around properties, and placed boards 
across ditches for safe passage. In the more desirable sections, the wealthy built large 
homes on spacious lots, but constraints on available land increased population density, 
especially in the poorer areas. The quality of the land available added to the list of 
difficulties. Even in relatively well-drained parts of the city, buildings of any type 
rested upon a soil that had a high content of organic matter and a water table that could
1 George G. Earl, Sewerage, Water and Drainage System o f  New Orleans, 
University of New Orleans, Earl K. Long Library, Louisiana Collection, Vertical File, 
n.d.; Peirce Lewis, New Orleans: The Making o f  an Urban Landscape, 17-30, 42; 
Kendall, History o f  New Orleans, 2: 565; The Sewerage and Water Board o f  New 
Orleans: How It Began, the Problems It Faces, The Way It Works, The Job It Does, 
University of New Orleans, Earl K. Long Library, Louisiana Collection (New Orleans, 
1959), 5. Lewis’s work provides an excellent description of the city from the point of 
view of a geographer: “the cross-section rather resembles a shallow clay saucer filled 
with layer upon layer of warm jello.” See also Albert E. Cowdry, “Land’s End,” 
excerpts from Albert Cowdry, Land’s End (U.S. Army Corps of engineers, 1977) 
reprinted in Thomas A. Becnel, editor, Agriculture and Economic Development in 
Louisiana) Volume 16 in Glenn R. Conrad, General Editor, The Louisiana Purchase 
Bicentennial Series in Louisiana History (Lafayette: Center for Louisiana Studies, 
1997), 22-26.
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be reached by anyone with a shovel and energy sufficient to dig several feet. 
Construction required pilings for stability, but subsequent settling and soil subsidence 
left buildings with eccentric tilts and angles. Perversely, progress in drainage meant a 
lowering of the water table, a consequent drying of the organic material, shrinkage in 
the soil as water evaporated, and a resulting drop in the city’s elevation.2
Any water which entered the city~by rainfall, river levee crevasse, or, 
occasionally, flood—could be removed only if it could flow to an even lower section of 
the city or if it evaporated over time. At the end of the nineteenth century, New Orleans 
challenged the laws of hydrology by introducing mechanical means of removing the 
water and keeping the city dry. And as the city removed more and more water from 
within its boundaries, the extent of inhabitable land grew, property values increased, and 
the not inconsiderable threat of frequent floods declined. Two other benefits grew out 
of the ambitious plan to drain the city: disposal o f sewerage and distribution o f pure 
water. The vaults of privies in New Orleans were shallow and subject to overflowing. 
Sewerage and other liquid municipal waste obeyed the same laws of physics as the less 
noxious rain water. As the city contemplated pumping rain water out o f its boundaries,
2 New Orleans: A History o f  Three Great Public Utilities—Sewerage, Water and 
Drainage—and Their Influence upon the Health and Progress o f  a Big City, a paper read 
by Hon. Martin Behrman, Mayor of New Orleans, before convention of League of 
American Municipalities, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, September 29, 1914, University of 
New Orleans, Earl K. Long Library, Louisiana Collection (New Orleans, 1914), 1. In 
John McPhee, The Control o f  Nature (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1989), 61, the 
author describes the relative positions of the river and the Louisiana Superdome by 
imagining ships on the river with the ability to turn inland and maintain elevation above 
sea level. By the time they reached the football stadium’s playing field, “they would 
hover above the playing field like blimps.”
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a system of collecting and removing sewerage seemed logical as well. And if  drainage 
were sufficient to stabilize the city’s soils, a water distribution system could be installed. 
The annual rainfall in New Orleans was among the highest of all cities on the continent. 
Citizens collected a portion in cisterns for drinking water, unaware o f the health hazards 
o f uncovered cisterns.
The interconnectedness of the three systems—drainage, sewerage and w ater- 
posed management, engineering, and political challenges. The sewerage system could 
not work effectively in the absence o f a water supply to flush the pipes and allow pumps 
to lift the outflow. A household water supply, if sufficiently purified, could provide 
drinking water as well as supply the medium to carry sewerage. And the large complex 
o f pipes necessary to both systems could only be constructed in a stable, drained 
environment. All three would require development according to a carefully phased 
plan. Construction would start in the built up areas of the city and be expanded as the 
city grew. The completion of all three systems demanded a consistent source of 
funding, a high degree of professional competence, and patience on the part o f the 
electorate. Further, the success of projects required a long term public commitment 
sustained by the voters and by the political, civic, and commercial establishments. That 
commitment rested on a widespread certainty among the city’s leadership that drainage, 
water, and sewer systems would not only improve sanitation and health, but also 
stimulate prosperity and commercial development. For large numbers o f New 
Orleanians, progressive government was synonymous with these ostensibly mundane
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public works and public services. The consensus in favor of progressive civic 
development was first apparent in the support for a new sewerage, water, and drainage 
system.
The municipal development of the utility systems formally began under the state 
legislature elected in 1896, but local attempts at acquiring the systems started some 
years before. Efforts to establish drainage districts supported by taxes failed in the late 
1880s, though a city flood in 1890 provoked new interest in governmental action. In 
that year, the legislature created the Orleans Levee Board which, although it did not 
directly address drainage, repaired interior levees and improved protection of the city 
from the overflows of canals. Several years later, the Fitzpatrick administration, which 
“showed an enlightened interest. . .  in drainage,” contracted for a topographical survey 
of New Orleans, the first step toward a comprehensive plan. (According to a WPA- 
compiled biography of Fitzpatrick, his interest earned him the nickname “Father of the 
Sewerage and Water System.”) Although consulting engineers formulated a plan 
complete with specifications, Fitzpatrick declined to adopt it, citing financial 
difficulties. Not until 1896 did the legislature create a drainage board for the city year 
and provide modest financing. In later years, the reform and Regular factions fought to 
claim credit for the new system, but Fitzpatrick’s actions gave the Regulars grounds to 
assert paternity.3
3 Report on the Drainage o f  the City o f  New Orleans by the Advisory Board 
(Appointed by Ordinance No. 8327, Adopted by the City Council, November 24, 1893) 
(New Orleans, 1894), 51-52 quoted in Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 95-103; 
Behrman, New Orleans: A History o f  Three Great Public Utilities, 3; Mayor’s Office,
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Drainage was not the only public works challenge for which the city looked to 
the state for assistance. The city granted franchises to two private companies in 
attempts to acquire a modem sewer system, but both companies underestimated the 
engineering challenge inherent to the New Orleans topography. Similarly, the city 
depended upon a private water company for a distribution system under a franchise 
granted in 1878. Widespread dissatisfaction with service of the Water Works Company 
led to a movement favoring municipal ownership. The city sued the private company, 
and the courts declared the franchise void due to nonperformance. The Municipal 
Improvement Association, formed in 1897, began an extensive campaign o f public 
education and political lobbying to establish a property tax and a special board for 
sewerage and water system development. Abraham Brittin, a prominent councilman, 
echoed the association’s suggestion and called for a special election. On June 6,1899, 
city residents agreed by a margin of 6,272 to 394 to adopt a fifty-year tax o f two mills. 
The new Board also received one-half of the surplus generated by a 10-mill city debt tax 
passed in 1890 and administered by the Board of Liquidation of City Debt. Act 6 of the 
legislature’s extra session of 1899 and a constitutional amendment affirmed the 
establishment of the independent board, which began operation in late 1899.4
Administrations o f  the Mayors o f  New Orleans, 201-203; Conrad, A Dictionary o f  
Louisiana Biography, 303; Kendall, History o f  New Orleans, 2: 507, 574-575.
Members of the 1896 commission included Robert Walmsley, Abraham Brittin, Paxil 
Capdevielle, Mayor Flower and others.
4 Behrman, New Orleans: A History o f  Three Great Public Utilities, 3; First 
Semi-Annual Report o f  the Sewerage and Water Board o f  the City o f New Orleans, New 
Orleans Public Library, Louisiana Division, cited hereinafter as [Number] Semi-Annual
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The timing of the election allowed Mayor Flower to appoint the initial members 
o f the Sewerage and Water Board, even though he would leave office within a few 
months. Members immediately faced the enormity of their duties, including the 
possible acquisition of the private company, the establishment o f plans for the water and 
sewerage systems, and the negotiation of a revenue-sharing agreement with the 
Drainage Commission. In order to obtain the funds necessary for large capital projects, 
the Board sought authorization for a bond issue from the voters in April, 1900, which 
passed easily. By the end of the first six months of operations, the Board directed its 
Superintendent, George Earl, to draw up preliminary plans for the water and sewerage 
systems. Earl warned the members that the large land area of the city relative to 
population reduced the efficiency o f the sewer system, and he suggested limiting its 
initial coverage to approximately 500 out of the city’s 700 miles of streets. He also 
reviewed comparative consumption figures with the Board and demonstrated the need 
for a metering system and a program to reduce waste.s
Report', Program o f  the Inauguration o f  Active Construction o f  the Sewerage System o f  
the City o f  New Orleans, New Orleans Public Library, Louisiana Division (New 
Orleans, 1903), listed members o f the city council and citizens’ committees which 
worked on the special election. Section 32 of Act #6 , required periodic reports from the 
Sewerage and Water Board to the city council. See also By-Laws: Sewerage and Water 
Board o f  New Orleans, New Orleans Public Library, Louisiana Division (New Orleans, 
1904), for a capsule history o f the special district, especially 14-21; The Waterworks, 
Sewerage and Drainage System o f  New Orleans, University of New Orleans, Earl K. 
Long Library, Louisiana Collection (New Orleans, 1940), [no pagination]; Kendall, 
History o f  New Orleans, 2: 525-528, 578-579; Daily Picayune, June 7, 1899, 1; and 
Nussbaum, “Progressive Politics in New Orleans,” 135-145.
5 First Semi-Annual Report, 1, 3, 4, 12-13, 16-17; Report o f  General 
Superintendent George G. Earl to Sewerage and Water Board, at Regular Meeting,
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In July, 1900, the Board considered a proposal to contract for water from a 
private company that promised to construct a pipeline to bring water into the city. The 
company did not reveal the source of this water, but contrasted its quality with river 
water and assured the Board that “no filtering [would be] necessary.” The proposal 
received a respectful hearing in part because the company’s attorney was the ubiquitous 
State Democratic Chair, E. B. Kruttschnitt, a Regular stalwart and Choctaw Club 
member. The Sewerage and Water Board Superintendent disputed the cost estimates o f 
the proposal and promised the Board that pure river water was possible. In need of 
expert assistance, the Board retained prominent engineers George Fuller and Rudolph 
Hering o f New York, though “both gentlemen were [temporarily] in Europe,” to form a 
committee of consulting engineers and local experts. The committee’s first assignm ent 
required a recommendation on the issue of filtration o f river water. The engineering 
committee firmly recommended the use of river water for the city. By using a multi­
stage process of settling and treatment, pure water could be delivered, although the 
Board o f Advisory Engineers admitted that the intake from the Mississippi River would 
be “more difficult to purify than the water supplying any other large city in the world.” 
The Board agreed with engineers’ recommendation, but took the precaution of 
establishing an experimental purification station to test the process. It authorized a site
April 19, 1900, New Orleans Public Library, Louisiana Division (New Orleans, 1900), 
3, 11; By Laws: Sewerage and Water Board, 17, 37; De-watering and Re-watering the 
City o f  New Orleans, University of New Orleans, Earl K. Long Library, Louisiana 
Collection (New Orleans, 1950?), [no pagination],
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in Audubon Park, adjacent to the Mississippi River, and rapidly accepted bids for its 
construction.6
The Board also considered a proposal to purchase the existing private water 
works, but the initial offer of the company at $110 per share far exceeded a fair price as 
determined by Board consultants, in part because the city’s legal attack on the company 
franchise had lowered the market value of the stock. Having successfully established 
the principle of public ownership of the water utility, the Board decided to let the private 
company assets remain on the market and to proceed with plans for construction of a 
new system. In order to finance the new system, the Board quickly moved to sell the 
bonds secured by the proceeds of the property tax. Advertisements for the bond issue 
set the sale date for December 15, 1900.7
6 Earl, Sewerage, Water and Drainage System o f  New Orleans', First Semi- 
Annual Report, 28.; Reports o f  General Superintendent on Possible Supply o f Water 
North o f Lake Pontchartrain with Estimated Cost o f Making Necessary Investigation 
and Status o f  Water Purification Elsewhere and approximate Cost and Method o f  
Conducting Investigation Proposed and Final Report o f  Executive Committee on 
Preliminary Report o f  Board o f  Advisory Engineers and Recommendations on Above 
Reports, New Orleans Public Library, Louisiana Division (New Orleans, 1900), 1-4; 
By-Laws: Sewerage and Water Board o f New Orleans, 17; Daily Picayune, July 25,
1900, 10; Report o f  Board ofAdvisory Engineers o f Preliminary Meeting and Report o f  
General Superintendent to the Sewerage and Water Board, New Orleans Public 
Library, Louisiana Division (New Orleans, 1900), 7; Kendall, History o f  New Orleans, 
2: 581.
7 Report o f  Counsel on the Morrill Proposal to Purchase the New Orleans Water 
Works Company, New Orleans Public Library, Louisiana Division (New Orleans, 1900), 
1,7; Daily Picayune, August 17, 1900, 3; August 25,1900, 4; August 30, 1900, 3; 
September 13, 1900, 4; First Semi-Annual Report, 5, 16-17; Second Semi-Annual 
Report; Kendall, History o f  New Orleans, 2: 582; De-watering and Re-watering the 
City o f  New Orleans', Behrman, New Orleans: A History o f  Three Great Public Utilities, 
8-9. The Daily Picayune suggested that since settling would produce large residues of
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Excitement over the public improvements permeated public discussion. Real 
estate agents and developers, identified in the Daily Picayune as the “class of people in 
the city [most interested in] progressive movements,” looked forward to an increase in 
property values. Harry Hodgson, President of the New Orleans Real Estate Exchange, 
declared “paving, draining and sewerage . . .  has already increased the value o f property 
from ten to fifteen percent,” and that he had already received communications from New 
York informing him that “ now that drainage, paving and sewerage is an assured fact in 
New Orleans we wish to open a correspondence with you with a view of placing loans 
in your city.” Hoping to capitalize on the new interest, a local plumber placed an ad 
reminding residents that “Progressive New Orleans Demand Progressive Plumbing.” 
And the Progressive Union hosted a sanitary expert from Chattanooga who lectured on 
the topic “Health is Wealth—Sanitation as a Civic Factor.” All hoped that the new 
works would help to eliminate the “unsanitary reputation” that burdened the city.
Martin Behrman later recalled that commercial expansion o f the city began with the 
passage of the tax because “the outside world” had previously tended “to avoid New 
Orleans as an undesirable place, either for residence or investment.”8
From the beginning, residents treated the project as more than just an 
engineering project or another instance of public construction. The rhetoric of the
mud, the city should utilize rail cars to dump the mud in the rear o f the city, thereby 
filling in swamp lands.
8 Behrman, New Orleans: A History o f  Three Great Public Utilities, 4; Earl, 
Sewerage, Water and Drainage System o f  New Orleans,; Daily Picayune, September 1, 
1899, Section II, 6, Section III, 2, 7; September 8, 1899, 6.
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Municipal Improvement Association emphasized the connection between the sanitation 
project and commercial success. The Louisville Courier-Journal predicted that “New 
Orleans . . .  must inevitably become one of the great cities o f the world” given a clean 
bill of health. The Daily Picayune echoed that judgment, claiming that “the greatest 
need to the progress of [the] city is . . .  public sanitation.” At Thanksgiving, A. F.
Theard gave thanks “that the citizens have ratified the sewerage and drainage tax . . .  
[that] will help New Orleans to regain its rank as one o f the healthiest and greatest 
commercial cities o f the world.” The holiday message o f Superintendent of the 
Sewerage and Water Board, George Earl, praised the work o f the citizens on the Board 
and found virtue even in the numerous unpaved streets o f New Orleans “where it is 
easier to build sewerage lines.” The consensus for new utility systems transcended city 
politics. Regardless of electoral squabbles to come, the Board and its works remained 
sacrosanct, immune from challenge by any of the city’s political factions or 
organizations.9
Sales of the Sewerage and Water Board bonds offered another occasion for 
linking the project to the city’s prosperity. All municipal bond sales went through the 
city’s Board o f Liquidation. Although members expressed disappointment that banks 
demanded four percent interest on the issue, thereby lowering the amount available for 
construction, the Board of Liquidation approved the sale. Member Isidore Newman, 
President of the New Orleans Stock Exchange, urged acceptance of the bid and a rapid
9 Earl, Sewerage, Water and Drainage System o f  New Orleans', Daily Picayune, 
September 4, 1900, 4; November 29, 1900, 3; Kendall, History o f  New Orleans, 2: 538.
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start to construction. “It is my opinion [that] the sooner the work is completed,” he 
said, “ the [sooner] city will enter on a new era of prosperity such as we have never 
known before.” On December 2, 1900, a Daily Picayune editorial predicted future New 
Orleans railroad expansion, population growth, and great manufacturing operations 
attributable to the sanitary improvements. Anxious to promote the sale o f the bonds, the 
newspaper continued the theme, suggesting that “the future welfare and prosperity of the 
city are dependent upon the success of the improvements.” Mindful of conflict of 
interest difficulties, four Board o f Liquidation members, including President Robert 
Walmsley, recused themselves due to connections with the banks purchasing the 
bonds.10
Mayor Capdevielle met with the foil Board on December 16, shortly after a 
group of banks bid on the bond issue. After interest charges and fees, the Board 
anticipated $12,000,000 for construction. With the funds imminent, the Mayor wanted 
to know how soon construction would start. The staff explained that engineering work 
was slow; specifications would take at least sixty days to complete. In addition, 
continuing litigation with the Water Works Company might add to the delay. Board 
member Charles Janvier asked whether the city would allow excavations during the 
summer months, the period o f greatest risk for disease, especially yellow fever. But the 
Mayor assured all that the city was “perfectly healthy now.” Enthusiasm continued into 
the new year. At the annual meeting of the Municipal Improvement Association,
10 Second Semi-Annual Report, 3-6; Daily Picayune, December 2, 1900, 4, 
December 16,1900,4; December 18, 1900,1.
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officers reminded the membership of the group’s pioneering work on behalf of public 
ownership of the sewerage and water systems and offered their congratulations to the 
city on the occasion of the bond sale. Later, Councilman Zacherie addressed a church 
group and repeated the connection between the project and prosperity: “We cannot live 
in an unhealthy place and if this city is to grow in population it must be thoroughly 
sanitized, which is to us more than half the battle for commercial success and 
supremacy.” The councilman predicted a city that would grow “from the present city 
clear back to the lake.”11
In March, 1901, the Sewerage and Water Board staff announced a plan to divide 
the proceeds of the bond sale. The Drainage Commission, granted a portion of the 
funds by the state legislature, would receive $3,900,000 The water works would get 
$1,600,000 and the sewerage project the remainder. Progress on water purification 
encouraged the members. Superintendent Earl announced the experimental station at 
Audubon Park produced pure water at less than $.03 per gallon; within a month that 
figure fell to $.025. But the Drainage Commission faced severe criticism from residents 
upset at a flood produced by torrential spring rains. The press reported that “Canal 
Street was a lake, Common and Tulane a river, and the rest o f the central portion of the 
city from Camp and St. Charles back, an ocean. As to the outskirts o f the city and the
11 Daily Picayune, December 16,1900, 12; December 18, 1900, 1; January 9, 
1901, 1; March 5, 1901, 3; Second Semi-Annual Report, 3-6. The councilman’s 
predictions of lakeward expansion came to pass within a few years. See below 
regarding the help provided by the Board to the New Orleans Land Company to drain 
the wetlands toward the lake.
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suburbs, the water was from two to five feet deep.” The Commission blamed a 
negligent contractor and faulted itself only for “being too patient in dealing with 
contractors.” Not long after, however, the Commission announced a reorganization of 
the drainage operation to improve service. The Commission planned to sue one of the 
contractors for negligence, but relented when the attorney for the contractor threatened 
“to expose” the Drainage Commission. The attorney was Edgar Farrar, law partner to E.
B. Kruttschnitt, Chairman o f the Democratic State Central Committee. Farrar had been 
active in drafting the original state legislation enabling the Sewerage and Water Board.12
Concern over the effectiveness of the Drainage Com m ission became a theme in 
subsequent press coverage. In a new round of bids, the commission awarded a large 
contract to the very company it had earlier blamed for the city flooding. In addition to 
its disputes with contractors, the Drainage Commission competed with the sewerage and 
water functions for tax revenues. Linus Brown, a local engineer, criticized the level of 
spending on drainage as inefficient. The Chair of the City Board of Health defended the 
level o f drainage expenditure, but criticized both utility boards for being composed of 
financiers and engineers, not sanitarians or hygienists, confirming once again the 
identification of the project with city health.13
12 Third Semi-Annual Report, 4; By-Laws: Sewerage and Water Board o f  New 
Orleans, 17; Daily Picayune, March 14, 1901, 3; April 19, 1901, 5; April 20, 1901, 6; 
April 24, 1901,4; May 16, 1901; May 19, 1901,4.
13 Daily Picayune, July 25, 1901, 3; July 31, 1901, 3; August 6, 1901, 3.
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In August, 1901 Superintendent Earl returned from a trip to the Northeast during
which he visited a number o f cities and investigated water purification and sewerage
treatment plants. Earlier he had advocated disposal of sewerage waste in the Mississippi
River. After his visits, he reported to the Board:
Because a discharge into the Mississippi River is the cheapest method, because 
every city above us has given us the example, because we can do it without harm 
to ourselves (as there are no cities below us to take exception to our course), 
because of the almost infinite and immediate dilution and disposal which such a 
discharge, properly placed, offers, I can see no grounds to look elsewhere.
Earl’s visit confirmed his recommendations. He noted the complicated sewerage
treatment procedures necessary in most cities and remarked that “the cost. . .  o f such a
system is very great and after seeing it I could but feel thankful that New Orleans has a
turbid river with a continuous and large discharge of water into which the sewerage will
be discharged with perfect impunity.” The Board agreed. New Orleans saved money
on sewerage treatment at the cost of its downriver neighbors, but those lands were
scarcely populated.14
The Louisiana Supreme Court handed the city an important victory on
November 6, 1901, when it declared the franchise of the private water company void.
The Board immediately moved to begin construction of the public system. A search
14 The Waterworks, Sewerage and Drainage System o f  New Orleans', First Semi- 
Annual Report, 20-21; By-Laws: Sewerage and Water Board o f  New Orleans, 17; Daily 
Picayune, August 24, 1901, 3; Kendall, History o f  New Orleans, 2: 580. Forgetful of 
Earl’s cavalier attitude, public comment later criticized the city of Chicago for altering 
the flow of the Chicago River in a manner that ultimately dumped that city’s sewerage 
into the Mississippi. In 1940, the Sewerage and Water Board continued to insist that the 
discharge “was lost in the immensity of flow” in the Mississippi.”
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began for a suitable site for the water purification system, and the Board authorized its 
attorneys to use expropriation in any case in which an agreement for compensation 
could not be reached. The engineering staff quickly located sites, but later complained 
that the owners wanted “high prices.” The Board also moved to take advantage of its 
favorable legal position by entering into negotiations with the private water and sewer 
companies to acquire their assets at what the Board hoped would be advantageous 
terms. The water company, having lost its franchise as a result of the court decision, 
still possessed a substantial distribution system. And an investigation of existing sewer 
lines concluded that the pipes “were in not bad shape” and suggested an acquisition 
price of between $170,000 and $229,000.15
During early 1902, the Sewerage and Water Board faced increasing criticism 
regarding the slow pace o f progress. Bonds had been sold more than a year ago, yet no 
work had begun. The Board’s President Pro Tern, Charles Janvier, responded by 
detailing the difficulties faced in “one of the largest public works o f this character ever 
undertaken in the U.S.” He defended the Board by pointing out the problems of 
protracted litigation, the limited funds, and the requirements o f complicated 
engineering. But the contradictions inherent in the separate governance o f  drainage 
from sewerage and water also began to emerge. As early as January 10, 1902, the 
Drainage Board suggested a plan by which it would voluntarily dissolve and ask the 
legislature to merge its functions with the Sewerage and Water Board. Public opinion
15 Fourth Semi-Annual Report, 3; Daily Picayune, September 27, 1901, 7; 
November 7,1901, 3; January 7,1902, 3 .
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turned against the Drainage Commission as the result of flooding, but also because of 
events that suggested financial incompetence and weak planning. The commission’s 
chief engineer resigned under fire, and talks o f merging the two boards grew more 
frequent.16
The regular state legislative session o f 1902 considered a bill to merge the 
systems under the Sewerage and Water Board. Local bankers expressed concern that 
the merger would invite yet more litigation, and the city’s commercial exchanges 
opposed the merger as well, but the legislature approved the bill. After a governor’s 
veto “for technical deficiencies,” the legislature proposed a new version, somewhat 
quieting the opponents. The logic of a merged board proved decisive. The governor 
signed the new bill, and members of both boards met as one on August 22, 1902. 
Though litigation followed and a court decision eventually reduced its membership, the 
new Board assumed the expanded duties with little difficulty.17
16 Fifth Semi-Annual Report, 6-10; Daily Picayune, January 10, 1902, 7; January 
26,1902, 4; February 4,1902, 3,4; February 14, 1902,4; February 21, 1902, 3, 4. The 
engineer allowed the substitution of one grade o f cement for a cheaper variety resulting 
in excess profits to a contractor. The Board initially won a suit against the company, but 
the courts later decided that no harm had come to the city as a result of the substitution. 
See Daily Picayune, May 22, 1904, 4.
17 The merger took place subsequent to Act 111, July 8, 1902. Sixth Semi-Annual 
Report, By-Laws: Sewerage and Water Board o f  New Orleans, 17-18, 26-28; Daily 
Picayune, May 27, 1902,11; June 8,1902, 3 ,4; June 13, 1902, 6, 7; June 26, 1902, 1; 
August 15,1902, 3; August 22, 1902, 3, 9; Mayor Capdevielle to Sewerage and Water 
Board, August 13, 1902, Mayor’s Correspondence; “Drainage in New Orleans” (n.d.), 
unpublished summary of drainage legislation, University of New Orleans, Earl K. Long 
Library, Louisiana Collection, Vertical File; Kendall, History o f  New Orleans, 2: 538.
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During the time the legislature debated merger, the Sewerage and Water board 
showed signs of progress in initiating construction. Its staff prepared detailed 
specifications for construction bids and announced that work on a series of sewer pipe 
contracts would begin “before the year is out.” By mid-year, the Board’s semi-annual 
publication detailed the work of the previous two and one-half years and looked forward 
to construction. But the bids received exceeded estimates by a wide margin.
Acceptance would result in a reduction in capital projects and lead to an incomplete 
system or the necessity for additional taxes. In spite of public pressure to begin 
construction work at all costs, the Board delayed the awards, reorganized the potential 
contracts into smaller segments, and requested that the construction companies resubmit 
bids. The Board also announced its intention to start construction with its own crews if 
necessary. By year’s end the Board advertised the newly reorganized contracts and 
anticipated substantial savings.18
New Year’s greetings published in the Daily Picayune prominently mentioned 
the public works projects. Tom Richardson, Secretary-Manager of the Progressive 
Union, hoped “that all difficulties concerning municipal improvements of every 
character will be removed and that a complete sewer and drainage system may be a 
reality.” J. Watts Kearney, the city’s postmaster, wished “that the Sewerage and Water
18 For a sample contract, see Specifications for Pumping, Steam and Electrical 
Equipment: Contract “D ”, New Orleans Public Library, Louisiana Division (New 
Orleans, 1902); Daily Picayune, May 27, 1902, 11; August 22, 1902, 9; August 26,
1902, 3; August 27,1902; October 24, 1902, 6; November 14, 1902, 11; Fifth Semi- 
Annual Report', Sixth Semi-Annual Report.
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Board be enabled to start their great works.” Kearney was more realistic. The Board 
started construction in 1903, but it would be a number o f years before a system began 
operations. Board members faced revenue allocation decisions now that drainage 
responsibilities had become part of its budget, but an increase in assessed valuation of 
properly' generated income in excess of bond issue requirements, and the resulting 
surplus could be appropriated.19
The Daily Picayune reported on February 3, 1903 that the Board opened the new 
bids. It would take several weeks to compile the responses, but the new bids “[did] not 
seem lower that the rejected bids.” The newspaper’s information was incorrect. In a 
vindication of the decision to delay the project, six o f the eight bids corresponded 
closely to the estimates of the Board’s engineers. The savings from the new bid process 
totaled between $200,000 and $500,000. Recommended contractors provided the 
necessary bonds, the city council concurred in the award o f the contracts, and work 
finally began. In the midst of the bid process, a court decision on the merger upheld the 
joining of the two boards, but altered the composition o f the membership, which 
consisted of the mayor, seven district representatives, three city council committee 
chairmen, and the President and one other member o f the city’s powerful Board of 
Liquidation.20
19 Seventh Semi-Annual Report', Daily Picayune, January 1, 1903, 5; January 22, 
1903, 4; Kendall, History o f New Orleans, 2: 538.
20 Seventh Semi-Annual Report'. By-Laws: Sewerage and Water Board o f  New 
Orleans, 18-19; Daily Picayune, February 3,1903,4; February 13, 1903, 8; February 
18, 1903, 8 ; March 13, 1903,4; March 20,1903; March 27,1903.
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Sewer system construction began on June 25, 1903 with a special event at Canal 
and Robertson Street. Principals wielded ceremonial shovels, and the assembly listened 
to speeches by the Mayor, attorney Bernard McCloskey, and E. B. Kruttschnitt. The 
Mayor called the project “unquestionably the greatest public improvement the city had 
ever undertaken.” Other speakers estimated the cost of the sewer project at $5,000,000; 
the initial seven contracts totaled approximately $1,500,000. Some observers later 
complained that the ceremony did not give “sufficient credit to former Mayor Flower, 
Abraham Brittin, Edgar Farrar nor to the Women’s League,” all early proponents of the 
project and the property tax to provide revenue. However, the program for the event 
clearly listed the early supporters and thanked “numerous citizens . . .  [who assisted in] 
this great stride in the advance of the city to the front rank among cities o f the world.” 
Special mention was made o f Miss Kate Gordon, President o f the Woman’s League 
“who took an active part in the voting” that established the projects.21
Difficult engineering problems faced the contractors who started the 
construction. The city’s almost featureless topography provided very slight gravity 
assistance to a sewer system, and what declination existed brought the sewerage toward 
the lake—exactly the opposite o f what the engineering plans intended. To compensate, 
contractors dug deeper and deeper trenches in which to place pipe. At intervals, electric 
lift stations pumped the liquid waste to a higher elevation, and the process began again.
21 Behrman, New Orleans: A History o f  Three Great Utilities, 7; Program o f the 
Inauguration ofActive Construction o f the Sewerage System o f  the City o f  New Orleans, 
Sewerage and Water Board Plan-, By-Laws: Sewerage and Water Board o f  New 
Orleans, 20; Daily Picayune, June 26,1903, 1; June 30, 1903, 6.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
199
Increasing sizes o f pipe connected homes to secondary lines and, in turn, to primary 
lines twenty-four inches in diameter. Ultimately, the sewerage o f the entire city was 
pumped over the levee well down river of the central business district and, more 
importantly, well down river from the anticipated intake for the city’s water purification 
plant.22
Superintendent George Earl provided a review of Sewerage and Water Board 
activities in the annual business issue of the Daily Picayune, September 1, 1903. Earl 
admitted the tardy start to the sewerage system but blamed court cases. He noted that 
the Board had started over $1,700,000 in sewer projects. Also underway were drainage 
projects began under the previous commission. Construction had not yet started on the 
water works, but the Board had acquired property and completed specifications for a 
purification plant with a capacity o f40,000,000 gallons per day. Earl went on the 
explain that the expense of the systems resulted from the large area o f the city in relation 
to population, the level character of the area, and the great amount o f local rainfall.23
In 1904, the Board remained active through two political contests: state 
elections early in the year and municipal elections in the fall. Neither contest obstructed 
the progress of the Board, nor did any of the various political platforms suggest a 
change in direction of the utility. The Board staff advertised additional requests for bids
22 Behrman, New Orleans: A History o f  Three Great Utilities, 6; Semi-Annual 
Report, Numbers 1-6; Kendall, History o f  New Orleans, 2: 579-580.
23 Daily Picayune, September 1, 1903, Section IV, 4. See also Earl’s subsequent 
analysis of the engineering difficulties in Earl, Sewerage, Water and Drainage System o f  
New Orleans.
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on sixty-six miles of sewer line, cast iron pipe, and, for the first time, two miles of water 
mains. Having learned from the first experience with letting bids, the Board divided the 
sewer work into six contracts in anticipation of promoting competition and lower costs. 
When bids arrived, there were thirty-six proposals. The work attracted to the city 
contractors “skilled in sewerage construction,” and several firms based outside of New 
Orleans received contracts. The use o f outside contractors raised questions in the 
community regarding the source of their labor, and the Board noted the obligation of the 
construction crews to give preference to “home labor.” The next year, the new Mayor, 
Martin Behrman, would again question contractors, noting rumors that “Negro workers 
from Memphis were being imported to the detriment of local labor.” 24
As construction progressed, estimates of completion dates began to circulate.
For the first time, Superintendent Earl provided assurance that, in spite of earlier 
setbacks, the systems would be completed by the end of 1908--more than four years 
away. In addition to the complexities of construction and litigation, the Board faced a 
the problem of constantly adjusting its plans to an expanding city. As the public 
systems improved, the city grew, requiring extension o f the system into areas 
increasingly distant from the center of the city. The Metairie ridge, a slight rise in 
elevation of only a few feet, marked the rear, or northern, boundary of New Orleans 
development. To the north of that ridge lay undeveloped, undrained lands for several 
miles toward Lake Pontchartrain. Acting on a request from the New Orleans Land
24 Daily Picayune, December 11,1903,4; January 21,1904,13; February 3,
1904,4; October 6, 1905, 8.
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Company, the Board agreed to assist the company in draining the northern area, called 
“Lakeview.” Several years later, under the pressure of declining budgets, the Board 
required extensions of the water and sewerage systems to be partly financed by the land 
companies requesting the new facilities.25
On April 1, 1904 the Board celebrated a milestone: the completion o f the first 
contract let by the Board for sewer work, in this case the laying o f  sewer pipe along the 
river front near Audubon Park. The demonstration of progress did not quell 
complaints, however, and Earl had to defend the Board once again. He reiterated the 
1908 goal for completion of the systems and denied that the Board delayed projects to 
accumulate funds otherwise available to construction. Three more contracts reached 
completion by mid-May, 1904, and the Board provided statistics to demonstrate the 
extent of the works in progress: thirty-nine construction gangs at work, 1,200 men 
employed, and fourteen active contracts. The scale of the public works attracted 
nationwide attention. In June, Mayor Capdevielle “had a visitor in Richard Wayne 
Wilson . . .  the representative o f the New York Tribune, to write o f  the sewerage, water 
and drainage systems, the industriousness of the South, and the new progress in this 
section of the country.” The Board awarded additional contracts in July totaling over 
$500,000 of work and noted the “ample and wholesale competition” on the bids.26
25 Eighth Semi-Annual Report', Daily Picayune, December 24, 1903, 5; February 
19, 1904,4.
26 Ninth Semi-Annual Report, By-Laws: Sewerage and Water Board o f  New 
Orleans, 21; Daily Picayune, May 13, 1904, 5; May 14, 1904, 5; June 7, 1904, 5; July 8, 
1904, 5.
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When the regular session o f the Louisiana legislature convened in summer.
1904, the Board faced only routine matters, although there was some concern over a bill 
that would limit the work day o f Sewerage and Water Board employees to eight hours. 
Lewis Johnson, Chair of the Board’s legislative committee, later reported that the 
offending legislation “was happily killed.” More important to the works project was the 
announcement in August that the Board planned to begin construction on the enormous 
water works that would provide the city with 40,000,000 gallons o f filtered Mississippi 
River water per day. Although the New Orleans summer saw little progress (at one 
point the Daily Picayune headline read “Sewerage and Water Board Managed to Get a 
Quorum”), the staff and consulting engineers worked on specifications for the giant 
pumps, filtering devices, and storage tanks. The board received initial bids in 
November, though a dispute over specifications delayed the awards until the following 
year. The bid dispute involved the attorney for one manufacturer questioning the 
quality of the ostensible winner’s product. Once again, the Board showed considerable 
deference to attorney E. H. Farrar. The machinery went to bid a second time, but, 
ultimately, neither company received the award.27
Although work on the water and sewerage system proceeded well, the drainage 
system continued to bedevil the Board. In December, 1904, the Board responded to
27 Specifications for Water Works Pumping Machinery: Contract “1-W", New 
Orleans Public Library, Louisiana Division (New Orleans, 1904); Tenth Semi-Annual 
Report', Behrman, New Orleans: A History o f  Three Great Utilities, 10; also By-Laws: 
Sewerage and Water Board o f  New Orleans, 21; Daily Picayune, July 16, 1904, 4; July 
29, 1904, 6,11; August 13, 1904, 4; November 9, 1904, 10; November 10,1904, 5; 
December 24, 1904, 10; December 28, 1904, 15; February 7, 1905, 6.
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residents’ complaints about the drainage canals and frequent flooding by establishing 
rules for use of the drainage system. Henceforth, the Board forbid the discharge of 
industrial waste and domestic outhouses into the canals and required specific permission 
for anyone to connect to any part of the new system. Nature did not cooperate, 
however, and 1905 brought even heavier rain than usual, highlighting drainage 
deficiencies during every downpour.28
At a lecture to Tulane University students, Superintendent Earl reminded 
listeners of the scope o f the work in progress: a land area of 15,000 acres, population of 
over 200,000, more than ninety percent of the population dependent on cisterns for 
water supply, approximately 66,000 structures, and 400 miles of streets. He argued that 
the drainage system showed progress. Prior to 1900 drainage could remove only 1,300 
cubic feet of water per second, although in recent rainstorms water fell on the city at 
rates exceeding 15,000 cubic feet per second. In a perverse way, city progress added to 
the strain on the system. Not only was there more land to be drained as the city grew, 
but the city’s extensive street paving program reduced the surface area available to 
absorb rain water. By the end of 1905, the allocation of revenue for drainage projects 
ran out. In the absences of additional construction funds, the Board limited drainage
28 By-Laws: Sewerage and Water Board o f  New Orleans, 21; Rules o f  the 
Sewerage and Water Board o f New Orleans, New Orleans Public Library, Louisiana 
Division (New Orleans, 1908), 3. The Sewerage and Water Board Pamphlet, published 
in 1908, included a listing of the 1904 rules as well as subsequent regulations regarding 
fire hydrants and house plumbing.
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work to maintenance, and began planning for a new bond issue to finish the drainage 
works.29
Meanwhile, the sewerage and water functions drew upon the remainder o f the 
original $16,000,000 bond issue. The Board awarded contracts for pumping machinery 
and extensive supplies of pipe. The largest o f the sewer mains became the city’s 
property as contractors completed work. The Daily Picayune humorist “McDonogh” 
praised the Board in a column comparing their activities to a stage production. “The 
Lucky Thirteen [Sewerage and Water Board Members],” he wrote, “are steady, if at 
times slow, performers . . .  running three [acts] alone and at the same time.”30
The outbreak of yellow fever in the city in the summer, 1905, made everyone 
aware that public health and sanitation measures were deadly serious. The connection 
between the epidemic and the work of the Sewerage and Water Board became apparent 
as soon as yellow fever cases and deaths began to increase. Drainage and water 
functions directly affected the spread of the disease because a particular breed of 
mosquito provided the vector for yellow fever. Ineffective drainage allowed standing 
water, a potential breeding place for the pest. Likewise, for the ninety percent o f New 
Orleanians that depended upon cisterns, the household water supply served as a source
29 Twelfth Semi-Annual Report, Daily Picayune, January 19, 1905, 6. In the 
previous year, the Board’s Tenth Semi-Annual Report had identified trash in the canals 
as a major cause of drainage system failure. Average annual rainfall during 1896 to 
1905 was approximately 51.5 inches; the 1905 total exceeded seventy-four inches.
30 Twelfth Semi-Annual Report, Daily Picayune, April 19, 1905, 5; May 3, 1905, 
10; May 23, 1905, 5; June 9,1905, 7; July 23, 1905, Section HI, 14.
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o f the disease. By July, 1905, Councilmen Zacharie proposed an ordinance outlawing 
the manufacture o f ice from “impure” water. Superintendent Earl reiterated the promise 
that the systems would be completed by 1908, but that schedule now seemed more 
important in an atmosphere of panic over the number o f new cases and deaths. The 
New Orleans Taxpayers Protective Association demanded prompt completion of the 
water system even if it meant slowing work on the other parts of the system. The 
Sewerage and Water Board patiently answered the letter. As the new President of the 
Board, Mayor Behrman reminded the association that only by stretching out the work 
had the Board been able to accomplish its goals, and that a completed water system, in 
the absence of the other systems, would be counterproductive. Engineers planned the 
sewerage system to carry household water waste in addition to sewerage. A domestic 
water supply with no means of sewerage disposal would lead to additional standing 
water, not less. And the standing water would remain i f  there were no drainage system 
that would carry it away. Controversy did not subside until fall, when cool weather and 
energetic public health measures brought the mosquito population, and the rate of 
infection, under control.31
31 Letter of Mayor Martin Behrman, President o f  the Sewerage and Water Board 
to the New Orleans Taxpayers’ Protective Association, August 16, 1905, in Sewerage 
and Water Board: Miscellaneous Correspondence, New Orleans Public Library, 
Louisiana Collection; Daily Picayune, July 29, 1905,4; August 1,1905,4; August 18, 
1905, 8. Superintendent Earl claimed the next year that improvements in drainage also 
contributed to the reduction in death rates. See Earl, Sewerage, Water and Drainage 
System o f  New Orleans.
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In late 1905, a letter to the Sewerage and Water Board from a  disgruntled 
contractor claimed that the sewer lines deteriorated rapidly due to deficient plans drawn 
by the Board’s staff engineers. The Superintendent claimed the contractor was “simply 
extortionate,” but the Board suspended all work until an assessment of the charges could 
be arranged. The consulting engineers assembled quickly and began a thorough review 
of work completed to date. Their report found no widespread problems and affirmed the 
engineering principles behind the system. Out of over 118 miles of pipe, defects 
appeared in only 317 feet. The Board affirmed the work of its engineers. To reassure 
the public even more, the Board invited the American Association for the Advancement 
of Science, which met in the city at the end of the year, to examine the sewerage, water 
and drainage plans.32
Early in 1906, the Board faced the unpleasant reality of its financial situation. 
Completion of all three systems demanded additional capital, but additional taxes would 
not be popular. Fortunately, the rapid growth of the city since the beginning of the 
project in 1899 provided a solution. The growth in property values increased the yield 
of the Board’s dedicated 2 mill tax; only a portion was necessary to service the original 
bond issues. The remaining revenue could be combined with the Board’s share o f the 
so-called debt tax o f 10 mills which provided a second income stream. The resulting 
funds would be able to service a new bond issue, yielding up to $8,000,000 in
32 Twelfth Semi-Annual Report, Daily Picayune, October 24, 1905, 10;
November 1, 1905,4; November 12,1905, 5; December 15,1905, 12; January 5,1906,
5; January 12, 1906,4.
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construction. Attorney Edgar Farrar, author of the 1899 legislation, agreed with the plan 
and offered his assistance to the Board. The Progressive Union joined in the effort to 
approach the legislature for an enabling act at the next regular session.33
Board projections for completion now depended upon the new funding.
Drainage improvements became a secondary priority. By the end of 1908 the central 
infrastructure of sewerage and water projects would be in place, but household 
connections would take one to two years more, assuming that the legislature approved 
the additional bond issue and the Board o f Liquidation could sell the bonds. The 
Sewerage and Water Board also planned to ask the legislature for increased regulatory 
powers, including the authority to remove cisterns once connection to the central system 
became possible, but, fearful of public opposition at a time when the bond issue was at 
stake, the Board withdrew its request for the cistern legislation.34
The connection of Farrar to the Board’s activities highlighted the non-partisan 
nature of the activities. Farrar started as a Regular, but drifted toward the reform 
elements of the city, even while maintaining his law practice with E. B. Kruttschnitt. 
Board members appointed by the Mayor worked in concert with members from the
33 Assessed value of city property subject to taxation grew from $132 million in 
1890 to $140 million in 1900. After the start o f Board operations, during the next 
fourteen years, values grew to $250 million. Behrman, New Orleans: A History o f three 
Great Utilities, 11; Twelfth Semi-Annual Report, Daily Picayune, February 15, 1906, 7. 
Farrar represented the investors of the private water works, now in receivership. If the 
sewerage and Water Board were in better financial condition, it might see fit to increase 
its offer to buy certain assets of the private company.
34 Daily Picayune, April 6, 1906, 6; April 10, 1906, 4; April 21, 1906, 12.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
208
Board of Liquidation; rarely did political issues intervene. On early May, 1906. 
however, the term o f member Charles Theard expired; Behrman replaced him with 
Joseph Voegtle, a member of the legislature and a Regular stalwart. The Times- 
Democrat immediately objected. Theard’s connections with the commercial 
establishment were impeccable; Voegtle managed a French Quarter hotel. Behrman 
defended his actions by reminding his opponents that his other Sewerage and Water 
Board appointments were favorable to the silk-stocking element. The underlying 
dispute involved more than a comparison of occupations and the class-consciousness of 
the Times-Democrat. Theard, though a friend of Mayor Capdevielle and a Regular in 
the 1899 elections, had opposed Behrman in the mayoral election of 1904. Voegtle not 
only supported the Regulars; he had provided rooms in his hotel for Behrman to use as 
his private offices during the 1904 campaign.35
In this instance, the commercial elite saved Theard’s membership, but not by 
dissuading the Mayor. Within a month, members of the Board of Liquidation 
engineered Theard’s reappointment. Charles Janvier resigned from the Board of 
Liquidation and the private members selected Theard as his replacement. Subsequently, 
Abraham Brittin, member of the Sewerage and Water Board by virtue o f a Board o f 
Liquidation appointment, resigned from the Sewerage and Water Board, creating an 
opening for Theard. Behrman could not prevent the maneuver. Ever the pragmatist, he 
accepted Theard’s presence, and the two worked well together. In spite of
3S Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 97; Daily Picayune, May 2, 1906, 5; 
Times-Democrat, May 3, 1906,4; Daily Picayune, May 5, 1906, 6.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
209
disagreements with the Board o f Liquidation on other matters, the pending bond issue 
required the two boards to cooperate, and Behrman helped organize the joint efforts.36
Several important events converged in fall, 1906. An immense water 
purification plant served as the heart of the water system, and plans for its construction 
approached completion. The Board took special care with the plant, inviting the 
consulting engineers to review the plans before a call for bids began. The firm of Black 
and Laird offered the successful bid, totaling $1,840,727.20. The executive committee 
and full Board agreed to the proposal, the city council concurred, and the parties signed 
the contract at the end o f September. A reminder to the new contractor to hire local 
labor followed closely behind. The legislature approved the new bond issue, but the 
Board needed voter approval. State officials cooperated with the Mayor, and the 
proposition enjoyed the favored first place on the November ballot. The measure passed 
by a large margin.37
After years of plans, tom-up streets, and litigation, concrete manifestations of 
the new systems reached the public. The first connection to the sewerage system
36 Daily Picayune, May 9, 1906, 4; June 7, 1906,4; September 14, 1906, 4.
37 Earl, Sewerage, Water and Drainage System in New Orleans', Thirteenth Semi- 
Annual Report', Fourteenth Semi-Annual Report, 24-25; Daily Picayune, July 6, 1906,
4; August 7, 1906, 5; September 12, 1906, 7; October 12, 1906, 4; Behrman to General 
Leon Jastremski, October 24, 1906, Mayor’s Correspondence. For sample contract for 
various parts of the systems, see Special Specifications for Sewers: Contract “X ”, New 
Orleans Public Library, Louisiana Division (New Orleans, 1906), and Special 
Specifications fo r Laying Water Pipe: Contract “9-W”, New Orleans Public Library, 
Louisiana Division (New Orleans, 1906). The latter document is an original submission 
by a contractor, “M. O’Herren Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa..”
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occurred October 11. 1906, at the firm of C. C. Hartwell, 213 Baronne Street, in the 
heart of the city’s business district. After an inspection by the Board, plumbers 
completed the connection amid a small celebration. When the system reached the 
offices of the Progressive Union, another celebration took place. Involvement of the 
Progressive Union highlighted the non-partisan nature of the triumph. The Union’s 
membership, though heavily representative of the city’s commercial interests, crossed 
factional lines between Regular and reformer. Mayor Behrman served on the 
organization’s Board of Directors. Members of the City Board of Health and members 
of the Sewerage and Water Board also attended the festivities at the Progressive Union. 
Though the organizers of the celebration hoped the governor would attend, they settled 
for the state Director of Health, who reminded the assembled dignitaries that the system 
would reduce the chance of yellow fever. (The honor of the first residence to be 
connected went to Major Harrod, former engineer to the Drainage Commission and 
consulting engineer to the Panama Canal Commission.) At its annual meeting early the 
next year, the Progressive Union celebrated the success of the system. President 
Godchaux made the commercial argument for the construction. “A few years ago the 
people of the city arose in their might and said ‘Let us have sanitary water and sewerage 
facilities, and lo! and behold! These are being constructed. Drainage, sewerage, 
wholesome water and clean streets is a city’s best investment, giving greatest, strongest 
and surest returns.”38
38 Daily Picayune, October 12, 1906, 4; October 21, 1906, 6; November 6, 1906, 
5; January 8, 1907, 4.
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By March, 1907, the sewer system covered 230 miles o f streets; 153 miles were 
ready for residential connections, but those connections did not materialize rapidly. 
Short of funds, the Board required the cost of connections to be borne by residents on 
the promise of repayment when the new bond issue produced funds. In spite o f a few 
high profile connections, large numbers o f residents remained skeptical and chose not to 
pay for a connection. The Board also faced renewed drainage difficulties. A downpour 
o f 8.57 inches in late April, 1907, reminded residents of their precarious site. “Drain, 
Not Explain” served as the protest slogan for Third Ward residents, but the Board could 
offer no immediate solution. The Era Club joined the dispute and formed a committee 
“to propose some persistent questions to the Sewerage and Water Board.” Board of 
Liquidation and Sewerage and Water Board member Theard worried about the city’s bid 
to hold an exposition in 1915 to celebrate the opening of the Panama Canal if  the 
drainage system were not complete. He suggested to the Board of Liquidation president 
that the bankers o f the city be organized “to take the $8,000,000 issue at four percent.” 
Yet the boom years of the decade did not continue. By 1907 uncertainty clouded 
national financial conditions and the public bonds became difficult to sell. Foreign 
investors withdrew funds from the United States, and large public bond issues could 
find no purchasers. Later in the year, the Board diverted a portion of operating funds— 
$240,000—into additional drainage construction, but only the sale of the bonds could 
provide funds to complete the system.39
39 Fifteenth Semi-Annual Report; Sixteenth Semi-Annual Report; Daily Picayune, 
March 4, 1907, 5; April 27,1907,4; May 14, 1907,11; May 25, 1907, 3; June 7, 1907,
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By September 1, 1907, the annual commercial review of the Daily Picayune 
hailed the progress on “the Trinity of Civic Salvation” and looked forward to its 
completion in 1908. The main sewers began operation with unfiltered river water and 
over 2 77  miles of pipe passed all tests. Over 150 miles o f the water distribution system 
were complete, and work continued on the main purification station. The purchase, 
earlier in the year, of the assets of a private water company in Algiers hastened progress 
on the west bank of the river. Even the cash-poor drainage system was forty percent 
complete. Mindful of the financial squeeze, the Board rejected a series of private bids, 
estimated at $300,000 in excess of what was reasonable, in favor of perform ing the 
work with Sewerage and Water Board employees. Behrman later claimed that the use 
of city employees saved the Sewerage and Water Board from $562,000 to $895,000 
during the period 1907-1913. But the issue of public versus private labor did not go 
away. Behrman and Earl stoutly defended the use of public labor. By 1913, the use of 
Board labor became a source of dispute between the Board and local contractors, and 
the state legislature refused to endorse the use of public labor for original construction, 
although maintenance work could be performed by Board employees.40
4; June 12, 1907, 7; November 24, 1907, 5. The Era Club later confirmed the 
judgement o f the Sewerage and Water Board staff that refuse clogging drains led to 
street flooding. The Club recommended “cleaning culverts, reducing street circulars and 
picking up garbage carefully.” Daily Picayune, December 29, 1907, 6. For an account 
of the 1907 financial panic and the intervention of J.P. Morgan, see Jean Strouse, “The 
Brilliant Bailout,” New Yorker, November 23, 1998, 62-77.
40 Eighteenth Semi-Annual Report; Behrman, New Orleans: A History o f  Three 
Great Utilities, 12-13; Correspondence and Papers Relating to the Board's 
Negotiations with the Algiers Water Works and Electric Company for the Purchase o f
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Early in 1908, the Board reached another milestone when the sewerage system in 
Algiers began operation. The first residence workers connected was Mayor Behrman?s 
home. The Board, however, faced new challenges from the water system. A large fire 
in the Third Ward spread out of control as insufficient pressure at the new hydrants 
hampered firemen. The superintendent explained that not all hydrants had been 
connected. Concerns over fire protection continued when, in June, conflagrations 
threatened the business district, still served by the private water company. Sewerage 
and Water Board officials hastened to connect the new city system to the old pipes in 
order the increase the pressure at the hydrants. By the end of the year, the Mayor staged 
a demonstration of the new system, using fire trucks to spray water down Elks Place.
The Daily Picayune declared “The City’s New Water System Makes a Splendid 
Showing.”41
The Board also dealt with less momentous matters. In early February, 1908, the 
Board received a report that an employee had been “garnished” by a woman in the red 
light district who claimed he “had pledged Sewerage and Water Board plans for wine 
drunk in her house.” And citizens along the new Melpomene drainage canal petitioned
Its Waterworks Systems, New Orleans Public Library, Louisiana Division (New 
Orleans, 1907); Behrman to City Council, April 30, 1907, Mayor’s Correspondence; 
Daily Picayune, September 1, 1907, Section III, 3; September 17, 1907,4; October 11, 
1907, 13. The Board plan received a setback when a local judge granted an injunction 
against Sewerage and Water Board labor on projects and ordered contracts awarded to 
the low bidder(s). The Board appealed and the ruling was later overturned, but the issue 
remained contentious for at least a decade. Daily Picayune, March 17, 1908, 15.
41 Daily Picayune, January 10, 1908,4, 11; February 12, 1908,13; February 14, 
1908; June 16, 1908; June 25, 1908, 5; November 16,1908, 4.
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the Sewerage and Water Board to build bridges over the canal to make travel easier and 
to build “fences along the canal to prevent cows” from falling into the water. The Board 
agreed to the bridges, but did not have sufficient funds to protect local livestock.42
Anticipating completion o f the system, the Board revisited the issue of 
household connections and the use of cisterns. At the Board’s request, the legislature 
considered a bill to require all premises to connect to the system and to outlaw the use 
o f both cisterns and privy vaults. Not all citizens agreed. The New Orleans Taxpayers’ 
Protective Association rallied against the legislation, claiming that “personal liberty is 
being attacked.” One member “advanced the argument that river water does not agree 
with some people; that a man knows his own stomach better than. . .  state legislation on 
the Water Board knows it.” Another member blamed the Regular organization, 
“seventeen inferior men,” though that comment “brought [another] member to his feet 
saying that if  party politics were to be dragged into a meeting at which ladies were 
present, there would be trouble.” Though the Board got its bill, it would be years before 
all homes joined the new system.43
The pace of construction picked up as the end of 1908, the Board’s self-imposed 
deadline, approached. By September, 1908, Earl reported the successful installation of 
411 miles of water pipe with most under pressure. Anticipating the start o f distribution 
operations, the Superintendent studied water rates across the country to arrive at a
41Daily Picayune, February 12, 1908, 13; March 24, 1908, 5; April 10, 1908, 4.
43 Daily Picayune, June 24, 1908, 4; September 9, 1908, 8; December 11, 1908,
4.
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schedule for New Orleans. Charges would “be sufficient to cover maintenance and 
operation of the system” but would not exceed the average for cities having municipal 
systems. Board members agreed with Earl, but put off formal adoption of rates until 
after the municipal election. A pro-Behrman election pamphlet later boasted that an 
investigation o f water rates by a committee o f the Progressive Union found the “rates 
satisfactory . . .  [and] the department was wonderfully well conducted.” The Board also 
considered an orderly method for establishing sewer and water connections; applications 
had increased and created a backlog for Sewerage and Water board crews. Complete 
operations awaited only the completion of the water works and implementation o f the 
filtering process.44
Those works attracted considerable national and international attention. Dr. 
Albert Chalmette, Director of the Institute of Lille, member of the Supreme Council of 
Public Hygiene o f France and bacteriologist, visited New Orleans and “declared himself 
highly pleased with [the] water works.” George K. Rider, Board o f Trustees of 
Sacramento, echoed the French visitor’s comments and paid the highest compliment: 
“New Orleans is a progressive and rapidly growing city and it couldn’t make a better 
investment than [the water works.]” Later in the year, the Louisiana Section of the 
American Chemical Society visited the works, examined the method of purification, and
44 Eighteenth Semi-Annual Report, Daily Picayune, September 11, 1908, 4; 
September 18, 1908,4; The Behrman Administration: Work Accomplished During the 
Eight Years o f  the Honorable Martin Behrman as Mayor o f the City o f  New Orleans 
Compiled and Condensed from the Records and Official Reports in the Various 
Departments o f  the City Government, University o f New' Orleans, Earl K. Long Library, 
Louisiana Collection, Vertical File (New Orleans, 1912), 4.
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“were impressed.” Mayor Behrman, asked for a Thanksgiving message by a New York 
newspaper, wrote “New Orleans rejoices today over the completion of our modem 
system of sewerage, water and drainage and water purification which will be in full 
operation by the dawn o f the new year.” His message to the newly installed city council 
in December boasted o f progress toward completion of the sewerage, water and 
drainage system, adding that street paving would be made easier once the contracts for 
pipe-laying were completed.45
The Board missed the December, 1908, deadline by only a few months. By 
January 1, 1909, the Superintendent estimated that ninety percent of the sewerage 
system and ninety-nine percent o f the water distribution system were complete. Testing 
on the water purification plant proved successful, and, in February, 1909, workers 
pressurized the distribution system and pure water flowed through the more than 500 
miles of pipes along New Orleans streets, including over 5,000 fire hydrants. Shortly 
thereafter, the city joined the remnants of the old, private system to the new by means of 
“a great reducing valve.” Consulting engineers from New York supervised the 
connection which “waited for the close of carnival” before completion. By 1910, the 
city had spent a total o f $8.5 million on the water system alone and over $5 million each 
on the sewerage and drainage systems. Not everyone felt gratitude towards the Board. 
Disputes over water rates arose immediately and bedeviled the Board for months. When 
the Era Club met in May, 1909, Jean Gordon, who had fought for adoption o f the
45 Daily Picayune, October 16,1908,6; October 28, 1908; November 26, 1908,
5; December 8, 1908, 5; December 11,1908,4.
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systems in 1899, suggested “that a special thanksgiving be held for the splendid clear 
water now being supplied to the city.” But “there was some opposition to this motion, 
one member holding that she saw no reason to give thanks for what one had to pay for.” 
In spite of the advice of the City Board of Health, the Taxpayers Protective Association 
persisted in its fight to preserve the right to maintain cisterns. Only a Louisiana 
Supreme Court decision to the contrary ended the use o f cisterns to provide water to 
homes.46
The start of operations o f the system did not mark the end of the capital funding 
crisis. The 1906 authorization for an additional $8,000,000 bond issue remained in 
place, but bonds could not be sold, even after a 1908 amendment providing for a 
premium of up to six percent for the purchasers. In February, 1909, the Mayor 
assembled the representatives of local banks to urge purchase of the bonds. Charles 
Theard, Chairman of the Sewerage and Water Board Finance Committee, and former 
adversary of Behrman, echoed the Mayor’s pleas. Bankers blamed the national 
financial crisis, but also reminded the Mayor of his insistence upon interest payments 
for public funds. Bank executive Sol Wexler suggested that public deposits “without 
interest would be a greater inducement to take” the bonds. Wexler also pointedly 
complained about the city’s assessments on bank property. Not until May, 1909, after 
suspension of construction and dismissal o f 400 employees, was the Board able to sell
46 Behrman, New Orleans: A History o f Three Great Utilities, 10; Nineteenth 
Semi-Annual Report; The Behrman Administration: Work Accomplished During the 
Eight Years. . . ,  4; Daily Picayune, February 25, 1909, 4; May 24, 1909, 5; March 10, 
1910,4; March 14, 1910, 6.
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bonds, and then only $1,000,000 of the issue was taken in spite o f the premium 
available to purchasers. The Mayor intervened once again late in 1910, bringing 
together the commercial exchanges in the hopes that their leadership would impress 
local banks. After promising that unexpended funds would be deposited in the banks 
that would purchase the issue, a local syndicate purchased the remaining $7 million in 
1911. A full construction schedule resumed, and the systems were substantially 
completed by 1917.47
What Behrman apologists called “the three great public utilities” embodied the 
principles o f southern urban progressivism: limitations on direct democratic input, the 
use of experts, and the assumption that a public interest could be defined and served.
The Sewerage and Water Board, for example, included both political appointments and 
representatives from the Board of Liquidation of City Debt. The city establishment 
justified support for the systems in recognizable progressive terms: commercial success 
as well as improvements in health and efficiency, especially as the result o f the epidemic 
of 1905. In New Orleans, the progressive impulse toward municipal reform existed 
across political and social lines, and lasted through numerous elections and changes in 
governmental structure. The underlying consensus in favor o f progressive civic
47 The Louisiana legislature granted permission for the premium in Act 111, 
regular session of 1908. Senator Voegtle, member of the Sewerage Water Board 
handled the legislation. Charles Theard, whom Behrman had replaced on the Sewerage 
and Water Board with Voegtle, later commended his adversary on his management of 
the legislation. Eighteenth Semi-Annual Report, 11; Daily Picayune, July 12, 1908, 4; 
February 27, 1909, 5; Nineteenth Semi-Annual Report, Twentieth Semi-Annual Report, 
Twenty-Second Semi-Annual Report, Twenty-Third Semi-Annual Report.
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development transcended, or overcame, corporate interests. New Orleans underwent a 
transformation as the result of these public utilities: a decrease in death rates, 
distribution of pure water, and expansion of habitable space due to drained lands. Such 
progress enjoyed the widest possible support and illuminates the turn of the century 
view of politics, progressivism, and the public interest.
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CHAPTER VII
THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE PORT OF 
NEW ORLEANS: PUBLIC WORKS AND TRADE EXPANSION
Along the bends o f the Mississippi River below New Orleans, vessels of all 
types traveled to and from the Crescent City. Between the city and the open water of 
the Gulf of Mexico was one hundred and ten miles of winding river, currents, narrow 
passes, and sand bars. Ship captains picked up bar pilots to navigate through the 
confusing passes at the mouth of the river, shaped by centuries of silt, and switched to 
river pilots to complete the trip upriver to New Orleans. Once at the port, ships clung to 
the city’s docks, fighting the currents that were always difficult and especially 
treacherous at high water times. The location of the Port of New Orleans overcame 
these and other obstacles through the transcending advantages of its location on the 
continent’s greatest river. The Mississippi provided access to a large percentage of the 
United States interior, to the Missouri and Ohio Rivers, and beyond.
Although the leadership of the city feared a decline of trade after the Civil War, 
the river trade revived quickly. The federal government sponsored improvements at the 
mouth of the river, and the products of new commercial agriculture developing in the 
Midwest and Plains became available for export. A large percentage of the nation’s 
grain output, coal production, cotton crop, and, in the twentieth century, petroleum
220
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products found an outlet to the world through New Orleans. The port also provided the 
Latin American world an entry to the United States market, particularly for the raw 
materials and agricultural products of Central and South America.1
A closeup view of the New Orleans port in the aftermath o f the Civil War 
revealed an unplanned mix of levees, batture lands, wharves, and landings. City streets 
converged at the river, adding to the congestion and confusion. The city council 
exercised authority over the river front, but had no clear vision o f  the port’s future. 
Unable to finance necessary improvements, the city contracted with a private firm to 
administer the port. After the expiration of the contract in 1881, a second lease granted 
rights of administration to Joseph A. Aiken & Company for ten years. The company 
agreed to spend a minimum amount on annual repairs and improvements, but the port’s 
infrastructure requirements quickly exceeded the specified investments. When the lease 
expired in 1891, the council drew up a more elaborate contract binding the successor 
company to a higher level of improvements, especially for the period 1891 to 1893. 
Moreover, the council specified wharf charges and license fees for steamships, flatboats, 
and barges. An elaborate, though arbitrary, allocation of space divided the river front 
area into zones for steamships, sailing vessels, salt carrying vessels, coal ships,
1 Lewis, New Orleans: The Making o f an Urban Landscape, 48-51; Kendall, 
History o f  New Orleans, 2: 599; Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 6; Port 
Handbook o f  New Orleans, University of New Orleans, Earl K. Long Library, Louisiana 
Collection (New Orleans, 1928), 9; Port and Terminal Facilities, Port o f  New Orleans, 
Louisiana, University of New Orleans, Earl K. Long Library, Louisiana Collection 
(New Orleans, 1919), 12; Frank T. Cass, Facts o f  Interest about the Port o f  New 
Orleans, University of New Orleans, Earl K. Long Library, Louisiana Collection (New 
Orleans, 1922), 6-7.
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steamboats, and luggers. Conditions improved for a time, but by mid-decade the river 
front area was in disarray.2
New transportation technologies complicated the port’s future. In the post-Civil 
War period, railroads came into the city in spite of formidable natural barriers.
Attracted by the business o f the port, railroads competed for scarce river front space. 
Once a railroad received a franchise or privilege, granted by the city council, that 
portion o f available land came under the control of the railroad and the shipping lines 
with which it negotiated agreements. The river front became increasingly crowded as 
competing interests and modes of transport filled the available space, and the port grew 
beyond the boundaries of the city proper. In 1888, Congress had recognized the 
growth and expanded the jurisdiction of the port into Jefferson Parish, upriver from New 
Orleans. The multi-parish nature of the operation changed the political climate, and in 
the crucial legislative session o f 1896, business, state, and municipal interests converged 
to radically restructure the adm in istration of the river front.
At the time, the legislature included a number of business-oriented municipal 
reformers from the Citizens’ League. Mayor Flower, and most o f the city 
administration, belonged to the Citizens’ League as well. The Regular organization, 
although temporarily out o f  office in the city, maintained considerable strength at the 
state level and could challenge initiatives o f the League. But this was not an issue about
2Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 6; Kendall, History o f  New Orleans,
2: 603-605. For a comprehensive history of the port, see Harold Sinclair, The Port o f  
New Orleans (New York: Garden City, 1942).
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which the two factions disagreed. Both agreed that the contracting o f port 
administration should be replaced with a comprehensive, state-level public structure. 
When the city council received a  report from a committee of the city’s merchants, no 
dissent was recorded. The legislature passed a bill to reorganize the port without 
significant opposition, and Governor Foster, a friend of the New Orleans Regular 
organization, signed the legislation. Act Number 70 of 1896 took the river front out o f 
the control of private contractors and placed it under a new organization—the Board o f 
Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans. The new governance o f the port took its 
place alongside other progressive-era reforms and public works projects in New 
Orleans. The widespread support given the Dock Board, as it was popularly called, 
reinforced the existence of a city consensus in favor of progressive civic development.
The structure of the new board eliminated direct control by elected officials.
The governor appointed members of the board from among the residents o f Orleans, 
Jefferson, and St. Bernard parishes. Members were required to “be prominently 
identified with the commerce or business interests of the port.” Thus the new structure 
followed the progressive ideal o f expert governance. But Regular Democrats 
maintained a measure of control through the governor’s appointment process as long as 
the state’s chief executive remained sympathetic to the Regulars’ wishes. Appointees to 
the Dock Board had considerable influence. The Dock Board possessed significant 
power to:
regulate the commerce and traffic of the Harbor of New Orleans . . .  to 
administer the public wharves; to construct new wharves.. .  and erect sheds
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
224
thereupon; to protect merchandise in transit; to place and keep the wharves, 
sheds, levees and approaches in good condition; to maintain sufficient depth of 
water and provide for lighting and policing such wharves and sheds.3
At its first meeting, the Board selected Robert Bleakley as President and Hugh
McCloskey as Vice-President. Other members included Thomas Henderson, Sidney
March and W. A. Kemaghan. Hugh McCloskey’s brother Bernard served as attorney
to the commissioners. Board members and staff were political appointees; all had
significant connections to the city’s political or economic establishments. The
McCloskey brothers were charter members of the Citizens’ League, although Bernard
McCloskey joined the Choctaws by 1902, as did Board member Sidney March.
William Kemaghan was a charter member of the Choctaw Club. The Board’s Assistant
Secretary, Clark Steen, had served as secretary to John Fitzpatrick during his mayoralty.
In September, the Board wrote to Acting Mayor Abraham Brittin of New Orleans to
announce their readiness to assume authority over the wharves and landings. To their
disappointment, the Louisiana Construction Company, contractor for the docks,
implicitly questioned the Board’s authority. Correspondence from the company came
not to the Dock Board but to the city administration. The Mayor forwarded the
communications, but the Board refused to received the letters. Before long, members
3 Arthur McGuirk, Laws Constitutional and Statutory Relating to the Board o f  
Commissioners o f  the Port o f  New Orleans Up to and Including the Year 1920, 
University of New Orleans, Earl K. Long Library, Louisiana Collection (New Orleans, 
1920), 2; Port Handbook o f New Orleans, 13-14; Daily Picayune, June 5, 1896,4, 12; 
July 7,1896,4; July 9, 1896,1; Kendall, History o f  New Orleans, 2: 605; Sinclair, The 
Port o f  New Orleans, 298-301. St. Bernard Parish occupies the east side o f  the 
Mississippi River below New Orleans.
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discussed the advisability o f seeking an annulment of the contractor’s lease in order to 
take over the docks immediately.4
Awaiting developments regarding the lease, the Board addressed other matters. 
The system of assigning dock space and the casual attitude of wharf officials had led to 
abuses. In April, 1897, the Board held special hearings to investigate charges that 
employees of the commission took bribes in exchange for allowing goods to sit on the 
wharves at no charge. Nothing emerged from the investigation, and a local grand jury 
took over the probe. In early September, 1897, Board President Bleakly became 
seriously ill and died after just one year’s service. Hugh McCloskey took over as 
president and Branch M. King, a cotton factor, took Bleakly’s place on the commission. 
McCloskey quickly showed interest and energy in his new position. He wrote the 
contractor urging repairs to wharves and landings and, within a month of taking office, 
organized the commission agenda and drafted a set of rules for the superintendent and 
other port employees. The commission prepared a report o f its first-year activities and 
forwarded the results to Governor Foster. The Governor wrote the members and 
thanked them for their efforts. Though he “had not yet read the report,” he wrote that 
“time, I feel confident, will show the wisdom of my selections in the personnel of the 
board as its record will be one of honest and intelligent administration of the port’s 
affairs.” The members approved by-laws in mid-November, 1897, committing
4 Minute Books, Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans, New 
Orleans Public Library, Louisiana Collection, August 24, September 8, November 4, 
November 18, 1896, hereinafter cited as Dock Board Minute Books; Port Handbook o f  
New Orleans, 8; Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern City, Appendices I and II.
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themselves to twice-monthly meetings from September to April and once-a-month 
meetings in the warmer months.5
The commissioners adopted a list o f port regulations in November as well. The 
specificity o f the new rules revealed areas of concern; for example, ships were not 
allowed to heat tar, pitch, or resin while in port because o f the fire danger. The 
regulations sought to impose a measure o f order to berth assignments, assigned 
responsibility for enforcement, and forbade “throwing ballast, rubbish, or anything that 
will sink into the river.” In addition to its administrative role, the Board also became a 
promoter and defender o f the port facilities. In answering a report in the New Orleans 
Times Democrat wherein a captain complained about wharf charges, the commissioners 
ordered the staff to research comparative charges at Baltimore, Mobile, New York and 
Galveston. The New Orleans charges were lower than all others, even under contractor 
rates. When the new public rates went into effect, the New Orleans port would be an 
even better bargain.6
By early 1899, port commissioners showed impatience with their situation. The 
city administration continued to grant privileges along the river front to various 
railroads, though state law seemed to give such authority to the Dock Board. 
Commissioner King requested an opinion from the Board’s attorney to investigate the 
situation, but only future litigation would clarify the respective roles of the city and the
5 Dock Board Minute Books, September 1, 15,23, October 20, November 17,
1897.
6 Dock Board Minute Books, November 17,1897, March 2,1898.
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Board. The Board also directed the attorney to investigate expropriation of the private 
lease. Bernard McCloskey brought unwelcome news to the frustrated members. The 
Board had the authority to expropriate, but such a course was unwise. Protracted 
litigation would last until the lease’s expiration date, and legislation obligated the city of 
New Orleans to pay liquidation costs in the case of a takeover. The attorney’s 
“conversation with city officials” indicated that the municipal government had no funds 
for that purpose. Unwilling to give up its investment and income, the company 
remained in operation until the expiration of its lease, and the Dock Board members 
waited until the wharves would finally pass to their control.7
Commissioner King again raised the question of Board authority in December, 
1900, six months prior to the lease expiration. He provided a list of suggestions to his 
fellow members, asking them to notify the New Orleans City Council and “ask their 
cooperation. . .  [that] no more franchises or privileges be granted by them without 
consultation.” He also suggested gathering data concerning operations from the 
contractor and negotiating a lighting contract along the wharves, adding “we must first 
work in harmony and let our efforts be earnest but economical, our aim always being to 
foster our port and harbor and increase our commerce.”8
In 1899, Board President Hugh McCloskey had promised the “wharfage system 
would be ideal as soon as all the private profit is eliminated.” Neither McCloskey nor 
any other Board member opposed private profit. All members enjoyed private business
7 Dock Board Minute Books, March 1, May 10,1899.
8 Dock Board Minute Books, December 5, 1900.
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interests of their own, but the ethic o f public ownership and operation prevailed- Private 
interests gave way when a clear public purpose arose. More to the point, the 
commercial establishment preferred (or tolerated) public ownership when the project 
served the larger concept of commercial progress. The Dock Board did not, in the eyes 
o f the commissioners, supplant private enterprise. The operation of the wharves under 
public control made an expansion of private enterprise possible. The consensus held 
that progress depended upon an expansion of harbor activities that would be possible 
only under public rule. The state legislature confirmed the Board’s authority by Act 
Number 36 in 1900 and adjusted the rates that could be charged.9
Expectations ran high as the takeover o f the river front drew near. “W harf 
reforms to wait a while,” proclaimed one headline, “until the control. . .  passes into 
Dock Board’s enterprising hands.” In a letter to the editor of the Daily Picayune, 
former Council member Sidney Story praised the position of the newspaper in favor of 
public utilities and counted the Dock Board as “the first victory. . .  [in] the campaign 
for building a greater city.” New Year’s greetings in 1901 from Mayor Capdevielle 
looked forward to wharves under the Dock Board control and vowed “to educate our 
people . . .  that they have the finest city on the continent.” The Mayor may have wished 
the Dock Board well, but this did not prevent him from trying to collect funds he felt 
were due the city for services rendered to the new commission. In May, 1901, the
9 Daily Picayune, September 1, 1899, Section Id, 12; McGuirk, Laws 
Constitutional and Statutory, 3-6; Kendall, History o f  New Orleans, 2: 605-606 .
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Mayor wrote the Dock Board demanding $17,500, the cost of police protection provided 
to the harbor district.10
The lease of the Louisiana Construction and Improvement Company finally 
expired May 29,1901. The commissioners compensated the Louisiana Construction 
Company for the residual value of property left behind. Board appraisers placed the 
amount due at $ 15,317.92, even though the company considered the price 
“confiscatory.” But the Board did not relent and the funds were paid. The Dock Board 
moved quickly to assert its leadership. Members visited the wharves and published a 
schedule of charges that lowered rates on certain sized vessels to encourage use o f the 
wharves. Within a week o f the takeover, McCloskey appeared before the city’s 
Progressive Union. He noted the reduction in rates under public control and detailed a 
comparison for seven ships in port. Under the old rates, the vessels would have paid 
$728.88 in port charges. The new schedule of fees lowered that amount to $242.96.
Such comparisons enabled McCloskey to justify the public involvement. The money 
saved, after all, was returned to private hands.11
Before long, the Board faced the consequences of jurisdictional ambiguities 
along the river front. Years of ad hoc, even contradictory, actions on the part of the city
10 Daily Picayune, November 8, 1900, 5; January 1, 1901, 3; April 1, 1901, 9.
11 Dock Board Minute Books, May 14,28,29, 1901; Kendall, History o f  New 
Orleans, 2: 605; Daily Picayune, June 4, 1901, 3; Martin Behrman, New Orleans: What 
It Is Doing to Facilitate Transportation Both by Rail and River, address delivered by 
Martin Behrman, Mayor of New Orleans, Twelfth Annual Session of the National 
Rivers and Harbors Congress, Washington, D.C., December 8,1915, University o f New 
Orleans, Earl K. Long Library, Louisiana Collection (New Orleans, 1915), 8.
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council left the area a jumble o f franchises and special privileges. Speculation about the
intrusion of railroad franchises on Dock Board land began before the expiration of the
primary lease. By mid-July, 1901, the Board confronted the dilemma by asserting its
full rights to the river front land, vowing to go to court to enforce its jurisdiction over
the Illinois Central tracks. The Board of Trade backed the Dock Board position, which
assured the commercial organization of its intention “to build all wharves . . .  necessary
to the handling of export and import business.” Similarly, in August, 1901, a seemingly
minor conflict over the placement of a fence, on property the ownership of which was a
matter of dispute, escalated into a confrontation between the Dock Board and the
Louisville and Nashville Railroad (L&N). McCloskey and City Attorney Samuel
Gilmore defended the public position, while attorney George Denegre represented the
railroad. A court decision favorable to the Dock Board helped settle the dispute.12
By early September, port operations enjoyed increased success and received
corresponding praise. August statistics showed the largest volume of business for the
port in its history, and Board members approved ambitious plans for construction. By
October the Daily Picayune wrote approvingly of the simultaneous lowering o f  rates
and increased improvements:
When one reflects that a few month have elapsed since the Dock Commission 
came into complete possession of the wharves . . .  the reputation of the port has 
been enhanced and more ships are now coming here.. . .  The Dock Board is
12 Dock Board Minute Books, July 2,9, 24, August 27, September 3, 1901; 
Daily Picayune, February 12, 1901, Section II, 1; July 26, 1901, 4; July 31, 1901, 4; 
August 1,1901, 3,4; August 29,1901, 3; August 30, 1901, 3; August 31,1901, 4; 
September 6,1901, 3.
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entitled to the warm commendation o f  the business community for the intelligent
and public-spirited manner in which the w ork. . .  has been carried on.13
The Board began to take a leadership position among government agencies. In 
October, the Dock Board joined with the commissioners o f the New Orleans Public Belt 
Railroad, recently established by the city council, to oppose Illinois Central claims to 
the waterfront. A month later, the Board convened a meeting with the Orleans Levee 
Board for the same purpose. Board authority increased dramatically when a court 
decided that only the Dock Board had authority over batture lands. The future o f the 
river front lay in the Board’s hands. Port charges declined again in December as the 
Board completed an effective six months in control of the wharves. The governor and 
various local dignitaries, including Mayor Capdevielle and former Mayor Fitzpatrick, 
took a tour of the new facilities at the end of the year, viewing “the great benefits that 
have resulted since the control. . .  passed from the hands of a private corporation.” 
Capdevielle’s tour did not suppress all controversy between the city and the Dock 
Board. In November, the Mayor reminded the port of the $17,500 owed for the cost of 
policing the “harbor precinct” for the previous seven months. Dock Board records 
indicate that “no action was taken” on the city’s request.14
13 Dock Board Minute Books, October 15, November 5,1901; Daily Picayune 
September 4,1901, 3; October 3, 1901, 7; December 4, 1901, 3,4.
14 Dock Board Minute Books, October 15, November 19, December 3, 1901; 
Daily Picayune, October 3, 1901, 7; November 16, 1901,3; December 4, 1901, 3,4; 
December 14,1901, 3; Capdevielle to Port Commission, November 27,1901, Mayor’s 
Correspondence. The New Orleans Public Belt Railroad was organized at the turn of 
the century to provide a public, common carrier railroad for the wharves and docks of 
New Orleans. See Chapter V m  for the history o f the public belt’s development.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
232
Progress continued during 1902 as the port business increased. The U.S. Navy 
brought a dry dock to Algiers to use for the repair and refurbishing of large ships. A 
successftd test was completed early in the year using the battleship Illinois. Within a 
short time, the use of the facility exceeded expectations. The Board continued its 
building program, expanding the capacity o f the port while improving existing facilities. 
Prior to the Board’s administration, most freight passing through the port lay exposed to 
the elements. Only a limited number of wharves had sheds to protect goods; tented 
tarpaulins provided only minimal protection for the remainder. Under the Dock 
Board’s leadership, contractors built sheds and wharves at a rapid rate at Henderson, 
Market, Toledano, Clouet and Orange Streets and provided facilities for an oil refinery 
in Chalmette, located in St. Bernard Parish. New facilities brought additional revenue, 
and funds in excess of operating expenses capitalized additional improvements. Not all 
projects involved contractors. When faced with higher-than-expected bids, the Board 
rejected the private option and directed its staff to perform the work. When rates for 
private dredges exceeded expectations, the Board contracted to purchase and operate its 
own. Nor were the Board’s promotional functions overlooked. Members received the 
pleas of the New Orleans Progressive Union and cooperated in a program to bring 
additional railroads to the city. One Progressive Union publication urged railroad 
investment in the city by detailing progress along the river. “City wharves . . .  are now
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in the hands of the Port commission. . .  [which is] reconstructing the wharves with 
substantial structures and sheds.”15
By the end of the board’s first year of full operation, members looked back on 
significant progress from the conditions extant under the private contractor. The 
governor reappointed Hugh McCloskey upon the expiration of his term, and his 
colleagues immediately reelected him President. Board interest in the progress o f  the 
Public Belt railroad added to an increasingly lengthy agenda, as did the operation o f a 
harbor patrol and the constant stream of requests for wharf space from steamship lines 
and railroads. Tonnage handled by the port had. increased significantly from 1900 
through 1901, from under 3,000,000 tons to over 4,000,000. In spite of the by-laws 
specifications of one meeting per month in late spring and summer, the Board held 
numerous special meetings in 1902 as the demands of business increased: four in May, 
one in June, two in July and three in August. By November, the rapid construction 
schedule required a line of credit and the Board negotiated a loan from the Hibernia 
Bank and Trust Company.16
15 Dock Board Minute Books, January 7, February 4, 15, May 13,16, 22; 
Kendall, History o f  New Orleans, 2: 607; Daily Picayune, January 7, 1902,4, 11; 
February 23, 1902, 3; July 9, 1902, 3; New Railroads for New Orleans: Valuable Facts 
and Reliable Statistics About the Metropolis o f  the South, published by Associated 
Committee of Commercial Bodies of New Orleans for the Increase of Railroad Facilities 
Called Together by the New Orleans Progressive Union, University of New Orleans, 
Earl K. Long Library, Louisiana Collection (New Orleans, 1902), 8.
16 Dock Board Minute Books, May-September, October 21, November 18, and 
December 2,1902; Port Handbook o f  New Orleans, 8,11.
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The next year marked a replay of earlier court fights. Even in the middle o f 
important litigation over river front control, a local railroad company requested 
additional privileges along the wharves. Dock Board members declined “to act upon the 
request until the suit is settled.” Mayor Capdevielle attempted to restrain the council’s 
tendency to award franchises along the river, questioning whether or not the council had 
the right to give property if  the Dock Board had control. Throughout the process, the 
Board counted on the support of the Board o f Trade, a stalwart defender of the notion 
that river front commerce should be administered by public bodies. As the Dock 
Board’s building program slowed because of lack of funds, steamship companies and 
railroads suggested a plan to advance funds to the port for the construction of additional 
steel sheds. Mindful of the public interest in the river activities, Board members briefly 
considered a recreational platform or pier. But safety considerations prevailed, and the 
plans died a quiet death.17
In August, 1903, the Board announced plans to spend $250,000 on new steel 
sheds. Board president McCloskey proudly reviewed the year’s progress, including the 
decline in ton-costs from twelve cents under the old system to less than seven cents. In 
1900, forty-eight percent of port business came across public wharves; the 1903 figure 
was seventy percent. The coffee trade from Central and South America grew from
17 The conflict between commercial and recreational access to the river 
continues. A collision in 1996 between a large freighter and a wharf refitted as a 
shopping center caused concern about the large number o f tourist and hotel facilities 
built close to the river, including the New Orleans Aquarium. Dock Board Minute 
Books, March 6, April 7, April 25, June 9, 1903; Daily Picayune, January 20, 1903,6; 
January 21, 1903, 8; February 3, 1903, 9; March 10, 1903, 3; June 10, 1903, 3.
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200,000 sacks in 1896 to 1,000,000 in 1902. To keep up with demand for facilities, the 
Board accepted an advance from a railroad line and contracted for even more shed 
construction at the Julia and Celeste Street facilities.18
New construction at the river near Girod Street placed more demands on the 
Dock Board budget. By May, 1904, as the regular session of the legislature approached, 
the Board prepared legislation authorizing $2,000,000 in revenue bonds for port 
construction and other improvements. The city’s political and commercial 
establishments immediately united behind the plan. Charles Janvier, member o f the 
city’s Board of Liquidation, issued a statement of support, the Board o f  Trade agreed by 
formal resolution, and the Daily Picayune lent its editorial voice to the effort. A vision 
of the new river front was presented to the public. “Commerce to Have a Grand River 
Front,” read the Daily Picayune headline to an article that described paved roads and 
approaches, sheds with public utilities, and lower shipping rates—all to be completed 
within two to three years. In the midst of the plans came word that the Dock Board had 
won its case against a railroad granted land by the city council, affirming the power of 
the state agency. Mayor Capdevielle agreed not to appeal, marking the acquiescence of 
the city in the Dock Board’s power. The Mayor, who had won his position through the 
political power of the Choctaw Club, defied the wishes of his city council when he 
decided not to appeal the case. But there was no clear Regulars versus reformer
18 Dock Board Minute Books, July 14, August 11, September 1,15; New 
Railroads fo r  New Orleans, 6-7; Daily Picayune, August 12, 1903, 5; September 1,
1903, Section III, 10; September 2, 1903, 8; September 16, 1903, 5; September 29,
1903,4.
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controversy on this issue. Most of the Dock Board, with the exception of President 
Hugh McCloskey, had ties to the Regulars and owed their positions to governors 
similarly connected to the Choctaw Club. The dividing line between the two sides was 
not factional, but rather reflected two different, although largely unarticulated, 
ideologies. Both groups wanted an expansion of city commerce, but those is favor of 
the railroad position saw economic development as a function of private investment, 
especially investment by large railroads. Those who argued in favor of the Dock Board 
position also craved commercial expansion. But the latter group assumed a  major role 
for government investment, operation, and even ownership o f crucial elements of the 
transportation infrastructure.19
After personal lobbying of Governor Blanchard by Board members, the bond 
authorization passed the legislature in Act Number 44 of the 1904 legislature. In mid- 
July consulting engineers placed “the magnificent plan” before the port commission and 
the long-range vision of the port was in place. In the midst o f the 1904 mayoral 
campaign, the changes along the river front received no great notice. Even though the 
campaign divided the city along traditional Regular-reformer lines, Martin Behrman and 
Charles Buck, the contending mayoral candidates, did not make the governance of the
19 Dock Board Minute Books, February 20, May 24,1904; Daily Picayune, 
February 19, 1904, 5; May 26,1904,1; May 28,1904, 5; June 25,1904, 5. The 
differences in the two groups may also reflect what William Link called the “paradox” 
of southern progressivism. In this case, those arguing for private investment represent 
the individualistic, republican South; those arguing on behalf of the Dock Board 
represent the centralizing influences of progressivism. Link, The Paradox o f  Southern 
Progressivism, 1-5.
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wharves an issue. The civic consensus in favor of changes in the port was firm and not 
subject to the vagaries of election. Once again, President McCloskey set out the vision: 
“The Cheapest Port Charges with the Best Facilities.” Routine business continued as 
well. The Illinois Central offered an advance to keep construction on schedule as the 
Board planned for an early 1905 bond sale. The Dock Board firmly supported city 
efforts to serve the wharves with an efficient railroad belt system. December tonnage 
figures set another record as the Board struggled to expand facilities to meet demand. 
And the completed bond sale provided necessary funds for four years of construction.20
In February, 1905, an enormous fire broke out on the Stuyvesant Docks, the 
portion o f the wharves leased to the Illinois Central Railroad. Damage to the cargo, 
freight handling facilities, nearby homes, and an ice plant was estimated to be as high as 
$3,000,000. The railroad immediately announced plans to rebuild, and the Board turned 
its attention to prevention and fire fighting. Within a week, plans emerged for a water 
main that would run along the river and serve the docks with sufficient pressure to fight 
fires. In addition, the Board planned for the purchase of a fire boat. By the end of 
March, the port acquired a tug to be converted into such a boat. Later actions o f the 
Board recommended the use of spark arresters on locomotives and the use of fuel less 
likely to cause a  fire hazard.21
20 McGuirk, Laws Constitutional and Statutory, 6; Dock Board Minute Books, 
July 26, 1904; Daily Picayune, July 13, 1904, 9; September 1, 1904, Section m , 10; 
October 5, 1904,4; December 21,1904, 7; January 4,1905, 4; February 8, 1905, 5; 
March 2, 1905, 5. For a full discussion o f the public belt railroad, see Chapter VIII.
21 Daily Picayune, February 27, 1905, 1; February 28, 1905, 1; March 2, 1905, 5; 
March 10, 1905,4; March 31, 1905, 5.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
238
In May, 1905, the Board looked back on its four years o f  active control of the 
port with, pride. Among other achievements, Superintendent Cope reported on the 
“Dock Board’s fine showing” after the port’s own crews built sections of wharves for 
“less than the lowest [private company] bids and much quicker” than the private 
estimate of construction time. The emphasis on savings realized from the use of public 
labor echoed the attitude of the city’s Sewerage and Water Board, which went to similar 
pains to justify public labor supplanting private contractors. But the substitution of 
public labor for private enterprise was not a permanent change. The Board would use 
the option o f its own labor when private bids were too high. As long as those bids were 
within reason, the Board utilized private contractors. By the end o f May, 1905, the 
Board announced award of a contract for one of the largest projects to date, the 
construction o f the Julia Street Wharf. And to prevent further fire calamities, the Board 
completed arrangements for a water main along the length o f the river front, although 
the Sewerage and Water Board did not complete the project until 1908. The activity did 
not go unnoticed. Daily Picayune columnist “McDonogh” called the Board “the 
Sensational Five . . .  doing the building along the riverfront.” He added that “ they have 
earned the title by neat, clean and consistent work” and “every day represents something 
done for the public welfare.”22
The next few months proved difficult for the port and the city as the yellow fever 
epidemic undermined the city’s commercial reputation. Monthly tonnage figures began
22 Daily Picayune, May 3, 1905,10; May 10, 1905, 4; May 31, 1905, 7; July 11, 
1905,4; July 23, 1905, Section HI, 14; May 9,1906, 5.
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to fall as the fever spread, although the port management announced only “very slight 
decreases from the previous year in spite o f the yellow fever.” Wharf construction 
proceeded even during the months o f the epidemic; $500,000 refurbished or built 
wharves at Toledano, Market, Erato, Eighth, Toulouse, Hospital, and Mandeville 
Streets. As a fire prevention measure, the Board asked riverfront railroads to use fuel 
that would reduce the danger of stray sparks. The tug-tumed-fire boat, re-christened 
“Sampson,” proved its worth by the end of the year, when, after a fire broke out on a 
cotton ship, it extinguished the blaze in three hours.23
The success of the port led to the Board’s involvement in a wider range of civic 
endeavors. In addition to its contributions to the public belt system, the Board provided 
an important mediating influence among river front interests. At the request o f the 
Progressive Union, which wished “to make New Orleans the distribution point for the 
immigration business,” the Board agreed to investigate the building of an immigration 
station. New Orleans was an important port o f entry for immigrants and state policy 
sought to increase the flow of potential rural labor. The Board identified a potential site 
but needed railroad cooperation in rearranging tracks, and the project stalled.24
Board policy also transformed the port administration into an active agent for 
promoting specific market segments in the import/export business. Latin American
23 Daily Picayune, August 9, 1905, 14; September 6, 1905, 4; September 15, 
1905, 5; November 14, 1905, 7.
24 Daily Picayune, December 20, 1905, 4; April 4, 1906, 11. For one view of 
Louisiana’s efforts to increase immigration, see Charles Shanabruch, “The Louisiana 
Immigration Movement, 1891-1907: An Analysis of Efforts, Attitudes, and 
Opportunities,” Louisiana History 18 ( Spring 1977): 203-226.
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exports of fruit to the United States expanded rapidly during the first decade of the 
century, and New Orleans was a natural point o f entry. The Board responded by 
erecting special facilities for the fruit trade. When the contractor experienced 
difficulties in delivering the completed sheds, the Board threatened to take over the 
project rather than risk the loss o f the trade. Business was so good that St. Bernard 
interests proposed an extension of port jurisdiction to the mouth o f Lake Borgne east of 
New Orleans. But the city council and press condemned the move as detrimental to the 
interests of the port, since it would dilute the economic effects of commerce over too 
large an area.25
Throughout 1906, the Board’s construction program continued: acquisition of 
steel doors for sheds, roofing contracts, new shed construction, and paving projects. 
Cooperation with the belt road led to an extension o f  the time limit set for the belt’s 
completion, a project necessary for the most efficient movement o f  goods along the 
river front. But for the first time since the organization of the new commission, 
questions arose over the port’s schedule of fees. The state legislature voted for an 
investigation o f “excessive charges” at the port, and McCloskey was forced to defend 
his policies. Cotton brokers in particular complained that the New Orleans port suffered 
in comparison with Galveston, causing a loss in cotton trade to the Texas competitor.
The controversy accelerated, and the Progressive Union asked Mayor Behrman to 
intervene, claiming that “the net cost for handling [cargo in New Orleans] is
25 Port Handbook o f New Orleans, 11; Daily Picayune, February 21, 1906, 5; 
March 7, 1906, 5; April 4, 1906, 11.
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prohibitory.” Behrman declined, but the Board o f Trade announced an investigation o f 
the port charges.26
The controversy over fees at the port persisted for two years. In response to the 
concerns o f the Cotton Exchange, the Dock Board began an inquiry into labor costs at 
the New Orleans docks and the methods of cotton compression and inspection that 
might put the city at a disadvantage. In February, 1907, the Board agreed with the 
Exchange that inspection policies put the city in a weak competitive situation and urged 
a conference between the Board o f Trade and the Cotton Exchange. When the situation 
had not improved by summer, the Progressive Union intervened and again urged a 
resolution o f the issue. Throughout the controversy, the Dock Board continued its 
program o f improvements. Bids were opened for a paved roadway along the wharves, 
the first phase of which would run from Bienville Street to Barracks Street, roughly the 
east-west boundaries of the French Quarter. A long wharf was planned for the stretch 
of the river from Jackson Avenue to St. Mary Street, a distance of 1,600 feet. And the 
Board held a conference with lumber interests from the Board of Trade to consider 
construction of a wharf designed to promote the export of lumber from the port. 
Governor Blanchard recognized the contributions o f Board President McCloskey by 
appointing him to an additional five-year term in September, 1907.27
26 Daily Picayune, September 1, 1906, Section III, 3; September 29, 1906, 5; 
October 11, 1906,4.
27 Kendall, History o f  New Orleans, 2: 607-608; Daily Picayune, January 4,
1907, 4; January 19, 1907, 12; February 20, 1907, 8; March 6,1907, 4; April 3, 1907, 5; 
June 28, 1907, Section II, 1; July 3,1907, 5; September 26,1907,15. See also Donald 
J. Millet, “The Lumber Industry o f ‘Imperial’ Calcasieu: 1865-1900,” Louisiana
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The latter half o f 1907 proved difficult for the port as total tonnage declined 
from 1906 levels. In 1908 the port would handle 1,000,000 fewer tons than the peak of 
5,000,000 in 1906. Longshoremen struck the river front, and even Mayor Behrman, 
viewed as sympathetic to labor, was unable to coax them back to work. Behrman 
suggested former Mayor Capdevielle as an “umpire” for the strike, but management 
rejected him because he would be standing for reelection as state auditor early in 1908.
In addition, racial tensions among the workers arose over representation on an 
investigating committee. Although black screwmen welcomed the investigation and 
nominated participants, white workers refused to accept African-American 
representation. In addition to labor troubles, the port continued to receive criticism and 
unfavorable comparisons with other ports. In November, after numerous attempts at 
mediation, the strike ended. At the same time, Governor Blanchard’s message to a 
special session of the legislation called for an investigation of the New Orleans port, 
emphasizing its status as a state, not a city, agency. The Progressive Union sided with 
the governor’s call for investigation. In the group’s annual report for 1907, initiation of 
the investigation is claimed as a signal accomplishment.28
History 7 (Winter 1966): 51-69 and Anna C. Bums, “The Gulf Lumber Company, 
Fullerton: A View of Lumbering During Louisiana’s Golden Era,” Louisiana History 20 
(Spring 1979): 197-207.
28 Port Handbook o f  New Orleans, 11; Behrman to William M. Smith, President, 
New Orleans Cotton Exchange, November 2, 1907, Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily 
Picayune, September 29, 1907,1; October 8, 1907, 13; October 9,1907, 13; October 22, 
1907, 1; October 31,1907, 12; November 1, 1907, 10; November 5, 1907, 8; January 8, 
1908,2; Colored Screwmen Benevolent Association Number 1 of Louisiana to 
Behrman, October 31,1907, Behrman papers.
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For the first part of 1908, the Dock Board faced the recently-appointed 
legislative investigating committee, whose work took five months to complete.
Members of the investigative committee visited Savannah, Pensacola, and Mobile to 
examine operations and gather suggestions for improving the New Orleans port. Upon 
convening back in New Orleans, the committee received information from the Dock 
Board, and attention quickly returned to the question of cotton handling. Inconsistent 
inspection and a myriad of compression standards harmed the cotton trade, and the 
President of the Cotton Exchange, William B. Thompson, called for “a central 
warehouse to cut out unnecessary labor and handling [and equipped] with a compression 
machine.” The Cotton Exchange and the Board of Trade entered into a rare public 
disagreement, each appealing to the investigating committee. Dock Board President 
McCloskey claimed that the “diversion of cotton” to Galveston could be traced to 
“transportation discrimination” not to the shortcomings of the port. He blamed both the 
railroads and the shipping lines, since preferential agreements between railroads and 
shippers discriminated against “tramp steamers.”29
The idea of an injurious combination of railroad and shipper resonated with a 
public suspicious of monopoly and alert to anti-trust actions. Federal power had been 
brought to bear against nefarious combinations; should not local and state power be 
exercised as well? The Daily Picayune editorialized against the “combinations” that 
restricted the cotton “free market.” Resentments aimed against the railroads increased
29Daily Picayune, February 8,1908, 1; February 19,1908, 11; February 20,
1908, 11; May 1, 1908,4; May 3, 1908, 4.
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when President J. T. Harahan and local General Agent Hunter C. Leake of the Illinois 
Central publicly suggested shipping cotton through Birmingham to Savannah. Leake 
later claimed that the simultaneous statements were “co-incidence” and that the railroad 
was not engaged in threatening the New Orleans port. Local observers remained 
unconvinced.30
The completion of the investigating committee’s work brought good news to the 
city and the port administration. The final report emphasized the quality of the port’s 
facilities and the “natural advantage” of its location, but pointed out that additional 
construction—especially for much-needed lumber facilities— required more funds. 
“Facilities and natural advantage equal trade” was the recommended formula, and the 
committee advised the upcoming session of the legislature to approve another bond 
issue first proposed by the Board in April “to complete the great wharf system.” The 
committee criticized the Leyland and Harrison shipping lines for “combining” with the 
railroads to “secure practically a monopoly” and shut out tramp steamers, thus reducing 
competition. Mindful of the controversy over the cotton trade, the report endorsed 
efforts to regulate cotton handling and compression. Finally, the committee confidently 
predicted labor peace “for five years” due to its benevolent intervention. (In spite of the 
investigating committee’s prediction, labor peace did not come to the docks. Strikes 
broke out in July, 1908, and the governor appointed an arbitration commission, assuring 
the community that “the arbitrators [would] be all white men.”). Additional good news
30 Daily Picayune, March 27, 1908, 5, 6; March 28, 1908, 5.
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came from a city council resolution. First introduced in the beginning of 1908, the 
resolution, backed by the Mayor, sought to dedicate the naturally scarce land along the 
river front for “public use . . .  forever.” The city council resisted, but the weight of 
public opinion—including support from the Board o f  Trade—moved the ordinance in the 
spring of that year.31
The proposed bond issue received widespread support after the recommendation 
of the investigating committee. The commercial exchanges and civic groups joined in 
urging the legislation, including the Cotton, Sugar and Rice, Livestock, Stock, and 
Contractors and Dealers Exchanges, as well as the Board o f Trade. The state legislature 
agreed, and Act 180 of 1908, approved on July 3, provided $3,500,000 for new 
construction. The act pledged Dock Board revenues from operations to pay the bonds. 
Obviously confident in the profitability of the docks, the legislature also required the 
Board to stand behind a bond issue granted to the Public Belt Railroad.32
The bond issue allowed the Board to continue its construction work at a crucial 
time, but final approval awaited a statewide vote in November. In April, the Board had 
agreed to expand the wharves by 4,000 feet in the area above Napoleon Avenue. During 
summer, shipping lines requested expanded facilities as overseas trade boomed. The
31 Henry Schreiber, President, Board of Trade to Behrman, February 3, 1908, 
Behrman Papers; Daily Picayune, February 19, 1908, 4; March 26, 1908, 6; April 29, 
1908,4; May 29, 1908, 12; June 9, 1908, 6; July 7,1908, 1. The arbitration 
commission successfully ended the strike. In February, 1908 the Wholesale Grocers 
Association; felt the land dedication issue important enough to issue a statement of 
support to the city council. Daily Picayune, February 14, 1908.
32 McGuirk, Laws Constitutional and Statutory, 10-12; Daily Picayune, June 17, 
1908, 12; Kendall, History o f  New Orleans, 2: 608.
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United Fruit Company petitioned the Board for additional wharf space to add to its 
2,100 feet. Company representative C. H. Ellis announced that United Fruit had ordered 
three new ships for the Latin American trade and planned to order three more, the 
largest o f which would be 400 feet long. The company anticipated an increase in the 
banana trade from 4,000,000 bunches per year to 8,000,000. In August, the Board 
hosted a visit from Governor Sanders and thanked him for supporting the bond issue. 
The Governor returned the compliment, calling the Dock Board “a model o f finest 
public service.” By November, additional requests for expansion came from coffee 
shippers. “Coffee the new king and the Dock Board will crown him” announced the 
Daily Picayune. The shippers estimated a volume of 2,000,000 bags, and the Board 
agreed to build a 1,500 foot shed and install automated handling equipment as soon as 
possible.33
As 1909 began and the bond issue went to market, the Board juggled space 
requests from competing interests, asserted its authority vis-a-vis the city council once 
again, and confronted safety issues. Steamboats constituted a declining percentage of 
port business and a  nuisance to other users of the docks. Bowing to the steamship lines, 
the Board rearranged wharf space, moved the steamboats, and assigned new facilities to
33 McGuirk, Laws Constitutional and Statutory, 12; Daily Picayune, April 10, 
1908,4; July 15, 1908,10; August 10,1908, 5; October 24, 1908, 5; November 18,
1908,4. The New Orleans port remained an important part of the banana trade until 
Gulfport, Mississippi, constructed special facilities and diverted a large portion o f the 
business. By 1920, the coffee trade at New Orleans exceeded 380,000,000 pounds, 
approximately thirty per cent of all imports of coffee into the United States. Cass, Facts 
o f  Interest about the Port o f  New Orleans, 19.
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them from Canal Street to Lafayette. But the Board resisted a new council initiative to 
grant land at Canal Street and the river to the Texas Pacific Railroad. The city council 
passed an ordinance at the request of the railroad, which wanted to use the Louisville 
and Nashville passenger depot on the downriver side of Canal Street. Secure in its legal 
status after a decade of court decisions, the Board refused. Alert to the continuing threat 
of fires along the docks, the Board recommended to the railroads that spark arresters be 
installed on all locomotives and required wharf operators to acquire fire-fighting 
equipment that would connect to the new water mains.34
Matters of commerce and the business climate united the commercial and 
political establishment beyond the routine matters of port administration. In March, 
1909, Mayor Behrman, John Parker and James W. Porch traveled to the northeastern 
United States to promote the port’s facilities. Although the Mayor and Porch had 
worked together on the public belt railroad, Parker—prominent member o f the Cotton 
Exchange—was a constant enemy of the Regulars. (Parker once called professional 
politicians “socially useless.”) Nevertheless, any political antagonism remained in the 
background during the promotional trip. At a banquet in Philadelphia, the Mayor spoke 
in praise of the river front facilities and emphasized the public nature of the operations. 
He assured the audience that all steamship and railroad lines enjoyed “parity” at the 
docks and recommended to his hosts “the evolution of a public policy which has had in 
view the preservation of a large part of our water front and its dedication under public
34 Daily Picayune, January 20, 1909,4; February 2, 1909, 12; February 18, 1909, 
5; March 12, 1909, 4.
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control to the needs of our commerce.” In May, 1909, Philadelphia officials visited
New Orleans, and regular steamship service began between the two ports. President F.
S. Groves of the Philadelphia and Gulf Steamship Line inspected the New Orleans
harbor facilities and supported the notion o f public ownership by commenting:
This is the most wonderful harbor I have ever seen; the best system in the county 
is in operation here.. .  the docks are splendidly constructed and much better than 
the slip system. The public ownership of the docks, I think, solves the problem. 
In Philadelphia, ninety percent o f the river front is owned by the railroads and 
this tends to cripple any port.35
Behrman had occasion to repeat his arguments in favor of public port facilities in 
May when the battleship Mississippi paid a  call on the port of New Orleans. Port 
officials felt that the U.S. Navy discriminated against the city and that competing ports 
spread false information about the navigability of the river. The federal government had 
only recently financed the opening of the Southwest Pass from the Mississippi River to 
the Gulf of Mexico, and city officials used the battleship’s visit to publicize the port’s 
facilities. At a grand banquet for the officers of the Mississippi, Mayor Behrman 
mentioned the city’s campaign to sell “the rest of the country” on the river’s ease of 
navigation. Congressman Ransdell of Louisiana called the visit “a splendid argument 
for deep waterways” and added that “New Orleans is especially fortunate in having
35 Behrman to James W. Porch, June 2,1907, Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily 
Picayune, March 11, 1909, 1; March 12, 1909, 5; May 8, 1909, 7; June 13, 1909, 4. 
According to Schott, “John M. Parker and the Varieties o f American Progressivism,” 
151-153, Parker helped organize the Southern Commercial Congress and was a 
prominent participant in the Rivers and Harbors Congress. The lobbying groups 
emphasized improvements to waterways, especially the Mississippi River. For the 
comment regarding professional politicians, see Schott, 117.
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retained control o f its riverfront instead o f transferring [it] to railroads.” When the
Mississippi subsequently traveled upriver as far as Natchez and then returned down the
river in record time, the city viewed the exercise as further proof that the river and port
were established in the first ranks of American waterways and harbors.36
Throughout the decade, the Dock Board took an expansive view o f its authority,
and its role in the promotion of commerce continued to grow. A joint committee o f the
Cotton Exchange and the National Farmers’ Union had studied the issue of cotton
warehousing, and Chairman W. B. Thompson approached the Dock Board with a
request for a radical departure from private enterprise. The business slump o f 1906 to
1908 was over, and the port hoped to capture a larger share of the cotton market. In
July, 1909, the President of the Cotton Exchange (and Public Belt commission member)
called for the construction and operation of a public warehouse for the storage and
handling of cotton for export. This was not the first occasion on which a central
warehouse had been recommended, but Thompson emphasized the difference between
the old and the new plans. The new plan involved a public facility, owned and operated
by the people o f the state.. . .  It is a public enterprise which mus t . . .  be 
successfully inaugurated and operated only by the power of the people. 
Individuals or private corporations cannot accomplish the object o f the design.
[It would be] foolhardy to give to such individuals or private corporations so 
large a grant of arbitrary power.”
36 Monthly Report of Secretary/Manager, Minutes, Reports, and Related 
Miscellany of the Progressive Union Board and Its Various Committees and 
Subcommittees, University of New Orleans, Earl K. Long Library, Special Collections 
(hereinafter cited as Progressive Union Minutes), May, 1909: Daily Picayune, May 10, 
1909,4; May 11, 1909, 6, 12; May 13, 1909,1; May 26, 1909,1.
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Thompson enumerated three dangers inherent in private ownership-high charges, 
monopolistic tendencies, and potential domination by the railroads—and argued that a 
public operation placed “under the Dock Board would avoid” all three. A Daily 
Picayune editorial quickly echoed Thompson’s arguments for expanded Dock Board 
power:
While under ordinary circumstances, the facilities for the handling o f cotton 
would and should be provided by private enterprise, the powerful combination 
composed of American railroads and foreign shippers and foreign buyers renders 
it imperatively necessary that our cotton growers, our manufacturers . . .  should 
make some counter movement to obtain some hold on the traffic o f one of our 
great staples. We must therefore adopt some such methods in handling and 
storing of cotton as are used and operated against us.37
The warehouse project faced a significant challenge from the private sector. A 
member of John M. Parker’s brokerage firm announced in early 1910 that investors 
planned a private warehouse to service the cotton trade. John Airy enumerated several 
reasons for a private facility, including liability, superior administration, and better 
cooperation from railroads. W. B. Thompson, Cotton Exchange President, took the lead 
in refuting Airy’s contentions. The Exchange declined to endorse a particular plan, but 
agreed that the facility—whether public or private—should stay within the city. Mayor 
Behrman opposed the private project, recalling later that “whenever government wants 
to do something some private interest always says it is unjustly injured.” The Dock 
Board vowed to fight the scheme, especially because its proposed location would 
remove business from the city. A steamship line joined opponents of the “outside site,”
37 Port Handbook o f  New Orleans, 11; Daily Picayune, July 11, 1909, 8.
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and Mayor Behrman began a search for a city location. The Daily Picayune 
editorialized on behalf of a public warehouse, citing fear of domination of trade by one 
railroad, the effectiveness of the Dock Board, and the access to the Public Belt Railroad 
that a city location would provide.38
The warehouse project took several years to implement. The Board received 
legislative authorization in 1910. Later that year, a constitutional amendment added to 
the Board’s authority. But litigation delayed the project, and the ability of the Board to 
construct the facility remained uncertain until 1913, when a new constitution for the 
state clarified the issue. Construction began the next year after a  review of the plans by 
the city’s Cotton Exchange and the first stage o f the warehouse was completed with an 
annual capacity o f two million bales. In later years, a public grain elevator took its 
place among the expanded facilities along the river front.39
Mayor Behrman praised the operation o f the river front and considered its 
improvement an important achievement for the city. Even though the Dock Board was 
a state agency, city support was essential in obtaining legislative support. In return, 
Dock Board patronage flowed to the Regular organization. In its operation, the Board
38 Hugh McCloskey to Behrman, January 3,1910, Behrman Papers; Daily 
Picayune, January 1,1910,6, 12; January 5, 1910, 6; January 13, 1910, 5; January 21, 
1910, 7; February 10,1910, 8; February 18, 1910, 5, 8; Reynolds, Machine Politics in 
New Orleans, 152-153.
39 The WPA Guide to New Orleans, the Federal Writers’ Project of the Works 
Progress Administration for the City of New Orleans (Pantheon Books, New York: 
1983), 276-277; Kendall, The History o f New Orleans, 2: 609-611; McGuirk, Laws 
Constitutional and Statutory, 13-14; Port Handbook o f  New Orleans, 25; Port and  
Terminal Facilities, 25-26; Facts o f  Interest about the Port o f  New Orleans, 18; 
Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 152.
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thus represented an interesting combination of progressive ideals—expertise and 
governance insulated from direct democracy—and the political functionality o f the 
Regulars—patronage and direct service to clients. The two supposed opposites came 
together in the public ownership and operations o f the docks. Mayor Behrman’s 
pragmatism led him to support the Dock Board and public projects such as the cotton 
warehouse, easily rejecting arguments to the contrary. Perhaps his lack of intellectual 
rigor, as opposed to native intelligence, made the Mayor the ideal leader for such 
ostensibly contradictory arrangements. Behrman claimed that public attitudes were 
pragmatic as well. “Things change. The people’s ideas change from time to tim e.. . .  
Once upon a time you could easily condemn anything by saying it was ‘Socialistic.’ 
When it was decided in 1910 to build the public cotton warehouse, The Times-Democrat 
said it was ‘Socialistic.’ Nobody paid the least attention to that.” In an address to the 
National Rivers and Harbors Congress in 1915, the Mayor claimed “in the policy and 
practice of public ownership, control and operation of its water-front facilities, New 
Orleans is far in advance of any other American port.” In that year, the jurisdiction of 
the Dock Board extended over forty-one miles of river front and five miles o f wharves.
In 1914, Behrman reported, the public facilities of the port served 1,529 vessels. The 
port ranked second in the United States in volume of cargo—over 6,000,000 tons—and 
had attracted $20,000,000 in federal funds helped to dredge the Mississippi River 
channels.40
40 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 83; Behrman, New Orleans: What It 
Is Doing to Facilitate Transportation, 5-7; Port Handbook o f New Orleans, 11.
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The construction and development program along the river front demonstrated a 
consistent purpose and an adherence to the principles under which the Board operated. 
Once the city and state turned away from private enterprise as a solution to the public 
organization of the docks, the Board steadfastly pursued the socialization of costs and 
benefits. Starting with the original legislation, the Board supplanted the private 
contractor and began infrastructure improvements, but its role grew almost immediately. 
Within a decade, the Board built wharves and sheds, assisted in the development o f the 
belt railroad, promoted the export and import trade through the construction of 
specialized facilities, and, eventually, built large warehouse and grain elevator sites.
This public orientation did not flow from a well-constructed ideology or political 
agenda. Much as public opinion supported the socialization of the sewerage, water and 
drainage systems, the public supported the operations o f the Dock Board—first, as a 
logical response to the threat of monopoly power, and, second, as a method of 
promoting private industry and commerce. To the tum-of-the-century businessman, 
progressive meant progress—the expansion of business and the well-being of citizens.
To the professional politician of the era, progressive civic development also meant the 
well-being of citizens, with the by product of satisfied voters and a smoothly 
functioning political organization.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER VIII
THE PUBLIC BELT RAILROAD COMMISSION:
PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT
In New Orleans, geography was destiny to a greater extent than most cities. If 
the city’s location was improbable from a drainage and sanitation point o f view, the 
consequences to transportation and economic development were not much better. The 
enormous advantage New Orleans enjoyed as a major port city on the continent’s 
greatest river could not be denied. As cotton production moved south and west in the 
nineteenth century, the city’s wharves attracted higher volumes o f trade and the 
financial services that supported the cotton trade. But as the Mississippi River 
approaches New Orleans from the northwest it begins an enormous counter-clockwise 
loop, forming the crescent that gives the city its nickname. After completing the 
crescent, the river turns abruptly southward, forming Algiers point on the west bank 
across from the French Quarter, and then continues on its way to the difficult river 
passes that empty into the Gulf of Mexico. The river’s twists and turns somewhat 
devalued the locational advantage. Commerce along the river was always difficult as 
ships fought varying water levels, swift currents, and congested access.
The development of land transportation, particularly railroads, came slowly to 
New Orleans because of its geographical constraints. The river formed a highway for
254
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trade but a nearly insurmountable barrier as well. Any access to the river—whether from 
east or west—confronted other bodies of water that tested the limits of engineering as 
well as financing. To the north and east lay Lake Pontchartrain and Lake Borgne, 
actually shallow bays of the Gulf of Mexico. In every direction, wetlands, swamps, and 
estuaries surrounded the city, justifying its colonial designation as the “Isle” of New 
Orleans. The Illinois Central Railroad approached from the north, connecting New 
Orleans to the lower Mississippi valley and to Chicago. From the northwest and west 
came the Texas Pacific and Southern Pacific, and from the Northeast came the 
Louisville and Nashville, the Northeastern, and the Southern.1
The wharf activity along the river front developed adjacent to the New Orleans 
Vieux Carre (French Quarter) and gradually expanded up and down the river from 
central New Orleans. The legislature eliminated the ad hoc system o f contract 
administration of the wharves by establishing the Board of Commissioners for the Port 
of New Orleans, and the new Dock Board reconstructed the river front wharves. But the 
problem of access to those wharves remained. The Franchise Committee and the Streets 
and Landings Committee of the City Council heard frequent requests from railroads 
seeking wrharf access, but granted privileges on a case-by-case basis that brought tracks 
from important trunk lines, such as the Illinois Central, up to the riverfront. These 
company-owned spurs provided connections to various points along the river or to a
1 Peirce Lewis, New Orleans: The Making o f  an Urban Landscape, 10-16. Some 
background material on New Orleans railroads can be found in Donald J. Millet, 
“Southwest Louisiana Enters the Railroad Age: 1880-1900,” Louisiana History 24 
(Spring 1983): 165-83.
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stretch of the river front wharves; however, they did not solve the problem. Railroads 
first provided switching to their own cars and serviced wharves where steamship lines 
with whom they had favorable agreements would berth. Rival carriers would receive 
service—for a price—only after the line’s own cars had been moved. Under these 
conditions, cargo interchange for goods leaving and coming into New Orleans was 
haphazard at best. Even on those occasions when interchange worked, railroads charged 
excessive fees.2
As early as 1879, during the improvements that dredged the river passes below 
New Orleans, businessmen began to promote the idea of a publicly-owned belt railroad 
that would encircle the developed areas of the east bank o f the city and provide low-cost 
interchange o f goods among carriers. In 1889, the Municipal Affairs Association 
suggested that the belt line become a priority for the city. Private railroads gave lip 
service to the idea of a public belt, but often opposed its development. In 1894, the 
Illinois Central convinced the city council to grant rights to the company for the 
construction o f a belt railroad under its control. Construction plans called for one 
section of the belt to run down State Street, a fashionable neighborhood adjacent to the 
city’s Audubon Park. Residents objected and the council repealed the ordinance. At a 
later date, the Illinois Central successfully obtained access to its Stuyvesant Docks by 
agreeing to the construction at railroad expense of four miles of double track along the
2 Behrman, New Orleans: What It Is Doing to Facilitate Transportation, 3; 
Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 151.
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river levee in uptown New Orleans. The track would became part of a larger public belt 
system.3
Official city action on the belt began early in 1900. In his annual address to the 
Municipal Improvement Association, William B. Bloomfield, its president, proposed the 
protection o f the land side of the river levee for public use and the construction o f a 
public belt.4 Within two weeks, encouraged by a favorable civil court decision 
regarding the city’s rights along the river front, New Orleans Councilman Lafaye 
echoed Bloomfield’s comments and offered an ordinance to create the public railroad, 
citing the necessity for “free and untrammeled use of the levee front” and the prospect 
of its misuse “if  it passes into the hands of any railroad corporation even under the most 
stringent restrictions.” The ordinance contained the essential features of the system that 
would eventually be built: public ownership and operation, freedom from corporation 
subordination, modest switching charges, and the construction o f a double track along 
the length of the river front. The draft ordinance also provided for a commission to 
govern the belt railroad, composed of the mayor, various city commissioners, and the 
chairs of essential council committees such as finance and budget. A Daily Picayune 
editorial praised the ordinance and asserted the great need for the belt line, the “greatest 
importance . . .  next to the reduction of wharfage and other port charges.” The new 
commission not only fit the progressive ideal of a independent government entity with
3 John Wilds, James W. Porch and the Port o f  New Orleans, 40-41; Kendall, 
History o f  New Orleans, 2: 509-510.
4Daily Picayune, January 10,1900, 4.
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access to expert advice, it also fit within the emerging New Orleans consensus in favor 
of progressive civic development.5
The new city council under Mayor Capdevielle took up the ordinance, and the 
streets and landing committee approved it on July 30, 1900. Shortly thereafter, the full 
council added its support and adopted Ordinance Number 147 on August 7,1900, 
naming a commission and appropriating $40,000 over four years for construction o f the 
tracks. The council emphasized the business purpose o f the belt and the public nature of 
the levee which “belongs to the people fo r . . .  commerce,” and upon which the “export 
and import commerce of New Orleans” depended. The ordinance also required a swift 
start to construction, and the Mayor signed it on August 11, 1900.6
Under the terms of the ordinance, the governing commission consisted of 
various public officials. In early September, the council selected three of its members to 
serve along with the Mayor, Comptroller, Commissioner of Police and Public Buildings, 
and the City Engineer. During Thanksgiving greetings to the city some months later, 
City Engineer W. J. Hardee gave thanks “for the municipal problems solved during the 
year” and cited the New Orleans Public Belt Railroad as a signal achievement. At its 
annual meeting on January 9, 1901, the Municipal Improvement Association officers 
reminded the membership that the group had advocated “for the last three years . . .  the
5 Wilds, James W. Porch and the Port o f New Orleans, 8; Daily Picayune, 
January 16,1900,4; January 24, 1900,4, 8. For a brief biographical sketch of William 
Bloomfield, see Kendall, History o f  New Orleans, 2: 879.
6 Ordinance o f  the City o f  New Orleans Providing fo r  a Belt Railroadfor the 
City o f  New Orleans and a Public Belt Railroad System, New Orleans Public Library, 
Louisiana Division (New Orleans, 1900).
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building of the public belt. The present city administration deserves credit for 
recognizing and appreciating the great benefits to commerce of a belt railroad.”7
Hardee’s enthusiasm notwithstanding, the initial years of the New Orleans 
Public Belt showed little progress. Many problems faced the new commission, 
including the composition of the governing body. The ordinance specified the 
membership of the commission, but restricting the group to members o f the 
administration and the city council diminished the authority of the commission to speak 
to and for the commercial interests in the city. More to the point, the council members 
o f the commission suffered from an inherent conflict in upholding the duties of their two 
positions. The council heard requests from a variety of interests seeking privileges and 
franchises, particularly railroads. There was a business and community inclination to 
support the railway business. Some o f the same organizations in favor of the belt 
railroad were also advertising the benefits of New Orleans to railroad companies in the 
hopes of increasing service to the city. It was difficult for the council to simultaneously 
give a fair hearing to railroad petitions while at the same time upholding the interests of 
the New Orleans Public Belt Railroad. Additionally, the council’s appropriation to the 
commission to begin work on the belt was insufficient to the task at hand.8
These problems paled, however, before the central dilemma: private railroads 
that enjoyed preferential access to the wharves resisted the construction and operation of
7 Wilds, James W. Porch and the Port o f New Orleans, 43; Daily Picayune, 
August 8, 1900, 4; September 6, 1900,4; November 29,1900, Section II, 1; January 9, 
1901,1.
8 New Railroads fo r  New Orleans, 9-12.
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the belt at every turn. Access resulted from agreements with the city council, an arena 
in which the railroads operated with confidence and considerable success. From the 
first, the belt railroad found it necessary to fight for a clearly defined concept of public 
interest over private interests. In this conflict, the belt administration drew upon the 
lessons that the Dock Board and the Sewerage and Water Board had learned and 
articulated a consistent policy that resisted compromising the public belt ideal. Support 
for the belt came from a variety of sources: machine politicians committed to public 
ownership, other governmental agencies, such as the Dock Board, commercial interests 
eager for lower shipping charges, and associations dedicated to efficiency in 
government.9
The first years of the New Orleans Public Belt Railroad Commission, as the 
governing body was formally known, saw only halting progress toward the construction 
o f the line. The council made an attempt to reform the process of granting privileges to 
railroads along the river front by making such grants revocable, but deferred the 
ordinance without further action. The council ordered City Engineer Hardee to prepare 
a map of the belt route and to survey the available land. His report in June, 1901, 
concluded that with “some current encroachments” excepted, there was sufficient room 
for a two-way track. Councilman Cucullu asserted that “the Belt Railroad project was 
o f the greatest importance to the city ... [and] required prompt action.”10 But the
9 Private associations included the Progressive Union and the Municipal 
Improvement Association. The wide range o f support given to the Public Belt Railroad 
provides one look at the various sources of southern commercial progressivism.
10 Daily Picayune, June 12,1901, 1.
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council soon learned that the available land identified by Hardee was the subject of a 
myriad of competing claims.
Of all the railroads serving the city, the Illinois Central was the most powerful.
In late June, IC officials asked the council for a grant o f six blocks along the river front. 
At the hearing by the council’s Streets and Landings Committee, the proposal drew 
opposition, particularly by the New Orleans Board of Trade, an association of merchants 
and shippers. The railroad resisted attempts to amend the ordinance and withdrew the 
request. Several weeks later, the city received “a curt letter” from Stuyvesant Fish of 
the Illinois Central accusing the city o f being ungrateful for the benefits brought by the 
railroad. Mayor Capdevielle responded and defended city policy. By the end of the 
month, the controversy attracted the attention of the dock board, which asserted its own 
rights to the land in question.11 The Illinois Central returned to the council one month 
later with a new proposal which, in spite of the Board of Trade’s and the Dock Board’s 
opposition, the council approved. The Daily Picayune editorialized in vain against 
giving “the city to the railroads,” although two other city dailies accused the Board of 
Trade and the Municipal Improvement Association o f standing in the way of progress.12
The controversy neatly captured the countervailing forces at work. The Dock 
Board, newly active along the river front, sought to preserve its rights, supported by the
11 Daily Picayune, June 25, 1901, 3,4; June 26, 1901,4; July 1, 1901, 4; July 17, 
1901; July 26, 1901,11.
12 Daily Picayune, July 31, 1901, 3; August 1,1901, 3; August 3, 1901,4, 7; 
August 4, 1901, 4; August 5, 1901, 4; August 6, 1901, 4; August 7, 1901, 3,4; Wilds, 
John W. Porch and the Port o f  New Orleans, 46-47.
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prominent Board of Trade. The railroad sought increased access to the wharves, 
asserting its commercial contributions for which the city should be grateful. And the 
city council found it difficult to choose among competing interests, often succumbing to 
the political power of the large trunk lines. When the IC ordinance reached Mayor 
Capdevielle, he concurred with the council’s judgement, citing the provision in the new 
ordinance requiring the railroad to provide land to the Public Belt Commission when 
belt construction began. In spite of ardent pro-business feelings, the Daily Picayune 
consistently backed the concept of a public river front. A disappointed editorial 
acknowledged the Mayor’s honesty but disagreed with his conclusion.13
The Louisville and Nashville Railroad (L&N) next tested the public resolve by 
erecting a fence on disputed property near the river front at Canal Street, the central 
business district’s main street. George Denegre, corporate lawyer and a brother of the 
Citizens’ League Senate candidate in 1896, represented the railroad. As the dispute 
reached the level of threats of force from both sides, the Board of Trade weighed in 
again, reminding the parties that the Public Belt Railroad had an interest in the land as 
well. Ironically, the principals in the controversy—including William Bloomfield—had 
been colleagues in the Citizens’ League efforts and had shared membership in the 
Municipal Improvement Association. But the former political associations did not 
lessen the economic conflict. The railroad relented when confronted with its lease 
payments of prior years, which undermined its claims to ownership. The fight ended
13 Daily Picayune, August 8, 1901, 4; August 10, 1901, 3, 4.
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with the belt railroad’s interests protected. The Board of Trade used the occasion to 
“agitate for public railroad construction as soon as possible.”14
By fall, 1901, more than a year had elapsed since the passage of the enabling 
ordinance, but no belt construction had begun. Mayor Capdevielle called a meeting of 
the Public Belt Commission to consider the lack of progress. As the group examined 
the issues, the primacy o f the Dock Board along the river front emerged. Specifically, 
the potential route of the railroad inevitably passed over ground in the hands of the 
Dock Board. The Mayor appointed a subcommittee “to wait upon [the Dock Board] and 
ask that such space be dedicated for the uses of a belt road.” At the September 28 
Public Belt Commission meeting, City Engineer Hardee shared with the membership his 
assessment that although an agreement between the city and the Southern Pacific 
Railroad was likely, a compromise with the Texas and Pacific line would be difficult. 
Attempts to cross the right of way of the T & P would likely end in litigation. At the 
same meeting the commission clarified its leadership by choosing, over his objections, 
Mayor Capdevielle as president. The meeting with the Dock Board went well as the 
Public Belt Commission elicited a promise of cooperation and the assurance that the 
port governors would take up the needs of the belt road as soon as possible. And in
14 Daily Picayune, August 29, 1901, 3 ,4 ; August 30, 1901, 3, 4; August 31, 
1901, 3; September 4, 1901, 3. The paper referred to the contest between the Dock 
Board and “Ellen N.,” a play on L&N. Mayor Capdevielle did not participate in this 
dispute. The Mayor sought to escape the city’s oppressive summer heat at various 
vacation sites. On this occasion, the he visited Montreal “for reasons of health.” Daily 
Picayune, August 10, 1901, 3.
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spite of widespread skepticism, the Illinois Central lived up to its agreement with the 
city by starting construction of a portion of the belt tracks.15
The attention given by the Public Belt Railroad Commission to the Dock Board 
grew in importance as the result o f  a state supreme court decision upholding the 
authority of the Dock Board over river front lands. But clarification o f authority did not 
lead to swift construction of the belt. In late July, 1902 the New Orleans Cold Storage 
Plant complained that the Illinois Central refused to provide switching services to the 
railroad cars of opposition lines. This prevented the plant from efficiently receiving and 
shipping goods. The city pressured the Illinois Central to change its policy, pointing to 
the terms under which the city allowed the railroad to use public streets. But the 
incident reinforced the view that, in the absence of a fully-developed common carrier 
doctrine, only a public agency could move goods fairly. The state legislature added its 
weight to the commission’s authority enacting a law recognizing the New Orleans 
Public Belt Railroad operation. In response to an L&N request to extend its tracks 
closer to the river, editorial comment asserted that the belt “should be regarded as a 
sacred undertaking, and for any man to lay hands lawlessly [on lands needed by the belt]
. . .  should be regarded as an infamous crime.” Yet even then the Public Belt 
Commission failed to act decisively and begin construction.16
15 Dock Board Minutes, October 1,1901; Daily Picayune, September 29, 1901, 
4; September 28, 1901, 12; October 3,1901, 7.
16 Daily Picayune, March 4, 1902,4; March 5, 1902, 4; July 31, 1902, 3; August, 
24, 1902, 3; August 2, 1902, 3; August 3,1902,4.
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At the end o f 1902, Capdevielle called a meeting o f the Commission “to suggest 
some sort o f work be started,” but it was not held until the new year. Assembled in the 
Mayor’s parlor, the group heard Capdevielle urge activity because “new railroads were 
entering . . .  the city and there should be some way of letting them in and giving them 
entry to the river front.” After some discussion regarding the status of land dedication 
along the river, the Mayor agreed to send an ordinance to the council addressing once 
again the subject o f jurisdiction over the choice lands. The impetus for the Mayor’s 
actions lay in the increasing interest on the part of a growing number of railroads in the 
city and its river trade. Sorting through the requests burdened the council and the 
administration; perhaps the belt construction would relieve the problem. Within two 
days, the Daily Picayune took the Commission to task for its delay. “The remarkable 
neglect with which the Public Belt Road has been treated. . .  is astonishing. Years have 
passed away.. . .  This is a poor showing, a poor commentary on the outcome of the 
gallant fight made by the people of this city to secure their own public belt.17
The confidence of the editorial writers in their assessment of public opinion 
never wavered; the city council was not so certain. Railroads served as catalysts for and 
symbols of economic progress. An offer to bring a railroad into the city could not be 
taken lightly, and the council faced a difficult balancing act in both upholding the public 
belt concept and granting privileges to attract and keep major trunk lines. As the Frisco 
controversy demonstrated, a politically well-connected railroad company wielded
17 Daily Picayune, December 16, 1902, 12; January 7, 1903, 4; January 9, 1903,
6 .
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substantial influence. Grants from the council during the early part of the century tried 
to finesse the inherent tension by giving land and access to the railroads, but requiring 
the companies to assist in the building of the belt. This effort merely complicated the 
situation, both legally and operationally. Lengths of track built by the railroads 
inevitably came under private operation, opening new controversies.
In the midst o f  efforts by the Frisco railroad to obtain a foothold in the city, a 
conference of the city’s’s commercial exchanges attempted to craft a compromise.
Under the auspices of the Board of Trade, the group established a model ordinance 
under which the railroads would build sections of the belt tracks. The tracks would 
serve all carriers with a  fee set for switching cars, but the proceeds of the fees collected 
would be reinvested into extension of the belt system. Neither the railroads nor the city 
council accepted the compromise, which led to protracted litigation and more 
construction delays.18 For six months, the Public Belt Commission suspended active 
operations and awaited the outcome of litigation. When the Commission gathered on 
July 17, 1903 to consider plans, the Daily Picayune sarcastically reported on “the 
alleged Public Belt Railroad . . .  [whose] commissioners had a meeting yesterday. This 
body has not been heard o f for so long a time that few citizens knew of its existence, 
but, nevertheless, there is such a body.” The request of another railroad energized the 
Commission. The Shreveport and Red River Railroad sought access to the city and 
offered to build a portion of the belt tracks as well as to donate $50,000 to the city for
18 Daily Picayune, February 1, 1903,4; February 6, 1903, 11.
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belt expenses. Additionally, the Commission had accumulated a like amount from 
several years of modest city appropriations.19
By the end of the month, the plan gained momentum as a alternative to a city- 
constructed and operated belt line. Council grants to the railroads would be used as 
leverage to obtain track construction and revenue. Council members served on the 
Public Belt Commission, but did not control a majority o f  its votes. The city council 
considered the Commission to be dominated by the administration and did not 
appreciate the commissioners crafting the terms of council franchises. In the midst of 
negotiations with the Shreveport and Red River Railroad, the council considered an 
ordinance to change the composition o f the Commission by eliminating all 
administration members except the mayor and replacing them with additional council 
members. Nothing came o f the effort, but the structure of commission membership 
remained controversial for over a year. The proposed agreement with the Shreveport 
and Red River Railroad continued to gain support, including messages from the 
commercial exchanges. The Progressive Union added its endorsement, pointing out 
desirability of securing additional railroad connections to the northern part of the state. 
On September 1, 1903, the grant passed the council unanimously.20
By spring of the following year, access to the river front had increased, but 
interchange of cars was no more rational than before. The public belt consisted o f
19 Daily Picayune, July 18, 1903, 6; July 29, 1903, 4, 5..
20 Daily Picayune, July 31, 1903,4; August 5, 1903, 5; August 7, 1903, 5;
August 28, 1903,4; September 1,1903, 5.
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disconnected pieces o f track constructed by various railroads. Among the competing 
actors—the railroads, the Dock Board, the Public Belt Commission, the city council, and, 
occasionally, the Orleans Parish Levee Board—there existed no comprehensive plan for 
construction or operation. The state supreme court, however, brought some clarity to 
the situation in May, 1904, with its decision in the Frisco case. It upheld the authority 
of the Dock Board over river front land and thereby removed the council from the 
business of granting privileges and franchises in that area of the city.
Decisions regarding railroad access became the responsibility o f Dock Board 
members appointed for the purpose o f improving the development and efficiency of 
trade along the wharves. Although the New Orleans Public Belt Railroad Commission 
had been given powers by the legislature and the city council, the decision established 
the supremacy o f the Dock Board in deciding not only the placement of public belt 
tracks, but also the expropriation of property for Dock Board mandated construction. 
Although the Public Belt Commission remained in existence, its focus changed to 
construction and operation. Only the Dock Board would have power over track 
locations in the future.21
The new developments moved the Commission to action. Mayor Capdevielle 
met with an early belt railroad supporter, J. E. Auvray, and assured him that pending 
sufficient funds “the Belt Road will be built.” Possibly because o f the impending
21 Daily Picayune, May 24, 1904,4, 6. A Daily Picayune editorial the next day 
suggested the abolition of the belt commission in favor of a takeover of the operation by 
the Dock Board. Daily Picayune, May 25, 1904, 6.
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municipal elections, the pace of action increased and the Dock Board reiterated its 
support for the belt operation, noting that it was the “council’s fault if  nothing has been 
done in this matter.” In mid-July Mayor Capdevielle met with a committee of the Board 
of Trade, one of whose officers, James W. Porch, showed considerable interest in the 
future of the belt. Porch lobbied the Mayor to change the composition of the 
Commission to increase representation from the city’s commercial exchanges, including 
the Board o f Trade. City Attorney Samuel Gilmore drafted an ordinance to restructure 
the Commission and presented it to the council on August 30, 1904.22
This election eve restructuring continued a progressive era trend toward isolation 
of governmental functions from the effects o f direct democratic representation. The 
governor appointed Dock Board members. The Board of Liquidation of City Debt was 
a self-perpetuating body, although representatives of the city ad m in istration served in a 
minority capacity. The Sewerage and Water Board included the city administration and 
mayoral appointees, but Board of Liquidation members had rights to membership as 
well. The plan for the new Public Belt Commission followed this trend. The mayor 
remained on the governing board, but other public officials would be replaced by 
representative chosen from the city’s commercial exchanges—the Board of Trade,
Cotton Exchange, Sugar Exchange, Progressive Union, and Mechanics, Dealers and 
Lumber Exchange— and by five at-large members. The mayor appointed the members 
from lists submitted by the exchanges subject to council approval, provided the
22 Daily Picayune, July 7, 1904,4; July 13, 1904, 5; August 17, 1904,4; Wilds, 
James W. Porch and the Port o f  New Orleans, 43-44.
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nominees were taxpayers and had lived in the city at least five years. The ordinance set 
the term o f office for members at sixteen years to further isolate the membership from 
the trends o f  city politics.23
The timing of the organizational change, immediately prior to the mayoral 
election, could hardly have been accidental. Both Gilmore and Capdevielle joined the 
Regulars after service to the Citizens’ League in 1896. Gilmore resided in uptown, silk- 
stocking New Orleans; Capdevielle was part of the social elite along Esplanade Avenue. 
Certainly the entreaties of the Board of Trade found both sympathetic to the notion of 
increased commercial representation on the Com m ission. By late summer, 1904, 
Capdevielle knew the Regulars would look elsewhere for their mayoral candidate. The 
absorption o f Citizens’ League members by the Regulars had not completely altered the 
attitudes of the reformers. By acceding to the Board of Trade lobbying, Capdevielle 
transformed the Public Belt Commission into an arm of the exchanges and assured its 
governance by the city’s commercial elite, with only a minimal level of formal input 
from the city administration. Although the next city administration might attempt to re­
establish direct political control o f the Commission, the exchanges could be expected to 
resist any such action, especially at the hand of a new mayor sensitive to charges of 
“bossism.”
Within a few days of the introduction of the ordinance, Board of Trade member 
Porch compared it favorably to efforts in Chicago and Indianapolis and assured the
23 Wilds, James W. Porch and the Port o f  New Orleans, 44; Daily Picayune, 
August 31, 1904, 4.
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public that such a commission would have the ability to build the tracks. The Daily 
Picayune reminded the city council that “if  the present council wants credit [for the 
restructuring], they (sic) should pass it immediately.” The council concurred and passed 
Ordinance #2683, N.C.S. (New Council Series), and the Mayor, for whom “it was 
important. . .  to pass the ordinance during his administration,” signed it on October 8, 
1904. Appointments followed quickly and included William Bloomfield, supporter of 
the belt system since his days as president of the Municipal Improvement Association, 
Board o f Trade member James W. Porch, bankers Sol Wexler and Louis Cucullu, and 
other members of the city’s commercial establishment.24
At the first meeting of the reorganized Commission, the membership elected 
Porch President Pro Tern. Fellow member J. D. Hill called him “the sturdiest champion 
of the Belt project the city has ever had.” According to the Com m iss io n ’s by laws,
Porch served as de facto  executive director. Mayor Capdevielle administered the oath 
of office to the new members, and the Commission agreed to meet with the Dock Board 
to pursue vigorously the construction o f the tracks. Prior to the official end of his 
mayoral term, Capdevielle resigned to accept an appointment as state auditor, but, as his 
final act in office, issued formal commissions to members of the new board. At the end
24 Capdevielle to City Council, October 13,1904, Mayor’s Correspondence; 
Wilds, James W. Porch and the Port o f  New Orleans, 44; Daily Picayune, September 2, 
1904, 5; September 30, 1904, 4; October 7, 1904, 4; Capdevielle to the City Council, 
Mayor’s Correspondence, October 13, 1904; By Laws—Public Belt Railroad 
Commission o f  the City o f  New Orleans; Ordinance #2683, N.C.S., Creating the Present 
Commission, University of New Orleans, Earl K. Long Library, Louisiana Collection 
(New Orleans, 1905). Reynolds, in Machine Politics in New Orleans, 151, confuses the 
ordinance for restructuring the Commission with the start of the Public Belt.
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of December, Porch requested a meeting with the new mayor, Martin Behrman, 
suggesting that it was “about time for the appointment o f the several committees” to 
carry out belt operations. Behrman agreed, presided at the Commission meeting, and 
began to take an active role in the business of the public belt.25
Behrman’s assumption of office, clarification of authority over the river front, 
and the reorganization of the Public Belt Commission marked important turning points 
in the development of the project. The pace of activity quickened in part because of 
Behrman’s energy and leadership and in part because business support followed the lead 
of the commercial exchanges now represented on the Commission. The new members 
attended the first Dock Board meeting of 1905 to appeal for assistance. Porch presented 
a plan for a twenty-one mile track system that would require eighteen months to 
construct. He left the meeting with assurances that the Dock Board would assist. Two 
weeks later, the Dock Board approved the belt plans, granted space for the tracks, 
required the Commission to begin construction within three months, and insisted that 
the belt road must remain the property of the city in perpetuity. Both the Dock Board 
and the Public Belt Commission now consisted of business men, many o f whom worked 
with each other in their private endeavors. They certainly shared a common visions of 
commercial expansion. But they also shared a vision of public development in the
25 Daily Picayune, November 3, 1904, 10; November 16, 1904, 5; December 22, 
1904, 5; Minutes, Public Belt Railroad Commission, November 2,1904; Wilds, James 
W. Porch and the Port o f  New Orleans, 44; By-Laws—Public Belt Railroad 
Commission, 5-10. Behrman and Porch knew each other well, having served together 
on committees and as directors of the Progressive Union.
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service o f that expansion, and their subsequent policies did not waver from a 
commitment to public action.26
Mindful of its new deadline, the Commission met the next day to hear the report 
of City Engineer Hardee reviewing the route the tracks would take along the river. The 
city appropriations had accumulated over several years and payments from railroads 
added to the belt treasury. A total o f $160,000 was available, enough to begin work but 
far short o f the total that would be necessary to complete the project. In additional to its 
financial problems, the Commission faced the legal difficulties of building a belt route 
that traversed a river front with numerous railroad crossing, switch tracks, and sidings. 
Porch decided to convene a conference of all presidents of rail lines operating in the city 
“to clarify the Public Belt route and to stay out of court.” An unexpected claim by the 
New Orleans and Northwestern Railroad that threatened to delay the start of 
construction would be only one of the controversies faced by the Public Belt 
Commission in its attempt to finish its work. At the conference, the belt staff reported 
on the results of a preliminary survey; thirty tracks would have to be crossed by the belt, 
each track representing a  construction and legal challenge. Conference participants 
reached no general agreement, and the Commission decided to move ahead and 
negotiate with each railroad one at a time.27
26 Daily Picayune, January 4, 1905,4; January 18, 1905, 5; By Laws—Public Belt 
Railroad Commission: Resolution o f  the Board o f  Commissioners o f  the Port o f  New 
Orleans, 15. The Board resolution reaffirmed the dedication of space to the New 
Orleans Public Belt Railroad that the Dock Board passed on August 12,1902.
27 Daily Picayune, January 20, 1905, 6; February 3, 1905, 4; February 17, 1905,
5.
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The Commission’s activity did not put an end to the city council’s attempts to 
dictate railroad policy. Seeking the privilege of a switch track, the Southern Pacific 
Railroad appealed to the council, and an ordinance favoring the line reached the Streets 
and Landings Committee. Council members ignored an amendment requested by the 
Public Belt Commission, in spite of the argument that other railroads had paid for 
privileges and the Southern Pacific ought to contribute as well. For several weeks the 
controversy continued until Mayor Behrman intervened and invited the antagonists to 
his office. At the gathering, support for the belt came from the commercial exchanges, 
including the wholesale grocers who registered their opposition to the Southern Pacific. 
Under pressure by the Mayor and his business allies, the Southern Pacific officials 
relented, but informed the council that they expected some consideration when another 
of their franchises came up for extension in a few months. Meanwhile, the Dock Board 
added to the argument in favor o f a public belt when it presented a finding that showed 
one particular rail car of lumber destined for wharf construction took five days “to 
belt.”28
During May and June, 1905, the Commission’s engineering staff continued the 
survey work preparatory to construction. By the end o f June, it completed surveys on 
eighteen out of twenty-one miles of the route. Noting the encouraging progress, the 
Orleans Parish Levee Board offered land to the Commission to extend the tracks to the 
rear of the city, a location that would fulfill the plan to circle the developed area of the
28 Daily Picayune, March 11, 1905, 4; March 23, 1905, 6; March 30, 1905, 5; 
March 31,1905,4; April 1,1905,4, 6.
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city. The Commission felt sufficiently confident to approve the specifications for the 
purchase o f the operation’s first locomotive and to announce plans for a July 1 
celebration of the start of construction, complete with speeches by city officials and the 
governor. Anticipating the festivities, the Daily Picayune lent its congratulations: “The 
New Orleans Public Belt Railroad, which was for a long time a mere figment of the 
imagination and was for a term of years a fragmentary affair. . .  become [s] at last a 
valuable factor in the city’s commercial facilities.”29
The celebration was memorable. Guests included not only politicians, but also 
representatives of the city’s commercial associations. Speakers paid tribute to J. E. 
Auvray, “the father of the Public Belt,” as well as to the contributions of the 
commission, the city administration, and the Dock Board. President Pro Tern Porch 
gave the keynote address, estimating the cost of the tracks and equipment would be 
$1,500,000, but proclaiming that the value of the operation on the private market would 
be $10,000,000. Porch cited twenty-six ports around the world which operated public 
belt tracks; New Orleans was the only city in the United States with such an asset.
“With a publicly owned system of wharves and with a public-controlled system of 
levees coupled with a perfect publicly owned belt line service we have the implements .
. .  that will enable us to defy the commercial and manufacturing world.” Governor 
Blanchard said “your belt line, in short, means progress. It will demonstrate to the 
outside world.. .  that New Orleans has caught the spirit of progress.” Mayor Behrman
29 Daily Picayune, May 19, 1905, 7; June 20, 1905, 12; July 1, 1905,6.
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reminded the audience “that the river front and its vast opportunities o f commerce 
belong to the people and should be owned by them.” The highlight of the ceremony 
featured the Mayor enthusiastically driving a golden spike, though event organizers later 
admitted that workers had pre-drilled the hole and filled it with cork.30
On July 12,1905, the city council accepted the bid o f the Southern Iron and 
Equipment Company of Atlanta to provide a locomotive to the Public Belt Railroad.
But the line could not begin operation until construction crews finished the tracks. In 
spite o f a cash flow crisis, work continued. The enthusiasm o f new Commission 
members extended to financial assistance when board member Henry Schreiber 
personally loaned funds to the Commission to avoid a delay in preparing for 
construction. To conserve funds, the management agreed to reduce the double-track 
plan to a single line, anticipating that revenue could be raised from one track and then 
applied to additional construction. Railroads friendly to the belt offered to advance 
money toward its construction, but the City Attorney ruled out subordinating the 
authority of the belt road.31
30 The Key to the Commercial Situation: A Publicly Owned and Publicly 
Operated Belt Railroad, New Orleans Public Library, Louisiana Division (New Orleans, 
1904). This Public Belt Railroad pamphlet contains the speeches of dignitaries from the 
opening ceremony and newspaper comment from that event and later. The pamphlet 
carries the date 1904, but the date is in error. There is no pagination in the document, 
although hand-written page numbers can be found at various places. See also Wilds, 
James W. Porch and the Port o f  New Orleans, 44-46; Daily Picayune, July 1, 1905, 6; 
Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 152.
31 Wilds, John W. Porch and the Port o f  New Orleans, 44-45; Daily Picayune, 
July 24, 1905, 5; July 27, 1905, 6; August 9,1905, 5.
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Claims of success began long before the completion of the track. Secretary 
Mayo of the Progressive Union announced that two flour mills would locate along the 
tracks; additional reports of industrial expansion surfaced, which seemed to confirm 
Porch’s judgment regarding the benefits of the belt in attracting manufacturing. “There 
is not a progressive city in the United States today but that is a great manufacturing 
center, and the Belt commission realizes that we m ust. . .  be in a position to handle our 
own production. We must become a manufacturing city, the creator o f wealth.” But 
amid the optimism, track construction came up against another obstacle. As the 
Commission’s work gangs approached land claimed by the Illinois Central, fights broke 
out with railroad employees. A crowd of between 450 and 1,000 Illinois Central 
employees (contemporary estimates varied) blocked construction and overturned rail 
cars. The police arrested a number o f workers for interfering with belt operations, but 
paroled them on assurances that the protest would end. The Mayor criticized the 
railroad and urged a peaceful solution, which Porch achieved after lengthy negotiations 
with IC officials. The controversy overshadowed the steady progress underway. In an 
annual review of the city’s business climate, the Daily Picayune printed a lengthy article 
by Porch detailing belt achievements including cooperation with the Dock and Levee 
Boards, the adoption of sound business practices within public ownership, and a sincere 
wish for “accord” with all the railroads. Later in the month, Porch returned to the city 
from a vacation and expressed the hope “that now that cooler weather is on and
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members of the commission are returning home, it is intended to push belt line 
construction.”32
A truce with the Illinois Central persisted, the antagonists arranged a conference, 
and progress resumed. In early October, 1905, various railroads, including the Illinois 
Central, entered into agreements with the belt management. By mid-month construction 
reached a milestone when tracks proceeding toward the central business district from 
both directions along the river met at Canal Street. Amid celebration, construction 
crews joined the uptown and downtown sections. The Public Belt Commission 
announced that the first engine and cars would move over the newly constructed tracks. 
Progress was “rapid and satisfactory,” and the press recounted reports of more firms and 
industries eager for locations along the belt facilities. The Dock Board cooperated in 
finding additional room for tracks and for rail yards to hold an estimated 110 cars the 
belt would be obliged to store. By the end of November, the Daily Picayune asserted 
that “all tracks [were] clear now for the Public Beit” and, with an agreement in hand 
with the Illinois Central, “all opposition on the levee front has been removed.”
Relations with the railroads, nevertheless, caused constant barriers to the belt project. 
Private and public interests continued to conflict, but the belt management persisted in 
its belief that its public organization would prevail against the private railroads. At the 
end of the year, Porch wrote that one of the benefits of the belt operation was that “in
32 The Key to the Commercial Situation, 6-7; Daily Picayune, August 2, 1905, 5; 
August 9, 1905, 5; August 21,1905, 1-2; September 1, 1905, section 4,1; September 
24, 1905, 3; September 29, 1905, 4; Wilds, John W. Porch and the Port o f New 
Orleans, 48-50.
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the age of combinations.. .  a publicly owned [railroad] would forestall monopoly.” In a 
belt pamphlet commemorating the open of belt construction, a series of aphorisms in 
support o f public ownership included “Our local safeguards protect us against 
combinations from the outside.”33
In February, 1906, the Public Belt Commission, faced with a shortage of funds, 
negotiated a $100,000 loan from the council. The council, consisting largely of 
members elected by the Regular organization, saw no contradiction in funding an 
autonomous commission whose members were drawn almost exclusively from the ranks 
of business. Admitting the limitations of its finances, the Commission announced its 
intention to put off construction in the rear of the city, dedicating “funds and energy. . .  
to completing a continuous track along the city’s wharves.” In a reversal o f earlier 
policy, the council began to examine all of the switch track privileges granted to 
railroads in order to test the legality o f revoking them if the Public Belt Railroad needed 
the tracks for its own operations.34
With routine matters apparently under control, James Porch expanded his view 
of the belt’s possibilities. As the council wrestled with where to place a railroad 
passenger terminal, for example, Porch suggested that the terminal company be required 
to reserve two tracks for the belt railroad. Anticipating development along the river, he 
also suggested that the belt build and operate a grain elevator “for everyone’s use.” He
33 Dock Board Minutes, November 7, 1905; The Key to the Commercial 
Situation, 7; Daily Picayune, October 6, 1905,3; October 18,1905, 4; October 25,
1905,4; November 8, 1905, 5; November 29,1905,12; November 30, 1905, 5..
34 Daily Picayune, February 16, 1906, 7; March 1, 1906, 4.
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encouraged the transfer of surplus city sugar sheds along the river to the belt’s 
jurisdiction. In his capacity at the Board of Trade, Porch encouraged dissemination of 
pro-belt information. In a discussion with steamship officials. Porch noted the excess 
costs to the shipping lines caused by shifting berths. In the absence of a completely 
functioning belt railroad, cargo could not easily be shifted on land. By completing the 
railroad, the shipping lines would avoid those costs.35
Expansion of the belt activities awaited resolution o f  more basic problems. The 
Shreveport and Red River Railroad, now known as the Louisiana Railway and 
Navigation Company, filed a dispute over river front land in extreme uptown New 
Orleans, adjacent to Jefferson Parish. By its actions, the railroad challenged the 
Louisiana Supreme Court and claimed that the court’s decision in the case between the 
Frisco Railroad and the Dock Board did not apply to the claim o f the Louisiana Railway 
and Navigation Company. The actions of the company were the first in a number of 
nuisance controversies faced by the belt in 1906. The Southern Pacific, Texas Pacific 
and L&N lines raised additional roadblocks and forced the belt line to delay the start of 
its full operations. In each instance, the Mayor and the Commission remained steadfast; 
they permitted no compromises with public ownership and control. And through it all 
Porch remained confident, ordering work “in dead earnest” on an uptown section o f 
tracks so that revenue could be earned and asserting that the belt seemed “as near a state 
of perfection in the method o f transportation as can be devised.” Porch followed his
35 Daily Picayune, March 16,1906, 5; March 17,1906,4; March 22,1906,2-3.
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claim with a request to the city council for a continuing appropriation of $25,000 per 
year, a figure that the council increased twice before final passage of the city’s 1907 
budget.36
In his New Year’s wishes for 1907, City Engineer Hardee hoped for the 
completion and operation of the New Orleans Public Belt Railroad, now more than a 
year behind schedule. Behrman wished the community “health, prosperity and 
happiness” but called a conference the next day to investigate the construction delays. 
No one accepted blame, but the Dock Board offered to “take the lead” in pushing for 
completion. New appropriations from the city helped the belt to purchase needed 
equipment and supplies. By mid-month, the belt and the Texas Pacific finally reached a 
tentative agreement, and the Illinois Central once more promised cooperation. But the 
Southern Pacific remained adamant that if it conceded transit to the belt, the city must 
reciprocate by extending its franchise for thirty years. The Commission, speaking 
through Porch, made its position clear: the belt would negotiate track rights of way, but 
the franchise was a council matter. “The Public Belt Railroad Commission . . .  is 
advised that it has a legal right. .  .to construct and operate a double track along the
36 Daily Picayune, April 3, 1906, 4; April 4, 1906, 3; April 9, 1906, 12; April 14, 
1906, 4; May 16, 1906, 7; May 18, 1906, 4; June 22, 1906, 15; July 11, 1906, 5; August 
17, 1906,4; August 22, 1906,4; August 31, 1906,4; September 1,1906, Section II, 16; 
September 16, 1906, 7; October 19, 1906,4, 5; November 3, 1906, 5, 6; November 9, 
1906.
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entire river front.” All parties agreed to meet to seek a resolution to the Southern Pacific 
conflict, but delayed discussions until after the city’s annual carnival celebration.37
When negotiations resumed in March, Mayor Behrman learned of executive 
sessions between belt management and Southern Pacific officials and demanded a 
public hearing. The Mayor criticized his fellow commissioners for the secret sessions 
and forced through an agreement in principle for the belt to obtain track rights in the 
Southern Pacific area along the river. Not until another month went by, however, did 
the Dock Board, the belt, and the railroad reach “a three-cornered peace on the river 
front” that allow the belt to proceed. The pace o f construction resumed and the belt 
anticipated the start of operations by June 1, 1907. The belt could not meet that date, 
however, and rescheduled the opening for October.38
Before the city could celebrate the opening of the belt line, another conflict with 
the Southern Pacific arose. In a replay of earlier violence, railroad employees, under 
instructions from their management, overturned rail cars to prevent belt construction. 
Railroad officials objected to the quality of materials used by the belt in crossing the 
Southern Pacific lines and resorted to force to make the point. Behrman went to the site 
and negotiated a truce. He later solicited reports from witnesses to the controversy, 
including Public Belt employees. In the first open break between the Mayor and 
President Pro Tern Porch, Behrman argued that the railroad should have some voice in
37 Daily Picayune, January 1, 1907, 6; January 18, 1907, 5; February 7, 1907, 5; 
February 9, 1907, 5.
38 Daily Picayune, March 21, 1907, 5; March 27,1907, 5; April 13, 1907, 5;
April 19,1907, 4; May 8, 1907,4.
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quality control because it would be responsible for track maintenance at the crossing. 
Weary of all the belt’s troubles and the demands on his time, the Mayor publicly 
suggested that it might be necessary to increase the Mayor’s authority over belt 
governance.39
In September, 1907, the Civil Service Commission informed the belt 
management that, as a city agency, the public railroad must follow civil service rules. 
The Civil Service Commission would examine potential employees of the belt, from the 
superintendent to common laborers, and certify applicants. The Regulars had adapted to 
various civil service restrictions and did not seek to overturn this decision. The 
selection process delayed operations yet again. Examinations for the position of 
superintendent began on September 24, 1907, but the Civil Service Commission did not 
complete the process for two months. On November 27, Augustus Phelps was named 
superintendent for the operation, but did not begin work until well into the following 
year. The belt had completed over seventy miles of track, including twenty miles of 
double track along the busiest sections o f the river front. Even at this point, the private 
railroads did not give in. A new set of negotiations began that would set the conditions 
o f interchange and the rates the public line would charge.40
39 Behrman to James Porch, May 23, 1907, Mayor’s Correspondence; H. 
Reynolds, Assistant Engineer, New Orleans Public Belt Railroad to Behrman, July 8, 
1907, Behrman Papers; Wilds, James W. Porch and the Port o f  New Orleans, 50-51; 
Daily States, July 8, 1907; Daily Picayune, July 9,1907,4; Times-Democrat, July 19, 
1907, 5; Daily Picayune, July 19, 1907, 5.
40 Behrman to James Porch, August 16, 1907, Mayor’s Correspondence;
Behrman to James Porch, August 22,1907, Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to City 
Council, November 27,1907, Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to Public Belt
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The belt announced rules in late December, submitted the draft of them to the 
railroads, and awaited comment. The Commission set a basic change of $2.00 per car 
for interchange service, a figure well below the $8.00 to $10.00 common among private 
lines. The commercial railroads adhered to a regional operating manual, and the belt 
agree to join the common rules that had rationalized inter-line operations, especially 
Rule 10 of the Southern Car Service Association as its associated guidelines. But the 
belt attempted to limit its liability while handling the rail cars, and the private lines 
balked.41
City Engineer Hardee, who had given thanks for the belt in 1900, issued a New 
Year’s wish that the project be completed in 1908. The Public Belt Commission finally 
prevailed that year and presided over the official opening of the public line. The newly- 
hired superintendent filled staff positions and drew up an operating budget. Although 
the railroads did not accept the proposed Commission rules, the management of the belt 
line announced unilateral adoption o f its draft pending further negotiations. The city 
council drafted a comprehensive ordinance to dedicate, in cooperation with the Dock 
Board, all river front lands to public use. A council resolution proclaimed that 
henceforth switch track privileges, the source of numerous controversies between the 
belt line and the railroads, would be granted only to connect with belt tracks. A 
proposal to the state legislature to allow the issuance o f bonds promised to end cash
Commissioner, November 27,1907, Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily Picayune, 
September 1, 1907, Section III, 4; September 20, 1907, 5; September 25, 1907, 4; 
November 28, 1907, 2.
41 Daily Picayune, December 21, 1907, 12.
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flow problems and financial uncertainties. The Progressive Union recognized the 
impending milestone by awarding its annual Loving Cup to William Bloomfield, who 
helped bring the belt to the attention o f the public ten years before. The Daily Picayune 
donated the cup each year and approvingly noted the contributions of Bloomfield and all 
other who assisted in the success of the belt railroad.42
Members of the state legislature raised temporary objections to the 
Commission’s plans to issue bonds. Complaints reached the members regarding the 
“seizure of private property” during construction of the railroad, but the legislature 
relented and allowed the bond issue after intense lobbying by the Mayor Behrman, Dock 
Board president, the Board of Trade ,and other commercial interests. The legislative act 
inserted a clause requiring compensation for private land taken. The opponents to the 
belt declared victory but allowed the operation to go forward. Act 179 of the 1908 
legislation provided authority for the bond issue, but contained a provision designed to 
protect the bondholders. If  the New Orleans Public Belt Railroad were unable to 
properly service the bonds, the responsibility for repayment to the bondholders would 
pass to the Dock Board.43
A last minute barrier arose from an unexpected source: the Interstate Commerce 
Commission declared the Public Belt Railroad a common carrier, subject to federal
42 Behrman to City Council, January 7, 1908, Mayor’s Correspondence;
Behrman to City Council, February 4,1908, Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily Picayune, 
January 1, 1908, 5; February 18, 1908, 4; March 20, 1908, 12; June 2,1908, 5; June 7, 
1908, 8.
43 Daily Picayune, June 17, 1908, 12; June 19; 1908, 5; McGuirk, Laws 
Constitutional and Statutory, 10.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
286
rules. After hurried attempts to reverse the federal ruling, the belt agreed to conform to 
ICC rules and put off the fight over jurisdiction. This allowed the New Orleans Public 
Belt Railroad Commission to celebrate a ceremonial opening on August 2,1908 when a 
locomotive traversed the length of the tracks. Interchange o f cars under public auspices 
began several weeks later. The Daily Picayune noted “the innumerable obstacles 
[which had been] encountered and overcome” and praised the efforts of the Board of 
Trade, the Mayor, the Dock Board and the city council. “The present council. . .  will 
mark this administration as public benefactors for all time to come.” Construction cost 
nearly $500,000, but the line became self-sustaining and remained so throughout the 
history of its operation. The city council passed a resolution o f thanks to the Leyland 
steamship line which had added to the celebration, emphasizing the close relationship 
between the belt line and the port.44
In 1905, James Porch wrote “We are confident it [the belt railroad] will prove a 
money earner.” True to Porch’s prediction, the belt succeeded financially from the 
beginning. Public belt equipment switched over 150 cars the first day, and management 
announced plans for additional tracks within one month. The volume of business 
required the upgrading of phone installation. The opposition of private lines diminished
44 Daily Picayune, August 4,1908, 1; August 15,1908, 5; John W Porch and 
the Port o f  New Orleans, 51-52; Daily States, August 3, 1908; A General Resume o f  the 
Composition, Functions, History and Operations o f  the City o f  New Orleans’s Civic- 
Owned and Operated Terminal Railroad, University of New Orleans, Earl K. Long 
Library, Louisiana Collection (New Orleans, 1956),[no pagination]; Clerk of City 
Council to Behrman, August 4,1908, Behrman Papers.
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and, eventually, disappeared. Minor difficulties over equipment and the constant 
jockeying over crossing and dock access did not detract from the accomplishment. In 
1909, the New Orleans Public Belt Railroad switched approximately 80,000 cars, a 
figure that more than doubled by 1914, and reached over 200,000 by 1915. Behrman 
often boasted o f the belt’s success and low charges, claiming an average savings per car 
of $4.00, and a reduction in switching time from several days to twenty-four hours or 
less. The belt administration was a financial success, but Behrman stated “it is not the 
purpose of the city of New Orleans to obtain a profit,” rather its purpose “[is] to 
decrease the excessive charges and provide efficient belting service at the lowest 
possible cost.” Businesses agreed that the belt had succeeded. Users of the services 
praised the operations after only a few months o f activity. In fighting a railroad claim to 
land, the belt pointed to the line’s success as a reason for the court to certify its 
jurisdiction. In May, 1909 steamship agents approached Porch with a plan to implement 
a barge unloading system, arguing that “railroads will not build [the facilities], therefore 
agents depended upon the belt.” Though Porch carried the idea to the Commission, the 
system was never built.45
By the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, the public nature o f the 
belt became a fixture on the city’s river front. Though legal challenges lingered, the belt
45 The Key to the Commercial Situation, 14; Behrman, New Orleans: What It is 
Doing . .. ,  14-15; The Behrman Administration: Work Accomplished During the Eight 
Year.. . ,  6; Martin Behrman, An Address by Honorable Martin Behrman, Mayor o f  New 
Orleans, Louisiana, at the Invitation o f  the Society o f  Economics, Tulane University, 
New Orleans Public Library, Louisiana Collection (New Orleans, 1913), 14-15; Daily 
Picayune, March 19, 1909,4; March 26,1909, 4; May 8,1909, 7.
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leadership remained firm. In May, 1909, former city attorney Samuel Gilmore, now a 
Congressman from the state’s Second district, returned from Washington, D.C., to argue 
a case on behalf of the belt railroad. Gilmore had filed the case some years earlier, and 
felt an obligation to see the litigation to the end. The Daily Picayune recalled the 1906 
incident in which railroad crews tried forcibly to build a track on disputed land, but 
Mayor Behrman, city Attorney Gilmore, and a court injunction saved the public interest. 
Three years later, the case was still in court attracting “much interest. . .  because of the 
principle involved, namely the city’s control of the river front.” The city eventually 
won the case, but the judgment did not become final until after Gilmore’s death.46
James Porch deserved much of the credit for the success of the New Orleans 
Public Belt Railroad because he mobilized the support of commercial interests. He also 
defined the principles by which the belt operated, including a strong commitment to 
equity and efficiency. Mayor Behrman played the same role from the public side and 
was especially valuable mediating among intense and occasionally violent parties. The 
two worked as allies for five years seldom disagreeing, but in 1909 Porch resigned as 
President Pro Tem. A possible conflict of interest, illness, the demands o f running a 
business, and the strain of constant public service affected his decision. As the 
operational demands of the belt grew, Behrman stepped in to assist in its reorganization; 
Porch resigned just days later. There is no evidence that Behrman engineered the 
resignation, but his day-to-day involvement with the Commission makes it likely that
46 Daily Picayune, May 23,1909, 7. Gilmore served only a short time in 
Congress, passing away in 1910.
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Porch’s action represented a decision reached at least with the Mayor’s knowledge. 
Commission members quickly nominated a replacement, but the Mayor objected to 
filling the position so quickly and without consultation. The Commission agreed to 
delay the vote. Within two weeks, W. B. Thompson, member of the Commission from 
the Cotton Exchange, who was developing a strong friendship with Mayor Behrman, 
emerged as the new President Pro Tern. Porch remained a member and served for 
another twelve years.47
Though neither Porch nor Behrman realized it at the time, their joint effort 
symbolized an important aspect of New Orleans pragmatic progressivism. The belt 
operation assumed functions previously allocated to private corporations. The 
consensus in favor of a public belt did not represent an explicit, ideological statement in 
support of socialism. To the contrary, Behrman’ memoirs reject the notion that the belt 
represented socialism: “Public ownership of such facilities as . .  .[the] public belt, was 
condemned as ‘Socialistic’ and ‘radical’ ideas when I was young. Now hard boiled 
bankers and business men all over the United States are strong for it.” Behrman held 
contempt for socialism, but a strong appreciation for public works in support of 
commercial development. In 1912, in his campaign for re-election, Behrman boasted 
that his administration “built the Public Belt Railroad [after] years o f futile efforts [and 
in spite of] severe antagonisms on the part of corporate interests.” The New Orleans
47 The Key to the Commercial Situation, 1-5; Daily Picayune, September 17, 
1908, 5; November 11, 1908, 5; December 8, 1908,15; December 18,1908,4; Wilds, 
James W. Porch and the Port o f  New Orleans, 52-56; Reynolds, Machine Politics in 
New Orleans, 151-152.
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Public Belt Railroad joined the other great public works of the first decade o f the 
twentieth century in defining the business climate, the political life, and the very 
geography of New Orleans. Its construction resulted from the consensus in favor of 
progressive civic development and the effective leadership of Martin Behrman. The 
railroad’s start of operations in 1908 highlighted the success of Behrman’s first term, 
and provided ample proof to the business community that there was no danger in a 
second Behrman term.48
48 The Behrman Administration: Work Accomplished. . . ,  5; Kemp, Martin 
Behrman o f  New Orleans, 104.
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CHAPTER IX
MARTIN BEHRMAN, 1908-1912:
POLITICAL BOSS AS COMMUNITY LEADER
Political activity in the city and nation began to quicken in the summer o f 1908. 
The national parties met in convention to determine presidential candidates, and 
speculation grew in New Orleans about the fall municipal elections. Although the state 
chose officials earlier in the year, an eventful legislative session affected the New 
Orleans contests. A party primary became the required method of choosing the 
Democratic candidate, ending the party convention system that the Regulars dominated. 
The legislature also passed laws regulating gambling and bar rooms, giving hope to 
those who proclaimed that a wave of moral reform would sweep the ring from power. 
But the state elections and the legislature also solidified the power of Governor Jared 
Sanders, the choice of the regular Democrats and a loyal friend to Martin Behrman.
Behrman enjoyed the normal advantages o f incumbency, as well as the 
extraordinary successes of the past four years. In contrast to the Capdevielle 
administration, which ended in 1904, Behrman’s term in office saw substantial progress 
in the implementation of vital public works projects. The sewer, water, and drainage 
systems had begun service, the Public Belt Railroad had started switching cars in 
summer 1908, and the Dock Board had transformed the river front. In addition,
291
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Behrman, the city council, and the various city departments had made significant 
improvements in the cleanliness o f the city, paved miles of previously primitive streets, 
and, despite the national financial panic and recession, had presided over impressive city 
expansion and a building boom. As early as July 3, 1908, the Daily Picayune 
speculated that Behrman would head the ticket, “with no talk o f opposition” to the 
Mayor or his principle lieutenants. Assuming no repetition o f  the 1904 District 
Attorney controversy, the Mayor seemed secure. Confident o f victory, Behrman left for 
the Democratic National Convention in Denver. But he did not want to neglect his local 
duties as campaign chairman for a local congressional district. Before he departed, he 
reminded Choctaw colleague John Fitzpatrick to “look after the First Congressional 
District Campaign Committee in his absence.” The announcement in mid-July that the 
Republican Party intended to contest the city elections by appealing to “disgruntled 
Democrats” did not attract much attention.1
Commissioner Smith of the Department of Public Works sat for a Daily 
Picayune interview while Behrman was away, and he made the case for the 
administration. During the Behrman years, Smith boasted, the city had acquired 
“seventy-four head of livestock, five sanitary flushing machines, twelve sweeping
1 Behrman to John Fitzpatrick, June 26, 1907, Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily 
Picayune, July 3, 1908, 12; July 12, 1908,4; July 17,1908, 11. The city was quiet 
during the Mayor’s absence, although Acting Mayor McRacken faced a unique problem. 
“There came a request to City H al l . . .  for a permit to have a  bull fight in this city, but 
Acting Mayor McRacken was not disposed to issue it, understanding that the Mayor was 
opposed to exhibitions of this character. He decided to withhold the permit to await the 
return of the Mayor.” Behrman declined to issue the permit as well. Daily Picayune, 
July 20, 1908,4.
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machines, eleven four-wheel dump carts, one paper wagon, and an egg wagon” for the 
collection of spoiled eggs. Of the $45,000 cost of these improvements only $17,000 
required new appropriations. The remainder had been financed out of savings. “My 
earnest aim and effort, “ Smith asserted, “is to have the service conducted upon the strict 
principles of business.” He concluded with a plea for another term. Other office 
holders speculated about the composition o f the ticket, but no caucus could be held nor 
decisions made “until the return of the big ones [bosses] from Denver.”2
While the Choctaw Club awaited the bosses return, jockeying for position and 
advantage began among the Regular faithful. A conflict over which ward would name 
the Civil Sheriff broke out between the Twelfth and Thirteenth Wards. Louis Knop of 
the Seventh Ward “wanted something more [in salary] than coal gauger” and threatened 
to challenge Commissioner Smith. Speculation suggested that Knop might “settle for 
State Inspector of cattle at the slaughterhouse.” The Ninth Ward, a site of constant 
intra-party fights since the death of the elder Dudenhefer and the imprisonment of his 
son, faced the loss of important patronage in the Recorder’s Office if the various 
factions could not get together.3
Behrman returned to the city on July 23, 1908. The national convention had 
nominated William Jennings Bryan for the third time. Behrman preferred a different 
candidate, but went along as a loyal Democrat. Choctaw member and newspaperman 
Robert Ewing accompanied Behrman to Denver and returned as Louisiana national
2 Daily Picayune, July 19, 1908, 1; July 21, 1908, 8.
3 Daily Picayune, July 21, 1908, 8.
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committee member. Within a few days, the Mayor and ward leaders “harmonized” 
almost all conflicts. No contests for the top positions emerged, although the primary 
election would be necessary to settle minor judicial posts. The Twelfth Ward 
surrendered the Civil Sheriff position, and the intramural factions of the Ninth Ward 
declared peace. Knop received the prize of the Civil Sheriffs office, securing Smith’s 
renomination for Public Works. Even the Daily Picayune expressed admiration at the 
smooth operation of the Regulars.“There is reason for general congratulations on the 
manner in which the primary scheme has worked,” suggested the Daily Picayune.
“There has been very little friction among the ward leaders, having apparently felt 
satisfied with the administration of Mayor Behrman.. . .  The opposition seems to have 
faded away.”4
Behrman’s control o f the situation extended beyond the confines of the Choctaw 
Club. The former traveling salesman, council clerk, and assessor now regularly worked 
with the city’s commercial elite. As a result, the opposition faded, and the Mayor 
quietly began to gather support, even from unlikely quarters. On July 29, 1908, the 
remnants of the 1904 Home Rule Executive Committee met to consider the upcoming 
campaign. Frank A. Daniels, chair of the committee, declared that he “was out of 
politics” and would resign if  the group sought to enter the mayor’s race. He added that 
“many of those who were prominent in the movement four years ago have since become
4 Daily Picayune, July 23, 1908, 4; July 26, 1908, 4; July 28, 1908, 8; July 29, 
1908, 5; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 178. Schott attributed the lack of 
opposition to the power of Governor Sanders and the workings of the new primary law, 
which favored the machine. Schott, “John M. Parker,” 110-111.
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supporters of Mayor Behrman.” A new reform group, the Independent Party, emerged 
and proposed a merger with the Home Rulers, but a joint meeting proved more farce 
than drama. Only five out o f thirty-four members of the Home Rule Executive 
Committee attended. The Independents assembled a larger group, but not all wards 
were represented. The members adjourned and authorized the chairman, R. A.
Tichenor, to draft a statement o f principles but delayed a decision on whether to 
challenge Behrman. Even the Times-Democrat, perpetual enemy of the Choctaws, 
offered a grudging endorsement of the Mayor, while condemning his colleagues and 
organization.5
Final proof of the Mayor’s strong position came in a telegram sent to the Daily- 
States. William B. Thompson, Jr., prominent businessman and President o f the Cotton 
Exchange, wrote the paper while on vacation in Bar Harbor, Maine, urging a second 
term for Behrman. Thompson had graduated from University of the South at Sewanee, 
attended John Hopkins, and received a law degree from Columbia. After a brief career 
as a lawyer in Dallas, he returned to New Orleans to take over the family business upon 
the death of his father. W. B. Thompson and Company was a cotton factorage business, 
but the son expanded into other areas, including insurance. Thompson’s endorsement 
symbolized both the Mayor’s success in attracting support and the unlikelihood of any
s Daily Picayune, July 29, 1908, 4, 11; July 31, 1908, 8; Kemp, Martin Behrman 
o f  New Orleans, 178-181. Chudacoff suggested that “reformers had little stamina 
compared with their rivals” and noted that the “New York Reform Club had to suspend 
its meetings [four years after its formation] for lack of a quorum.” Chudacoff, The 
Evolution o f  American Urban Society, 173-174.
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serious opposition. In his memoirs, Behrman complained that he had no real friends in 
the Cotton Exchange crowd, but Thompson proved a loyal friend and political ally.6
Behrman expressed his gratitude to Thompson in a  letter sent soon after word of 
the endorsement became public. “When I assumed the reins o f government, there were 
many representative citizens who feared that the city of New Orleans had taken a step 
back,” the Mayor wrote, and, that many believed “the progressive march o f this 
metropolis would be impaired most seriously based [on] their having heard o f me only 
as a politician or ‘ward boss.’ I set out not only to maintain the progressive march of 
our beloved city, but to quicken it.” When Thompson returned to the city, he repeated 
his endorsement and identified the characteristics in Behrman he most valued—the 
Mayor’s ability to build consensus and to mobilize public opinion. Thompson wrote 
that citizens tend “to discourage all improvements because it is our humor to be 
dissatisfied with whatever order or system may be in control.” He went on to praise 
Behrman’s ability to overcome that constraint. “Your unostentacious discharge of your 
duty, your fairness and your faithfulness have been fruitful. . .  in inducing the most 
thorough concurrence of opinion that I have known in my acquaintance with the 
political history of New Orleans.”7
6 Daily Picayune, July 30,1908,4; Schott, “John M. Parker,” 100 quoting the 
New Orleans Item, November 17, 1922; Kendall, History o f  New Orleans, 2: 804. There 
is no indication of political activity on the part of Thompson prior to the 1908 election. 
He had only recently been elected president o f the New Orleans Cotton Exchange when 
he endorsed Behrman.
7 Behrman to W.B. Thompson, July 30, 1908, Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily 
Picayune, August 8, 1908, 8.
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In spite of the long odds, the Independents decided to oppose Behrman. A 
headquarters opened, but the groups had difficulty finding a candidate to challenge the 
popular Mayor. The Daily Picayune ridiculed the effort and claimed the “Independents 
Still Hunting A Moses.” But on August 23, the group presented William G. Tebault as 
its candidate for mayor. Tebault was forty-nine years old and claimed participation in 
the Battle of Liberty Place as a teenager, as well as more recent civic service in fighting 
yellow fever. He owned a retail furniture business that was “known for [its] original 
advertising.” Tebault quickly resorted to the standard reform rhetoric. He promised an 
infusion of “$250,000,000 in capital to the city” as soon as the “system [of bosses] was 
defeated.” He added that “the ring is frightened.” By early September, he issued a 
platform calling for a clean city, honest elections, revision of city payrolls, frequent 
audits, and “a liberal policy toward railroads and industry.”8
The Independents faced challenges more difficult than assembling a ticket and 
platform. A new state law sought to discourage Democratic insurgents from running in 
the party primary and, when they lost, bolting to enter the general election. To prevent 
such rebellion, the law required independent tickets to file petitions prior to the 
Democratic primary. Signatures could not include those who subsequently voted in the 
primary. The Independents did not fulfill the mandates of the law. Immediately after 
the primary, the state’s Board of Contests disqualified the New Orleans Independents 
because several persons who signed the petition also took part in the just-completed
8 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 181-182; Daily Picayune, August 19, 
1908, 5; August 23, 1908, 4; September 3, 1908, 5.
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Democratic election. Tebault challenged the decision in court and asserted his plans “to 
run anyway.”9
The Regulars faced a momentary crisis when Vital Tujague, Chief Clerk for the 
city’s Treasurer’s Office, admitted the theft of $30,000 of municipal funds under his 
control. (He used the money to support a gambling habit.) But Tujague’s brother agreed 
to cover the shortfall, and Behrman immediately issued a statement claiming credit for 
uncovering the theft. Several months prior to the discovery of the missing funds the city 
had begun a series o f audits at the Mayor’ suggestion. The theft created no lasting 
damage to the Regulars or to Behrman’s candidacy. The Independents, on the other 
hand, found no judicial relief to the Board of Contests’ decision and lost an appeal to 
gain a position on the ballot. Important supporters defected, but Tebault claimed he 
“would run to the bitter end” and that “thee [Independent] League is stronger than ever,” 
all evidence to the contrary.10
The Daily Picayune added to Tebault’s troubles by publishing a comparative 
analysis of municipal expenditures that contradicted the standard reform claim of ring 
profligacy. In a list o f per capita expenditures in major cities, New Orleans ranked near 
the bottom at $20.93. The highest expenditures were in Boston ($48.52), New York 
($43.39), and Washington, D.C. ($37.84). No one made the obvious point that low 
expenditures reflected a lack of necessary public investment. But the reform elements
9 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 182; Daily Picayune, September 6, 
1908; September 8, 1908,4.
10Daily Picayune, September 11, 1908, 1; September 20, 1908, 5.
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o f the city had for so long preached the necessity of frugality that the statistics undercut 
any argument for a change in administration. The statistics also showed the city was not 
among the highest in indebtedness as well.
On October 3, 1908, the Independents lost another court challenge of the 
decision that denied its candidate a place on the ballot. Undeterred, the group issued its 
platform and vowed to fight on. Tebault promised the use “o f white labor for all public 
works on the levees and handling commerce for New Orleans,” and the Independents’ 
platform “encourage [d] all negroes to return to cane, rice, com and cotton fields o f 
Louisiana.” Although reluctant to reverse progress toward clean water, it also defended 
“the rights [of citizens] to use cisterns” and committed the Independents to the efficient 
management o f public utilities. But very few took Tebault’s campaign seriously. Late 
in October, the Supreme Court o f Louisiana once again ruled against the Independents. 
Tebault reminded the voters that a write-in vote remained an option, but on election day, 
the insurgents drew only a few votes. Tebault recorded only eighty-nine votes, a 
Socialist candidate 270 votes, and Behrman 26,897.11
The Regulars victory overshadowed defeat of the national Democratic ticket.
The Daily Picayune interpreted the presidential race as a contest between monopoly 
power and the people, and proclaimed the “Trust Kings [were] Out for Taft.” City 
candidates unopposed in the general election turned over surplus funds to the 
organization for use in the presidential race. Regular John Fitzpatrick managed fund
11 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 182-186; Daily Picayune, September 
20, 1908, 5; October 4,1908, 5.
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raising for the Bryan campaign and asked the Mayor to recommend “ a reliable man to 
canvass for Bryan.” Fitzpatrick confidently predicted the election of Bryan was “more 
probable every day.” The Mayor personally contributed $100.00 to the fund. Although 
the Democrats easily carried the city and the state, Taft won the national race.12
In reporting Behrman’s victory, the Daily Picayune offered a flattering recap of 
Behrman’s career and an assessment of his temperament. “His disposition [is] most 
genial and he is charitable to a fault.” Two weeks after the election, the paper paid 
tribute to his hands-on management style in an article titled “How the Mayor Does It.” 
The paper cited two letters from the Mayor to members of his administration in response 
to citizen complaints. The letter to Superintendent Earl of the Sewerage and Water 
Board began “I met a delegation o f citizens” and went on to describe the need to 
maintain the Melpomene Canal. The other communication went to Commissioner 
Smith of the Public Works Department and described the need for a foot bridge over the 
same canal at Roman Street. The Daily Picayune concluded “that there will be action 
commenced after receipt of the letters may be assured.” Behrman paid tribute to the 
outgoing council, issued a challenge to the new council to continue his first term’s 
policies, and “after the hurrah and the celebration were over,” the Mayor later recalled,
“I went back to work.”13
12 Fitzpatrick to Behrman, August 18, 1908; Behrman secretary (W.P. Ball) to 
Robert Ewing, September 17, 1908; Daily Picayune, October 29, 1908, 12; November 
4, 1908, 1.
13 Behrman to City Council, December 5, 1908(?) (no date provided), Mayor’s 
Correspondence; Behrman to City Council, December 8,1908, Mayor’s 
Correspondence; Daily Picayune, November 4, 1908, 1; November 19, 1908, 5.
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At the first meeting o f the new council, Behrman reported on the auditors’ 
analysis of the municipal bookkeeping system and asked the council to support reform. 
The press paid tribute to the Mayor’s experience and accomplishments and the initial 
meeting of the council. The Daily Picayune noted the election o f the same set of 
officers who had served the previous four years, a “remarkable tribute to the general 
efficiency of city government.” Less generously, the Times-Democrat took issue with 
Behrman’s characterization of “a practically unanimous vote of the people.” “It is true 
that there was no opposition, b u t . . .  political conditions destroyed any chance for 
organization in opposition to the ring.” The anti-ring paper went on to give Behrman 
credit for his knowledge of city government and “for the investigation initiated by him 
to find the financial status o f the various city departments.”14
A more tangible tribute awaited Behrman upon his return from a Washington, 
D.C., conference on December 18, 1908. Over 150 colleagues greeted him at his home, 
held a banquet in his honor, and presented the Mayor with a magnificent silver service, 
“243 pieces . . .  worth $1,000.” The group lauded the Mayor “for his loyalty to the 
Democratic Party,” his hard work to advance “up from the ranks,” and his service as 
Mayor, including school construction and public utilities. Former Mayor Fitzpatrick, 
Choctaw Club leader and state tax collector, generously proclaimed Behrman “the 
greatest Mayor of all time.”ls
14 Daily Picayune, December 8, 1908, 5; Times-Democrat, December 8, 1908, 
quoted in Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 188-192.
15 Daily Picayune, December 19, 1908.
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Political events soon intraded on the Regulars’ victory celebrations. Robert 
Davey, charter member of the Choctaw Club and Member of Congress for the Second 
Congressional District o f Louisiana, died in late December, 1908. Speculation about a 
successor began immediately and centered on City Attorney Gilmore, Lieutenant 
Governor Paul Lambremont, and Tenth Ward leader Robert Ewing. Gilmore declared 
his candidacy on January 1, 1909. His reform background in the Shakspeare and Flower 
administrations had been forgiven by his loyalty to the Regulars since his 1899 election 
as City Attorney. He had no opposition in his recent reelection campaign. Within two 
days the Regulars affirmed his selection. Behrman personally chose Judge Isaiah D. 
Moore to succeed Gilmore as City Attorney. Gilmore had served the city as a firm 
believer in public ownership and carried the city’s cases against the railroads and the 
private utility companies. Even after his election to Congress, Behrman called upon his 
friend to argue cases on behalf of the city.16
Matthew Schott, biographer of John Parker, characterizes Behrman’s second 
term as one in which the city organization drew apart from the reform and commercial 
elements of the city. Specific issues arose to create conflict between the factions, and 
subsequent political developments increased the perception of a break between the 
groups. But most of the Mayor’s second term followed the trends of his first. The 
connections between the Mayor and the business community remained strong as he 
strove to finish public work projects, upgrade the appearance of the city, and promote
16 Daily Picayune, December 27, 1908, 1,6; January 2, 1909, 2; January 4, 1909, 
7; May 23,1909. See Chapter VIII for Gilmore’s role in the Public Belt Railroad cases.
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New Orleans on the regional and national scene. Political and electoral differences 
persisted and new ones would emerge. But on the essential elements o f the consensus in 
favor of progressive civic development, Behrman and the commercial elite shared the 
same agenda.17
As Behrman’s second term began, routine administrative and policy matters 
absorbed the Mayor’s attention. He pursued delinquent payments from street railroads 
to fulfill their obligations under the terms of city franchises. Sensitive to criticism from 
the Times-Democrat, he demanded testimony from a reporter who interviewed an 
alleged deadhead employee of the Dock Board. Informed of a potential scandal at the 
House of Detention, the Mayor investigated and found that “Captain Morris Picheloup .
. .  [was] using prisoners for personal business.” The Mayor referred the matter to 
Commissioner of Police and Public Buildings, Alex Pujol, and the captain was 
suspended. Behrman also appealed to the District Attorney to investigate rumors of 
wrongdoing in other city departments. The Mayor echoed the concerns o f the Board of 
Trade regarding high fire insurance rates in New Orleans and demanded the council 
begin an investigation. In late January, 1909, the Mayor appealed to U.S. Senators 
Murphy Foster and Samuel McEnery to intervene in Congress to “preserve the naval 
station at New Orleans.” Together, these actions illustrated Behrman’s conception of 
his role as Mayor in an active government: careful accountability in the expenditure of
17 Schott, “John M. Parker, 107-108.
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public funds, regulation of private industry under franchise agreements, and promotion 
of economic development.18
Less lofty aspects of the Mayor’s jobs also demanded Behrman’s attention. His 
responsibilities as chief executive and political leader demanded constant attention to 
the requirements of patronage. Behrman often prevailed upon subordinates and other 
political figures to employ persons he recommended. The Mayor sent a list o f eleven 
names to Sewerage and Water Board Superintendent Earl, suggesting they might “be 
used as laborers. They are worthy and deserving.” He forwarded to Governor Sanders 
the letter of a mutual friend and recommended that Sanders “issue to him a commission 
and make him happy.” Even in a letter to his daughter, vacationing in Mississippi, 
patronage questions intruded. He could get not a job with the Public Belt Railroad for a 
Mississippi resident, the Mayor wrote. The law required all employees o f that public 
agency to be Louisiana voters. But he suggested an alternative. “I may be able to get 
him on the streetcars as a conductor or motorman. Let me know what he thinks.”19
The progressive trend toward regulation of morals became an immediate concern 
to the Mayor in 1909. The Locke Law outlawing race track gambling and the Gay-
18 Behrman to Editor, Times-Democrat, December 12, 1908, Mayor’s 
Correspondence; Behrman to Alex Pujol, January 6, 1909, Mayor’s Correspondence; 
Behrman to City Council, January 12, 1909, Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to 
McEnery and Foster, January 25, 1909, Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily Picayune, 
January 13, 1909, 4; January 24,1909, 8.
19 Behrman to Superintendent Earl, Sewerage and Water Board, January 17,
1909, Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to Governor Sanders, February 25, 1909, 
Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to Nellie Behrman, September 8, 1908, Mayor’s 
Correspondence.
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Shattuck Law regulating bar rooms went into effect at the start of the year. Behrman 
opposed both efforts, but was bound to enforce the laws. In a  letter to W. J. O’Connor, 
Inspector of Police, Behrman detailed the elements of “Shattuck-Gay” that required 
enforcement, particularly the prohibition against issuing liquor licenses to women, and 
allowing any “woman, girl or minor” to “serve in any bar room.” Behrman had little 
use for prohibition, but remained polite to his constituents who thought otherwise. To 
one such voter, Behrman expressed regret that “he would be unable to attend the annual 
meeting of the Carrie Nation Club.” Regarding the anti-gambling Locke Law, Behrman 
asserted it would not suppress gambling, but would drive the practice off o f the 
legitimate tracks and into the community at large where “ten times the size of the police 
force” could not suppress it.20
Some businessmen shared Behrman’s concerns and made a connection between 
laws to control behavior and the economic condition of the city. On January 5, 1909, 
B.C. C as anas organized a meeting at the Grunewald Hotel and formed the Business 
Men’s League to combat the perception that New Orleans had become “ultra 
puritanical.” Such attitudes, Casanas feared, contributed to a depression in the local 
economy and low employment:
20 Behrman to W. J. O’Connor, January 2,1909, Mayor’s Correspondence; 
Behrman to Louis Ochs, February 16, 1909, Mayor’s Correspondence; Kemp, Martin 
Behrman o f  New Orleans, 231-239. Behrman’s attitude toward prohibition can be 
inferred from a telegram to Governor Sanders at Vicksburg, Mississippi, October 28, 
1909. The Governor was on his way to New Orleans and Behrman sent greetings. “My 
sympathy is extended to the near-beer sufferers. Console yourselves with the 
knowledge that oceans of the real stuff awaits your arrival here.” Behrman to Sanders, 
October 28, 1909, Mayor’s Correspondence.
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These injurious effects have been produced by an erroneous report that has gone 
abroad that the people of New Orleans are becoming ultrapuritanical and that 
they have passed and would still further pass drastic blue laws that would curtail 
the just liberties of its citizens and make penal what has hitherto been considered 
legitimate occupations and innocent amusement.21
The Business Men’s League was not the only commercial association mindful of 
the New Orleans economy. The 1909 annual meeting of the Progressive Union 
highlighted the group’s achievements and praised the Mayor for his “Buy at Home 
Campaign” among city departments. But the mutual congratulations could not hide 
apprehension about the city’s economy. The previous year, members agreed, “had been 
one of business stagnation,” and President Philip Werlein promised efforts to bring 
more business to New Orleans. The national financial panic and recession affected all 
city businesses. Shipments declined in the port, the street railroad company faced 
bankruptcy, and the city experienced difficulties in leasing property and selling 
franchises. Both the Progressive Union and the Business Men’s League sought 
additional advertising for the city, increased expenditures for promotional literature, and 
the installation of a natural gas pipeline franchise to boost the local economy. The 
Progressive Union fought adverse economic conditions with a campaign to identify 
New Orleans as the “Winter Capital of America” in the hopes of attracting tourists. The 
Businessmen’s League lobbied for the restoration of winter horse racing and organized 
underwriting for the revival of the French Opera. Fearful of the effects o f adverse
21 Business Men’s League, Board of Directors Meeting, January 22, 1909, 
Minutes, Reports and Related Miscellany, Business Men’s League, New Orleans, 1909- 
1911, University of New Orleans, Earl K. Long Library, Special Collections (hereinafter 
cited as BML Minutes); Daily Picayune, January 6, 1909, 11.
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legislation on the city’s economy, the group issued a statement of opposition to calls for 
“the complete suppression o f the liquor traffic in the state and other blue law 
legislation.”22
The commercial and political leadership o f New Orleans had built up the 
physical infrastructure of the city during the previous decade. The victory over yellow 
fever and a strong building boom reassured city leaders who feared losing place among 
the great cities of the nation. But 1907-1909 proved a difficult time, and the city sought 
a variety o f solutions . Press comment advocated increased manufacturing in the city as 
the path to economic growth. Businessman John M. Parker looked beyond the city and 
promoted regional growth through the Southern Commercial Congress. City leaders 
reached out to attract conventions and professional meetings to New Orleans, confident 
that investment would soon follow visitors once the progressive nature of the city were 
discovered. Special attention focused on the river and the port as the sources of 
commerce, wealth, and international status. News that the city would host the Lakes-to- 
the-Gulf Deep Waterway Convention encouraged city businessmen to view New 
Orleans as a commercial leader. The 1910 convention of the American Water Works 
Association gave the city an occasion to show off its new water purification plant and 
distribution system.23
22 Progressive Union Minutes, Annual Report o f Activities in 1908 by M. B. 
Trevezant, Secretary/Manager, January 11, 1908; Board of Directors, BML Minutes, 
January 22,1909; Board of Directors, BML Minutes, March 9,1909; Daily Picayune, 
January 11, 1909, 5; March 3, 1909, 4; March 25, 1909, 5.
23 Progressive Union Minutes, Board of Directors, April 1, 1909; Progressive 
Union Minutes, Monthly Report o f Secretary/Manager, May, 1909; Daily Picayune,
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Mayor Behrman retained a central role in the promotion of the city as well as in 
the management of the major public works projects. Through 1910, he continued to 
serve on the Board of Directors of the Progressive Union, although his attendance at 
Board meetings declined. After receiving a number of citizen complaints, he urged the 
Sewerage and Water Board to review the new water rates. He also worked tirelessly for 
the sale of bonds to finish the water and drainage systems, although adverse financial 
conditions allowed only $1,000,000 of the potential $8,000,000 to be sold. The city’s 
efforts to change its method o f garbage disposal made progress when the Public Belt 
Railroad agreed to haul garbage to a landfill. Eager for the city to expand, the Mayor 
argued before the city Council on behalf of the New Orleans Land Company, which had 
opened the city to the north and developed the suburb of Lakeview. Behrman supported 
the company in its request for an extension of city lighting, and cited both the work 
performed in building streets and draining land and the company’s record in paying 
taxes.24
In the summer of 1909, the Mayor took a long vacation to the West. During his 
travels, he visited with mayors of large cities and exchanged information on items of 
mutual interest. In his absence, Acting Mayor McRacken filled in as chief executive, 
but stayed in close touch with the Mayor. At Behrman’s instructions, McRacken
April 2, 1909, 4; April 4, 1909, 4; June 10, 1907.
24 Daily Picayune, May 26,1909, 12; June 11,1909, 15; June 12,1909, 5; June 
25, 1909, 5; June 26, 1909, 5; Behrman to Hugh McCloskey, Dock Board, June 7, 1909, 
Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to Public Belt Railroad Commission, June 7, 1909, 
Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to City Council, July 6, 1909, Mayor’s 
Correspondence.
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contacted Louisiana members o f  Congress to promote the immigration station, which 
Congressman Gilmore announced would be approved. The site o f the station was in 
Algiers, Behrman’s home, and he took particular interest in the project. The Progressive 
Union maintained a high level o f activity, even during the hot summer months. The 
group attempted to improve sanitation by hiring an inspector at a salary of $75 per 
month. The experiment only lasted three months. Upset at numerous complaints over 
the inspector’s zealousness, the Board of Directors fired him in August. Both the 
Progressive Union and the Business Men’s League worked on city promotion. The 
Union planned a conference matching rural buyers with New Orleans dealers, and the 
League published a pamphlet “advertising New Orleans as a commercial center.”25
The Mayor returned to New Orleans in late August. He praised the city of 
Seattle, which he had just visited, as “progressive” and cited its tripling of population in 
just ten years. Eager to see similar growth in New Orleans, the Mayor quickly resumed 
his duties. He wrote to A.C. Wuerple, President of the New Orleans Land Company, 
developers o f the north New Orleans area known as Lakeview, acknowledging the 
company’s offer of a site for a new school “not less than $25,000 in value.” Behrman 
also joined the Progressive Union’s effort to raise money to entertain the delegates o f 
the upcoming Lakes-to-the-Gulf Deep Waterway Association and pressed city 
departments to keep the city clean for the visitors to New Orleans. He emphasized his
25 Daily Picayune, June 29,1909, 5; July 11,1909, 8; July 11,1908, Section II, 
15; July 29, 1909, 5; August 8, 1909, 5; Acting Mayor McRacken to Representatives 
Gilmore and Estopinal and to Senator Foster, July 20,1909. The immigration site did 
not obtain final approval until December, 1909.
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message by inspecting areas of the city without prior warning, looking for weeds, 
clogged gutters, and other unsightly problems.26
City council business had accumulated during the Mayor’s absence. Many 
pending actions reflected the concerns o f progressive sensibilities. Mindful of the threat 
o f disease-bearing mosquitos, the council voted to fumigate local schools prior to the 
return of students from summer vacation. At the council’s urging, a citizens’ committee 
began to raise funds for the establishment of public baths. “Among the most prevalent 
reform endeavors in southern towns and cities were clean-up and local improvement 
campaigns,” and New Orleans joined the trend. The council heard from proponents of 
the city beautiful movement, who asked for funds to establish a tree nursery. Organized 
into a new city Parking [Park] Commission, the movement at first wanted to locate the 
new nursery in the New Orleans City Park. The Mayor asked former Mayor Paul 
Capdevielle, President o f the City Park Improvement Association, to hear the 
Commission request, but the meeting did not go well. Although the council initially 
insisted that City Park surrender fifteen acres for the nursery, resistance from the 
influential association led the council to reserve its decision. At the Mayor’s urging, the 
council acquired sufficient land in another part of the city and located the nursery at the 
new site. The resolution of the issue was typical of Behrman’s political skill. He 
responded to the demands of the city beautiful movement, deferred to the City Park
26 Daily Picayune, August 23, 1909, 3, 5; August 24, 1909, 5; August 28, 1909, 
4; Behrman to A.C. Wuerple, August 25, 1909, Mayor’s Correspondence.
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Improvement Association, and still managed to find an alternative method to satisfy the 
parties.27
Behrman’s political skills led him safely through another problem in September
1909. Business interests upset over high fire insurance rates appealed to the Board of 
Trade, which issued a report to the Mayor. One of the charges contained in the report 
identified “the political influence in the organization and control of the Fire 
Department.” The report recommended “a reorganization of the Board o f Fire 
Commissioners,” that would free “the department. . .  from the machinations o f ward 
bosses.” The strong language came from a committee that included James Porch, the 
Mayor’s colleague on the Public Belt Com m ission. The connection between the 
organization of the Fire Department and insurance rates was tenuous, and Behrman 
could have fought the committee’s conclusions and defended his administration.
Instead, Behrman thanked the Board of Trade for its work and accepted structural 
change in the department. He pressed the city council and local architects to prepare a 
new building code, and, by the end of the year, shared credit with the Board o f  Trade as 
insurance companies agreed to reductions in premiums of nearly forty percent.
Behrman’s actions in the fire insurance controversy coincided with the interests of the 
city’s commercial classes, but nothing in Behrman’s background nor his outlook on 
politics suggested to the Mayor that those interests were in any way different from the
27 Behrman to Paul Capdevielle, August 27,1909, Mayor’s Correspondence; 
Behrman to City Council, October 12, 1909, Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily Picayune, 
August 25, 1909, 5; October 13, 1909, 8; October 18,1909, 5; December 7, 1909, 6; 
Grantham, Southern Progressivism, 288-289.
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interests of the city or its citizens. The booster spirit o f  the commercial elite coincided 
with the views of Behrman and the Regulars. Only on rare occasions did the views of 
the two groups diverge.28
There was no divergence when it came to promoting the economic future of the 
city. In the fall o f 1909, both the business and political leadership mobilized to support 
the Lakes-to-the-Gulf Deep Waterways Convention. The meeting fulfilled multiple city 
goals: promotion of Mississippi River trade, appropriation of federal funds for dredging 
and harbor improvements, and elevation of New Orleans to a leadership position among 
commercial cities along the great river. A hospitality fund of more than $20,000 and 
preferential rates on railroads made visitors welcome. Word that President Taft would 
visit the convention added luster to the event and provided an opportunity to directly 
approach the Chief Executive on behalf of city interests, such as the immigration 
station. The presidential visit also became an occasion for the city to boast of its recent 
improvements. Plumbing contractor C. C. Hartwell suggested in an advertisement that 
“there are many interesting things in and around the Crescent City to show the 
President, and none more important than the great sewerage and water system.”
28 Behrman to C.H. Ellis, President, Board of Trade, September 13, 1909, 
Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily Picayune, September 12,1909, Section I, 8; December 
19, 1909,10; December 25, 1909, 11. Behrman submitted a new building code to the 
city council in June 1910. Behrman to City Council, June 28,1910, Mayor’s 
Correspondence.
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Hartwell added to those among readers who might need his services, “Are you 
connected?”29
After the weeks of buildup, the visit itself prove anticlimactic. The President 
approached New Orleans by way of the Mississippi River, and the Daily Picayune hired 
a boat to deliver copies of the newspaper to the Presidential party. A navy fleet 
accompanied the President, but the flotilla ran four hours behind schedule. Parade 
Chairman John P. Sullivan ordered the ceremonies to start, and the parade proceeded 
without the honored guest while onlookers called out “Where’s Taft?” The President 
arrived late, but delivered speeches at the Jesuit College and at Tulane University. 
Before he departed the next day, Taft agreed to help the port, visited the potential site of 
the long-planned immigration station, and endorsed the aims of the Lakes-to-the-Gulf 
Deep Waterways Convention.30
The convention highlighted the connection between New Orleans and the 
Mississippi Valley. But the cities commercial interests also display strong support of 
Southern regional interests. John Parker worked to gain financial support for the 
Southern Commercial Congress, founded in 1908 with the slogan “A Greater Nation 
through a Greater South.” In addition to promoting tariff protection for southern
29 Daily Picayune, September 1, 1909, Section V, 1; September 2, 1909; 
September 26, 1909; October 13,1909. Taft’s visit was his second to New Orleans. As 
President elect in February, 1909, Taft attended a Carnival ball in New Orleans, played 
golf, and delivered a speech to the residents of the Confederate Soldiers’ Home.
30 Financial Statement, Lakes-to-the-Gulf Deep Waterway Convention, 
Progressive Union Minutes, December 1,1909; Daily Picayune, October 31, 1909, 1; 
November 1, 1909, 1. The performance of the French Opera company cost $1,027; the 
Stag Smoker totaled $1,373.
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products, the Congress supported improvements to transportation infrastructure, 
including river dredging and harbor improvements. The New Orleans Progressive 
Union joined with the Congress. Responding to regional loyalty, the Union also worked 
to alter the federal government’s design plan for the new post office in New Orleans. 
Instead o f Indiana limestone, the Union and other city organizations lobbied for 
“improved material” and eventually setded on Georgia marble as a substitute. A year 
later, the lobbying succeeded, and the post office received the “finer,” Southern 
material.31
The sheer volume of civic voluntary activity, lobbying, fund raising, and 
municipal promotion was impressive. But duplication of efforts and the fatigue brought 
on by constant pleading for dues, subscriptions, and donations wore on members of the 
business community. During 1909 and 1910, the Progressive Union raised funds—in 
excess o f normal dues—for convention hospitality, for a clean city campaign, and for 
special activities for city merchants. The Union also considered proposals to underwrite 
the French Opera season as well as to underwrite the Southern Commercial Congress. 
Business Men’s League President Casanas authorized agents to solicit for membei ships 
in the BML and, at the same time, chaired a committee city to raise funds for public 
baths. The Anti-Tuberculosis League and the Good Roads Association also appealed to
31 Board of Directors, Progressive Union Minutes, November 11, 1909; 
Secretary/Manager’s Report, Progressive Union Minutes, December, 1910; Behrman to 
John M. Parker, November 4, 1909, Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily Picayune, 
December 1, 1909; December 12,1909. The post office subsequently moved to a new 
location, but the building remains, now the site of the Internal Revenue Service.
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the public for funds. And in 1910, fund raising for the proposed Panama Exposition 
demanded attention. Some participants in all of these efforts complained, and a Joint 
Conference met in late 1909 to consider merging at least some of the organizations. No 
progress resulted, and the various exchanges and associations remained independent.32
On issues of good works, boosterism, and public improvements , the business 
community had acted with virtual unanimity . But its solidarity broke down when the 
interests of one business group collided with another. In those instances, the Mayor 
either stayed out o f the dispute or chose to support the position most likely to benefit the 
wider public. Two controversies in late 1909 and 1910 illustrated the potential for 
disagreement between business groups. In one instance, President W. B. Thompson 
cited the findings o f a Cotton Exchange committee that the railroads bringing cotton to 
New Orleans for overseas shipment practiced rate discrimination. In addition to his role 
as President of the Cotton Exchange (a position to which he was reelected in December 
1909), Thompson was one of the Exchange’s representative to the Public Belt Railroad 
Commission. Only one month earlier, he succeeded James Porch as President Pro Tern 
of that body. Railroad and steamship lines (which enjoyed cooperative agreements on 
rates) denied Thompson’s assertions o f discrimination, but relations between the 
Exchange and the transportation companies remained tense.33
32 Executive Committee, BML Minutes, February 2,1909; Progressive Union 
Minutes, November 11, 1909; Daily Picayune, September 1, 1909, Section n , 4; 
September 12, 1909; September 14,1909; November 12, 1909, 8.
22Daily Picayune, November 23,1909, 6; November 28,1909,4; December 12, 
1909, 5; December 12, 1909, 5.
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Early in 1910, in another example of a breakdown in the normally placid 
relations among business interests and government, private investors announced plans to 
build a cotton warehouse on the river front, but outside of the jurisdiction o f New 
Orleans. The plan contradicted the recommendations made by Thompson, and members 
o f the Dock Board objected to the plan as well. President Hugh McCloskey assured 
Behrman that “the Board of Port Commissioners would use every effort” to keep cotton 
wharves in the city. The suspicion that the new facility would favor the Illinois Central 
Railroad to the detriment of other lines generated opposition to the plan as well.
Behrman agreed that the plan threatened the city’s interests and mobilized the Regular 
organization’s resources in the legislation to help in the fight. The Mayor also 
supported Dock Board actions to support the imports o f coffee into New Orleans by 
expanding public warehouse facilities, including the construction of two-story steel 
sheds along the stretch of wharves dedicated to the handling of coffee imports. The 
construction established a precedent for subsequent Dock Board actions that completed 
not only a public cotton warehouse, but a public grain elevator as well.34
The two cases—alleged railroad discrimination and public versus private 
warehouse facilities—demonstrated that business interests were not monolithic. The 
ethic of private enterprise occasionally came into conflict with public interests. Not 
only Behrman, but also public-spirited businessmen such as Thompson argued for the
34 Times Democrat, January 4, 1910; Daily Picayune, January 5, 1910, 6;
January 13,1910, 5; February 17, 1910, 6; February 25,1910,4; Hugh McCloskey, 
President, Dock Board to Behrman, January 3, 1910, Behrman Papers. See Chapter VII 
for details o f the private versus public warehouse controversy.
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public interest in such cases. The decision of businessmen to advocate for public
facilities did not deny the basis of private enterprise, but asserted that in particular
instances a public entity served business interests—widely defined—better than a single
corporation or combination. The essence of the consensus for progressive civic
development depended on the acceptance of a strong public role in the promotion of the
city’s economic future.
The business community remained respectful of the Mayor’s record in spite of
occasional disagreements. In February 1910, Sol Wexler of the Whitney Bank,
provided his thoughts on government to the Daily Picayune. Only a year earlier,
Wexler had clashed with the Mayor over a Sewerage and Water Board bond issue, but
the incident had no lasting effect. “The first thing necessary to make a  city great,”
Wexler said, “is that it shall be well governed. In this we are past fortunate for in Mayor
Behrman we have an administration that has few equals in the whole country.” The
Daily Picayune continued its defense of municipal operations and Behrman’s role. The
paper argued that the important distinction in the public ownership debate was not
government versus private enterprise, but political versus business principles.
While municipal control has proved wasteful in many cities, this has been due 
not to the fact o f municipal control but to the attempt to manage these utilities 
along political instead of along business lines. There is no more reason why 
municipal control should not prove successful than would ordinary private 
control, provided only the same business principles are applied in both cases.
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The commercial leadership of New Orleans accepted and, on occasion, welcomed 
Regular political leadership because business principles coexisted with politics in the 
new governmental agencies of the progressive era35
Unfortunately for Behrman, his acceptance by the commercial leadership was 
not matched by those citizens eager to improve the New Orleans moral climate. The 
future of Storyville, the city’s “restricted,” district, became an issue in early 1910. The 
Era Club announced it would join with the Progressive Union “to have the 
neighborhood surrounding the terminal depot purged of the present conditions which 
makes entry into the city a disgrace to our citizens.” Perhaps not coincidentally, the 
attack on Storyville coincided with a Progressive Union membership drive. The two 
groups objected to the fact that trains entering the terminal passed along the southern 
border of Storyville, and passengers not heeding the conductor’s discreet warning could 
view the places of business located along that section of Basin Street. The Committee 
on Municipal Affairs issued a report to the Progressive Union “complaining of houses in 
Storyville fronting Basin Street near the terminal” and submitted photographs of the 
situation. Behrman declined to take action. He stated that “the railroads knew of 
Storyville prior to locating [their] terminal,” and he denied the existence o f “a threat to 
public morals.” He noted that no one from the railroads had filed a complaint, and he 
preferred a policy that would keep the houses in a restricted zone.36
35 Daily Picayune, February 1, 1910, 6.
36 Daily Picayune, February 13,1910, 4; February 24, 1910, 15; March 20, 1910; 
Report from Committee on Municipal Affairs, Progressive Union Minutes, March 8, 
1910; Behrman to President and Board of Directors, Progressive Union, March 18,
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The standoff between Behrman and those opposed to Storyville did not end the 
controversy over the regulation of morals. The Business Men’s League, formed in 
opposition to “puritanizing,” assisted the Mayor in his attempts to reduce the effects of 
laws regulating gambling and bar rooms. He also faced a growing prohibition 
movement in the state. In March 1910, the Business Men’s League received notice of 
Anti-Saloon League activities in the upcoming session of the legislature. The Business 
Men’s League took the lead in organizing the New Orleans commercial exchanges 
against prohibition. The Mayor warned that prohibition would cause a loss of 
$1,000,000 in tax revenue and make it “almost certainly impossible to bring the 
proposed Panama Exposition to New Orleans.” Responding to a more broadly-based 
community membership, the Progressive Union declined to join the Business Men’s 
League in opposition to prohibition.37
Behrman may have tolerated gambling and drink, but on the subject of race he 
was more likely to seek social control. In this respect, the Mayor’s views corresponded 
with most southern progressives. In July 1910, black heavyweight John Johnson 
defeated a white opponent. Racial unrest broke out in several cities where, in the words 
of the Daily Picayune, “negroes became obstreperous.” “It is to the credit o f New 
Orleans,” the paper continued, “that nothing of the sort happened here” and consoled its 
readers with the assertion that it was “only in the matter of brute force, muscular power
1910, Mayor’s Correspondence; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 304.
37 Executive Committee, BML Minutes, March 19, 1910; Special Meeting,
Board of Directors, Progressive Union Minutes, April 2, 1910.
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and endurance that the negro is the equal of the white.” The Progressive Union wrote 
the Mayor, urged him to ban motion pictures of the fight, and warned that “the proven 
result o f this fight has been assaults, race clashes and disturbances and the inflammation 
excited by these can easily lead to rape and lynching.” Behrman promptly responded 
that he agreed with the Union’s position on the fight and had already prohibited the 
motion pictures. When word spread o f the Mayor’s actions, he received congratulations 
for the ban. Some months later, however, a riverboat company showed the film on one 
o f its vessels. The river was under federal jurisdiction and outside o f the Mayor’s 
prohibitions. New Orleans escaped racial unrest over the Johnson fight, but unrest of a 
different sort emerged.38
Regardless o f individual views of morality and its effects upon business, all 
factions in the city united behind one great cause in 1910—the effort to have the federal 
government designate New Orleans as the site for the 1915 celebration of the opening of 
the Panama Canal. The effort to obtain the exposition for New Orleans revealed that 
political factions could join together on issues they perceived as important to the city’s 
stature and future. Proponents o f both Regular and reform factions supported the 
exposition and worked to acquire it for New Orleans. In addition, the efforts to 
convince the federal government illustrated what the New Orleans leadership thought of 
its own city. In the competition with San Francisco for the exposition, the arguments
38 Board of Directors, Progressive Union Minutes, July, 1910; Behrman to Philip 
Werlein, President, Progressive Union, July 8, 1910, Mayor’s Correspondence; John 
Janvier to Behrman, July 8,1910, Behrman Papers; Daily Picayune, July 5,1910, 8; 
January 19,1911, 4.
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and responses often showed the strengths and weaknesses o f the Crescent City. Finally, 
the exposition campaign demonstrated both the limitations o f voluntary efforts and the 
extent to which businessmen depended upon the direct financial and political support of 
local and state government.39
The first committee in charge o f the exposition promotion consisted of twenty- 
five prominent citizens appointed by the Mayor. By early 1910, the committee had 
given way to an exposition company o f which Janvier, Behrman, and others were 
directors. Initial attempts to fund the promotional campaign depended upon private 
enterprise. The company attempted to raise the necessary funds for the exposition 
through stock offerings, but the subscriptions fell far short. Word reached New Orleans 
that San Francisco would compete for the exposition and had raised substantial funds. 
Behrman concluded that the city must take the lead in transforming the exposition 
efforts into a public endeavor. On March 2, 1910, the exposition leadership announced 
that at the next session of the legislature, the city would seek “a small tax from the state” 
to fund the 1915 exposition.40
In addition to public funding, Behrman mobilized personal lobbying on behalf of 
the exposition. On March 5,1910, he appointed a group o f  businessmen who traveled 
to Washington, D. C., to promote New Orleans as the federally-approved site. Later in 
the month, the Mayor asked for a special meeting of the Progressive Union Board of
39 Daily Picayune, March 3, 1910, 1,3. See Chapter V for the beginning of the 
Panama Exposition effort.
40 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 239-243; Daily Picayune, December
23,1909, 5; March 3, 1910, 1,3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
322
Director in order to pass a resolution in support of the exposition efforts. The Directors 
agreed to the request and passed the resolution. The New Orleans Fat Man’s Club, 
“formed by fifty who met the 200 pounds prerequisite,” also endorsed the Panama 
Exposition and, for good measure, elected President Taft an honorary member of the 
club. After the return of the lobbying delegation from the nation’s capital, the Mayor 
helped to organize a mass meeting in New Orleans in support of the exposition. 
Governor Sanders attended, pledged the support o f the state towards the exposition tax, 
and listened to Behrman commit the city to its share o f the public funding.41
By June 1910, the exposition leadership organized the World’s Panama 
Exposition Company to carry on the fight. Charles Janvier served as Chairman of the 
Finance Committee, Sam Blum, an active member of the Business Men’s League, 
chaired the Publicity Committee, and insurance executive T. P. Thompson became 
chairman of the Executive Committee. The Progressive Union and the Business Men’ 
League assisted in organizing support among their memberships. Information from the 
state’s congressional delegation confirmed that Congress would select either San 
Francisco or New Orleans as the official exposition site, and that the choice would be 
made after Congress convened in December. The congressmen added that depth of 
financial commitment would be crucial and urged the company to spend the summer 
months securing substantial support. The tenor of the competition became clear when
41 Behrman to Senator McEnery, March 3,1910, Mayor’s Correspondence;
Board o f Directors, Progressive Union, March 28, 1910; Daily Picayune, March 6,
1910, 9; March 29,1910, 6; April 4, 1910, 5; April 8,1910,1.
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San Francisco newspapers began criticizing New Orleans’ climate and health 
conditions. The Daily Picayune promptly responded to the “slanderous and malignant 
attacks . . .  concerning the salubrity o f the climate of New Orleans and charging that 
summer temperatures are extreme.” The paper continued that “fevers [are] no longer a 
menace [in New Orleans], as is the oriental bubonic plague at San Francisco.” After 
defending the city’s health, the paper added that if there were any problem, it could be 
traced to “the increase in negro death rates.”42
The state legislature held its regular session in 1910, and the exposition played 
an important part in the deliberations. Behrman later recalled that the state’s prohibition 
lobby threatened to involve liquor regulation with the exposition tax, but Senator Joseph 
Voegtle of New Orleans defused the issue. A bond issue to support the exposition 
passed, and the legislature dedicated a three-eighths mill tax to service the bonds. To 
boost the city’s chances of success, the legislature passed a resolution to invite former 
President Theodore Roosevelt to take a position at the head of the exposition company. 
The city did well during the legislative session, but lost an important ally in the 
exposition fight when Senator McEnery died on June 28,1910. What had been a 
straightforward and noncontroversial process now became embroiled in the politics of 
senatorial succession.43
42 Board of Directors, Progressive Union Minutes, June 21, 1910; BML 
Minutes, August 1, 1910; Daily Picayune, June 19,1910, Section I, 1; June 24,1910, 8; 
June 25,1910, 8.
43 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 239-244.
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Immediate speculation about the successor to McEnery focused on the governor. 
However, Senator Foster and Governor Sanders both came from the same town. The 
election of Sanders would violate an unwritten law of Louisiana senatorial politics that 
dictated that the northern and southern sections of the state would each have a senator.
In spite of explicit threats that “North Louisiana would be heard from in the elections of 
1912,” the state legislature elected Sanders on July 6, 1910. Only twelve days later, 
after the adjournment of the legislature, Congressman Samuel Gilmore passed away. 
Behrman later noted that “the death started more politics,” and the organization quickly 
settled on H. Garland Dupre, Speaker of the House and Assistant City Attorney in New 
Orleans, as the successor. Dupre was only thirty-seven years old, but had attracted 
attention throughout the state, and, at the time of his selection, was considered a 
possible candidate for governor. Behrman recalled “that with the exposition bill 
pending in Congress, we needed a man of Dupre’s caliber.”44
The success of that bill depended not only upon congressional leadership, but 
also upon the level of financial support. When the backers of the San Francisco 
exposition “raised the stakes in Washington. . .  New Orleans had to respond.” The 
bond issue passed by the legislature proved insufficient, and the city requested a special 
session of the state legislature to impose an additional special tax on city property 
holders only. The directors of the exposition company offered to reimburse the state for
44 Behrman to City Council, July 26, 1910, Mayor’s Correspondence; Kemp, 
Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 246-247; Daily Picayune, July 19, 1910, 1; July 21,
1910.
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the expenses of the special session but, Governor Sanders declined the offer. The extra 
session took place in August, and members voted the new tax as requested. The Daily 
Picayune made a sophisticated argument for the tax by opposing free riders on the 
benefits of the exposition. The tax would “distribute a fair portion o f  the burden on 
property holders who will be greatly benefitted by the exposition but who have 
subscribed nothing to the fund.” The company leadership appreciated the extra funds, 
but feared the consequences of the impending turnover in the governor’s office when 
Sanders departed for Washington. After an appeal to the Governor signed by the 
company’s Board o f Directors (including Behrman), Sanders agreed to resign as senator. 
To counter a rumor that he was in line for a high-paying job with the exposition,
Sanders announced he would accept no such position. He made it clear that he would 
run for the Senate in the future. Acceding to the wishes of North Louisiana, Judge 
James R. Thornton o f Alexandria took the seat in the Senate. Mayor Behrman watched 
the events from a distance; he was in St. Paul, giving a speech on street paving at the 
League of American Municipalities. Behrman was happy to report that the association 
endorsed New Orleans as the site of the exposition.45
45 Special Meeting, Board of Directors, Progressive Union Minutes, July 30, 
1910; Board of Directors, BML Minutes, August 1, 1910; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  
New Orleans, 250-255; Daily Picayune, July 31, 1910, 1; August 1, 1910; August 15, 
1910, 6; August 25, 1910, August 27, 1910, 5; Martin Behrman, Street Paving Problem, 
Address by Honorable Martin Behrman, Mayor o f  New Orleans La., Fourteenth Annual 
convention of the League of American Municipalities, St. Paul, Minnesota, August 23 
to 26,1910, University o f New Orleans, Earl K. Long Library, Louisiana Collection.
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During the months of effort on the exposition, Behrman remained active in other 
aspects of municipal government. He led efforts to attract the Amateur Athletic Union 
competition to New Orleans, earning a Daily Picayune headline, “Progressive Chief 
Executive Heads the List.” Later in the year, he traveled to Chicago to convince the 
Knights Templar to bring their convention to the city. Though unsuccessful, he thought 
the effort repaid by the publicity the city received. Back home, he hosted officials from 
Camden, New Jersey, to examine the sewerage, water, and drainage systems. And in 
March, the city announced it would plant “blue grass . . .  on the mound o f the Clay 
statue to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of its unveiling.” The Clay statute had been 
moved to Lafayette Square during the Capdevielle administration because of increased 
street car traffic on Canal Street. Mindful o f the interests o f local businesses, Behrman 
promoted a “Buy at Home” campaign among city departments, though “he would not 
want the city to pay more money to get the material here then it could be bought for in 
the market generally.”46
In July 1910, in the midst of organizing efforts for the Panama exposition, the 
political opposition to Behrman and Sanders began to coalesce around familiar reform 
themes. The Charleston News and Courier published a lengthy editorial linking the 
issues o f political environment and the proposed exposition. The South Carolina 
newspaper claimed that “no city in the union is more completely at the mercy of an 
organized political machine than is New Orleans.” The paper acknowledged
46 Daily Picayune, February, 25, 1910, 12; March 15, 1901; March 22, 1910, 5.
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Behrman’s’s qualities as “an able and honest man” who “saved the machine in the last 
election.” But the editorial predicted “that New Orleans in the next election will make a 
vigorous effort to throw off the yoke [of the machine].” The New Orleans Times- 
Democrat picked up the theme and began to predict that the presence o f the machine 
would have dire effects on the city’s chances for the exposition. Seeking to counter the 
argument, the Daily Picayune published comparative statistics on national municipal 
expenditures, calling New Orleans “the most economically governed city.”47
Although political developments at all levels of government held the public 
attention in 1910, even greater interest focused on the continued fight for the honor of 
holding the Panama Exposition. The ballot on the November congressional elections 
included a state constitutional provision for the exposition tax. The amendment passed, 
supported by both the city and other state parishes. James L. Wright, secretary o f the 
World’s Panama Exposition Company, welcomed the vote and expressed his gratitude 
on Thanksgiving Day. “Never before in its history has New Orleans been so well 
advertised throughout the country, or her people so united on any proposition.” T. P. 
Thomson, Chairman of the exposition Executive Committee, noted that private funds 
and the proceeds of the public taxes would provided approximately $10,000,000 with 
which to lobby Congress for official designation as the exposition site. The New 
Orleans effort adopted the argument that the city provided the logical point for the 
exposition, convenient to the Panama Canal and to major United States population
47 Charleston New and Courier, quoted in Daily Picayune, July 26, 1910, 6; July
28,1910.
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centers. “The Logical Point” became the slogan for the publicity associated with the 
lobbying campaign. City stationary showed a map o f cities with New Orleans at the 
center. The exposition company published a series of pamphlets, each titled “The 
Logical Point,” for distribution to other cities and to members o f Congress.48
In December, 1910, Congress convened in Washington, D.C., and the House of 
Representatives Committee on Expositions took up the contest between New Orleans 
and San Francisco. Even the national railroads took sides. A report that the Southern 
Pacific favored San Francisco angered New Orleans politicians who had fought for 
favorable treatment for the trunk line. A large group o f New Orleans business and civic 
leaders traveled to the nation’s capitol to take part in the lobbying. Behrman joined the 
group in early December. Preliminary indications favored the Crescent City, and 
Chairman T. P. Thompson declared “victory in Washington is assured.” Not everyone 
thought that victory was worthwhile. A Wall Street Journal editorial claimed that the 
exposition would bring no real increase in wealth and concluded “we think Providence 
should inflict this cross upon New Orleans [because] San Francisco had her earthquake 
and fire.” The Daily Picayune answered that “such an exposition will bring into the 
state a vast concourse of people who have money to invest and are seeking opportunities
48 The Logical Point, Number 17, [n.d.], New Orleans Public Library, Louisiana 
Division; Daily Picayune, November 24, 1910, 5. Census results in 1910 revealed that 
New Orleans remained the largest city of the South, although its 1900 to 1910 rate of 
growth was a modest fourteen percent. The city’s population of 339,075 in 1901 
exceeded Louisville, the second largest city, by over 100,000. Atlanta, 154,839, had 
less than one-half of the population of New Orleans. Grantham, Southern 
Progressivism, Table 11,277.
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for such investment.” The paper later reported that the Harvard Law School football 
team, traveling in New Orleans, had endorsed the city as the best site for the exposition. 
In early January, a mild earthquake in the San Francisco area, and the resulting 
memories o f the 1906 disaster, provided the New Orleans delegation with ammunition 
against the selection o f the California city. To counter San Francisco warnings about 
New Orleans health conditions, the Daily Picayune reported on a war on rats in San 
Francisco as part of a an effort to reduce “the bubonic plague on the west coast.”49
A new delegation of New Orleans business leaders “stormed Washington” as the 
House committee began its work. Mayor Behrman, Cotton Exchange President W.B. 
Thompson, and Unitarian minister H.E. Gilchrist provided testimony on the first day of 
the hearings. To counter claims of labor trouble in the Crescent City, union leaders of 
New Orleans assured Congress that “labor conditions [in New Orleans] are eminently 
pleasant and satisfactory. The selection of the city of New Orleans as a site for a 
Panama Exposition would be of inestimable benefit and advantage not alone to the 
general public, but very largely to the laboring man and all labor unions here.” San 
Francisco added to the argument by claiming that construction jobs in New Orleans 
associated with the exposition would go to “negro mechanics.” New Orleans countered 
by publicizing the demand o f artists asked to exhibit at the exposition that the U.S.
49 Daily Picayune, December 2,1910,1; December 5, 1910, 5; December 12, 
1910, 5 , 8; January 5, 1911, 1; January 6. 1911, 6; January 9, 1911, 8.
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government would have to bear the cost of earthquake insurance should the event be 
held at San Francisco.50
The report of the House committee favored New Orleans by a vote of nine to six. 
Faced with defeat in the House, San Francisco representatives attempted to bypass 
normal Senate rules to expedite the process in that chamber, a move that New Orleans 
considered “treachery.” More worrisome for New Orleans was the intervention of 
President Taft, reported to be “working against New Orleans.” In a curious echo of 
Populist rhetoric, the Daily Picayune darkly suggested that “Taft can’t ignore powerful 
railroad combinations and Eastern syndicates.” Taft increase his pressure on 
Republican House members before the final vote, and the Daily Picayune complained 
that “Taft’s activities for San Francisco Are Notorious,” and that “President Taft, his 
Cabinet and Wall Street [are] Working Against New Orleans.” The presidential 
lobbying proved effective, and on January 31, 1911, the House voted 188 to 156 to 
reverse the committee recommendation. Subsequent information suggested that Taft 
had brokered a deal with California to support the exposition in San Francisco in 
exchange for withdrawal of anti-Japanese legislation in California, which threatened 
Taft foreign policy. Although at first New Orleans delegates vowed to fight in the 
Senate, the city soon accepted defeat. Acting Mayor McRacken telegraphed Behrman 
in Washington to offer condolences. “I can safely speak for the people of New Orleans
50 Acting Mayor McRacken and City Attorney I.D. Moore to Behrman, January 
11, 1911, Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily Picayune, January 10, 1911, 1; January 12,
1911,1; January 13,1911, 4; January 15, Section I, 6.
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in saying that your noble and untiring efforts in their behalf commend the admiration 
and excite the applause o f every man, woman and child in this community 
notwithstanding apparent defeat.” A subsequent report in the New Orleans press 
charged that San Francisco had obtained the exposition in part through the expenditure 
of over $100,000 for entertainment in Washington during the contest.51
Behrman returned to New Orleans several days after the defeat. The Daily 
Picayune had previously noted his absence by commenting “there has not been that 
spice and snap to the scene that is usual” and observing that City Hall awaited the 
Mayor’s return “as the big rains are after a long dry spell.” Grateful for the help 
received in Washington, Behrman and the Business Men’s League made plans to honor 
the Congressmen on the House committee who had supported New Orleans, especially 
Congressman Rodenberg of East St. Louis. Rodenberg agreed to visit New Orleans and 
paid tribute to its leadership. “I have never met a finer set o f men than those who 
represented New Orleans.” He offered hope that the city would get favorable treatment 
from Congress in the future “because o f the feeling among the members that new 
Orleans did not get what she was entitled to.” House committee members visited New 
Orleans several months later and received loving cups from the grateful city. In a 
private comment to Louisiana Senator Murphy Foster, Behrman expressed the opinion
51 Daily Picayune, January 21, 1911, 1; January23, 1911, 1; January24, 1911, 1; 
January 26, 1911, 1,8; January 29,1911, Section I, 1; January 31, 1911, 1; February, 1, 
1911, 1, 8; February 2, 1911, 1; February 3,1911, 1; February 4, 1911,1; February 5, 
1911, 1; March 8, 1911,4; March 25,1911,4; Acting Mayor McRacken to Behrman, 
January 21, 1911, Mayor’s Correspondence; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 
239-240.
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that San Francisco had “put up a dirty fight,” and relations with San Francisco remained 
strained as a result of the Washington contest. Tensions eased somewhat, however, 
after an exchange o f telegrams. The San Francisco organizers expressed “appreciation 
o f the chivalrous manner in which you have met a  very trying situation. [We] respect 
your abilities as fighters and organizers.” In the Mayor’s absence during the exposition 
contest, James Porch had become president of the Progressive Union, and, for the first 
time in over a decade, the Mayor was no longer on its Board of Directors. On the other 
hand, at the annual meeting o f the Choctaw Club, Behrman became a member of the 
club’s Board of Governors.52
The effort to gain the exposition produced several important residual effects.
The business and political leadership united behind a single effort, regardless of political 
affiliations. The city gained an awareness of its potential role in the commerce of 
Central and South America. Convinced that the city would benefit from increased 
efforts to attract visitors, the Progressive Union subsequently established a Convention 
and Tourist Bureau. The private funds raised by the exposition company were sought 
for permanent city exhibits, but the company liquidated its assets after plans proved 
impractical. Advertisements o f local retailers continued to refer to “the logical point,” 
and interest in Latin America led local executives to found the Pan American Life
52 Daily Picayune, February 3, 1911,4, 11; February 10, 1911, 5; February 14, 
1911,6; February 15,1911,9; Progressive Union Annual Meeting, January 9,1911, 
Progressive Union Minutes; Choctaw Club to Behrman, January 15, 1911, Behrman 
Papers; Behrman to Senator Murphy Foster, February 11, 1911, Mayor’s 
Correspondence.
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Insurance Company. James Wright, secretary to the exposition company, became the 
secretary to the new insurance venture. James Porch worked to established a shipping 
line to service Central and South America. In July, 1912, a chartered vessel made a 
voyage to Brazil and Argentina under the name of the new line—the Mississippi Valley, 
South American and Orient Steamship Company, also know as the Pan American Mail. 
After delivering a full load of cargo, however, the ship was unable to obtain goods for 
the return trip. Faced with an undercapitalized business, increasing charter rates, and 
the antagonism of British shippers influential in the Latin American market, Porch 
abandoned the effort in October, 1912.53
The Mayor, exhausted from the hectic events, fell ill and received visitors at his 
home for several weeks. Unable to attend a banquet o f the Progressive Union, he 
acknowledged the group’s plans to highlight the Public Belt Railroad and sent a 
message praising the operation as “one of our chief sources of pride and 
congratulation.” When in late March, 1911, local banks finally accepted $7,000,000 of 
Sewerage and Water Board bonds, the president of the Interstate bank remarked, “the 
present Mayor is the best practical official who has held that office during the fifteen 
years that I have lived in New Orleans . . .  so we wanted to have these bonds sold during 
his administration.” His comments started speculation that Behrman would not stand 
for reelection, but the bank official denied that reading of his remarks. Behrman left the 
city for rest and recuperation amidst growing speculation about candidates, tickets, and
53 Daily Picayune, February 27, 1911,4; March 5, 1911, 5; March 29, 1911,5,6; 
Wilds, James W. Porch and the Port o f  New Orleans, 93-101
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political factions. He had served almost seven years as Mayor, and presided over 
unprecedented modernization, reorganization, and promotion o f the city. His 
administrations had successfully completed large parts of the reform program, first 
defined during the difficult years of the 1890s: a clean water supply, improved draining, 
modem sewerage disposal, reform of the waterfront, establishment of a public belt 
railroad, street paving and cleaning, expansion of public education, and the 
establishment of the city’s reputation as an international commercial center. With the 
possible exception of social pressure to govern moral conduct, such as regulation o f  bar 
rooms, suppression of gambling, and removal of Storyville, and the constant 
disagreement over the role o f patronage in government, the Mayor helped to conceive 
and implement the progressive vision of an early twentieth century city. But successful 
implementation of the reform agenda did not satisfy the reformers. The members o f  the 
Good Government League represented a political faction that had not seen success in 
city or state elections since 1896. Fifteen years later, the League would not take comfort 
in the achievements of the city, even those in which League members had played a 
significant part. Only political victory would satisfy the League, and the process of 
demonizing Regular leadership and the city machine began in earnest in Spring, 1911.54
S4Behrman to City Council, May 9,1911, Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily 
Picayune, March 24, 1911, 4; March 31, 1911, 3; April 8, 1911, 3.
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CHAPTER X
POLITICAL POWER AND PROGRESSIVE REFORM: 
COMMISSION GOVERNMENT COMES TO NEW ORLEANS
Mayor Behrman's political control remained steady throughout his first term and 
most o f the second, but a challenge arose in 1910. In that year, on August 23, a headline 
in the New Orleans Daily Picayune announced the emergence of a new faction within 
the Democratic Party of Louisiana. A meeting o f more than one hundred and fifty men 
from throughout the state convened in New Orleans to condemn Governor Jared 
Sanders and issue a manifesto of reform principles. Editors of both the Times-Democrat 
and the Item attended the meeting. E. H. Farrar, a prominent corporate attorney, who 
became president of the American Bar Association two months later, chaired the 
assembly, and Behrman nemesis John M. Parker served as third vice President. To 
emphasize its commitment to the Democratic Party, the enthusiastic assembly named 
the organization the Democratic Good Government League of Louisiana. Reform efforts 
o f the 1890's had associated with racially suspect Republicans and Populists, hence the 
necessity of emphasizing the connection with the Democratic Party. The proclamation 
that the League was statewide in scope indicated a challenge to the Regulars that would 
include politics outside of the city. The new organization’s platform called for a wide 
range of legislation, especially laws that would guarantee free and fair elections. The
335
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League looked first to the state elections scheduled for early 1912, but the Daily 
Picayune observed “while there was no direct attack upon the city administration [in the 
public speeches], the inference was plain that plans of the movement contemplated a 
fight.” In fact, the League’s agenda and the speeches of the leadership singled out the 
New Orleans political machine as a target. Parker, for example, directly challenged the 
Choctaw organization. His motive, he said, “was to rid this state and city of the infernal 
political machine which has been a menace ever since I was a boy.” Behrman and his 
colleagues may have enjoyed an easy reelection in 1908, but Parker and the new League 
made certain that 1912 would be different. The League organized early, set its sights 
on statewide and city goals, and launched multiple challenges to the power of the 
Regulars. Unlike the occasional and ineffective challenges to the political power of 
Behrman and Sanders, the Good Government League seemed, in the words of one 
Regular, “serious” and able to take advantage of “the unrest in the country parishes,” 
possibly caused by resentment over the Sanders senatorial candidacy.1
The League repeated the familiar pattern of reform versus Regular political 
competition, whether within the Democratic Party or in the general elections. The 
League’s formation and challenge to the Regulars recalled the fights over the lottery 
system, which had divided the state into pro- and anti-lottery forces. In the 1890's, 
Populists and Republicans joined forces at the state level to fight corrupt elections and 
Democratic bossism. During the municipal elections of 1896, a combination of
1 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 250; Daily Picayune, August 23,
1910,1; August 24, 1910, 3; September 2,1910,1. Schott, “John M. Parker, 111-112.
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reformers upset by the excesses of a machine administration defeated the ring 
candidates. The Democratic Good Government League followed much of the pattern 
set by previous reform groups. These were ad hoc organizations brought together by 
authentic outrage, political opportunism, and expediency. Few o f the reform 
organizations had lasted beyond the elections for which they formed. The 1910 
gathering, though, showed promise of more permanent success. Supporters o f the 
League included many experienced politicians and financial supporters. It presented a 
clear platform, chose strong candidates, and benefited from divisions within the 
Regulars.
A listing of those attending the organizational meeting o f the Good Government 
League showed fifty-six names; twenty-nine were present or former office holders. This 
strong base of experience increased the League’s chances for success, but diminished its 
ability to claim political innocence. The Daily Picayune admiringly described the 
League’s first meeting, but expressed disappointment that “the inauguration [was] 
somewhat spoiled by the presence of so many former office-holders.” In addition to the 
politicians present, a number o f  reform-minded attorneys from New Orleans attended, 
along with the editors of the New Orleans Times-Democrat and the New Orleans Item - 
two newspapers supportive o f anti-ring candidates. It was an auspicious beginning.
The reform movement, quiescent since 1904, once more affected state and city politics. 
The new League did not challenge Behrman nor the Regulars on issues of policy. There 
was no movement to turn the clock back on civic improvements, nor on the changes in
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government that had seen the successful development of a new port and belt railroad. 
The new League focused, instead, on the process of elections, the machinery of the 
Regular organization, and the form of government that administered New Orleans. 2
Behrman’s political troubles extended beyond the formation of the new faction. 
Late in 1910, a patronage controversy erupted over selection of a new public school 
superintendent. From 1877 to 1908, both the state government and the city council 
chose members o f the school board. Behrman, Capdevielle, Charles Buck (former 
mayoral candidate), W. J. Kemaghan (Regular Dock Board member), Ernest B. 
Krutschnitt (Chairman of the State Democratic Central Committee), John T. Michel 
(Secretary of State under Sanders), R. M. Walmsley (President of the Board of 
Liquidation), Charles Theard (member of the Board of Liquidation), and many other 
prominent citizens and office holders participated on the board under that system. In 
1906, the city prevailed upon the state legislature to increase local participation in the 
selection of the school board. Act No. 6 provided for a board of seventeen members 
(one from each ward) and three city administrators—mayor, city treasurer, and 
comptroller—to serve ex officio. The arrangement provided Behrman, and the Choctaw 
organization, opportunities for increased political power and, more importantly, the 
gratitude of voters whose districts received new schools. The Mayor worked to increase 
school board tax revenues, helped to pass a license tax on bar rooms dedicated to
2 New Orleans Daily Picayune, August 24,1910. The New Orleans Times- 
Democrat and the New Orleans Item were strong reform papers. Regular boss Robert 
Ewing published The New Orleans States. The Daily Picayune dismissed the other 
papers as the “partisan press” and tried to advertise its independence whenever possible.
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education, and persuaded the city council to appropriate funds for school construction. 
During Behrman’s first term, the school board also increased teacher salaries and 
expanded a program of evening schools.3
In October, 1910, long-time Behrman ally Warren Easton, superintendent of the 
New Orleans public schools, died after serving in that post since 1888. Unwilling to 
accept the promotion of Easton’s assistant to the top position, Behrman tried to entice 
James Aswell, director the state’s Normal School, to accept the position. Aswell had 
served as state superintendent of education, but Behrman’s interest went beyond those 
credentials. Aswell’s ambition to be governor was well known, and accepting the New 
Orleans position would eliminate a gubernatorial candidate who might threaten the 
Regulars’ choice for the highest state office. Aswell declined, however, and the Mayor 
sought a new candidate, ignoring the calls o f reformers for a “non-political” school 
board. The Mayor’s views on patronage enraged the reform elements, but he held his 
position without guile or apology. “I am the head of the administration and the local 
Democratic organization,” declared the Mayor. “The members of the school board were 
nominated by that organization the same time I was, and I have a right to a voice in the 
policies of the board . . .  to the end that their execution shall reflect credit both on the 
organization and on my administration.” To have his voice heard, however, Behrman
3 Donald Devore and Joseph Logsdon, Crescent City Schools: Public Education 
in New Orleans (Lafayette: Center for Louisiana Studies, 1991), 120-146. Behrman 
took a personal interest in many school issues, especially construction. See letter to 
Behrman from the Mother’s Club o f Beauregard School, November 18,1907, Behrman 
Papers.
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forced one member off the board and arranged a favorable appointment in his place. 
With an majority now secure, Behrman nominated Joseph R. Gwinn, an associate 
professor of education at Tulane University.4
The Mayor’s handling o f the dispute was typically adroit. His choice of Gwinn, 
a uptown professor with connections to a parents’ reform group, protected him from 
charges o f cronyism. And when parents mobilized a mass protest meeting, the Mayor 
personally appeared to defend his actions. The Daily Picayune, at first antagonistic 
toward the Mayor’s actions, began to defend the Mayor and new superintendent. For 
his part, Gwinn reassured anxious parents and pledged to support reform o f the school 
board. The Mayor echoed his call for reform and stole an issue from the reform element 
by backing a smaller board to be elected at-large. The obvious evidence of progress, 
especially the number of new school buildings, demonstrated to the public at large, if 
not to the Mayor’s uptown enemies, that the administration o f public education was in 
good hands. But the Mayor’s political opponents continued to resist. The ward system 
of school board representation became the focus of protests, and, within two years, a 
new “non-political,” five-member school board replaced the larger governing body.
The dispute over the size and composition of the school board, and the assumption that 
politics could be taken out o f the system, paralleled the emerging discussion over the 
structure o f city government. The transition from a ward-based system of representation 
to an at-large structure with limited membership was the central characteristic not only
4 Devore and Logsdon, Crescent City Schools, 134-135; Reynolds, Machine 
Politics in New Orleans, 204; Daily Picayune, October 18, 1910, 8; October 29, 1910.
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of the reform of the school board, but would also become part of the reform prescription 
for city government—the commission.5
The Mayor’s opponents in the school board fight sought to protect education 
from politics, or, at least, from the influence of Regular Democratic politics. Behrman 
approached the superintendency as another opportunity to exercise his political power 
and extend his influence. To the protesting parents, patronage in the school system was 
evil per se. To Behrman, patronage represented an important means of governing. And 
not only school board patronage demanded his attention. Throughout the term of 
Sanders, Behrman made use of his close friendship with the Governor to provide jobs 
for associates. In August, 1910, for example, Behrman prevailed upon Sanders to 
appoint Regular Herman Miester to the Fire Rating Commission. The Mayor’s position 
as leader of the New Orleans Regulars increased his influence in patronage matters, but 
the power of other ward leaders constrained his freedom o f action. The strict division o f 
patronage within the city functioned to maintain order and prevent intra-organizational 
disputes. The Mayor respected those patronage boundaries, but, beginning in 1910, 
Tenth Ward leader Robert Ewing began to show disturbing signs of independence, if  not 
outright revolt.6
Ewing had become part of the Choctaw leadership in 1899 by supplanting the 
Regulars’ choice in the Tenth Ward. He served as business manager for the Daily States
5 Daily Picayune, November 17, 1910, 1; November 24, 1910, 6; Devore and 
Logsdon, Crescent City Schools, 136-139. The dispute over the size and composition of 
the school board paralleled the emerging dispute over the structure of city government.
6 Behrman to Sanders, August 15,1901, Mayor’s Correspondence.
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and later became publisher of that newspaper as well as one in Shreveport, Louisiana. 
Ewing possessed a reputation for gathering patronage to the Tenth Ward, and, during 
Behrman’s second term, controlled the operations of the city treasurer and the municipal 
tax collection apparatus, among other offices. Ewing’s newspapers gave him a 
disproportionate voice in the political affairs of the Regulars, and he was not shy in 
expressing his opinions nor in asserting his patronage rights. In Machine Politics in 
New Orleans, Reynolds repeated the assertion of the Daily Picayune that Ewing 
controlled one-fourth of all patronage available to the Regulars. His enthusiastic 
exercise o f patronage power led to occasional conflict with the Mayor. “Finnegan of 
Algiers, Oil Inspector for the Board of Health,” the Mayor wrote to Sanders, “died on 
yesterday. [I] understand that Ewing is making claim for this place. This position is 
allotted to me and I insist that the vacancy belongs to me.” On another occasion, the 
Mayor protected the patronage rights of another ward leader. “William J. Brady, 
Constable First city Court, died last night. This is clearly a First Ward place. Don’t do 
anything until you see [Assessor] Taylor Gauche.” The conflict with Ewing over 
patronage would lead to more serious challenges to the Regulars’ authority.7
By the close of 1910, Behrman faced political problems on several fronts. The 
Democrat Good Government League promised to run an anti-machine candidate in the 
upcoming governor’s race, threatening the Mayor’s source of state power. Many
7 Behrman to Sanders, October 5, 1910, Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to 
Sanders, December 2, 1910, Mayor’s Correspondence; Schott, “JohnM. Parker,” 104; 
Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 167. Both Schott and Reynolds use the 
word “insatiable” when describing Ewing’s attitude toward patronage.
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parents active in public education, and the influential women’s Era Club, objected to the 
Mayor’s action in replacing Warren Easton. The Good Government League, in the 
middle of the school board controversy, made clear that its political ambitions went 
beyond the state elections and directly challenged the Mayor. The League placed John 
Parker in command of the New Orleans campaign with instructions to organize the city 
ward by ward. The leadership of the reform element called upon supporters to pay the 
poll tax, and announced “the objective and purpose of the league . . .  is to destroy the 
system that makes bosses and rings possible.” And Robert Ewing continued to 
demonstrate political independence from the Choctaw organization, raising the possible 
of a internal challenge to the Mayor’s authority. Clearly, Behrman would not enjoy an 
easy election should he decide to run for a third term.8
In the first decade of the century, the national progressive movement touched 
municipal governments in a number of ways. Reformers examined not only the policies 
and politics of local governments but the governmental structures as well. Unable to 
obtain power in New Orleans by confronting Mayor Martin Behrman on substantive 
issues and policies, the Democratic Good Government League determined to overthrow 
the Democratic Regulars by first capturing the office of governor of Louisiana, and then 
by changing the governmental structure of New Orleans. The power of the Regulars 
was more precarious than at any time since the 1890s, but the city organization met the
8 Daily Picayune, November 15, 1910, 10; November 18, 1910, 5.
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challenge o f the new reform League and accepted the trends in progressive 
governmental forms.
Throughout 1910 and the following year, League spokesmen reiterated the 
intentions o f the group: the destruction of the boss system, and the deliverance o f the 
state and city from Regular Democratic control. One important method of fighting the 
Regulars involved the machinery of elections. The Regular organization provided poll 
commissioners, and the important position of Registrar of Voters, a  parish official 
appointed by the Governor, fell under the patronage arrangements between the Choctaw 
Club and the state’s chief executive. During the period 1910 to 1912, the registrar was 
William Ball, former secretary to Mayor Behrman. From Behrman’s triumph in 1904 
until the 1912 gubernatorial race, elections in the city held little suspense, and the 
evidence suggests that, at least in some wards, Regular commissioners were not above 
padding the results by voting on their own the names of electors who had chosen to stay 
home on election day.
In March, 1911, an election to the state Supreme Court shattered the Regulars’ 
complacency. Civil Court Judge W. B. Sommerville faced little opposition as he sought 
to replace retiring Supreme Court Judge Francis Nicholls. The election took place 
without incident, but several days later, the Good Government League brought charges 
against a number of Regular commissioners. The district Attorney received evidence 
that vote lists included the names o f persons who later filed affidavits swearing that they 
had not voted in the election. John Parker, chair o f  the League’s City Campaign
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Committee, complained that “all I have ever asked is a square deal from the New 
Orleans ring. If they will give us a fair and square election in 1912, and they lick us, we 
won’t say a word, not a word.” Mayor Behrman did not defend the Regular 
commissioners. He denounced electoral fraud and asked that all perpetrators face 
prosecution. The district attorney indicted twelve men for fraud. All received jail 
sentences of six months in the parish prison. After sentencing, two prison officials were 
indicted for alleged favorable treatment o f the prisoners, including issuing furloughs to 
prisoners to visit their families.9
Further battles arose over the registration lists. The complex voter registration 
law, Act 90 of 1908, allowed sworn canvassers to challenge the registration o f anyone 
on the rolls. The Good Government League employed detectives to examine the rolls 
and to challenge those suspected of fraud. In a city of over 300,000, it was common for 
many voters to change addresses from one election to the next. This provided at least 
one innocent explanation for what might otherwise seem fraudulent. But the League 
anticipated more serious transgressions and spent months in 1911 investigating the 
Registrar’s Office. League detectives identified approximately 3,000 records o f 
“improper and illegal registration,” but admitted that most of the discrepancies involved 
change of address problems with no clear pattern of dishonesty. The League conflicts 
with Registrar Ball took place against the backdrop of increased political speculation.
9 Daily Picayune, March 7, 1911, 5; March 16, 1911,4; March 17, 1911, 6; 
April 13, 1911,6; April 19, 1911, 8; April 22,1911,4; June 23,1911, 5.
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The state Democratic primary, scheduled for January, 1912, would be contested by at 
least two candidates—the nominee of the League and that of the Regular organization.10
At a rally at the New Orleans Athenaeum theater, the League promised 
allegiance to the Democratic Party, a permanent organization, and a fight against “not 
individuals, but against a system, which creates one-man power in our city and state.” 
The league principles promised security of legitimate investment from “browbeating by 
those in office,” restoration of the financial good names of the city and the state, 
efficiency in government, education free from politics, an honest count in elections, and 
a fight “not for interest, but for good government.” The Daily Picayune analyzed the 
principles in an editorial. The paper, independent but generally supportive of Mayor 
Behrman if not the Regular organization, declared the Good Government League 
“largely inspired and animated by selfish personal motives,” but felt that political 
opposition was healthy in that it would “arouse citizens to their political duties.” The 
paper felt it unfortunate that “it [was] customary to speak and write o f politicians in a 
contemptuous and reproachful tone and manner as if they were engaged in a calling at 
least disreputable, if not disgraceful.” The Daily Picayune did “not believe that the 
present city and state administrations are wicked, corrupt or unworthy, any more than it 
believes that all the citizens arrayed in opposition to them are unselfish, pure and 
blameless.” But the League rhetoric betrayed exactly that Manichaean view of the 
political world. Speakers at the league rally condemned the power of the bosses and the
10 Terrence W. Fitzmorris, “Pro Bono Publico: New Orleans Politics and 
Municipal Reform in the Progressive Era, 1912-1926,” 37-39.
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“ballot stuffers.” One speaker gave advice to League members in the city who would 
deal with Regular poll commissioners: “Peacefully if you can; forcibly if  you must.”11
The League plan of confronting the Regulars in a two-way race went awry in 
early April, 1911, when James Aswell, head of the state Normal School, announced for 
governor. His platform echoed many League themes: reduction of the appointive 
power of the governor, efficiency in the delivery of government services and education, 
and the abolition of “useless offices.” Although AswelFs candidacy seemed to pose the 
greater threat to the League, the Regulars feared the third candidate as well. As they 
searched for their own candidate, the normal unity of the Regulars showed strain, and 
Robert Ewing, powerful Regular leader in the New Orleans Tenth Ward, openly 
supported the Aswell effort. The New Orleans vote might reach as much as thirty 
percent of the total vote cast. Any split in the heavily controlled New Orleans returns 
could assist the League candidate as well as Aswell.12
The League had trouble selecting its candidate for Governor. Most o f  its well- 
known leaders, such as John M. Parker, had disavowed any interest in elective office, in 
an attempt to convince voters of the purity of their motives. By April, the League 
decided upon Luther Hall, a north Louisiana jurist, whose recent election to the state 
Supreme Court provided a safe haven from which to run. Hall agreed to carry the
11 Daily Picayune, March 19, 1911, 1,8, 13. The talk o f abolition o f excessive or 
useless state offices rarely resulted in action. After his election to the governor’s office 
in 1920, Parker admitted that the phrase “useless offices” was “largely demagogic” and 
that he could not find such offices in the state. See Schott, “John M. Parker,” 359.
12 Daily Picayune, April 2, 1911,3.
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League banner, but declared his independence of political factions. The northern part of 
the state harbored resentment toward the southern because of Sanders’s attempt for 
McEnery’s senate seat. Hall and Aswell would benefit from that feeling, but might split 
the available vote. In an effort to balance the League ticket, delegates to its convention 
in New Orleans searched for “a  Creole, from South Louisiana, and a good French 
speaker.” Henri L. Gueydan fit the description, and the convention added him to the 
ticket. In his acceptance speech, Hall struck familiar reform themes. The campaign 
would be a mission against the machine. The “present, paramount, dominant issue,” 
proclaimed Hall, “is whether this machine shall remain in power to continue its 
exploitation of government functions.” In its review of the speech, the Daily Picayune 
called it “commonplace, made up o f platitudes and altogether disappointing.”13
The search for a candidate among the Regulars took several strange turns.
Efforts to convince Congressman Joseph E. Ransdell to run failed because he preferred 
a Senate race against Murphy Foster. Congressman H. Garland Dupre o f New Orleans 
had a safe seat in the House and chose to remain in that office. Another rumor 
suggested that the Regulars would draft First District Congressman Albert Estopinal for 
Governor. Even W. B. Thompson, Cotton Exchange President, was mentioned, despite 
his lack of experience in electoral politics. The Regulars scrambled to find a candidate 
because the natural successor to Sanders was John T. Michel, Regular leader from the 
New Orleans Thirteenth Ward, and Secretary of State. Michel had announced for
13 Daily Picayune, March 7, 1911, 5; April 6,1911,4; June 20,1911,3; June 21, 
1911, 1,3; June 22,1911,1, 8; Fitzmorris, “Pro Bono Publico,” 28-29.
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governor in 1910, but suffered under at least two handicaps. A member of the Regular 
caucus confided to the Daily Picayune that “Michel is a ward boss” and that “he can’t 
speak.” The paper’s source defended Michel from both charges, pointing out that 
Mayor Behrman was also a ward boss, but “the best mayor this city has ever had.” 
Behrman had trouble speaking in public when he first ran for office but overcame his 
reticence. There was speculation that the Regulars lacked confidence in a Michel 
candidacy, but an alternative plan to send Behrman to Congress and let Michel run for 
mayor did not materialize. Behrman wanted to run for a third term as mayor. The 
Regulars prized loyalty, and Michel, whatever his weaknesses, had earned their support 
and received the nomination. When the new candidate released his platform, the Daily 
Picayune expressed surprise at its reform tone: honest elections, economy in 
government, abolishment of useless offices, frequent accounting for state funds, and 
reorganization of the state bureaucracy.14
The similarity of the three platforms reflected more than the banality of 
campaign rhetoric. Secure in his base, Michel reached out to reform elements and those 
areas of the state outside New Orleans. Hall and Aswell echoed the prejudices of the 
conservative newspapers and rural leaders most likely to effect votes. Hall also reached
14 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 248; Daily Picayune, April 23, 1911, 
Section II, 16; April 26, 1911,2; June 18,1911, 3. Fitzmorris, in “Pro Bono Publico,” 
rendered harsh judgements about Michel, describing him as “the epitome of the second 
class politician.” But Michel had won a statewide race for Secretary of State. For the 
Regulars to function effectively, the ward leaders required at least some basic skills in 
management, communication, and political judgement. See Fitzmorris, “Pro Bono 
Publico,” 24.
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out to the city voters by repudiating the support of the Anti-Saloon League and coming 
out in favor of local option. All candidates adopted platforms that reflected the 
conventional wisdom o f their time, repeated the anti-government sentiments o f the 
business classes, and “contained promises to the good people.” In addition, the three 
gubernatorial candidates opposed suffrage for women, although they supported the right 
of women to stand for election to parish school boards. In matters of style, however, 
Michel suffered by comparison to his competitors. Aswell was young, active, an 
effective stump speaker, and quick with a story to illustrate his points. Hall, a respected 
judge before his entry into the race, had a keen legal mind and the rhetorical abilities 
honed by long service in the courts.15
Michel was also at a disadvantage because of the peculiar election cycle. The 
primary for governor and other state offices ran a the same time as primaries for both 
U.S. Senate seats. The seat held by Murphy Foster was up for election, and the 
incumbent drew the challenge of Joseph Ransdell. The seat made vacant by the death of 
Senator McEnery drew a larger field: Governor Sanders, south Louisiana Congressman 
Robert Broussard, and Congressman Arsene Pujo from the southwest comer of the state. 
The three-way race took all o f the Governor’s energy, and support for Michel that the 
Regulars might expect from Sanders was not forthcoming. The Senate races may also 
have exacerbated the South-North split. I f  Foster won re-election and Sanders
15 Daily Picayune, June 25,1911, Section II, 16.
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triumphed in the race for the other seat, both Senators would be politicians from the 
southern part of the state.
Finally, Michel’s candidacy bore the burden of his New Orleans connection. 
Apart from League rhetoric about the evils o f the machine, Louisiana residents outside 
of New Orleans often viewed the Crescent City with suspicion. The regulation of 
saloons and the suppression of race track gambling had passed the legislature over the 
objections of most New Orleans legislators. Though New Orleans Catholics shared 
their religion with other South Louisiana residents, the majority of North Louisiana 
residents were Protestant. New Orleans was an exciting destination, almost exotic to the 
rural population of the state. But it was also the object of distrust. In spite o f press 
attempts to claim that it was somehow the right of New Orleans to finally have a 
governor from its ranks, the remainder o f the state resisted rule by a Crescent City 
politician.16
Behrman tried valiantly to promote the Michel candidacy. He limited the 
damage caused by Aswell by confining the Regular revolt to Ewing. To avoid further 
conflicts with the Tenth Ward leader, Behrman agreed to limit the split to the 
gubernatorial candidacy only. Ewing would not be challenged by the Regulars, but his 
apostasy would be contained. Behrman knew that he remained in control of the city 
vote. He had earlier written to Senator Foster and assessed the political situation. “I can
16 Daily Picayune, April 9,1911, Section II, 5. This attitude toward New 
Orleans and its politicians persisted throughout the twentieth century, fed at first by 
Huey Long’s populism, and, subsequently, by resentment toward New Orleans’ 
perceived liberalism on the race issue.
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state to you positively that the League is making very little progress in the city. John 
Parker is going around making different statements, and I feel quite sure that the people 
will soon have him sized up for what he is worth, and with that the movement here will 
be of almost no consequence.” Behrman had particular contempt for Parker, whose 
erratic loyalty to the Democratic Party was well known. During the League campaign, 
Parker acknowledged support of Taft in 1908, although he later claimed that he had 
remained loyal to Sanders and Behrman. In 1904, “through an oversight,” Parker had 
not paid the poll tax and did not vote. Behrman added his reassurances to Foster that 
“every leader in the city will support you. You need have no fear at all.” The Mayor’s 
assessment of the city situation was accurate, but he had little control over the country 
vote.17
To further diffuse potential League issues, Behrman announced in June, 1911, 
that the city Democratic organization “will purge the registration rolls in every ward.
The public can rest assured of one thing—that the regular organization is now engaged in 
as thorough a purging of the registration rolls as is possible.” Each faction checked 
names and addresses on the voter rolls against actual residents. By August, Registrar of 
Voters William Ball bragged that the canvass had removed more names than the efforts 
of the Good Government League, but the work of the Regulars failed to quell the issue. 
The registration fight became more bitter as the election approached. The League’s
17 Behrman to Senator Murphy Foster, May 12,1911 and May 20, 1911,
Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily Picayune, May 27, 1911, 3; June 15, 1911, 7; June 23, 
1911,3; July 2, 1911, Section n, 16.
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constant charges of fraud provoked a Daily Picayune editorial. “It has been a rule o f the 
various state political campaigns . . .  for the self-seeking politicians who style 
themselves ‘reformers’ [to] arrogate to themselves all the political honesty in the state.” 
By November, Ball reported that 5,851 names had been purged. The Regulars reported 
3,515 of those names; the League canvassers discovered 2,336. Most of the purges 
resulted from voters changing residence; only 173 were discovered to be fraudulent, and 
thirty-eight of those were from one precinct in the Eight Ward, known to be “reform 
territory.”18
During the election campaign, the League began to show interest in more than 
just overturning the boss system. Progressive reformers across the nation put their faith 
in new forms of city government. By 1911, nearly 200 cities had adopted the 
commission form; within a decade, that total would more than double. The commission 
replicated features o f the business world and appealed to the reformers’ longing for 
efficiency and simplicity in municipal government. Commission plans transferred 
authority from ward leaders and district councilmen to commissioners elected at large. 
The commissioners formed a board o f directors for the municipal corporation, 
presumably free of political obligations and machine pressures. In operation, the 
commission plan was more complex, but it quickly became a favorite solution for 
reformers who sought to oust machine rule. After League members began advocating 
the commission form, the Daily Picayune reminded readers that the commission system
18 Daily Picayune, June 23, 1911, 3; August 5,1911, 6; August 12, 1911,6; 
November 9, 1911, 8.
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“now in vogue is not new to New Orleans,” since a commission governed the city from 
1870-1882. That government proved “such a despotism that the people were eager to 
get rid of it.” A visiting professor at the Tulane Summer Normal School praised the 
commission form and detailed its success in Houston. To answer the objection that the 
commission had once been tried in New Orleans, he asserted that “the commission rule 
will not be a success if  the political bosses are in power.” Visiting officials from the 
Montgomery commission made the obvious point, that “when there is a good mayor and 
council, there is no necessity [for the commission]. The strategy of the League became 
clear. After electing its gubernatorial candidate, thus eliminating one source of the 
Regulars’ power, it would attempt to destroy the ward boss system by altering the form 
o f government in the city. A commission would reduce the number of elected officials, 
and the reformers believed that the boss system would wither in the absence of electoral 
offices to dispense. Late in the state campaign, Parker admitted that the League would 
not run a city ticket unless Hall was victorious.19
The campaign did not stop the Mayor from important initiatives. He took time 
to support the Dock Board’s plans for a public cotton warehouse, only now coming to 
fruition, and when long-time Dock Board President Hugh McCloskey resigned,
Behrman convinced Governor Sanders to name Cotton Exchange President (and 
Regular supporter) W. B. Thompson to the vacancy. Behrman confidently left the city 
to attend the National Municipal League Convention and delivered an address
19 Daily Picayune, June 29,1911, 6; July 1,1911,4; January 11, 1912, 3;
Bradley R. Rice, Progressive Cities (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1977), 53.
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describing the operation o f the New Orleans Public Belt Railroad. At the conclusion of 
the convention, the association honored Behrman by electing him a trustee. The city 
later hosted a meeting o f five southern governors at the end o f October. W. B. 
Thompson addressed the group, arguing in favor of the public warehouse system for 
cotton that would provide a means to gradually release the commodity onto the world 
market. The Mayor’s participation and the governors’ conference highlighted the 
prominence of the city and its chief executive. Behrman continued to participate in such 
national associations, addressing the groups on various matters of municipal 
operations.20
The state election, however, dominated the time of city officials. As the election 
approached, defections from one camp to another became partisan news, demonstrations 
of strength or weakness. “Joseph W. Dorsam, well-known coal merchant and 
businessman,” reported the Daily Picayune, “has severed his connections with the Good 
Government League.” Dorsam reported that “the Good Government League of the 
Eighth Ward is actuated solely by a desire to substitute themselves for those in power.” 
W. B. Thompson delivered a speech on behalf of Michel, asking citizens “not to be 
misled by the hue and cry and affirmations of holiness into believing that this is a 
contest between light and darkness.. . .  It is the same old effort of the ‘outs’ to gain 
control o f political place and power.” The truce in the Tenth Ward broke down, and 
James Henriques attacked Ewing claiming that the rebel leader drew power only from
20 Behrman to Sanders, September 23, 1911, Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily 
Picayune, August 9,1911, 7; September 30, 1911,3; October 7, 1911, 4.
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his newspapers. Charles Buck, former candidate for mayor in 1896 and 1904, weighed 
in on the side of the League, comparing the battle against the bosses to the battle against 
“carpet bag rule.” City Treasurer Otto Briede, beholden to Ewing, fired Michel 
supporters in his office. The Mayor’s secretary, Rudolph Huffi, supported Aswell. He 
resigned his position with the Mayor “to avoid embarrassment,” and took a position in 
the City Treasurer’s office, a Ewing stronghold. The Daily Picayune darkly warned 
against the threat to the Democratic party posed by “Republicans and Near- 
Republicans.” Parker had voted for Taft, and League activist Donaldson Caffery “ran 
against the Democrat [candidate for governor] Heard. Worst o f all the League 
transgressions, James Wilkinson ran in 1892 as a Republican candidate, and, during the 
campaign, had argued “for equal rights for whites and Negroes.”21
As the new year approached, additional conflict broke out over the voter lists.
To demonstrate the hypocrisy of League attempts to purge the rolls, Ball released copies 
of the registrations forms for John Parker and H. Dickson Bruns, a  physician long active 
in reform campaigns. Ball showed that each form contained mistakes in calculating the 
amount of time the gentleman had resided in New Orleans, sufficient under the law to 
prosecute for fraud. Also, in the place provided for a listing of party affiliation, the 
Bruns application was conspicuously blank. After yet another challenge from Bruns 
regarding the honesty of the rolls and lack of service from the Registrar, Ball responded
21 Daily Picayune, October 17,1911, 3; October 20,1911, 3; October 29, 1911, 
Section I, 3; November 1,1911, 3; November 8,1911,6; November 17,1911, 3; 
November 30, 1911, 3; December 12,1911,3; December 16, 1911, 8.
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with a “warm” letter. “You are one of those whose superior esteem o f themselves has 
misled them into prating about public officials being public servants so much and so 
often that you [have confused] public servants with private menials.” He went on to call 
Bruns “a political eunuch” out to destroy the Democratic Party. Bruns decided not to 
respond, but the League effort did not cease. League canvassers presented 600 
additional names for removal on January 5,1912. On the same day, word came from 
Acadia Parish that the League had attempted wholesale purges of the rolls in that parish 
as well.22
The election took place January 23,1912. Results remained incomplete for 
several days, but as country returns came in, it became clear that the League had done 
better than the Regulars expected. Senator Foster lost to Congressman Ransdell; 
Governor Sanders and Congressman Broussard faced a second primary. In the 
gubernatorial race, the three-way contest left Aswell far behind. Michel and Hall would 
enter a second primary. Closer examination of the results over the next few days further 
discouraged the Regulars. Sanders withdrew, giving Broussard the Senate seat. Michel 
trailed Hall by only 6,000 votes out of nearly 120,000. However, much o f Aswell’s 
vote was anti-machine and would naturally go to Hall in a  run off The efforts for 
Michel by the city Regulars produced a 10,000 majority from the New Orleans wards, 
but they could not overcome the country vote. After a few days of reflection and 
consultation, Michel announced he would withdraw, and Hall became the Democratic
22 Daily Picayune, December 13, 1911,3; December 17, 1911,3; January 1,
1912, 3; January 2 ,1912,1; January 6,1912,3,4.
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nominee for governor. In the one-party Louisiana system, that was equivalent to 
election as governor. Michel did not leave unrewarded. Regulars announced in early 
March that the former candidate would become assessor for his uptown municipal 
district, replacing a Regular office holder, whose apparently genuine illness opened a 
spot for Michel at a crucial time.23
The defeat of Governor Sanders for Senate was a bitter disappointment for the 
state’s chief executive. In 1910 he had resigned the Senate seat to assist New Orleans in 
its campaign for the Panama Exposition. The city returns seemed a betrayal to Sanders, 
but, in his memoirs, Behrman defended himself and the New Orleans Regulars.
Sanders, Behrman argued, had introduced the Locke Law to suppress race track 
gambling and had cooperated with efforts to regulate saloons more carefully. Behrman 
carried his ward for Sanders, but other leaders had not concealed their opposition to his 
election. With Sanders, the sitting governor, angry at the city, Behrman quickly moved 
to make friends with Hall, the governor-elect. At the meeting of the Democratic Sate 
Central Committee at which Hall’s nomination would be certified, observers noted that 
Behrman proudly escorted Hall into the meeting. Behrman later recalled that “some of 
Hall’s wilder supporters immediately began to cry that their successful candidate had 
‘gone over to the ring.’” Behrman denied that Hall had converted to the Regulars. The 
Regulars enjoyed a majority of votes in the Democratic State Central Committee, yet let 
it be known that Hall should be free to name the next chairman. In the organization of
23 Daily Picayune, January 24-28, 1912; January 30, 1912,1; March 3, 1912, 2; 
Fitzmorris, “Pro Bono Publico,” 45-47.
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the state legislature, the Regulars from New Orleans controlled a crucial bloc of votes. 
New Orleans supported Robert Butler of Terrebonne Parish for Speaker, a “Hall man, 
but that is no longer regarded as a barrier to the support of the Orleans delegation.” 
These demonstrations of good faith undoubtedly improved relations between the 
Regulars and the new Governor, but in his memoirs, Behrman refuted the charge that 
Hall assented to Regular control, and asserted that Hall was “against the Regulars in 
New Orleans” during his entire term.24
Regardless o f Hall’s attitude toward the Regulars, his effectiveness as a governor 
depended on his ability to deal with the state legislature. Only four New Orleans 
League candidates managed to win seats; the Regulars captured the balance. 
Nevertheless, the League looked forward to that year’s legislative session and 
anticipated success in its attempts to defeat the ring. The legislature provided the Good 
Government League with crucial weapons to battle the city machine. New registration 
and election laws made machine vote-tampering more difficult, though legislators loyal 
to the ring diluted the harshest measures. In addition, reformers attempted to follow 
through on their promise for a substantial change in the structure of the city’s 
government by replacing the mayor-council with the commission form of government.25
Momentum for commission government began building after the state election 
and continued through the legislative session of 1912. Only days after Hall’s election,
24 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 259-261, 265-271; Daily Picayune, 
January 28, 1912,1; February 9, 1912,3; March 5, 1912, 3; March 11, 1912,3.
25 Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 186-198.
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the Daily Picayune commented on the upcoming city elections. “Along with the rumors 
of prospective candidates [ for example, Parker] there is an equally strong inclination 
that a commission government might be handed New Orleans by the next session of the 
legislature.” Once again, the paper reminded readers to be wary o f the commission and 
of its use in New Orleans during Reconstruction. The editors o f the Daily Picayune 
softened their stand two days later, calling for “considerable discussion” regarding 
commission government, and asking for details o f any plan. “Publico” responded to the 
request with the outlines o f a commission government, printed by the Daily Picayune 
February 12, 1912. It called for a mayor and four administrators to form an executive 
board. Combined with a review board of seven taxpayers, the executive board would 
choose other city officers. Whatever changes might occur, the paper opined, should be 
ratified by the voters, although it seemed that “many citizens believe that the affairs of 
this great city would be better conducted under [a] commission form of government.”
At the end of March, the Good Government League “unanimously endorsed 
commission government” and arranged for a public meeting and lecture to explain the 
benefits of the new form o f government. The next week, John Z. White of Chicago 
spoke glowingly of commission government. His Good Government League hosts 
endorsed the “fights for commission government and the betterment of conditions in the 
city” and appointed John Parker to lead the effort.26
26 Daily Picayune, January 30, 1912, 3; February 1, 1912, 8; February 12, 1912,
3; February 16, 1912, 8; March 27, 1912, 8; March 28,1912, 1; March 30, 1912, 6;
April 3, 1912, 8; April 4,1912,4; April 5,1912, 4.
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In June, 1912, League supporters proposed a bill to the legislature to redesign 
the government of New Orleans along the new commission lines. The machine, 
however, retained significant strength in the state’s legislative branch, and it found the 
original draft objectionable, particularly those sections that reduced elective offices and 
required extensive constitutional change. Ring loyalists presented a substitute for the 
commission bill which, though it retained much of the commission form, gave 
considerable flexibility to those who would serve as commissioners. The Good 
Government League objected to the substitution, but ultimately supported the revised 
bill and an amendment to require a local referendum before the change in government 
would go into effect. The legislature agreed to these changes and set the referendum 
date for August 28, 1912. The acquiescence of the Regulars in this major structural 
reform ran counter to at least one view of the political culture o f urban machines. “The 
hostility o f the ‘boss-immigrant-machine complex’ . . .  to structural reforms” wrote John 
D. Buenker, “has been . . .  thoroughly documented.” Perhaps the relatively low level of 
immigrants in New Orleans or Behrman’s confidence in his organization’s ability to 
thrive under any political system were sufficient to deflect otherwise natural antagonism 
toward the structural reform.27
The results o f the legislative session encouraged members o f the League, but 
political developments were not as favorable. Although the Regulars had not supported
27 Daily Picayune, June 14, 1912 through June 28, 1912; Fitzmorris, “Pro Bono 
Publico,” 68-71; Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 193-195; John D. 
Buenker, “Sovereign Individuals and Organic Networks: Political Culture in Conflict 
During the Progressive Era,” 197.
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Governor Hall in the recent election, he began to accommodate the machine in several 
ways, especially regarding appointments. The Governor faced a difficult financial 
situation and needed machine support for an overhaul of the tax system. In addition, he 
found himself drawn to Mayor Behrman and at odds with the self-righteousness of 
League members. Behrman later suggested that Hall and the Good Government 
League leadership had a falling out over campaign finances. As the summer progressed, 
presidential politics began to attract attention, and both Behrman and Hall could see the 
advantage of cooperation in the election of Wilson and control o f federal patronage.28
In July, 1912, national politics dealt an additional blow to League aspirations. 
John M. Parker was a friend of Theodore Roosevelt. When the former president had 
begun his challenge to President Taft for the Republican nomination, Parker declined to 
switch parties and declared his loyalty to the Democrats. But Taft’s victory at the 
Republican convention, and the subsequent third party efforts o f Roosevelt, changed the 
situation for Parker. Although he was the chairman of the Good Government League— 
officially a Democratic organization—Parker admitted that he would support Roosevelt’s 
bid for a third term under the banner of the Progressive Party. On July 11,1912, Parker 
officially resigned as leader of the city League efforts. Behrman later downplayed the 
effects of Parker’s departure. “I do not think,” he wrote, “that the absence or the 
presence of the Hon. John M. Parker anywhere would have affected me as much as one
28 Daily Picayune, August 22, 1912, 1; Reynolds, Machine Politics in New 
Orleans, 206; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 260-265; Schott, “John M. 
Parker,” 119.
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hundred votes,” but Behrman admitted that “general opinion” disagreed. The Item 
called Parker’s move “desertion.” Although his hopes of nomination for vice-president 
on the Roosevelt ticket did not materialize, Parker supported the Progressives in the 
presidential election.29
Parker’s defection to the Progressive Party harmed the League in at least two 
ways. It removed one o f the organization’s most effective spokesmen and organizers.
In addition, it presented the Regulars with ammunition to attack once again the party 
loyalty of the League membership. In a state where voters identified such loyalty with 
racial solidarity, this was no small weapon. The League carried the burden of a reform 
past that flirted with Republicanism on more than one occasion. To complicate matters 
further, Parker’s replacement was Donelson Caffery. He had been a resident o f New 
Orleans for only three years, and, in 1900, had run for governor on a fusion ticket, 
supported by Populists and Republicans. The reconciliation between Colonel Ewing 
and the Regulars also damaged the hopes of the League. Ewing served as national 
committeeman to the Democratic Party and attended the convention that nominated 
Woodrow Wilson. Behrman and the other Regular leaders postponed decisions on 
parochial candidates until Ewing returned. Though the ring did not publicly disclose the
29 Daily Picayune, July 9, 1912, 1, 4; July 12, 1912, 1; August 13, 1912, 10; 
Schott, “John M. Parker,”121, 171-210; Fitzmorris, “Pro Bono Publico,” 95-100; Kemp, 
Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 270.
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terms of the agreement to the public, Ewing rejoined the regulars in time for the 
parochial and municipal elections.30
Prior to the those elections, the city faced a referendum on the question of 
commission government. Both political factions supported the change, although many 
League members objected to the changes made to their original bill. On July 15, James 
F. Coleman, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the League, announced that 
organization’s support for the referendum. He regretted that the legislature did not 
present the original League plan to the voters, but stated that the substitute— the Regular 
bill—was a step in the right direction. With both sides on record supporting the 
commission plan, there was little controversy over the referendum vote. The Daily 
Picayune reported rumors that the League’s support for the plan was not sincere and 
printed numerous editorials urging a high turnout in favor o f the plan, but the spirited 
contest between the League and the Regulars for offices in Orleans Parish (the elections 
for which would occur only one week after the referendum) held the public’s attention. 
Mention of the commission plan was infrequent during the August campaign. Ward and 
precinct meetings endorsed commission government, but almost as an afterthought, 
when the campaign orators had finished extolling the virtues o f various candidates.31
30 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 37-38; Daily Picayune, July 9,
1912,4; July 12, 1912,1; July 18,1912, 3; August 4,1912, 3; Schott, “John M. Parker,” 
185-189. League members later charged that the Regulars supported Luzenberg for 
District Attorney because he was Ewing’s “favorite,” and that this was the price paid for 
Regular unity. See the Daily Picayune, August 21, 1912, 6. Reynolds gives the 
impression that Ewing opposed the ring during the city elections. This was clearly not 
the case. Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 206.
31 Daily Picayune, July 16,1912, 9; August 9, 1912, 8; August 14, 1912, 3.
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The principal contest o f the parochial fight involved the election o f a District 
Attorney. Parker’s successor as Leader of the Good government League, Donelson 
Caffery, stood as the candidate o f the reform forces. The Regulars surprised political 
observers by nominating Chandler C. Luzenberg. Regular loyalist Joseph Generelly had 
expected the nomination, partially as a reward for his effective service in the state 
legislature when the original commission bill was debated. When denied the ring 
endorsement, Generelly bolted and ran as an independent. The split in the machine 
ranks encouraged the League’s expectations of victory.32
Donelson Caffery was a former candidate for governor and the son o f a United 
States Senator. His campaign oratory assailed the misrule of the machine and 
proclaimed the integrity of the League alternative. Occasionally, his rhetorical excesses 
embarrassed the reformers. He explained away a hasty call to arms in the middle of the 
election campaign, but rarely restrained himself when predicting the inevitable downfall 
o f the ring. In a campaign speech in early August, he attempted to wrap the League in 
the banner o f municipal reform and to identify it with the commission plan. “What is 
the universal cry for the commission in New Orleans,” he said, “but a verdict of the 
people that the ring has made the old form of government abominable? What is the 
half-hearted adoption of that cry by the ring but a . .  confession that it has failed?” He 
continued with a declaration of the purity of League motives. “Our motive is not office;
32 Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 195-205; New Orleans Daily 
Picayune, July 19,1912,1; Fitzmorris, “Pro Bono Publico,” 101-103.
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it is to enlarge the political freedom and the commercial greatness o f our.. .  city and 
state.”33
Machine orators took a more cynical view of the League intentions. They 
pointed out that Caffery had been a political candidate before and that his recent move 
to New Orleans demonstrated political opportunism. In addition, League supporters 
were hardly political newcomers. At the same time that Caffery was telling the crowd 
that League motives did not include office, he was also extolling the support o f  Edgar 
M. Cahn, a veteran of the reform fight of 1904. Dr. Henry D. Bruns, a close associate of 
John M. Parker, addressed a League rally with the words, “This looks like old tim es.” 
Bruns was in a position to know. A League spokesman had introduced him as a man 
“who has been fighting [along with] the reform movements for the last twenty-five 
years.”34
The leadership of the Good Government League in New Orleans reflected its 
bias toward the business and professional classes. An executive committee of ten  
included seven attorneys and three men of commerce. At the ward level, the League 
showed a more varied leadership. There were three attorneys and five men of 
commerce, but there were also two clerks, a worker for the city, a contractor, a druggist, 
a hotelier, and a car repairer. The leadership of the Regular organization generally held 
government jobs, ranging from U.S. Congressman to clerk for the mayor. Only five
33 Daily Picayune, August 21, 1912,6.
34 Daily Picayune, August 21, 1912, 6; Matthew J. Schott, “Progressives Against 
Democracy: Electoral Reform in Louisiana, 1894-1921,” 251.
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ward leaders, for example, held positions outside of government employment. These 
included a publisher (Robert Ewing), a saloon-keeper, a transportation executive, a 
grocer, and a contractor.35
League partisans traded charges with ring supporters on a number o f issues 
during the campaign, but questions o f patronage frequently arose. Good Government 
leaders viewed the machine as insatiable in its appetite for jobs. Colonel Ewing,
Regular boss in the Tenth Ward, had particular influence in obtaining positions for his 
constituents, a talent that League members held up as an example of the evils of 
machine rule. But supporters of the League were not ignorant o f the possibilities for 
patronage. Governor Hall had distributed some jobs to the League forces and they 
pressed for more during the campaign.
Donelson Caffery demonstrated the League’s ambivalence regarding patronage 
issues during a precinct rally in the Tenth Ward. He condemned Ewing’s influence in 
obtaining patronage and held up the machine’s treatment o f  Joseph Generelly as an 
example of ring duplicity. Yet in response to a question about jobs from a resident of 
the ward, Caffery said that “the Good Government League may rest assured that they
35 Names of ward leaders were obtained from newspaper accounts o f the 
election. Occupations were those listed in the New Orleans City Director for 1912. The 
composition of the reform leadership (i.e., the executive committee and the state 
organizers) tends to support the conclusions of Samuel P. Hays regarding the origins of 
municipal reform. However, the occupations of the reform ward leaders suggests a 
wider base of reform leadership than is at first apparent. For insights into the origins of 
urban reform see Samuel P. Hays, “The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in 
the Progressive Era,” 157-169 and James Weinstein, “Organized Business and the City 
Commission and Manager Movements,” Journal o f Southern History, 28 (May 1962): 
166-182.
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will be remembered in this regard.” A few minutes later, as reported by the Daily 
Picayune, Caffery promised the assembly that “after September 3 [the date o f the 
election for District Attorney] the city will be run as any corporation on a business basis 
strictly.” The Good Government League may have believed its own rhetoric regarding 
government jobs, but patronage issues proved troublesome from the beginning of the 
campaign. An executive committee of League members assigned potential jobs and 
allocated places on the reform ticket, a process remarkably similar to that of the Regular 
caucus. Some members complained that the process passed over hard-working League 
loyalists. Such disputes were not unique to the League, but the occurrence of patronage 
arguments in the Good Government ranks undercut the righteous oratory condemning 
the practices of the Regulars.36
Under the instructions of the League’s Executive Committee, the Fifth Ward 
received the position o f Criminal Sheriff on the ticket. John Cruso won rank and file 
support for the nomination, but the leadership would not support his candidacy because 
of the opposition of the Times-Democrat. “We can’t afford to invite such opposition,” 
commented a League spokesman, “and Cruso will be replaced.” Cruso operated a 
saloon in which gambling was reported to take place in an upper room. During the state 
campaign, a Regular spokesman charged that Cruso had gone over to the League 
because the Mayor insisted on enforcing anti-gambling laws. In a similar manner, Dr. 
John T. Jones, physician for the longshoremen’s and screwmen’s organization, learned
36 Daily Picayune, August 10, 1912, 3; July 18, 1912, 3.
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that League would not back him for the position o f coroner. Two weeks before the 
parochial elections, the Daily Picayune reported additional disputes within the League 
ranks. “There had been considerable dissatisfaction among the leaders and their 
followers regarding the jobs and in some wards there were threats o f disaffections.” 
Harry Moumey, speaking on behalf of the Regulars, addressed a meeting of Seventh 
Ward loyalists and refuted “the idea that [Good Government League candidates] were 
running for offices for honor and uplift of the city affairs.” J. C. Hicks, described as a 
“convert from former reform movements,” said that League members were “largely a 
bunch of office-seekers.” Behrman echoed these assessments of the reformers and 
dismissed them as “the outs wanting to get in.”37
Searching for an effective issue, Caffery accused the machine of financial 
impropriety in its dealings with the Sewerage and Water Board. The proceeds from a 
bond issue had been deposited in two New Orleans banks; officers of the institutions 
included prominent machine supporters Charles Janvier and Sol Wexler. However, the 
Board of Liquidation, a blue-ribbon panel which included many League supporters, had 
approved of the financial arrangements. Most members of the Sewerage and Water 
Board and the Board of Liquidation joined Mayor Behrman in condemning Caffery’s 
charges.38
37 Daily Picayune, July 18, 1912, 3; August 18, 1912,3, 8; August 14,1912, 3; 
August 21, 1912, 6; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, xxii.
38 Daily Picayune, August 11,1912,6; August 13,1912, 4. Although some pro- 
League members of the Boards were not enthusiastic about criticizing Caffery, most 
went along with the Mayor.
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In the midst of the heated parochial campaign, the public lost sight o f the 
pending vote on the commission plan. The city’s newspapers predicted a low turnout in 
the ratification vote and voiced concern that under such circumstances a minority could 
reject the commission government. Editorials warned against overconfidence among 
commission supporters, and the League and the regulars traded charges over the 
sincerity of each group’s work for ratification. The Daily Picayune reminded readers 
that the plan put before the voters was not the bill that the League had proposed in the 
state legislature, but the newspaper agreed with the argument of the Regulars that the 
Good Government League bill had been constitutionally inadequate. The editorial 
urged support for the commission plan, stating that it included all the main features 
needed for effective government. On the day before the ratification vote, another 
editorial repeated arguments in favor of commission government, including the 
assertion that the new form would result in the election o f “the best men for the office” 
and would reduce “ward influences and the old time conditions.”39
The result of the ratification vote proved that fears of a low turnout were 
justified, but the plan won by a wide margin. Out of approximately twenty-six thousand 
voters, the commission plan triumphed by ratio of more than eleven to one. Wards 
Three and Fifteen, strongholds of the Regulars, supported the plan by nearly twelve to 
one; the pro-League Twelfth and Fourteenth wards voted in favor by a ratio o f about ten
39 Daily Picayune, August 9, 1912, 8; August 15, 1912, 8; August 17, 1912, 6; 
August 20, 1912, 7; August 25,1912. On the reformers point regarding the election of 
“good men” as office holders, see Weinstein, “Organized Business,” 173.
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to one. Downtown support was slightly higher than the uptown wards, but the 
overwhelmingly favorable vote indicated strong support from all political factions.40
The vote for parochial offices followed the commission vote by one week. The 
three-way race for District Attorney had attracted the most attention, but voters selected 
from among candidates for thirteen offices, school board seats, and parish Democratic 
committeemen. Only Caffery came close to defeating the machine candidate, assisted 
by the Generelly-Luzenberg split. The machine majority in other races averaged four to 
six thousand votes. Caffery stated that the patronage practices of the ring caused his 
defeat and suggested after the election that the state should adopt an amendment to its 
constitution disenfranchising city officials and workers. Turnout increased when 
compared to the commission election; over thirty-six thousand New Orleanians 
participated in the parochial vote, but even this figure was lower than the governor’s 
race held earlier in the year. Observers blamed the three thousand vote drop off on the 
summer heat and the absence of many voters. League partisans claimed that at least two 
thousand of the city’s “prominent people” were on vacation and that if the election has 
been in October Caffery would have triumphed. Other League supporters blamed 
Governor Hall for the ring victory, claiming that “if the distribution of the state places 
had been made more promptly, it would have helped the parish fight.” A candidate who 
lost in the parochial contest added, “I think they ought to hurry up with the jobs.”41
40 Daily Picayune, August 29,1912, 1.
41 Daily Picayune, September 5,1912, 1,3, 7, 8; September 6,1912, 3; 
Fitzmorris, “Pro bono Publico,” 114-116.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
372
Voters of New Orleans faced another election in one month. According to the 
terms o f the commission plan, an election would be held in early October to select a 
mayor and four commissioners. All would be elected at large, and both the Regulars 
and the League would offer full slates of candidates. Although the ring had won the 
parochial elections, the commission plan seemed particularly suited to reform 
candidates. Prominent businessman and reform advocate J. F. Coleman expressed 
confidence in the outcome of the municipal elections in spite of the earlier results. The 
leadership of the League met immediately after the parochial elections to select a slate 
for the commission contest. While the Good Government League and the ring decided 
on candidates, the newspaper printed rumors of dissatisfaction among League 
supporters. Although Joseph Generelly declared allegiance to the reform organization, 
the League suffered from the defection of other ward and precinct organizers. Within a 
week o f the election, newspapers printed accounts of League members' overtures to the 
ring. “It was stated yesterday that a number of League men who are disappointed and 
alarmed about getting nothing through the League have been to the Regulars recently 
and offered to come over with all their friends for a consideration of getting something 
in the deal.”42
John Cruso, denied a place on the League’s parochial ballot, announced his 
decision to join the ring; many precinct leaders followed his example. Cruso explained 
his decision as the result of a patronage dispute. He complained of the League’s lack of
42 Daily Picayune, September 6, 1912, 3; September 12,1912, 3.
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effective organization, the defection of Parker, and the failure o f the leadership to follow 
through on promises of jobs. The account o f the Daily Picayune was more colorful. 
“Cruso [has] decided to leave the League after having failed to secure any of the plums, 
peaches, and apricots promised him, and getting a box of lemons.” League troubles 
were not limited to Cruso’s Fifth Ward. A dispute in the Eighth Ward caused ill 
feelings among League supporters and increased defections. W.R. McCarthy, leader of 
the League in the Eleventh Ward, also joined the Regulars. He complained of bad 
management within the reform group and o f its failure to follow through on patronage 
promises. In addition, Edward Nulty, Good Government League president of the Tenth 
Ward, joined the ring. There were some defections of ring members to the ranks o f the 
League, but no ward leaders of the machine went over to the other side.43
Publicity surrounding the commission plan emphasized the parallels between 
business and efficient government. The identification of commissioners with business 
practice put a premium on selection of candidates with business backgrounds. The close 
race for District Attorney and the strong vote for the commission plan convinced 
Regular leaders that the organization should draw its candidates from among city 
businessmen. Regular leaders sought to avoid possible League charges of a politicized 
commission by precluding city officials from seeking commission posts. Although 
Behrman would lead the ticket as candidate for mayor, no other individual associated 
with the ring’s political leadership would run for commissioner. The discipline o f the
43 Daily Picayune, September 13,1912, 3; September 14,1912, 3; September 15, 
1912, 5.
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machine enabled its leaders to enforce such a decision. Otto Briede, a Ewing loyalist 
from the Tenth Ward, was City Treasurer, and sought Ewing’s support to run for 
commissioner. Briede reasoned that since he was not a ward leader, he should be 
allowed to contest for a commission seat. But the caucus had “determined on the course 
of eliminating active politicians. Mr. Briede could not see the point, but that was the 
leader’s ultimatum.”44
On Thursday, September 19, less than two weeks before the election, the Good 
Government League announced its choices for mayor and commissioners. A committee 
of sixty ratified the selections of the Executive Committee and presented the names to 
the public. The ticket reflected the reform antecedents of the League and the 
commission system’s emphasis on business experience. Charles F. Claiborne led the 
ticket as candidate for mayor. He was a descendant o f the first governor o f Louisiana 
and a prominent city lawyer. Claiborne confidently predicted victory by three thousand 
votes. He stated, “I am not a politician,” but admitted to frequent participation in prior 
reform movements. He had served as councilman during the reform administration of 
Mayor Shakspeare and returned to the council in 1896 during the administration of 
reform mayor Walter Flower and the Citizen’s League. The four commission 
candidates o f  the League had similar political backgrounds, although all were 
businessmen as well. Louis Pfister had been active in the drive for public ownership of 
utilities and served on the city council with Claiborne during the Flower adm inistration.
44 Daily Picayune, September 16, 1912, 3. The account emphasizes the role 
played by Ewing, regular leader of the Tenth Ward in spite of his earlier defection.
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George M. Leahy had also served on the reform council, and Andrew McShane was a 
member of the Fire Board during the same administration. Only Oscar Schumert lacked 
a political connection with previous reform efforts. He was President of Fidelity 
Homestead Association, but retained strong contacts with organized labor.45
The Regulars announced their ticket the following day. As expected, Behrman 
lead the ticket as mayoral candidate: he predicted a regular victory of seven thousand 
votes. The other four members, though, were newcomers to Regular electoral politics. 
Determined to avoid the appearance of politics as usual, the ring demonstrated its ability 
to attract prominent members of the community and to offer a business slate of its own. 
W. B. Thompson was a Behrman favorite, who had offered the Mayor crucial support in 
1908. A graduate of Columbia University and a four-time President of the New Orleans 
Cotton Exchange, he had served the city on both the Public Belt Railroad Commission 
and the Dock Board. His social contacts included membership in the Boston, Pickwick, 
and the Southern Yacht Clubs.
The other regular choices were nearly as impressive. Harold W. Newman was 
also a lawyer turned businessman, an expert in stocks and bonds. A graduate o f Tulane 
University, he was president of the New Orleans Stock Exchange and of the Young 
Men’s Hebrew Association. E.E. Lafaye, although only thirty-two years old, was a 
respected businessman and land developer. The fourth member of the commission
45 Profiles of the League candidates were printed in the Daily Picayune, 
September 19,1912, 1. Candidates endorsed by the paper were given more complete 
coverage on subsequent days.
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ticket was A.G. Ricks, a Confederate veteran over seventy years old. Ricks, ironically, 
had served on the city council with Claiborne and other members o f the League ticket, 
but had broken with the reform elements. He was connected to the city’s brewing 
industry and served on the boards o f several financial institutions.46
The composition of Behrman’s ticket caused problems for League strategists.
The regular candidates were not ward leaders nor city department heads; their business 
credentials were as impressive as, or exceeded, those o f the reform group’s candidates. 
Only Mayor Behrman remained a plausible target. He was the leader of the machine 
and the embodiment of its patronage arrangements; yet the voters had already shown 
their support for Behrman in two previous mayoral elections. To be successful, the 
League needed issues other than the Mayor’s political connections. Donelson Caffery 
attempted to turn the public against Behrman with charges of public corruption. He 
held meetings with a New York detective who had exposed the New York City machine 
and invited him to come to New Orleans.' Behrman diffused the issue, though, by 
welcoming any investigation.47
At the time of the municipal elections, the Regulars had controlled city 
government for twelve years; Behrman had served eight years as mayor. Unfortunately 
for the League, the city administration was responsible for impressive public 
improvements in the areas of drainage, public utilities, promotion o f commerce,
46 For descriptions of the regular ticket, see the Daily Picayune, September 20, 
1912,1,6.
47 Daily Picayune, September 19, 1912, 1.
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sanitation, and public health. The League might have claimed that the ring operated the 
city inefficiently, or that patronage raised the cost o f improvements, but it could not 
question the evidence that New Orleanians saw every day. The Regulars made use of 
their achievements by showing films of the improvements during public rallies. One 
advertisement in the Daily Picayune promised “free admission, fine music, and no 
speeches” while the audience would view moving pictures of public improvements 
constructed during Behrman’s tenure.48
The Daily Picayune enthusiastically endorsed Behrman for mayor. During the 
two weeks before the election, it printed numerous articles about the city’s progress. 
Although it backed two League candidates for commission seats, it supported two 
Regulars as well. Reports of campaign speeches showed a repeat of League rhetoric 
about the evils of machine rule and pleas to the voters to recall the reform victories of 
previous years. But the League failed to identify its ticket with the newly-adopted 
commission plan or to build any public case that only a reform group could govern 
effectively under the new municipal structure. The commission plan was in place after 
legislative action and a referendum by the voters, but the city’s political alignments 
showed no change from the pattern of the previous two or three decades.49
On October 1, Behrman and the entire Regular ticket easily defeated the League 
candidates. The Mayor’s prediction of a 7,000 vote margin proved modest; the results
48 Robert W. Williams, “Martin Behrman: Mayor and Political Boss o f New 
Orleans, 1904-1926;” Daily Picayune, September 20,1912, 3.
49 Daily Picayune, September 21, 1912, 6
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showed a Behrman majority of over 9,000. The only bright spot for the League was the 
showing of Andrew McShane, who ran ahead of Claiborne in every ward and polled the 
highest total of any reform candidate since the 1890's. Nevertheless, League members 
were shocked at the magnitude of the defeat; one called it “not a defeat” but “a 
massacre.” Post-election comment speculated on the future of the League and the 
reasons for its poor showing. Spokesmen for the reform group announced that they had 
drawn up a charter to make the organization permanent, but realistic members assumed 
that the League would die out as a result of the lost election. One member commented, 
“They talk of charters and keeping the thing alive. That sounds nice in the official 
journals, but it is all bunk. We are dead.” The Daily Picayune pointed out that the 
reform vote had not increased since the 1904 election. League strategists consistently 
overestimated their support, causing one election authority to state, “The whole trouble 
is that some people have the idea they can win without votes.”50
The defeat o f the League resulted from several factors: the unity of the 
Regulars, weak support from the Governor, the defection of Parker, lack of issues, the 
flexibility of the Regulars, and a failure to translate the commission victory into a 
mandate for new politicians as well as a new structure. The flexibility and pragmatism 
inherent in Behrman’s view of politics allow the Regulars to coopt both the idea of 
commission government and the climate of change. Voters could see no reason for 
replacing a successful and popular mayor. A League member, in enumerating reasons
50 Daily Picayune, October 2, 1912,1,6; October 3,1912, 1, 3.
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for his organization’s defeat, paid reluctant tribute to Behrman. Claiborne, he said, was 
not the man “to lead this movement against a progressive like Behrman. Yes, I say 
progressive. He is one. He is a ringster, if you will, but he is a progressive. I give that.” 
Behrman parlayed that combination into five victories for mayor.51
The voters of New Orleans knew that progressive reform did not require the 
adoption of a commission plan. Such reform was well under way by the time the Good 
Government League seized upon the commission idea. The change in governmental 
form promoted by the reform element was an effort to promote political change—the 
overthrow of the Regulars—not policy change. Voters chose the Regulars because that 
faction, under Behrman’s able leadership, had successfully guided the city’s consensus 
in favor of progressive civic development.
The League’s effort to reform New Orleans politics had not been a total failure.
In its two years of operation, the Good Government League had achieved many of its 
objectives. The voters chose a League-backed candidate for governor, the legislature 
passed a series o f laws revising election procedures, and the citizens of New Orleans 
adopted a commission form o f government. But the League did not defeat bossism.
The Regular Democrats o f New Orleans accepted the new form of city government, kept 
their organization intact, and soundly defeated League candidates for municipal office. 
For New Orleanians, the adoption of a municipal commission altered the structure of 
their government, but the Good Government League did not transform institutional
51 Daily Picayune, October 3, 1912, 3; Chudacoff, The Evolution o f  American 
Urban Society, 161.
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reform into electoral victory. The city was the largest in the country to attempt 
commission rule at that time. But the power and flexibility of the New Orleans machine 
enabled it to accept structural reform in government, while retaining its electoral 
superiority. Until the reformers understood and practiced the exercise o f political 
power, the machine would control the government o f New Orleans.52
52 Rice, Progressive Cities, 113-125; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 
316. The pragmatism and flexibility of the New Orleans Regulars regarding 
commission government was not unique. Boss Crump of Memphis “solidified his grip 
on Memphis” after than city adopted commission government in 1909. The 
organization of Tom Dennison in Omaha similarly adjusted to the new form of 
government in 1912 by running candidates and “dominating that body for the machine’s 
benefit.” See Chudacoff, The Evolution o f  American Urban Society, 161-162.
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CONCLUSION
The victory o f Martin Behrman in the 1912 mayoral election marked a renewal 
of commission government in New Orleans, once tried in the Reconstruction era. In 
early 1913, in an address to the Society of Economics at Tulane University, Behrman 
spoke about the commission form of government as an experiment. He was uncertain 
about its future and expressed some skepticism about its efficacy in large cities. But the 
Mayor’s third term proved that he, and the Regular organization, could adapt to the new 
structure, continue to win elections, and persist in the progressive policies started at the 
turn of the century. By 1916, no serious political opposition to the Mayor had emerged, 
and he easily won yet another term. It would be four years later, in the election of 1920, 
that Behrman, after four terms as mayor, lost to a reform candidate. After years of 
opposition to Behrman and the state Regulars, John M. Parker won the governor’s 
office early in 1920. With his assistance, along with a breakdown in the normally 
efficient Choctaw organization, Andrew McShane defeated Behrman, and the reform 
faction enjoyed its first mayoral victory in the twentieth century.1
1 Behrman, An Address by Honorable Martin Behrman, Mayor o f  New Orleans, 
Louisiana, Made at Invitation o f Society o f  Economics, 8-9; Schott, “John M. Parker,”
317-408. For a thorough account of the Behrman administrations under the commission 
government, 1912-1920, see Fitzmorris, “Pro Bono Publico,” 136-448.
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The third and fourth terms of Martin Behrman followed the patterns set in his 
first two terms. In spite of considerable progress, New Orleans had not conquered its 
substantial problems. Street paving, general sanitation, and regulation o f street 
railroads and other utilities remained difficult, i f  not intractable, issues. Public 
resources were meager in the best of times, and the city discovered no solution to the 
constant demand for greater revenue. But the three major civic reforms of the early 
progressive era continued to thrive.
The Sewerage and Water Board made excellent progress on the water, sewerage, 
and drainage systems during 1899-1912, but additional work remained. Connections 
between residential property and the new systems occurred slowly. Not until 1925 did 
sewer connections exceed ninety percent. Subsurface drainage and an extensive 
network of canals gradually improved the ability o f  the Board to remove rain water 
from the streets, but the capacity of the city’s pumps limited the effectiveness of the 
system. New, higher capacity pumps provided the answer, and, by 1925, pumps 
handled 13,000 cubic feet of water per second. By the same year, investment in the 
infrastructure reached $30,000,000—nearly double the original estimate.2
The first decade of the reorganized Port o f New Orleans saw consolidation o f the 
Dock Board’s authority, an enormous building program, and the beginnings of 
important public facilities. The second decade expanded publicly-owned facilities, 
including the completion of the public cotton warehouse, the building of a public grain
2 The Waterworks, Sewerage and Drainage System o f  New Orleans, n.p..
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elevator, and the construction of special facilities for handling bananas, coffee, coal, and 
lumber. Total tonnage handled by the port doubled from 5,000,000 tons in 1912 to 
10,000,000 tons in 1920. By 1925, tonnage reached over 14,000,000 tons. By the early 
1920s, the Dock Board completed the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal linking the 
Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain. These accomplishments occurred against a 
backdrop of political intrigue. In spite of the Dock Board’s supposed isolation from 
politics, wholesale changes in the membership of the Dock Board took place in 1916, 
1919, and 1921.3
The Public Belt Railroad also thrived after the adoption o f commission 
government, although the city and the Public Belt Railroad Commission fought to 
establish authority immediately following the 1912 election. The courts upheld the 
independence o f the Commission, and the commercial exchanges continued their 
influence over its membership. The bureaucratic battles did not stop belt road 
expansion. In 1912, it consisted of twenty-eight miles o f track; by 1925, it had 
expanded to eighty-two miles. The railroad operated seven locomotives in 1912 and 
sixteen in 1925. Tracks and switching locomotives served not only the Mississippi 
River wharves, but also the new industrial and transportation sites along the Inner 
Harbor Navigation Canal. In 1921, the Constitution of the State o f Louisiana authorized 
the New Orleans Public Belt Railroad Commission to take responsibility for a railroad
3 Cass, Facts o f  Interest about the Port o f  New Orleans, 18-21; Port Handbook 
o f  New Orleans, 8, 11.
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and automobile bridge across the Mississippi River, though the great project did not 
reach completion until a decade later.4
The three public works projects did not exclusively depend upon the city 
government for finances or leadership during the period 1912 to 1920. Behrman served 
as president o f the Sewerage and Water Board and as president o f the Public Belt 
Railroad Commission, and he took an active interest in both entities. Though not a 
member of the Dock Board, the Mayor often advised the governor regarding 
appointments to that body. The reasons for Behrman’s defeat in 1920 had little to do 
with his leadership in the areas o f public works or substantive policy disagreements.
The 1920 election replayed most of the themes of New Orleans political factionalism: 
antagonism o f reformers toward the boss system, calls for efficiency in government, and 
reform o f registration and voting procedures.
A new, state-level reform organization—the Democratic Liberty League-joined 
with a city reform group—the Orleans Democratic Association—to oppose the Choctaw 
Regulars in 1920. Behrman had reason to fear the Orleans Democratic Association. 
Unlike previous attempts at unseating the Regulars, the 1920 reform movement 
compromised ideological purity in favor of practical politics. Among the members o f 
the new association were found not only uptown reformers and commercial leaders, but 
also disaffected Choctaws and ward bosses. John Patrick Sullivan, a former prominent 
Choctaw, who had broken with the organization in 1913, eagerly led the Orleans
4 The Behrman Administration: Work Accomplished During the Eight Years. .., 
6-7; Port Handbook o f  New Orleans, 42-43.
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Democratic Association. By election time, he was joined by Robert Ewing, once more 
an apostate from the Regular cause. Behrman’s long tenure in office, and the decrease 
in the number of elective offices under the new commission system, frustrated 
ambitious Regulars, some of whom aspired to municipal office. Adding to Behrman’s 
troubles, Governor Rufus Pleasant opposed Behrman, and, in 1919, had begun a 
program to reduce the Mayor’s influence over local patronage.s
Behrman also faced two other negative factors in the election of 1920. Never a 
favorite of the social control advocates of progressivism, the Mayor had refused 
repeated requests to close Storyville. What uptown reformers and Baptist ministers 
could not accomplish, however, the United States government did; in 1917, Storyville 
was shut down, declared a moral hazard to military installations in the New Orleans 
area. Yet the closing o f the official district did not end the vice associated with it. 
Behrman received the blame, and in the months before the 1920 election, his 
administration drew the ire of local newspapers. One paper printed a lurid series of 
articles on the supposed corruption of young New Orleans schoolgirls. Behrman also 
suffered from the natural decline in electoral support for an administration that had been 
in power for so long a time. In spite of all the disadvantages, however, Behrman 
almost won a fifth term. The sixteen-year incumbent lost by 1,450 votes out o f  more 
than 44,000 cast. Behrman attributed the defeat to three causes. He was ill for part of
5 Fitzmorris, “Pro Bono Publico,” 465-490; Bodet, “Sixteen years of Enemies is 
a Lot o f Them,” paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Louisiana Historical 
Association, 1992, 3; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, One measure o f  John P. 
Sullivan’s talents was his ascent to national office in the Elks at the age of 35.
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the campaign and lost valuable time recuperating in Biloxi. He blamed Parker for 
hypocritical use of patronage to defeat the Regulars, particularly jobs controlled by the 
dock Board. And Behrman recognized the inevitable accumulation of enemies over the 
course o f his four mayoral terms. “No matter what you do in public office,” Behrman 
later recalled, “you still make enemies. Sixteen years of enemies is a lot o f them.”6
Behrman did not retire quietly to his Algiers home. He won election to the state 
constitutional convention in 1921 and waited for an opportunity to vindicate his record. 
Some satisfaction arrived in 1922 when his long-time antagonists at the New Orleans 
Item became disillusioned with the performance of the new mayor, Andrew McShane. 
The Item also broke with Governor Parker for his refusal to carry out a promised civil 
service bill. Behrman began to write a series o f columns for the Item detailing his 
political career, which also had the effect o f keeping his name before the public. 
Although he retired as chair of the Regular organization, Behrman remained active in 
the caucus. When a fight over the Regular leadership of the Fourteenth Ward caused a 
split in the organization, Behrman stepped in and reasserted his authority. At the same 
time that Behrman consolidated his power, public attitudes towards the reformers began 
to parallel those of the former mayor. The good intentions o f the reforms was not
6 Bodet, “Sixteen Years of Enemies is a Lot of them,” 10-11; Devore and 
Logsdon, Crescent City Schools, 164; Herman Deutsch, “La Politique,” in Chase, et. al., 
Citoyens, Progres et Politique de la Nouvelle Orleans, 1889-1964 (New Orleans: E. S. 
Upton, 1964); Fitzmorris, “Pro Bono Publico,” 488-515, Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  
New Orleans, 305-316; Williams, “Martin Behrman: Mayor and Political Boss o f New 
Orleans, 1904-1926,” 118-130; Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 208-213. 
Fitzmorris provided slightly different election figures which put McShane’s majority at 
1,365.
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matched by a practical knowledge of politics nor by any apparent administrative 
abilities.7
The Regulars nominated Behrman for a fifth term in late 1924. His enthusiastic 
supporters adopted the slogan, “Papa’s Coming Home!” to welcome him back to the 
campaign trail. He faced two other candidates: Paul Maloney, who had split from the 
Regulars, and Mayor McShane. In a spirited contest, the Times-Picayune% and the Daily 
States endorsed Maloney, but the Item, though an adversary o f Behrman for years, 
endorsed the former Mayor. Behrman’s platform promised to deliver what McShane 
had failed to provide, particularly street paving, and pledged an ambitious transportation 
program that included bridges across the Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain. He 
also advocated development of the New Orleans lakefront, better regulation of private 
utilities, and enlargement o f City Park. In the first ballot, Behrman received 35, 837 
votes. He outpolled Maloney by slightly more than 2,000 votes, but failed to obtain a 
majority. McShane’s vote was only 4,654. Unable to sustain an additional election 
against Behrman, and discouraged by reports o f his supporters going over to the side o f 
the former Mayor, Maloney withdrew and Behrman won election. The headlines
7 Schott, “John M. Parker,” 385-387; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f  New Orleans, 
320; Fitzmorris, “Pro Bono Publico,” 618-633.
8 The Times-Democrat and the Daily Picayune had merged operations in 1914, 
creating the Times-Picayune.
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proclaimed “Papa’s Back,” but his return last barely eight months. He took the oath of 
office in early May, 1925, and died on January 12, 1926.9
Behrman and the Regular Democrats dominated New Orleans political and civic 
life during the first two decades of the twentieth century. The southern variety of 
national progressivism flourished in New Orleans during that time because of, not in 
spite of, the leadership of a political machine. In an era of increased specialization and 
organizational development, the New Orleans Regulars honed the skills o f professional 
politicians, who knew how to win elections for the purpose of gaining power, and public 
administrators, who knew how to use power in order to effectively run government. 
Their skills brought New Orleans into the new century by nurturing a consensus in favor 
of progressive civic development. The consensus promoted the construction of much- 
needed public services, the reconstruction of the city’s docks, enhancement of the 
municipal economy, and improvements in transportation, education, and public health. 
New forms of government mobilized public finance, public administration, and the 
assistance of professional expertise in the service of the progressive agenda.
The reform faction of New Orleans deserves credit for advocating and, in some 
instances, initiating the legislation that encouraged municipal progress. During the 
years that followed the takeover of city government by the Regulars, the reform faction
9 Deutsch, “La Politique,” in Chase, et. al., Citoyens. . .  ; Kemp, Martin 
Behrman o f  New Orleans, 335-341; Fitzmorris, “Pro Bono Publico,” 637-670. The 
election cycle differed from earlier contests due to a change in state law, which sought 
to move the New Orleans mayoral election from proximity to the governor’s race.
Thus, McShane’s term was extended, and Behrman was elected to a term that would 
have extended to 1930.
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claimed such credit in urging its return to power. There is no way o f knowing whether 
or not the reformers would have been successful implementers of the progressive 
policies. But their record, in office and in opposition, suggested that the reformers were 
uncomfortable with political power, suspicious of democracy, and less than attentive to 
the details of public administration. Even when holding political office, reformers could 
not transcend their view on the necessity of disinterested officials. Independent boards 
and commissions provided the bridge between their uncertainties and the necessities o f 
modem governance. The reformers occasionally attempted to copy the Regular 
organization, but in their commitment to oppose patronage, reformers cut off their 
leadership from the practical side of power and administration. In its organization, the 
League fell far short o f what was necessary for political permanence The contribution o f 
the reformers to New Orleans, apart from their advocacy of progressive policies while in 
office 1896 to 1900, consisted mainly of mobilizing support for the community 
consensus for progressive civic development.
The Regular administrations by no means solved all of the city’s problems, nor 
were all aspects of national progressivism adopted. But New Orleans in 1912 was a far 
more modem city than the New Orleans of 1896. The New Orleans Regulars were not 
reluctant to seek political power, nor were they reticent about the practice of public 
administration. Weak on theory, they embraced pragmatism and flexibility. Alert to 
public opinion, the Regulars adopted progressive initiatives and adapted to evolving 
forms of governance. In the Regular organization, power flowed from patronage, the
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influence of the elected leadership, and its day-to-day connection with voters and the 
machinery of government. Most Regular leaders held offices that kept them in touch 
with voters and provided constant information useful to administration. Whether 
through boards, commissions, or new forms of municipal government, the Regulars 
persisted at the work necessary to transform New Orleans. By all sensible measures, 
that work involved progressive policies. New Orleans did not require a reform 
government to adopt those policies.
The progressive civic consensus of 1896-1912 transformed New Orleans, mainly 
as a result of the public works projects initiated and implemented by both political 
factions. The new sewerage, water, and drainage systems improved public health, 
enhanced the appearance of and quality of life in the city, and, most o f all, secured a 
stable public health environment. No longer would the yellow fever pose a threat to the 
city’s inhabitants. Increased drainage capacity also allowed the expansion of the city, 
especially to the north, towards Lake Pontchartrain, and to the east, along the route o f 
Bayou Gentillly. Although significant residential development in those areas would not 
take place until after World War I and later, the city’s new infrastructure made those 
new neighborhoods habitable.
The commercial developments along the river front similarly transformed the 
city. The work of the Dock Board cleared away the last remnants of the nineteenth 
century wharves and landings. The Board constructed modems sheds and docks along a 
new levee system. Responding to changing patterns o f international trade, the Board 
expanded the port and built special cargo facilities for the coffee, banana, and lumber
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trades. Asserting its full legal authority, the Board upheld public control o f the river 
front’s vital commercial assets and expanded the role o f public facilities with the 
construction of the Board-owned cotton warehouse, a grain elevator, and the Inner 
Harbor Navigation Canal.
The Dock Board’s interests extended to river front transportation and coincided 
with the efforts of the city to establish the Public Belt Railroad. The improvements at 
the port could not stand alone. Construction of the belt transfer system for cargo was a 
crucial ingredient in the transformation of the port. The New Orleans Public Belt 
Railroad assured that river front commerce, vastly expanded by the efforts of the Dock 
Board, would move easily among port facilities and between the docks and the various 
railroad lines serving the Crescent City. The Public Belt also preserved competition 
among the private railroads by preventing any one or more companies from securing 
favorable treatment in the port. As the business of the Public Belt grew, so did its 
responsibilities. Its tracks expanded as the port grew, spurs connected new industrial 
sites, and the Public Belt built the first railroad crossing of the Mississippi at New 
Orleans.
The policies leading to the transformation of the city in the years 1896 to 1912 
illustrated many of the tenets of southern progressivism: municipal reform, dependence 
upon experts, changes in voting laws, regulation of railroads, economic development, 
new forms of governance, public health, and promotion of education. New Orleans also 
joined the ranks of cities which adopted the commission form of government, a reform 
which embodied the quintessential progressive elements. Less laudably, the city
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conformed to southern progressivism by operating a government “for whites only” in 
which blacks lost the right to vote and suffered the indignities of a solidly .Tim Crow 
society.
Among the wide range of progressive era initiatives, the New Orleans city 
government-under the control of Regular Democrats for most of the period— embraced 
most with enthusiasm and resisted only those associated with strict control of behavior, 
such as prohibition and suppression o f gambling. The avoidance o f strictures on 
personal behavior did not disqualify the Regulars from inclusion among the ranks of 
southern progressives. No southern or national progressive embodied every single 
notion of the movement. In spite o f an inclination for historians to posit a necessary 
connection between reform elements and progressivism, the evidence clearly shows that 
the city’s Regular Democrats were responsible for the New Orleans progressive civic 
consensus. The Regulars were members of the machine, bosses, and “ringsters,” but 
they were also southern progressives.
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